D. Sudhakar &
Ors. Vs. D.N. Jeevaraju & Ors.
[With Civil Appeal
Nos.4517-4521 of 2011]
[Civil Appeal
Nos.4510-4514 of 2011]
J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
1.
The
operative portion of this judgment was pronounced on 13th May, 2011. The full
text of the judgment is now being pronounced.
2.
Civil
Appeal Nos. 4510-4514 of 2011 arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 5966-5970 of 2011 are
filed by five Independent Members of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly against
a judgment of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court upholding an order passed
by the Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly disqualifying them under
Paragraph 2(2) of Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India on the ground that
they had joined the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) after their election to the
Legislative Assembly as Independent candidates.
The said order of disqualification
was passed by the Speaker on Disqualification Application No.2 of 2010 filed by
Shri D.N. Jeevaraju, Chief Whip, BJP, Karnataka Legislative Assembly and Shri C.T.
Revi, Member of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly. Civil Appeal Nos. 4517-4521
of 2011 arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 5995-5999 of 2011 are filed by the very same
five Independent Members of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly challenging the very
same judgment of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court upholding the order
passed by the Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly disqualifying them under
Paragraph 2(2) of Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India.
The said order was
passed by the Speaker on Disqualification Application Nos. 3 to 7 of 2010 filed
by the voters from the constituencies represented by the five MLAs. Since the Speaker
of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly had passed a Common Order dated 10th October,
2010 on Disqualification Application Nos. 2 to 7 of 2010, the impugned judgment
of the Full Bench of the High Court also was a Common Order passed in Writ Petition
Nos. 32674-32678/2010 and Writ Petition Nos. 33998-34002/2010. Therefore the
basic dispute in these Civil Appeals relates to the validity of the order of
disqualification passed by the Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly
against the Appellants on Disqualification Application Nos. 2 to 7 of 2010.
3.
The
Appellants herein were elected to the Thirteenth Karnataka Legislative Assembly
as independent candidates in the elections held in May, 2008. On 30th May,
2008, they were sworn in as Ministers in the Cabinet of the government headed
by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa, who was elected as the leader of the B.J.P. Legislature
Party and was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State of Karnataka.
On 6th October, 2010,
the Appellants submitted separate letters to the Governor of Karnataka stating that
having become disillusioned with the functioning of the Government headed by
Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa, in which there was widespread corruption and nepotism, a
situation had arisen where the governance of the State could not be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India.
The Appellants also
indicated that Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa had, therefore, forfeited his right to
continue as Chief Minister having lost the confidence of the people and in the
interest of the State and the people of Karnataka, they were expressing their lack
of confidence in the Government headed by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa and as such they
were withdrawing support to the Government headed by him as the Chief Minister.
The Governor was also
requested to intervene and institute the constitutional process as constitutional
head of the State. On the same day, on the basis of the letters written by the
Appellants and others, the Governor of Karnataka asked the Chief Minister to prove
his majority on the Floor of the House by 12th October, 2010.
4.
On
the very next day i.e. on 7th October, 2010, the Respondent Nos.1 and 3, namely,
Shri D.N. Jeevaraju and Shri C.T. Ravi, the Chief Whip and the General Secretary
of the Bharatiya Janata Party, respectively, filed Complaint No.2 of 2010 dated
6th October, 2010 with the Speaker of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly under Rule
6 of the 6Karnataka Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of Members on Ground
of Defection) Rules, 1986, hereinafter referred to as the
"Disqualification
Rules", to declare that the Appellants had incurred disqualification on the
ground of defection as contained in the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. On the
basis of the said Disqualification Application, on 8th October, 2010 the Speaker
issued Show-Cause Notices to the Appellants informing them of the Disqualification
Application filed by the Chief Whip of the Bharatiya Janata Party and the General
Secretary thereof, indicating that despite having got elected as independent candidates,
they became members of the B.J.P. Legislature Party and also became Ministers and
thereby they violated Paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution.
The Appellants were informed
that they had acted in violation of paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution of India and it disqualified 7them from continuing as Members of
the Legislature. The Appellants were given time till 5.00 p.m. on 10th October,
2010, to submit their objections, if any, to the Disqualification Application either
in writing or presenting themselves in person, failing which it would be presumed
that they had no explanation to offer and further action would thereafter be taken
ex-parte in accordance with law. In the meanwhile on 9th October, 2010,
Disqualification Application Nos.3 to 7 were filed by some voters against the Appellants
and show-cause notices were issued by the Speaker on the same day requiring the
Appellants to submit their explanation before 5.00 p.m. on 10th October, 2010.
5.
Having
come to know about the show-cause notices from the media, the Appellants through
an Advocate submitted a letter to the Speaker on 9th October, 2010, indicating that
they had come to learn from the media that the show-cause notices had been issued
to them as per the orders of the Speaker. In the said letter it was categorically
stated that the procedural requirements of Rule 7 of the Disqualification Rules
had not been complied with as copies of the Petition and annexures were not supplied
to the Appellants and a period of 7 days to submit the reply was not given to them.
A specific request was
made to the Speaker to supply the said documents and to grant a period of 7
days to submit the reply. Though the documents were not supplied, the Appellants
though their Advocate submitted an interim reply on 10th October, 2010, during the
proceedings before the Speaker. It was specifically stated in the reply that it
was submitted as an interim reply without prejudice to and by way of abundant caution
and reserving the right of the Appellants to submit exhaustive reply.
6.
The
Appellants further submitted in the interim reply that the notice was in clear
violation of the 9Disqualification Rules, 1986, and especially Rules 6 and 7 thereof.
It was mentioned that Rule 7(3) requires copies of the petition and annexures
thereto to be forwarded along with the show-cause notice.
