Report No. 73
3.3. Existing provisions in the Limitation Act not enough.-
As to excluding the time taken in the criminal proceedings in question, the existing provisions in the Limitation Act, 1963-sections 14 and 15(1) which are nearest to the matter under consideration1-do not appear to cover the situation under consideration. Section 14 provides for the exclusion of time taken in a proceeding prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. The present is not a case falling within that category. Then, section 15(1) provides as follows:-
"15(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for the "execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded."
This provision is confined to stay resulting from an "injunction or order". View can be taken that the expression "injunction or order" does not cover legislative provisions or executive orders which bar the institution of suits or applications. The general view seems to be that contained in Rowland J's. observations2:-
"I do not think that it is necessary or that it would be good law to invoke a theory of suspension of limitation in any case in which suspension is not expressly provided for either in the Limitation Act or in some special Act."
This view is supported by the principle which has found recognition in section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963, namely, "3where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it"
Some doubt may also be expressed on the question whether section 15(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the execution of orders (as distinguished from the execution of decrees). In this position, an express provision for excluding the time spent on the criminal proceedings in question in the trial court, when computing the period of limitation for an application for execution by the wife, would appear to be needed.
1. Sections 14-15, Limitation Act, 1963.
2. Mahavir Prasad v. Bhupal Ram, AIR 1929 Pat 694 (700) (FB).
3. Section 9, Limitation Act, 1963.