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Pritam Singh v. State, 1950 SCR 543: AIR 1950 SC 169 (Fazl Ali, Patanjali Shastri, Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea and S.R. Das JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

The appellant was sentenced to death on the charge of murder by the Sessions Judge, Ferozepur. The High Court of Punjab upheld the conviction, and confirmed the sentence. In appeal, the Supreme Court found that the story of prosecution was supported by no less than five witnesses, was not incredible, or improbable, and had impressed four assessors and the two lower courts. Therefore, it would be against all principles and precedents, if the Supreme Court were to constitute itself into "a third court of facts" and after reweighing the evidence, to come to its own conclusions. The appeal was dismissed. The court rejected the contention of the counsel for the appellant that, once an appeal had been admitted by special leave, the entire case was at large, and the appellant could contest all the findings of facts and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court or trial court. It cited the observations of the Privy Council; (Ibrahim v. Rex, 1914 AC 599 (615): AIR 1914 PC 155) to the effect that the Privy Council had repeatedly treated application for leave to appeal and the appeal as being upon the same footings. Different standards could not be adopted at two different stages of the same case. The Supreme Court made the following observations regarding the scope of Article 136:-

On a careful examination of Article 136 alongwith the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible, a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this article. By virtue of this article, we can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal cases, in income-tax cases, in cases which come up before different kinds of tribunals and in a variety of other cases. The only uniform standard which in our opinion can be laid down in the circumstances is that Court should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases where special circumstances are shown to exist. The Privy Council have tried to lay down from time to time certain principles for granting special leave in criminal cases, which were reviewed by the Federal Court in Kapildeo v. King (AIR 37, 1950 FC 80: 51 Cr IJ 1057). It is sufficient for our purpose to say that though we are not bound to follow them too rigidly since the reasons,constitutional and administrative, which sometimes weigh with the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of those principles are useful as furnishing in many cases a sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court in granting special leave. Generally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. Since the present case does not in our opinion fulfil any of these conditions, we cannot interfere with the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must be dismissed."

Lachhman Singh v. State, 1952 SCR 839: AIR 1952 SC 167 (FazI Ali and Bose JJ.).

Appeal under Article 134 (1) (c).

The appellants were tried for murder and sentenced to transportation for life. The Punjab High Court upheld the conviction and the sentence. Before the Supreme Court, the value of the evidence as to the recovery of blood-stained clothes, at the instance of the appellants, was attacked, and the inference to be drawn from the post-mortem examination by the doctor (as to the time of the offence) was also pressed. The Supreme Court, however, pointed out, that these points had been put before the lower courts, and did not prevail with the High Court and the Court of Session, and that it was not a function of the Supreme Court to reassess the evidence and the argument on points of fact which did not prevail with the lower courts. The Supreme Court also did not find sufficient ground for interference.

Appeal disallowed.

Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1953 SCR 319: AIR 1953 SC 83 (135) paras. 20, 21 (Patanjali Shastri C.J., B. K. Mukherjea, Chandrashekher Aiyer, Bose and Ghulam Hasan

Appeal on a certificate granted under Article 132, as the case involved a substantial question of law to the interpretation of the Constitution (validity of the East-Punjab Cotton Cloth and Yarn) Order, 1947 in so far as it dealt with the export and import across the customs frontiers.

The appellant was convicted of an offence under the East-Punjab Cotton, etc., Order and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment by the hying Magistrate. Appeal to the Court of Session was dismissed, but the sentence was reduced. A revision to the High Court was dismissed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant did not succeed on the constitutional point. But counsel for one of the appellants craved leave to bring to the notice of the Court an important point which had resulted in grave miscarriage of justice; the courts below had relied on an admission alleged to have been made by the appellant that he was present at the customs barriers at Wagha. But actually there was no such admission by the appellant. The Supreme Court considered this point, and found that the record continued no such admission. It, therefore, directed rehearing of the appeal by the Sessions Judge on the other evidence; after excluding the admission.

Appeal allowed and rehearing ordered.

Kalawati v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1953 SCR 546: AIR 1953 SC 131 (Patanjali Shastri C.J., B.K. Mukherjea, Chandrashekhar Aiyer, Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ).

Appeal under 132, and also on certificate under Article 134 (1) (c).