The notice which was pasted
on the doors of the MLA quarters in the MLA hostels at Bangalore, which were locked
and used by the legislators only when the House was in session, called upon the
Appellants to reply to the notice by 5.00 p.m. on 10th October, 2010, which was
in complete violation of Rule 7 of the above-mentioned Rules which laid down a mandatory
procedure for dealing with the petition seeking disqualification under the
Rules. In fact, even the time to reply to the notices was reduced to the severe
prejudice to the Appellants. It was pointed out that Rule 7 requires that the
Appellants should have been given 7 days' time to reply or within such further
period as the Speaker may for sufficient cause allow.
It was contended that
under the said Rule the Speaker 10could only extend the time by a further
period of 7 days, but could not curtail the same from 7 days to 3 days. It was the
categorical case of the Appellants that the minimum notice period of 7 days was
a mandatory requirement of the basic principles of natural justice in order to enable
a MLA to effectively reply to the Show-Cause Notice issued to him seeking his disqualification
from the Legislative Assembly.
It was mentioned in the
reply to the Show-Cause Notice that issuance of such Show-Cause Notice within a
truncated period was an abuse and misuse of the constitutional provisions for the
purpose of achieving the unconstitutional object of disqualifying sufficient
number of Members of the Assembly from the membership of the House in order to prevent
them from participating in the Vote of Trust scheduled to be taken by Shri B.S.
Yeddiyurappa on the Floor of the House at 11 a.m. on 11th October, 2010. It was
contended that the Show-Cause Notice was ex- facie unconstitutional and illegal,
besides being motivated and malafide and devoid of jurisdiction.
7.
In
addition to the above, it was also sought to be explained that it was not the intention
of the Appellants to withdraw support to the government formed by the B.J.P., but
only to the Government headed by Shri Yeddiyurappa. It was contended that
withdrawal of support from the Government headed by Shri B.S. Yeddiyurappa as the
Chief Minister of Karnataka, did not fall within the scope and purview of the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution of India. In the reply, the Appellants
categorically denied the allegation that they had joined the Bharatiya Janata
Party.
It was asserted that they
remained independents and they had not joined any political party including Bharatiya
Janata Party. It was claimed that they were always treated as independents
only. It was urged that the conduct of the Appellants did not fall within the 12meaning
of "defection" or within the scope of para 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule
of Constitution of India or the Scheme and object thereof. However, on 10th
October, 2010 itself, the Speaker passed an order "disqualifying the Appellants
from the post of MLA for violation of Para 2 of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution
of India with immediate effect." The said disqualification is the subject matter
of this litigation.
8.
At
this juncture, it is necessary to take note of the fact that 13 MLAs, belonging
to the Bharatiya Janata Party, had also withdrawn their support to the Government
led by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa and had made the same request to the Governor, as had
been made by the Appellants herein, for initiating the constitutional process
in the wake of their withdrawal of support to the Government led by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa.
This had resulted in the
filing of Disqualification Application No.1 by Shri Yeddyurappa against the
said MLAs and ultimately in their disqualification from the membership of the House.
The Civil Appeals challenging their disqualification has been heard by this
Court and judgment has been reserved.
Learned counsel for
the Appellants submits that the same issues as were involved in the earlier cases
are also involved in the present case, except that while in the case involving
the 13 B.J.P. MLAs, the allegation made against them was that they had
voluntarily left the Bharatiya Janata Party, in the present case the allegation
against the Appellants is that having got elected as independent candidates they
had joined the Bharatiya Janata Party by extending support to Shri B.S.
Yeddyurappa and by joining his Ministry as Cabinet Ministers. The same
grievances as were raised by the 11 B.J.P. MLAs who were disqualified have been
raised by the Appellants herein.
It has been reiterated
on behalf of the Appellants that the very basic requirements of natural justice
and administrative fair play had been denied to them. On the other hand, not
only were they not served with notice of the disqualification proceedings, but
they were not even given sufficient time to deal with the allegations made against
them. According to the Appellants, the proceedings before the Speaker, who had acted
in hot haste in disqualifying the Appellants before the Vote of Confidence was to
be taken by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa, had been vitiated as a result of such conduct
on the part of the Speaker.
9.
Appearing
in support of the Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos.5966-5970 of 2011, Mr.
P.P. Rao, learned Senior Advocate, contended that by not allowing the Appellants
sufficient time to even reply to the Show-Cause Notices issued to them, in violation
of Rule 7 of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of Members 15on
Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986, the Appellants had been deprived of a
valuable opportunity to meet the allegations, although their membership of the
House depended on a decision on the said allegations and their response thereto.
Mr. Rao also submitted
that apart from being denied a proper hearing in terms of the statutory rules,
the High Court had erroneously interpreted the provisions of paragraph 2(2) of the
Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India in holding that the Appellants had joined
the Bharatiya Janata Party, as alleged by the complainants. Mr. Rao submitted
that it had been alleged that the Appellants had joined the Bharatiya Janata
Party either when prior to the formation of the Ministry they had given
individual letters of support to Shri Yeddyurappa as the leader of the B.J.P. Legislature
Party, or when they had joined the Cabinet as Ministers in the B.J.P.
Government led by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa.
10.
Mr.
Rao then urged that the High Court had also misconstrued the concept of whips being
issued to ensure compliance by Members of a particular political party, who were
also Members of the Legislature Party of the said political party. Mr. Rao
urged that such whip had been issued to the Appellants, who as Members of the Government
may have acted in terms thereof, but that did not mean that the Appellants had formally
joined the Bharatiya Janata Party, as had been concluded by the Speaker.
11.
Mr.
Rao contended that neither the Speaker nor the High Court had addressed these
issues correctly in relation to the evidence available before him, as had been observed
by the Constitution Bench in Rajendra Singh Rana & Ors. Vs. Swami Prasad Maurya
& Ors. [(2007) 4 SCC 270]. Mr. Rao submitted that events subsequent to the date
on which an independent Member joins a political party is not material for a decision
as to whether the particular Member had, in fact, joined the political party or
not.