The appellant Kalawati and the appellant Ranjit Singh were tried for the murder of Bikram Singh, the husband of Kalawati. The prosecution case was, that the two appellant had developed illicit intimacy with each other, and wished to get rid of Bikram Singh, because he was cruel in his behaviour to appellant Kalawati. Ranjit Singh, was charged under section 302, and Kalawati was charged under that section read with section 114 of the Penal Code. The Sessions Judge found Ranjit Singh guilty and sentenced him to death; he acquitted Kalawati of the offence under section 302, but found her guilty under section 201 as she had suppressed the evidence, screened Ranjit Singh and given false information in respect of the murder. She was sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment. Both appealed to the Judicial Commissioner, and the State also appealed against the acquittal of Kalawati on the charge of murder.

Appeal regarding Kalawati allowed in substance; sentence of Ranjit Singh reduced.

The Judicial Commissioner allowed Kalawati's appeal and set aside her conviction under section 201, but allowed the State's appeal against her and convicted her of murder under section 302, read with section 114, and sentenced her to transportation for life. Ranjit Singh's appeal was dismissed.

He, however, granted a certificate under Article 132 as a question of interpretation of Article 20(2) and (3) of the Constitution was involved. He also granted a certificate under Article 134(1)(c), on the ground that,since confirmation of a sentence of death was generally made by a Bench of two Judges, it was not fit and proper that the matter should rest with his own decision sitting singly.

The Supreme Court regarded the grant of certificate under Article 134 as not sound, and observed, that if there is only one Judicial Commissioner in a particular State, who is to confirm the sentence of death, the procedure laid down must be followed, and the fact that there was not a Bench of two Judges was not an adequate ground for converting the Supreme Court into an ordinary Court of appeal. But the Supreme Court heard the appeal on merits.

The Supreme Court found the case not proved beyond doubt against Kalawati, and thought that the plot was finally executed without her instigation, even though she might be aware of the intentions of Ranjit Singh. The Court also hesitated to act upon her confession, in view of certain weaknesses therein. However, the Court regarded her as guilty of the offence under section 201, since, after the occurrence, she gave a false version of dacoity. "The border-line between abetment of the offence and giving false information to screen the offender is rather thin in her case, but it is prudent to err on the safe side, and hold her guilty only of an offence under section 201, Penal Code, as the learned Sessions Judge did" The Court sentenced her to three years' rigorous imprisonment under section 201. As regards Ranjit Singh, the court dismissed his appeal on the merits, but substituted for the sentence of death the sentence of transportation for life, having regard to the time that had lapsed between occurrence of the offence and the decision of the Supreme Court, and also to the probable motive of prevention of cruelty to a helpless woman.

Tulsi Ram v. State, AIR 1954 SC 1 (Kania C.J., Patanjali Shastri and S.R. Das JJ.).

Appeal under Article 134(1)(a).

The appellant was tried for murder, but acquitted by Additional Sessions Judge, Bhandra. The High Court at Nagpur reversed the acquittal, and convicted him of murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered, that the case against the accused had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and observed that in an appeal under section 417, while the appellate court had full power to review the whole case, it must start with the realisation that an experienced judicial officer, sitting with four assessors had concluded that there was clearly reasonable doubt in respect of the guilt of the accused. The Supreme Court stated-'It therefore, requires good and sufficiently cogent reasons to overcome such reasonable doubt before the appellate courts come to a different conclusion.' After examining the evidence, the Supreme Court acquitted the accused.

Appeal allowed.

Muthuswami v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 4 (Fazl Ali, Mahajan and Bose JJ.)

Appeal not quoted in the judgment.

The appellant was convicted by the Court of Session of murder. He was sentenced to death. The High Court upheld the conviction, relying only on the confession of the accused. The Supreme Court felt, that in the circumstances of the case, the confession should not be believed. The High Court had relied upon the wealth of details in the confession as a safeguard of its truth, but the Supreme Court pointed out that the main features of the story given in the confession had not been tested. Further, the confession was retracted, and should ordinarily have required corroboration, which was wanting in this case. The accused was acquitted.

Appeal allowed.

Sadhu Singh v. State of PEPSU, AIR 1954 SC 271 (Mahajan, B. Mukherjee and Jagannath Dass JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

In this case, a Division Bench of the High Court of Patiala had confirmed the sentence of transportation of life passed against the appellant for murder. In the First Information Report, the version put forth was, that the gun of the accused had gone off by accident and killed the deceased. It was only later that the case was altered into one of intentional homicide. In view of this special circumstance which the appellate court had failed to appreciate, the Supreme Court felt that it should interfere,as otherwise a failure of justice would be occasioned. The appellant was held guilty of the offence under section 304A, and the sentence reduced to imprisonment already undergone.

Appeal allowed.

Nar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1955 SCR 238: AIR 1954 SC 457 (B.K. Mukherjea, Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ.).

Appeal under Article 134 (1) (c).

This case is important only for the decision that the expression "case" under Article 134(1)(c) means the case of each individual person, so that a certificate can be granted in respect of one person and refused in respect of another. On the merits, the appeal against the conviction under section 302 read with section 149 Indian Penal Code was dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Chamru Eudhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 652. (Mahajan C.J. and Bhagawati and Venkataran.a Ayyar JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

In this case, the Supreme Court altered the conviction of the accused under section 302 into one of a conviction under section 304 Indian Penal Code and altered the sentence of transportation for life into one of seven years' rigorous imprisonment, on the ground that the case fell within Exception IV to section 300.

Appeal allowed in part.

Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, 1955 1 SCR 1083: AIR 1955 SC 216 (B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das and Bose JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

Five persons, including the three appellants, were prosecuted for the murder of one R. Each was convicted and sentenced to death under section 302. In the appeal and in confirmation proceeding in the High Court, there was difference of opinion among the two Judges; Ali Khan J. held that the conviction should be maintained, but the sentence should be "commuted " to imprisonment for life, while Deshpande J. held that all the accused should be acquitted. The matter was referred to a third judge-P.J. Reddy J.,-who adjudged all the five to be guilty under section 302, and considered that the death sentence of the three appellants should be maintained, and those of the two other should be commuted to transportation for life. In accordance with the opinion of the third Judge,the sentences suggested by him were maintained, as well as the conviction. The High Court refused certificate for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted special leave.

Appeal allowed as regards conviction of one appellant and sentence of the other two.

The Supreme Court observed, that ordinarily, it would not have inquired into questions of fact; but as three persons were sentenced to death on the opinion of the third Judge, despite the opinion of the one Judge that the death sentence should not be imposed, and the opinion of the other Judge that the appellant were not guilty and should be acquitted, the Supreme Court deemed it advisable to examine the evidence.

After examining the evidence, it held, that so far as appellant Pandurang was concerned, he was liable only under section 326, Indian Penal Code, and inference of common intention to cause death should not be made in his case. Hence, the conviction was altered from one under sections 302 to 326 and the sentence was altered from death to imprisonment for ten years. As regards the other appellants, their convictions were maintained, but the sentence was reduced to transportation for life. The Supreme Court observed, that while it did not intend to fetter the discretion of the Judges in the matter of sentence, yet, when the appellate judges, who agreed on the question of guilt, differed on that of sentence, it was usual not to impose the death penalty unless there are compelling reasons.

Machander v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 792 (Bose, Jagan Nath Das and Sinha JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

The appellant was charged with the murder of one M and was convicted. This conviction was maintained by the High Court of Hyderabad on the facts of the case, which were very peculiar. The Supreme Court allowed his appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence (The sentence passed by the trial court is not stated in the judgment).

Appeal allowed.

In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the ill-will between the accused and the deceased, the suspicious conduct of the accused, and the fact that thirteen days after the murder, he knew that M had been murdered, and also knew where the murder had been committed and the body was hidden, were circumstances which could be said to point with equal suspicion at the other members of the accused's family. The brother of the appellant, though challenged in this case, was absconding and could not be traced. If the brother had committed the murder, it was possible that the accused, the appellant, had derived his knowledge of the murder, etc., from the brother. Soon after the arrest, the accused wanted to make a clean breast of everything, but the police waited six days before getting a confession judicially recorded. The examination of the accused under section342, Criminal Procedure Code, had also not been satisfactory. In view of all these facts, the appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence set aside. Retrial was not ordered, since the appellant had been on his trial for over four and a half years.

Aher Raja Khaima v. State of Saurashtra, 1955 2 SCR 1285: AIR 1956 SC 217 (Bose and Chanderasekhar Aiyar JJ. Venkatarama Aiyar J. dissenting).

Appeal under Article 136.

In this case the Sessions Judge, differing with the unanimous opinion of the assessors, acquitted the appellant of the murder of one Jetha, who was married to a girl with whom the appellant was on intimate terms. The High Court of Saurashtra, in an appeal by the State, convicted the accused. The main question in the appeal before the Supreme Court was whether, in reversing the order of acquittal, the High Court had borne in mind the principles which the Supreme Court had enunciated about interference with acquittal (under section 417, Criminal Procedure Code). The majority of the Supreme Court took the view, that it was not enough for the High Court to have taken a different view of the evidence and that there must be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. Applying this test the majority found, that the circumstances did not disclose strong and compelling reasons to set aside the acquittal and allowed the appeal.