Mr. Rao also urged that
neither the decision in the case of Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh Vs. Chairman, Bihar
Legislative Council & Ors. [(2004) 8 SCC 747], nor the decision in the case
of Jagjit Singh Vs. State of Haryana [(2006) 11 SCC 1], had any application to
the facts of this case, since in the said cases what was sought to be explained
by this Court is that the Speaker could not give a finding regarding
disqualification on the basis of conduct subsequent to the date on which a M.L.A.
becomes disqualified from being a Member of the House.
It was also observed that
when the view taken by the Tribunal is a reasonable one, the Court would be slow
to strike down the view regarding disqualification on the ground that another view
was better. Mr. Rao urged that in the instant case, reliance by the Speaker on the
decision of this Court in the case 18of G. Vishwanath Vs. Speaker [(1996) 3 SCC
353], is not of much assistance to the Respondents, because even from the conduct
of the Appellants, it could not be said that they had joined the B.J.P.
Legislature Party. Mr. Rao urged that the fact that the Appellants had attended
meetings of the B.J.P. Legislature Party was of little help to the Respondents
since in the Attendance Register of the meetings they had been shown as
independent Members and a separate group under the heading "Independent
Co-Members".
12.
Mr.
Rao urged that the Appellants had always been treated as a separate group from the
B.J.P. Legislature Party and it is only in connection with this case that the Respondents
had attempted to show that the Appellants had joined the Bharatiya Janata Party
and by withdrawing support from the B.J.P. Government led by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa,
19they had incurred disqualification under paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule
to the Constitution.
13.
Mr.
Rao also contended that the Whip issued by the Chief Whip of the B.J.P. Legislature
Party did not form part of the documents produced before the Speaker, and, in any
event, no Whip was served on the Appellants nor had they signed such a Whip.
Therefore, the allegation that they had acted in accordance with such Whip did not
and could not arise and the finding of the Speaker to the contrary, was perverse.
Mr. Rao added that the Whips which have been subsequently brought on record in W.P.(C)Nos.32674-32678
of 2010, reveal that when the Whips were addressed to the ruling party Members,
including the Ministers, they were addressed as Members of the Party, whereas the
remaining five Whips were addressed to the Appellants as Hon'ble Ministers.
14.
Mr.
Rao also submitted that in the Whips issued to the Appellants nowhere had it been
indicated that they had joined the Bharatiya Janata Party. Mr. Rao urged that the
positive case made out by the Respondents in the application for
disqualification was that the Appellants had joined the B.J.P. before they were
sworn in as Ministers of Cabinet rank on 30th May, 2008, and not that they
joined the B.J.P. later before the issuance of Whips on 29th December, 2009. Mr.
Rao repeated his earlier contention that the question before the Speaker for consideration
was whether the Appellants had joined the B.J.P. before their being sworn in on
30th May, 2008, or not. It was submitted that it was beyond the Speaker's
jurisdiction to decide any matter other than what had been indicated in the Disqualification
Application.
15.
On
the question of scope of judicial review of the Speaker's order, Mr. Rao submitted
that although reliance had been placed on paragraph 109 of the decision of this
Court in Kihoto Hollohan Vs. Zachillhu [(1992) Supp.2 SCC 651], wherein, it was
held that judicial review of the order of the Speaker should be confined to
jurisdictional errors only, the observations contained in paragraph 103 of the judgment
had not been noticed. Mr. Rao submitted that in the said paragraph, it had been
clarified that the finality clause in paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution
does not completely exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts under Articles 136, 226
and 227 of the Constitution, though, it does have the effect of limiting the scope
of the Courts' jurisdiction under the said provision.
It was further observed
that the principle applied by the courts is that inspite of a finality clause it
is always open to the High Court or the Supreme Court to examine whether the action
of the authority is ultra vires the powers conferred on it or whether the power
so exercised was in contravention of a mandatory provision of law. Mr. Rao
urged that the judgment in Kihoto Hollohan's case (supra) could not be read
piecemeal, but would have to be read as a whole.
16.
Mr.
Rao submitted that in the instant case, the Speaker's order had been made in violation
of paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule by erroneously equating the expression "Political
Party" with the Government of the State. Mr. Rao also submitted that the order
of the Speaker had been passed in disregard of the relevant statutory Rules, namely,
the Karnataka Disqualification Rules and without reconsidering the materials available
with the Speaker under the aforesaid Rules.
17.
Mr.
Rao then urged that the Speaker has also erred in entertaining the applications
of voters in violation of Rule 6 of the aforesaid Rules and also 23Rule 7(3) which
require the Speaker to give a minimum of 7 days' time to reply to the
show-cause notice issued by him. Mr. Rao submitted that the order was also liable
to be quashed on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice
by not giving the Appellants a reasonable opportunity to present their case
effectively.
18.
Mr.
Rao lastly submitted that the order of the Speaker was perverse and was tailored
to suit the Government led by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa in the Vote of Confidence
that was to follow the day after the decision had been pronounced by the Speaker.
Mr. Rao also repeated his earlier submissions that the Speaker had proceeded in
the matter in great haste to meet the aforesaid deadline.
19.
Mr.
Rao submitted that the Speaker had acted in a mala fide manner in order to bail
out the Chief Minister and to save his own Chair by not referring the case to the
Committee of Privileges having regard to the allegations of bias made by the
Appellants in their replies to the Show-Cause Notices and deciding the case himself,
while continuing to be a Member of the Bharatiya Janata Party while occupying
the Chair of the Speaker.
20.