Appeal allowed.

(The majority regarded the confession of the accused as false and involuntary).

Venkataram Aiyar J. however, dissented, and in an exhaustive judgment reviewing the Privy Council and Supreme Court decisions as to the scope of interference in criminal appeals, expressed the view that the doctrine of compelling reasons had no justification for its existence ; that the phrase was undefined, and was dangerous, because it related to the appreciation of evidence.

It put a judgment of acquittal (however recorded) "in a position of vantage", which the law did not grant to it, and such a situation must result in great mischief if the doctrine was to be regarded as imposing a restriction on the powers of court. Once that doctrine is kept apart, there was no ground for interference in this case with the finding of the High Court (Pritam Singh's case, 1950 SC 169 cited). The law did not provide for a further appeal on the facts against the order of reversal, because the present appeal was not under Article 132 or Article 134(1)(a)(b), but was under Article 136. Even on the merits, the decision of the High Court was correct.

Appeal was allowed by the majority, and conviction set aside.

Surjan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1956 SC 425 (Bose and Jagannath Dass JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

The facts are not important. The doctrine of "strong and compelling reasons" regarding interference by the High Court in acquittal is followed in this case, and previous cases cited.

Appeal of appellant Surjan accepted in part namely, conviction under section 304 altered into conviction under section 323.

Haripada v. State of West Bengal, 1956 SCR 639: AIR 1956 SC 757 (Bhagwati, Imam and Govinda Menon JJ.).

Appeal under Article 134(1)(c) and 136.

In this case, the appellant was convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta of an offence under section 411, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for two years. His appeal to the High Court was dismissed by the High Court at Calcutta, but the Calcutta High Court granted a certificate for leave to appeal under Article 134(1)(c) on the ground that it felt that there had not been such a full and fair trial as ought to have been held. The Supreme Court regarded such a reason for the grant of the certificate as unsound. The High Court had noted, that the question involved was one of fact, and therefore in the opinion of the Supreme Court, there could not be any justification for granting the certificate and converting the Supreme Court into a court of appeal on question of facts. For remedying a gross miscarriage of justice or departure from a legal procedure vitiating the whole trial, the Supreme Court would certainly interfere, but the High Court could not arrogate that function to itself and pass on to the Supreme Court a matter purely involving a question of fact. On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court found no reason for interference.1

Appeal Dismissed.

Bhagwan Das v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 589. (Bhagwati and Kapur JJ.).

Appeal under Article 138.

The appellants (along with the daughter of one of the appellants) were tried for murder under section 302, Indian Penal Code but were acquitted by the Sessions Judge, Ganganagar. The High Court of Rajasthan, in appeal, reversed the order of acquittal of the appellants and convicted them under section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to transportation for life. This order of the High Court of Rajasthan was appealed on two grounds, (i) that there was no evidence against the appellants to justify conviction, and (ii) that there were no "compelling" reasons for reversal of the acquittal.

Appeal allowed.

As regards the first, the Court observed, that while the Supreme Court would not interfere with the findings of the High Court merely because the conclusions of the Supreme Court on the evidence differed with those of the High Court, yet where the evidence was such that no tribunal could legitimately infer from it that the accused was guilty, the Supreme Court would set aside the conviction. [Stephen Seneviratne v. King, AIR 1936 PC 289 (291) followed]. In this case, the evidence was of such quality that no legitimate inference of guilt could properly be drawn. There were certain contradictions in the statement of important prosecution witnesses. Again, dying declarations stated to have been made by the deceased were made to witnesses whose evidence suffered from material contradictions. Ordinarily, a dying declaration of this kind would be insufficient for sustaining conviction on a charge of murder. Next, the High Court had disbelieved the evidence of the doctor, saying that his opinion was not in conformity with the books in medical jurisprudence, but this was not a satisfactory way of disposing of evidence unless the passages from the books are put to the witness (Sunder Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 28 followed).

An acquittal should not be set aside in the absence of substantial and compelling reasons. The judgment of the High Court did not disclose any such reason for interference with the findings of the trial court. The appeal was allowed and the accused acquitted.

Junman v. state of Punjab, AIR SC 469 (472) (Jagannath Das, Imam and Govinda Menon JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

The appellants were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, for Lion into one for murder and sentenced to death. The convictions were confirmed and the sentence of death also confirmed by the High Court of Punjab. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, while stating that in an appeal under special leave it was ordinarily bound by the finding of fact arrived at by the High Court, proceeded to hear the appeal on evidence, because the High Court had not dealt with the appeal as it should have, and did not seem to have exercised its independent judgment on the material facts. It pointed out, that in proceedings for confirmation under section 374 the High Court had to satisfy itself that the case had been proved beyond of reasonable doubt. In fact, the proceedings before the High Court are a re-appraisal or reassessment of the entire facts and law, in order that the High Court should be satisfied on the materials about the guilt or innocence of the "accused person." The High Court should, therefore, come to an independent conclusion of its own on the material, it could be assisted by the opinion expressed by the Sessions Judge. After going into the evidence, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence for murder, and altered the conviction into one under section 304 (first part) Indian Penal Code.

Appeal allowed by altering the conviction into one for lesser offence.

Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1957 SCR 953: AIR 1957 SC 637 (Jagannath Das, B.P. Sinha and Gajendragadkar JJ).

Appeal under Article 136.

The appellants were convicted of murder and sentenced to death. They alongwith the approver were stated to have murdered one Gurdev Singh in village Sohian, Police Station, Jagraon. The High Court of Punjab maintained the conviction, and confirmed the sentence. The Supreme Court in appeal stated, that ordinarily it would not interfere with concurrent findings of fact when the appeal was by special leave, but in this case it felt bound to interfere because the judgment of the High Court suffered from a serious infirmity in that the Judges, while dealing with the evidence of the approver, had not addressed themselves to the question whether the approver was a reliable witness or not. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the evidence of the approver in this case was so thoroughly discrepant that it was difficult to resist the conclusion that he was wholly unreliable. The appellants were acquitted.

Appeal allowed.

State of Delhi v. Shri Ram Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 490.

Appeal under Article 136.

The appellant was convicted by the trial court of an offence under section 5(4) of the Indian Official Secrets Act. Appeal against the conviction and sentence was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, but the High Court of Punjab, in revision, acquitted him. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. The High Court had acquitted him on the ground that one important prosecution witness was to be looked upon as an accomplice, and that there was no other evidence against the appellant. On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court regarded that person as utterly untrustworthy, and dismissed the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

K. Kunhahammad v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 661 (663) (Gajendragadkar, Sarkar and Subba Rao, JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

The appellant was convicted of a criminal conspiracy to misappropriate the property of one co-operative society; and other connected offences. The conviction was under section 409 and section 477A, Indian Penal Code. The High Court of Madras accepted the appeal regarding section 477A and confirmed the conviction under section 409. The Supreme Court observed that, the finding of the High Court that the charge under section 409 had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, was a finding of fact, and, in this conclusion, the High Court had agreed with the view taken by the trial Judge. This finding could not be challenged before the Supreme Court in the present appeal. (Certain procedural irregularities were also discussed, but it was held that the accused had not been prejudiced.).

Appeal dismissed.

Shambhu v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 SC 725 (727), para. 4 (Gajendragadkar, Subba Rao and Shah JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

Certain persons, including the appellant were convicted by the Additional Judicial Commissioner, Chhota Nagpur, for the offence under section 302 and also for the offence under section 302 read with sections 149 and 148 etc., Indian Penal Code. For the offence under section 302, appellant S was sentenced to transportation for life. The other accused were convicted under section 326 read with sections 149 and 148, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six years (four years in the case of some of the appellants). The High Court apparently confirmed the convictions and the sentences. The Supreme Court refused to interfere on questions of fact based on appreciation of evidence, observing: "It is the settled practice of this Court that unless the trial is vitiated by an illegality or irregularity of procedure or the trial is held in a manner violative of the principles of natural justice resulting in an unfair trial, or unless the trial had resulted in gross miscarriage of justice, this Court in a criminal appeal does not normally enter upon a review of the evidence on which the conclusion of the Courts below is founded."

Appeal dismissed.

It had been argued, that the conviction under section 326 read with section 149 was had, as no member had been proved to have caused "grievous hurt" to any of the victims. It was held, that the conviction under section 326 read with section 149 was valid; the common object of the unlawful assembly, as found by the Courts below, was to cause grievous hurt, and death was caused by one of the members of the assembly. For causing the death, the other members were not found to be responsible,but the conviction for the offence of causing grievous hurt "in prosecution of the common object" was maintainable as the offence of murder was in its nature an aggravated form of grievous hurt.

Appeal was dismissed.