On
the question as to whether the Disqualification Rules were mandatory or
directory, Mr. Rao submitted that the decision in Ravi S. Naik Vs. Union of
India [(1994) Suppl.2 SCC 641] was per incuriam as it had not adverted to the
decision of the Constitution Bench in Kihoto Hollohan's case (supra), wherein it
had been held that the Speaker's decision while exercising power under
paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution did not enjoy the immunity
under Articles 122 and 212 from judicial scrutiny as had also been pointed out by
K.T. Thomas, J. in Mayawati Vs. Markandeya Chand [(1998) 7 SCC 517].
Mr. Rao urged that in
any event, the view expressed in Ravi S. Naik's case (supra) was no longer good
law after the subsequent Constitution Bench decision in Rajendra Singh Rana's case
(supra), wherein it has been laid down that the Speaker was expected to follow
the Rules framed under the Tenth Schedule which had been approved by the
Legislative Assembly. Mr. Rao urged that the Speaker had all throughout treated
the Appellants as independent Members as would be evident from the debates of
the Assembly.
21.
Mr.
Rao then submitted that the circumstances leading to the disqualification of the
Appellants was quite obviously stage-managed in order to help the Chief Minister
to survive the Confidence Vote on 11th October, 2010, by any means and the same
will be evident from the affidavits filed later by the voters who had filed Disqualification
Petitions, which exposed the involvement of the Speaker and his Office as well as
the Political Advisor to the Chief Minister in inducing them to sign such
applications.
Mr. Rao submitted
that the decision of the Speaker having been taken in violation of paragraph 2(2)
of the Tenth Schedule, Rules 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7(3) of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly
(Disqualification of Members on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986, and the
principles of natural justice, was perverse and mala fide and was not sustainable
either on facts or law.
22.
Appearing
for the Appellants in the Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.5995-5999 of
2011, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned Senior Advocate, reiterated the submissions made
by Mr. P.P. Rao in the other set of appeals. Mr. Venugopal submitted that merely
because the Appellants had joined the Council of Ministers in the Yeddyurappa
Government, it could not be contended that they had joined the Bharatiya Janata
Party.
Mr. Venugopal submitted
27that in the past there had been several instances where Members elected as independents
to the Lok Sabha had served in the Governments formed by Political Parties but had
retained their status as independent Members of the House. Mr. Venugopal
referred to the two instances when Mrs. Maneka Gandhi was elected to the Lok Sabha
as an independent Member from Pilibhit in Uttar Pradesh and had served as Minister
at the Centre in the Governments led by the Bharatiya Janata Party. Similarly, Shri
Biswanath Das, Shri S.F. Khonglam and Shri Madhu Koda, who were all independent
legislators, became Chief Ministers of the States of Orissa, Meghalaya and
Jharkhand.
23.
Mr.
Venugopal submitted that if by joining the Yeddyurappa Ministry, the Appellants
had shed their independent status and had become Members of the Bharatiya Janata
Party, then they stood disqualified from the membership of the House at 28that stage
itself. Such a stand had not, however, been taken by the complainants or even the
opposition parties, till the Governor directed a Vote of Confidence to be held on
12.10.2010. Mr. Venugopal submitted that the said position would make it very
clear that the Appellants continued to enjoy an independent status, although, they
had extended their support to the B.J.P. Government led by Shri Yeddyurappa and
had also joined the Ministry as Cabinet Ministers.
24.
Mr.
Venugopal also repeated Mr. Rao's submissions that even at the B.J.P. Legislature
Party meetings the independent status of the Appellants had been duly
recognized and in the said meetings they had been shown not as a part of the Bharatiya
Janata Party, but as a separate entity with separate serial numbers. It was
further urged that it could not also be presumed that by joining the rallies of
the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Appellants had joined the Party and had,
therefore, laid themselves open to disqualification as Members of the House under
the provisions of the paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution.
25.
Mr.
Venugopal lastly submitted that the Appellants had denied receipt of the Whips said
to have been issued to them by the Chief Whip of the B.J.P. Legislature Party or
having acted in accordance therewith. Mr. Venugopal submitted that by no stretch
of imagination could it be assumed that the Appellants by their aforesaid acts had
joined the Bharatiya Janata Party or had even intended to do so. Mr. Venugopal submitted
that the impugned order of the Speaker was motivated and made with the sole intention
of disqualifying them from participating in the Vote of Confidence which was to
be held on 11th October, 2010.
26.
Appearing
for the Respondent No.1 Shri D.N. Jeevaraju and others in the Civil Appeals arising
out of the Special Leave Petitions filed by Shri D. Sudhakar and others, Mr. Satpal
Jain, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that one single incident cannot always
be a factor to determine as to whether an independent Member had joined a Political
Party or not and that there was no bar in taking cognizance of subsequent events
in order to arrive at such a conclusion. It was submitted that even if it be held
that the Appellants had joined the Bharatiya Janata Party by joining the
Ministry, the Speaker was always entitled to consider the subsequent conduct of
the Appellants for purposes of corroboration of the earlier facts. Mr. Jain
submitted that paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution makes it
absolutely clear that on the joining of a Political Party an independent stands
disqualified, but a declaration to that effect could be made at a later stage.
27.
Mr.
Jain reiterated the stand which had been taken on behalf of the Respondent No.1
before the Speaker that the Whip which had been issued by the Chief Whip was also
meant for the Appellants and had been served on them and they had also acted
according to the said Whip. It was urged that this was not a case of support being
rendered to the B.J.P. Government led by Shri Yeddyurappa, either from inside or
from the outside, but this was a case where the Appellants had wilfully shed their
independent status and had become Members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party and
by such conduct they stood disqualified as Members of the House by virtue of paragraph
2(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution.
28.