Anant Lagu v. State of Bombay, (1960) 2 SCR 460: AIR 1960 SC 500 (S.K. Dass, Sarkar and Hidayatulla JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

The appellant was tried for the murder of a woman named Laxmibai Karve, the charge being that on or about the night between 12th November and 13th November, 1956, either at Poona or in railway journey between Poona and Bombay, he administered to her some unrecognized poison or drug which would act as poison, with the intention of causing her death, and that caused her death. He was sentenced to death by Shri V. N. Naik, Sessions Judge, Poona under section 302, Indian Penal Code. The conviction was maintained and the sentence confirmed by the Bombay High Court (J. C. Shah J. and V. S. Desai J.). The main point was, whether the death was caused by poison or by disease, and (if by poison) whether the accused had administered the poison.

The Supreme Court (S.K. Das and Hidayatulla JJ.) observed, that ordinarily, it was not the practice of the Supreme Court to re-examine the findings of fact reached by the High Court, particularly in a case where there was a concurrence of opinion between the two courts, also. But, here the case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence, and there was no direct evidence that the appellant administered poison. No poison had, in fact, been detected by the doctor who performed the post-mortem examination or by the Chemical Analyser. The inference of guilt having been drawn on an examination of a mass of evidence during which subsidiary findings were given by the two courts below, the Supreme Court, in view of the extraordinary nature of the case felt it necessary to satisfy itself whether each conclusion on the separate aspects of the case was supported by evidence and was just and proper.

According to the majority of the Supreme Court, the death had not occurred from diabetic coma but was due to some unrecognized poison or drug acting as a poison, and that it was the accused who committed murder by administering such substance; the Court considered the circumstantial evidence so decisive, that the Court could unhesitatingly hold that the death was as a result of administration of poison and that the poison must have been administered by the accused. The Court pointed but that there was no hard and fast rule that the poison must be isolated. Sarkar J. however, dissented as, in his opinion, the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed and the sentence of death was maintained, as the Supreme Court observed that that was the only sentence that could be imposed for this planned and cold-blooded murder for gain. (The appellant in this case had, according to the prosecution case, committed the murder to get hold of the property of the deceased. The appellant was her personal physician.).

Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1961) 3 SCR 120: AIR 1961 SC 751 (Imam, Subba Rao and Raghubar Dayal JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

This case is important only for its discussion of the principles on which the High Court should act in hearing appeals against acquittal. The judgment notes that the expression "substantial and compelling reasons" used in earlier decisions of the Supreme Court had caused considerable difficulties to High Courts. Those words, it was stated, were not intended to add a condition to section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but only to convey the idea that the appellate court must not only bear in mind the principles laid down by the Privy Council, but also give its clear reasons for coming to the conclusion that the acquittal was wrong. The Supreme Court pointed out, that the appellate court had full power to review the evidence upon which the acquittal was founded, that the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup's case (64 IA 398: AIR 1934 PC 227) were a correct guide, and that the different phrases used in the decisions of the Supreme Court, like substantial and compelling reasons" or good and sufficiently cogent reasons" or "strong reasons" were not intended to curtail the power of the appellate court to review the evidence and come to its own conclusion, but to state that in doing so the appellate court should not only consider the matters on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court in appeal, but should also express those reasons in its own judgment in which it holds that the acquittal was not justified.

Appeal dismissed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The following observations as to the scope of interference under Article 136 are also interesting:-

"Article 136 of the Constitution confers a wide discretionary power on this court to entertain appeals in suitable cases not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. It is implicit in the reserve power that it cannot be exhaustively defined, but decided cases do not permit interference 'unless by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done' Though Article 136 is couched in widest terms, the practice of this Court is not to interfere on questions of fact except in exceptional cases when the finding is such that it shocks the conscience of the court. In the present case, the High Court has not contravened any of the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup's case, [64 Ind App 398: AIR 1934 PC 227(2)] and has also given reasons which led it to hold that the acquitta.-was not justified. In the circumstances, no case has been made out for our not accepting the said findings."

On the merits of the case the Supreme Court saw no reason to interfere.