On
the allegation with regard to the mala fides, Mr. Jain submitted that the same would
have to be considered in the light of the circumstances in which the order of the
Speaker came to be 32passed. It was submitted that once the question of
disqualification of the Appellants was brought to his notice before the Vote of
Confidence was to take place, it became the constitutional duty of the Speaker to
decide the same before the Vote of Confidence was taken in order to ensure that
persons who were not eligible to vote, did not participate in the Vote of Confidence
to be taken on 11th October, 2010.
29.
Mr.
Jain referred to and relied on the decisions of this Court in Dr. Mahachandra Prasad
Singh's case (supra)and Jagjit Singh's case (supra) in support of his
contention that in order to incur disqualification under paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution, it was not always necessary that a written communication
would have to be made to the Party in that regard.
30.
Mr.
Jain also contended that in the translated copy of the Whip which had been
issued by the Chief Whip of the B.J.P. Legislature Party, the very vital words describing
the Appellants as Legislators of the Ruling Party had been omitted. Mr. Jain submitted
that this fact had not been noticed by the High Court, particularly, since the
Whip was a single-line Whip. Mr. Jain submitted that the Whip had been issued
to all Members of the Bharatiya Janata Party and its Ministers in the same fashion
as it had been issued to the Appellants. Mr. Jain submitted that the order of
the Speaker disqualifying the Appellants from the Membership of the House did not
call for any interference and the Appeals were liable to be dismissed.
31.
While
dealing with the submissions of Mr. P.P. Rao and Mr. Venugopal, Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee,
learned Senior advocate, who appeared for Shri C.T. Ravi, the Respondent No.3 in
the Civil Appeals arising out of the Special Leave Petitions filed by Shri D. Sudhakar
and others, submitted that the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to
the Constitution made it quite clear that the decision relating to disqualification
on ground of defection was final and, accordingly, the scope of judicial review
available against the order of the Speaker in exercise of powers under the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution was extremely limited, as had been indicated in Kihoto
Hollohan's case (supra), and was confined and limited to infirmities based on (a)
violation of constitutional mandate; (b) mala fides; (c) non-compliance with the
rules of natural justice; and (d) perversity. Mr. Sorabjee submitted that the
Speaker's order impugned in the Appeals did not suffer from any of the above-mentioned
infirmities and hence no judicial review was available to the Appellants in the
present case.
32.
Mr.
Sorabjee also relied heavily on the decision of this Court in Ravi S. Naik's case
(supra) and also in Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh's case (supra), where the Disqualification
Rules framed by the Speaker in exercise of the power conferred under paragraph 8
of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, was held to enjoy a status which was
subordinate to the Constitution and could not be equated with the provisions of
the Constitution. They could not, therefore, be regarded as constitutional mandates
and any violation of the Disqualification Rules did not also afford a ground for
judicial review. Mr. Sorabjee submitted that the aforesaid questions were no longer
res integra and had been authoritatively settled by the aforesaid decision of
this Court.
33.
On
the question of mala fides, Mr. Sorabjee submitted that as had been observed by
this Court 36in Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad Vs. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad [(2005) 11 SCC
314], a series of repetitive and almost abusive allegations against the Speaker
was not sufficient to support a charge of mala fides, especially when it is leveled
against a high functionary such as the Speaker. Mr. Sorabjee submitted that the
law, as was also stated by this Court in E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu
[(1974) 4 SCC 3], is clear that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavily
on the person who alleges it, since the allegations of mala fides are often more
easily made than proved. Mr. Sorabjee submitted that the Court could not and
should not uphold a plea of mala fides on the basis of mere probabilities.
34.
On
the question of undue haste, which was one of the pillars of the submissions
relating to mala fides, Mr. Sorabjee submitted that the Speaker was bound to a schedule
which had been set by the Governor for holding the Vote of Confidence and he,
therefore, had no option but to reduce the time for the Appellants to show
cause as to why they should not be disqualified from the membership of the
House to a period which was less than 7 days, as was stipulated under Rule 7 of
the Disqualification Rules.
35.
On
the question of natural justice, Mr. Sorabjee once again referred to the observations
made by this Court in Ravi S. Naik's case (supra), wherein it was observed that
the rules of natural justice were not immutable but flexible. Mr. Sorabjee submitted
that the same view had been reiterated in Jagjit Singh's case (supra) also. Mr.
Sorabjee contended that even if a different view was possible from the view which
had been taken by the Speaker, unless the decision of the Speaker was shown to
be wholly perverse or contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, the same 38ought
not to be discarded and substituted for a different view which this Court may also
consider to be possible.
36.
Mr.
Sorabjee concluded on the note that the essence of being an independent lies in
his acting according to the dictates of his independent conscience, untrammeled
by the dictates of the Whip of any political party. Accordingly, an independent
could support a proposal of the Government or oppose it, but that would be according
to his independent conscience and if such an independent member joins as a
Minister in the Government formed by a political party, his independence is
compromised and as indicated in Kihoto Hollohan's case (supra), it was for him to
resign his membership of the House and go back to the Electorate for a fresh
mandate.
37.
While
adopting Mr. Satpal Jain's and Mr. Sorabjee's submissions, Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned
39Senior Advocate, who appeared for the Respondent Nos.4 and 5 in the Civil
Appeals arising out of the Special Leave Petitions filed by Sri Shivraj S.
Thangadgi and others, submitted that the said Respondents as voters of the
Constituency which had elected the Appellants as independents were aggrieved by
the fact that the Appellants had acted in a manner which was contradictory to the
object underlining the provisions in the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, namely,
to curb the evil of political defections motivated by lure of office or other similar
considerations which endanger the foundation of our democracy.
Mr. Gupta also relied
on the decisions of this Court in Kihoto Hollohan's case (supra) and G. Vishwanath's
case (supra). Although, the locus standi of the Respondent Nos.4 and 5 to maintain
a complaint under the Disqualification Rules was strongly disputed in the
absence of any mention of a voter having a right to file a complaint, Mr. Gupta
submitted that even if no rules had been framed by the Speaker under paragraph 8
of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the Speaker was still vested with
the authority to take action against an independent member on information received
by him.
Mr. Gupta also relied
on the decisions cited by Mr. Satpal Jain and Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee in support of
his aforesaid contention and submitted that the order of the Speaker impugned in
these appeals did not call for any interference and the Appeals were,
therefore, liable to be dismissed.
38.
Appearing
for Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa in these appeals, Mr. P.S. Narsimha, learned Senior
Advocate, urged that the allegations made against Shri Yeddyurappa of colluding
with the Speaker to obtain an order of disqualification of the Appellants before
the date scheduled for the Vote of Confidence in the House, was wholly unjustified
and uncalled for. Mr. Narsimha submitted that Shri 41Yeddyurappa was duty bound
to inform the Speaker of any incident or incidents that may have occurred after
the Members had been elected to the House, which would disqualify them from the
membership thereof and Shri Yeddyurappa had, therefore, acted as part of the duties
of his office in informing the Speaker by way of the Disqualification
Application regarding the conduct of the Appellants as well as some of the
other MLAs belonging to the Bharatiya Janata Party.
39.
Referring
to the concept of collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers as
envisaged in Article 75 of the Constitution, Mr. Narsimha submitted that as had
been commented upon in M.P. Jain's "Indian Constitutional Law", (Sixth
Edition), "a notable principle underlying the working of Parliamentary Government
is the principle of collective responsibility which represents ministerial accountability
to the legislature" and that Article 75(3) lays down that the Council of Ministers
shall be collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. Mr. Narsimha urged that the
principle of collective responsibility ensured the unity of the Members of the Government
and also made sure that each individual Minister took responsibility in regard to
Cabinet decisions and to take action to implement the same.
40.
Mr.
Narsimha submitted that as soon as the Appellants joined the Ministry led by Shri
Yeddyurappa as Ministers, they divested themselves of their independent character
and became collectively responsible to the other Members of the Cabinet and the
Members of the State Assembly for governance of the State.
41.
Most
of the grounds taken in the present set of appeals were also taken in the Civil
Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition Nos.33123-33155 of 2010 and other
connected appeals filed by Balachandra L. Jarkiholi and others. As indicated
hereinbefore the only point of difference between the two sets of appeals is that
while in the earlier set of appeals the issue involved was whether the Appellants
had voluntarily given up their membership of the Bharatiya Janata Party so as to
attract the disqualification provisions contained in paragraph 2(a) of the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution, in the present set of appeals the question is whether
the Appellants having been elected as independent members of the Karnataka
Assembly had incurred disqualification from the membership of the House in terms
of paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution by joining the Bharatiya
Janata Party through their acts of extending support to a government led by
Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa and becoming Ministers in the said government.
42.
From
the facts as disclosed during the hearing and the materials on record, it is the
admitted case of both the parties that the Appellants had been elected to the 13th
Karnataka Legislative Assembly as independent candidates in the elections held in
May 2008. It is also not disputed that immediately after the declaration of the
results of the Assembly Elections on 25.5.2008, Shri B. S. Yeddyurappa secured letters
of support from the Appellants herein on 26th May, 2008, and on the same day he
addressed a letter to the Governor claiming majority support of the House which
included the support of the Appellants herein, with a request to the Governor to
appoint him as Chief Minister of the State. It is also undisputed that on 30.5.2008
Shri Yeddyurappa was sworn in as Chief Minister of Karnataka along with the Appellants
as Cabinet Ministers and on 4.6.2008, he proved his majority in the House.
43.
The
question with which we are concerned is whether by their said acts, or acts subsequent
thereto, the Appellants could be said to have joined the Bharatiya Janata
Party.
44.
After
having been sworn in as Ministers in the Government led by Shri Yeddyurappa, the
Appellants undisputedly attended meetings of the B.J.P. Legislature Party and had
also participated in rallies and public meetings which had been conducted by
the said party.
The Speaker, as well
as the Full Bench of the High Court, came to the conclusion that by offering letters
of support to Shri Yeddyurappa and joining his Council of Ministers, the Appellants
had shed their independent status and had joined the Bharatiya Janata Party, and
the same was subsequently corroborated by their further action in attending the
meetings of the B.J.P. Legislature Party and participating in its programmes. Both
the Speaker and the High Court, therefore, held that the Appellants had become disqualified
from the Membership of the House under paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule of
the Constitution.
45.
In
the absence of any written and/or documentary proof of the Appellants having
joined the Bharatiya Janata Party, both the Speaker and the High Court relied on
the decision of this Court in Ravi Naik's case (supra), which was subsequently followed
in Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh's case (supra) and Jagjit Singh's case (supra),
in which it was held that in order to incur disqualification under paragraph
2(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution it was not always necessary that
a written communication would have to be made to the political party in that
regard. As far as issuance of Whip by the Chief Whip of the Bharatiya Janata Party
is concerned, such an act would not ipso facto be taken as 47conclusive proof that
the Appellants had joined Bharatiya Janata Party. Furthermore, in the face of denial
by the Appellants of having been served with the Whip, there is nothing on
record to prove that they were actually received by the Appellants.
46.
The
decisions referred to hereinabove have settled certain principles of law relating
to interpretation of the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, but
the said principles have to be applied in each case in its own set of facts. In
the facts of this case, there is no material or evidence to show that the
Appellants had at any time joined the B.J.P. Even as independents, the Appellants
could extend support to a government formed by a political party and could become
a Minister in such government. There is no legal bar against such extension of
support or joining the government.
Hence, such extension
of support or joining the government as Minister by an independent does not by itself
mean that he has joined the political party which formed the government. There
is also no evidence to show that the Appellants were accepted and treated as
members of the B.J.P. by that political party. It is to be noted that the Petitioners
before the Speaker had no grievance about the Appellants supporting the B.J.P. Government
and becoming Ministers in the government, for more than two years.