K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 (S.K. Das, Subba Rao and Raghubar Dayal JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

The appellant was charged under section 302 as well as under section 304, Part I, Indian Penal Code for the murder of the paramour of his wife. The Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, sitting with a special jury, heard the case. The, jury brought in a verdict of not being guilty, by a majority of eight to one, but the Sessions Judge did not agree with the verdict and submitted the case under section 307, Criminal Procedure Code, to the High Court of Bombay. In the High Court, the reference was heard by Shelat and Naik JJ. Shelat J. held that, there were misdirections to the jury, reviewed the evidence and came to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of murder. Alternatively, he expressed the view that the verdict of the jury was perverse and unreasonable, and contrary to the weight of evidence. Naik J., in a separate judgment, took the view that no reasonable body of persons could have come to the conclusion arrived at by the jury. The appellant was sentenced by the High Court to imprisonment for life under section 302.

Appeal dismissed.

The Supreme Court, in appeal, discussed in detail the scope of section 307, Criminal Procedure Code, and after examining the evidence, upheld the conviction and sentence, passed by the High Court. In the course of judgment, observed that it found force in the argument of the Attorney General, that if under section 307, Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court could consider the evidence afresh and come to its conclusions, in view of the misdirections by the trial Judge to the jury, the Supreme Court should not, in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, under Article 136, interfere with the findings of the High Court. But since the Supreme Court had heard the counsel at great length, it proposed to discuss the evidence.

Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 439 (442), paras. 10, 11 and 12 (Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, Wanchoo and Das Gupta JJ.).

Appeal under Article 136.

Six persons including the appellants, were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur, on several charges in connection with death by homicidal injuries of two brothers. They were all acquitted, but on appeal by the State, the High Court of Punjab set aside the orders of acquittal in respect of the appellants and convicted them under section 302. The appellants filed the present appeal after obtaining special leave from the Supreme Court. One of the grounds of appeal was, that the High Court had not sufficient reason for interfering with the orders of acquittal; that the High Court had mis-read the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge and attributed to him statements not found in his judgment, etc. The Supreme Court pointed out, that in appeals against acquittal, the Court of Appeal must examine the evidence with particular care, and must also examine the reasons on which the acquittal was based, and should interfere only when the view taken by the acquitting Judge is clearly unreasonable. In earlier cases of the Supreme Court, the words "compelling reasons" had been used, and this had caused difficulty to High Courts occasionally. In later years, the Supreme Court had avoided emphasis on "compelling reasons", but, nevertheless, adhered to the view, that before interfering in an appeal, against an acquittal, the High Court must examine not only questions of law and fact in all their aspects, but also reasons which impelled the lower court to acquit the accused. If the Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower court was clearly unreasonable, that itself was a compelling reason for interference.

Appeal accepted as regards one person and dismissed as regards the other.

If the High Court has thus approached the matter and applied the correct principle, the Supreme Court will not ordinarily embark upon a re-appraisal of the evidence to ascertain whether the High Court was right in its view of evidence. But if the judgment of the High Court, while indicating the conclusion of the High Court that the view taken by the trial court was unreasonable, does not disclose a careful examination of the evidence, or if the High Court has erred on a question of law, or obviously mis-read the evidence, or mis-read the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme Court was bound to appraise the evidence for itself and to examine the reasons on which the lower court based the acquittal and then to decide whether the High Court's conclusion (about the lower court's view being unreasonable) is correct. In the present case, the judgment of the High Court did not contain much discussion of the evidence and the judgment also revealed that the Judges of the High Court were under some misapprehension in thinking that the Additional Sessions Judge has held that the accused Bagh Singh was not mentioned as a witness in the inquest report. The Supreme Court therefore examined the evidence in detail. It also pointed out that the view taken by the Sessions Judge, that a dying declaration mentioning as many as six accused persons could not support a conviction without corroboration, was wrong. The trial Judge, no doubt, had followed an earlier decision of the Supreme Court [(Ram Nath v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 420 (423)] which observed that it was not safe to convict an accused person merely on the evidence furnished by a dying declaration without further corroboration. BO in a later case [(Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 552 (568): AIR 1958 SC 22 (28, 29)], it was held that there was no rule of law that a dying declaration could not from the sole basis of conviction; each case must depend on its own facts.

On a consideration of the evidence, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the conclusion of the High Court regarding appellant Harbans Singh was correct. But as regards appellant Major Singh, the High Court was wrong in thinking that he gave any of the fatal blows. The evidence left scope for thinking that the dying declaration had either made a mistake about Major Singh, or had wrongly implicated him. Therefore, it could not be said that the view taken by the trial judge as regards Major Singh was clearly unreasonable. Appeal of Major Singh was accepted, and he was acquitted. Appeal of Harbans Singh was dismissed.

Tara Chand v. State of Maharashtra, (1962) 2 SCR 755: AIR 1962 SC 130 (Kapur, Subba Rao and J.C. Shah JJ., Raghubar Dayal and Hidayatulla JJ. dissenting).

Appeal treated as under Article 134(1)(a)

The appellant was convicted of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder by the Sessions Judge, Dhulia. He had killed his wife by setting fire to her clothes (There were quarrels between the parties). The Sessions Judge had convicted him under section 299, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him under section 304, Part I, to three years' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal to the High Court by the State, the High Court of Bombay convicted him under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to death. The appellant applied for a certificate to appeal under Article 123(1)(c). The certificate was refused. The Supreme Court gave special leave under Article 136. After the hearing of the appeal, the Supreme Court, in its judgment, examined in detail the question whether he had a right of appeal under Article 134(1)(a), and held that the word "acquittal" in that clause covered a case where the High Court, on appeal, had reversed the decision of the trial court and convicted the accused of murder (instead of culpable homicide not amounting to murder). Acquittal was not confined to complete acquittal; it meant acquittal of the offence charged (Kishan Singh v. Emp., 55 IA 390: AIR 1928 PC 254, cited).

Appeal dismissed by majority

The argument of the appellant, that the deceased had committed suicide, was not accepted by the Supreme Court. There was no evidence on the record which could detract from the findings for the High Court or the trial court, regarding the correctness of the dying declaration in which the deceased had charged the appellant.

Raghubar Dayal and Hidayatulla JJ., however, dissented from the view that the conviction under section 302 should be maintained; in their opinion, in an appeal under Article 134(1)(a), the Supreme Court must assess afresh the value of the evidence on record, and should not follow the practice of the Supreme Court under Article 136 not to interfere with concurrent finding of the fact, in the absence of special circumstances. They had doubt about the truth of the dying declarations and took the view that the conviction of the appellant on the basis of that declaration should not be maintained.

Appeal was dismissed according to the majority judgment.

Rama Shanker v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1239. (Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Shan JJ.).

Appeal under Article 13 (1) (c)

The appellants were convicted by the Extra Additional Judge, Howrah of offences under section 302 read with section 148 and 149, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to death. The Sessions Judge had accepted the unanimous verdict given by the jury. The High Court of Calcutta, in proceedings for confirmation of the death sentence and in the appeal filed by the appellants, held, that the verdict of the jury was vitiated because of certain misdirection by the Sessions Judge. After an elaborate examination of the evidence, it found some of the appellants guilty of offences under section 302 read with section 134, Indian Penal Code and confirmed the sentences of death.

Appeal dismissed.

On an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, after reviewing the evidence, maintained the conviction. As regards the sentence, it observed, that the appellants had forcibly entered the house and killed two persons and assaulted members of the family. The assault was pre-conceived and initiated with deliberation, to slaughter a defenceless woman and her young son. Innocent persons who intervened, were also killed mercilessly and, therefore, this was pre-eminently a case for the death sentence.

The Supreme Court discussed in detail the scope of the High Courts' powers in proceedings for confirmation and held (following Abdul Rahim v. Emp, 73 IA. 77: AIR 1946 PC 82) that the High Court was not bound to order a retrial.

(The Supreme Court pointed out that the powers of the High Court under sections 374 and 376 Criminal Procedure Code were very wide and the High Court could arrive at its own conclusion after reconsideration of the evidence or order retrial; the matter was in the discretion of the High Court).

Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (C.A No. 31, 1963)-(1963)-SCN Item 160, April 25 1963 (Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Das Gupta JJ.).

Article not referred to.

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the charge framed against the appellant. under section 302, Indian Penal Code, had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and so the appellant was acquitted.

Appeal allowed.

Ramaotar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (Cr App 149 of 1962)-Oct. 30, 1963-(1963) SCN Vol. 5, Item 316. (Das Gupta and Dayal JJ.).

Article of the State of constitution not referred to in the judgment.

The appellant stated that he had a dream in which the deceased told him that the murder of the deceased was committed by X. Information was given by the appellant, which led to recovery of the body. The appellant was convicted of murder. The High Court refused to refer to the dream.

Appeal allowed.

The Supreme Court observed, that the prosecution version that the accused led the party of the villagers to the place in the river where the body was found, was linked up with the other part of the prosecution story about the appellant having spoken about the dream. When that story was rejected, the evidence that the accused led the party to the particular place in the river was also considerably weakened. Taking into account all the circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that though it might be true that the accused was the first to notice the body lying in the river, it had not been proved that he led the party to that particular place.

Appellant was acquitted.