Only when the Appellants
withdrew support to the government led by Shri Yeddyurappa and a Confidence Vote
was scheduled to be held, the Petitioners raked up the issue of alleged
disqualification. The Appellants, even while participating in the meetings of the
B.J.P. Legislature Party, were shown separately in a category different from the
other participants in such meetings, which clearly indicates that the
Appellants, though Ministers in the Government led by Shri Yeddyurappa, were treated
differently from 49members of B.J.P. and were considered to be only lending support
to the Government led by Shri Yeddyurappa, without losing their independent
status. Mere participation in the rallies or public meetings organised by the
B.J.P. cannot lead to the conclusion that the Appellants had joined the B.J.P.
47.
The
results of the election were declared on 25th May, 2008. Sri B.S. Yeddyurappa was
elected as Leader of the B.J.P. Legislature Party on 26th May, 2008. The
Appellants who had been elected as Independents declared their support to Sri
Yeddyurappa as Chief Minister on 26th May, 2008. In the Notification dated 27th
May, 2008 constituting the Legislative Assembly, the Appellants were shown as
Independents.
In the statement
submitted by the Leader of the B.J.P. Legislature Party, the names of Appellants
were not included in the list of B.J.P. members. In the Registers maintained by
the 50Speaker under Rules 3 & 4 of the Disqualification Rules, the Appellants
were shown as Independents and at any time after they were sworn in as
Ministers on 30th May, 2008, no change was effected in the Registers. No information
was furnished either by the Appellants or by the B.J.P. Legislature Party to include
the Appellants among B.J.P. members.
Thus, as per the Records
of the Legislative Assembly, the Appellants were not members of B.J.P. when the
order of disqualification was passed by the Speaker.
48.
We
are unable to accept the submission made on behalf of the Respondents that by
extending support to Shri Yeddyurappa in the formation of the Bharatiya Janata Party
led government, the Appellants had sacrificed their independent identities. The
fact that the said Appellants also joined the Council of Ministers does not
also point to such an eventuality.
It is no doubt true that
an independent legislator does not always have to express his intention to join
a party in writing, but the mere extension of support to Shri Yeddyurappa and the
decision to join his Cabinet, in our view, were not sufficient to conclude that
the Appellants had decided to join and/or had actually joined the Bharatiya Janata
Party, particularly on account of the subsequent conduct in which they were treated
differently from the Members of the Bharatiya Janata Party.
In view of our finding
that the Appellants had not joined any political party as alleged, the order of
disqualification passed by the Speaker was against the Constitutional mandate in
para 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.
49.
This
leaves us with the other question as to whether the Speaker acted in contravention
of the provisions of Rule 7(3) of the Disqualification Rules under which a
Member of the House, to whom a Show-Cause Notice is issued, has to be given 7
days' time or more to reply to the Show-Cause Notice. The question which immediately
follows is whether the Speaker acted in hot haste in disposing of the Disqualification
Application against the Appellants for their disqualification from the House. Yet
another question which arises is with regard to the scope of judicial review of
an order passed by the Speaker under paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution, having regard to the provisions of Article 212 thereof.
50.
There
is no denying the fact that the Show-Cause Notices issued to the Appellants were
not in conformity with the provisions of Rules 6 and 7 of the Karnataka Legislative
Assembly (Disqualification of Members on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986,
inasmuch as, the Appellants were not given 7 days' time to reply to the Show-Cause
Notices as contemplated under Rule 7(3) of 53the aforesaid Rules.
Without replying to the
said objection raised, the Speaker avoided the issue by stating that it was sufficient
for attracting the provisions of paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution
that the Appellants herein had admitted that they had withdrawn support to the
Government led by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa. The Speaker further recorded that the Appellants
had been represented by counsel who had justified the withdrawal of support to
the Government led by Shri Yeddyurappa. Without giving further details, the
Speaker observed that the Disqualification Rules had been held by this Court to
be directory and not mandatory, as they were to be followed for the sake of
convenience.
The provisions of
Rule 7(3) of the Disqualification Rules were held by the High Court to be directory
in nature and that deviation from the said Rules could not and did not vitiate the
procedure contemplated under the Rules, unless the violation of the procedure is
shown to have resulted in prejudice to the Appellants. The Speaker wrongly relied
upon the affidavit filed by Shri K.S. Eswarappa, State President of the B.J.P.,
although there was nothing on record to support the allegations which had been made
therein. In fact, the said affidavit had not been served on the Appellants. Since
Shri K.S. Eswarappa was not a party to the proceedings, the Speaker should have
caused service of copies of the same on the Appellants to meet the allegations made
therein.
Coupled with the fact
that the Speaker had violated the provisions of Rule 7(3) of the
Disqualification Rules in giving the Appellants less than 7 days' time to reply
to the Show-Cause Notices issued to them, failure of the Speaker to cause service
of copies of the affidavit affirmed by Shri K.S. Eswarappa amounted to denial of
natural justice to the Appellants, besides revealing a partisan attitude in the
Speaker's approach in disposing of the Disqualification Application filed by Shri
B.S. 55Yeddyurappa.
If the Speaker had
wanted to rely on the statements made in the aforesaid affidavit, he should have
given the Appellants an opportunity of questioning the deponent as to the truth
of the statements made in his affidavit. This conduct on the part of the Speaker
also indicates the hot haste with which the Speaker disposed of the
Disqualification Application, raising doubts as to the bona fides of the action
taken by him. The explanation given by the Speaker as to why the notices to show
cause had been issued to the Appellants under Rule 7 of the Disqualification
Rules, giving the Appellants only 3 days' time to respond to the same, is not very
convincing.
There was no compulsion
on the Speaker to decide the Disqualification Applications in such a great
hurry, within the time specified by the Governor for the holding of a Vote of Confidence
in the government headed by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa. It would appear that such a course
of action was 56adopted by the Speaker on 10th October, 2010, since the Vote of
Confidence on the Floor of the House was to be held on 12th October, 2010.
We have no hesitation
to hold that the Speaker's order was in violation of Rules 6 & 7 of the Disqualification
Rules and the rules of natural justice and that such violation resulted in prejudice
to the Appellants. Therefore, we hold that even if Rules 6 & 7 are only directory
and not mandatory, the violation of Rules 6 & 7 resulting in violation of
the rules of natural justice has vitiated the order of the Speaker and it is
liable to be set aside.
51.
We
are next faced with the question as to the manner in which the Disqualification
Applications were proceeded with and disposed of by the Speaker. On 6th October,
2010, on receipt of identical letters from the Appellants withdrawing support to
the B.J.P. Government led by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa, the Governor on the very
same day wrote a letter to 57the Chief Minister informing him of the
developments regarding the withdrawal of support of the 5 independent MLAs and 13
B.J.P. MLAs and requesting him to prove his majority on the Floor of the House
on or before 12th October, 2010 by 5.00 p.m.
The Speaker was also
requested to take steps accordingly. On the very same day, Shri B.S.
Yeddyurappa, as the leader of the B.J.P. in the Legislative Assembly, filed an application
before the Speaker under Rule 6 of the Disqualification Rules, 1986, for a
declaration that all the 13 MLAs elected on B.J.P. tickets along with two other
independent MLAs, had incurred disqualification under the Tenth Schedule to the
Constitution.
Immediately thereafter,
on 7th October, 2010, the Speaker issued Show-Cause Notices to the concerned
MLAs informing them of the Disqualification Application filed by Shri B.S.
Yeddyurappa and also informing them that by withdrawing support to the
Government led by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa, they were 58disqualified from continuing
as Members of the House in view of paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule to
the Constitution.
On 7th October, 2010
itself, Petitions were filed against the Appellants by the Respondents and the Speaker
on 8th October, 2010 issued show-cause notices to the Appellants. The Appellants
and the B.J.P. MLAs to whom show-cause notices were issued were given time till
5.00 p.m. on 10th October, 2010, to submit their objection, if any, to the said
application.
Apart from the fact
that the Appellants were not given 7 days' time to file their reply to the Show-Cause
Notices, the High Court did not give serious consideration to the fact that even
service of the Show-Cause Notices on the Appellants and the 13 MLAs belonging to
the Bharatiya Janata Party had not been properly effected. Furthermore, the MLAs
who were sought to be disqualified were also not served with copies of the Affidavit
filed by Shri K.S. Eswarappa, although the Speaker relied heavily 59on the contents
thereof in arriving at the conclusion that they stood disqualified under
paragraph 2(1)(a)/2(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution.
The MLAs were not supplied
with copies of the affidavits filed by Sri M.P. Renukacharya and Shri Narasimha
Nayak, whereby they had retracted the statements which they had made in their letters
submitted to the Governor on 6th October, 2010. What is even more glaring is the
fact that the Speaker not only relied upon the contents of the said affidavits,
but also dismissed the Disqualification Application against them on the basis of
such retraction, after having held in the case of 13 MLAs belonging to the Bharatiya
Janata Party that they had violated the provisions of paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution immediately upon their intention to withdraw their
support to the Government led by Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa was communicated to the
Governor.
52.
It
is obvious from the procedure adopted by the Speaker that he was trying to meet
the time schedule set by the Governor for the trial of strength in the Assembly
and to ensure that the Appellants and the 13 B.J.P. MLAs stood disqualified prior
to the date on which the Floor test was to be held. Having concluded the
hearing on 10th October, 2010 by 5.00 p.m., the Speaker passed detailed orders,
in which various judgments, both of Indian Courts and foreign Courts, and
principles of law from various authorities were referred to, on the same day, holding
that the Appellants and the other MLAs stood disqualified as Members of the
House. The Vote of Confidence took place on 11th October, 2010, in which the
disqualified Members could not participate, and in their absence Shri B.S. Yeddyurappa
was able to prove his majority in the House.
53.
Unless
it was to ensure that the Trust Vote did not go against the Chief Minister,
there was hardly any reason for the Speaker to have taken up the
Disqualification Applications in such a great haste.
54.
We
cannot lose sight of the fact that although the same allegations as had been made
by Shri Yeddyurappa against the disqualified B.J.P. MLAs, were made also against
Shri M.P. Renukacharya and Shri Narasimha Nayak, whose retraction was accepted
by the Speaker, despite the view expressed by him that upon submitting the
letter withdrawing support to the B.J.P. Government led by Shri B.S.
Yeddyurappa, all the MLAs stood immediately disqualified under paragraph 2(1)(a)
of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the said two legislators were not disqualified
and they were allowed to participate in the Confidence Vote, for reasons which
are obvious.
55.
Therefore,
we hold that the impugned order of the Speaker is vitiated by mala fides.
56.
On
the question of justiciability of the Speaker's order on account of the expression
of finality in paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, it is now
well-settled that such finality did not bar the jurisdiction of the superior Courts
under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution to judicially review the order
of the Speaker. Under paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the
Speaker discharges quasi-judicial functions, which makes an order passed by him
in such capacity, subject to judicial review.
57.
We
are, therefore, unable to sustain the decision of the Speaker, as affirmed by the
High Court on all counts, and we, accordingly, allow the appeals and set aside the
orders passed by the Speaker on 11th October, 2010 and by the Full Bench of the
High Court on 14th February, 2011.
58.
There
will, however, be no order as to costs.
................................................J.
(ALTAMAS KABIR)
................................................J.
(CYRIAC JOSEPH)
New
Delhi
25.01.2012
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