Supreme Court Bar
Association and others Vs. B.D. Kaushik
Supreme Court Bar
Association Vs. A.K. Manchanda
J U D G M E N T
J.M. Panchal, J.
1.
Since
common issues for determination are involved in Civil Appeal No. 3401 of 2003 and
Civil Appeal No. 3402 of 2003, this Court proposes to dispose them of by this
common judgment.
2.
Civil
Appeal No. 3401 of 2003 is filed by three appellants, i.e., (1) Supreme Court Bar
Association (Registered), through its Honorary Secretary Mr. Ashok Arora, (2) Shri
Ashok Arora, Honorary Secretary of Supreme Court Bar Association and (3) Ms.
Sunita B. Rao, Coordinator, Implementation Committee, Supreme Court Bar Association
(for short "SCBA"), Tilak Marg, New Delhi. It is directed against interim
order dated April 5, 2003, passed by learned Civil Judge, Delhi below application
filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code
(CPC) filed in Civil Suit No. 101 of 2003. Civil Appeal No. 3402 of 2003 is
filed by Supreme Court Bar Association through its Honorary Secretary against
interim order dated April 5, 2003, passed by the learned Civil Judge below
application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151, CPC,
filed in Civil Suit No. 101 of 2003. By the common order, the appellants are restrained
from implementing the resolution dated February 18, 2003 amending Rule 18 of the
Rules and Regulations of SCBA till the final disposal of both the suits.
3.
The
respondent in Civil Appeal No. 3401 of 2003 is Shri B.D. Kaushik whereas the respondent
in Civil Appeal No. 3402 of 2003 is Shri A.K. Manchanda. Both the respondents are
the advocates practicing in Delhi. They are members of SCBA, Delhi High Court
Bar Association, Delhi Bar Association, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, etc. The
appellant No. 1, i.e., Supreme Court Bar Association is a Society registered on
August 25, 1999 under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and its Registration
No. is 35478 of 1999. The Registered Office of the Association is in Supreme
Court premises at New Delhi. The provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860
empower a society to frame Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations.
In exercise of those powers the Association has framed Memorandum of
Association of the SCBA as also the Rules and Regulations. The aims and objectives
of the Association are specified in Clause 3 of the Memorandum of Association,
which are as under: -
"3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES:
The Aims and Objectives of the association are:
i.
To
promote upholding of rule of law;
ii.
To
encourage profession of law in India;
iii.
To
promote and protect the privileges, interest and prestige of the association and
to promote union and cooperation among the advocates practicing in the court and
other associations and advocates;
iv.
To
promote and maintain high standards of profession among members of the Bar;
v.
To
establish and maintain an adequate library for the use of the members and to provide
other facilities and convenience to the members;
vi.
To
watch the state of law, progress of legislation and administration of justice
and to take such steps as may be necessary for their progress and reform;
vii.
To
express opinion on proposed legislation and other matters of interest and to
make representation in respect thereof;
viii.
To
take necessary steps to prevent and remedy any abuse of law or mal- administration
of justice;
ix.
To
make representation from time to time to the authorities on matters affecting
the Bar;
x.
To
acquire and safeguard the rights and privileges necessary or convenient for the
purpose of the association;
xi.
To
arrange for raising funds for legal aid and to do everything including applying
of funds that may be necessary to that end;
xii.
To
promote and participate in All India Lawyers' Association and activities connected
therewith;
xiii.
To
adopt all such matters as might be necessary or incidental to the carrying out
of the aforesaid objects;
xiv.
To
take measures including founding and applying of funds for aid to deserving members
of the association and its employees;
xv.
To
conduct and hold seminars, symposia, conference on issues and topics of interest
to the legal profession and to disseminate information in this behalf; and
xvi.
To
promote the welfare of the members of the association."The Rules and Regulations
framed by the Association are known as Rules and Regulations of Supreme Court
Bar Association. Rule 3 of the Rules and Regulations defines certain phrases. Rule
3(i) defines `Association' to mean the Supreme Court Bar Association. There are
four classes of Members as specified in Rule
4.
They
are (i) Resident Members, (ii) Non-resident Members, (iii) Associate Members, and
(iv) Non-Active Members. As per Rule 3(ii) `Associate Member' means an
association of advocates practicing in a High Court or Judicial Commissioner's
Court and enrolled as such a Member. Rule 3(iv) defines the term `Committee' to
mean Executive Committee of the Bar Association whereas Rule 3(v) defines the
word `Court' to mean the Supreme Court of India. The term `Member' is defined
in Rule 3(vi) to mean a member of Association. Sub-rule (vi)(a) of Rule 3,
which was inserted by resolution of Special General Body Meeting dated September
9, 2010 retrospectively with effect from September 14, 2009, defines `Temporary
Member' to mean a member other than a member within the meaning of Rule 3(vi).
`Non-Active Member' is defined in Rule 3(viii) to mean a Member whose name is kept
on the list of Members notwithstanding he has accepted an office of profit
disentitling him to practice. The phrase `Resident Member' is defined in Rule 3(ix)
to mean a member residing and practicing as an advocate in Delhi or its
suburbs. Rule 5 of the Rules and Regulations deals with fees, admission and
subscription. Rule 5(v)(a) provides that in terms of Rule 5 an applicant found
to be suitable to be made a member of the Association, will be made a member, initially
on temporary basis for a period of two years.
It further provides that
a person so made a member on temporary basis will be identified as temporary
member and such temporary member will be entitled to avail the facilities of
the Association such as library and canteen etc., but he will not have a right to
participate in general meetings as prescribed in Rule 21 or to contest and vote
at the elections as provided in Rule 18 and to be issued a Library Card.
Explanation appended to Rule 5(v)(b) makes it clear that `suitable' means a
person applying must fulfill all the criteria listed in the Rules and
Regulations of the Association, viz., Rule 5(v) and also satisfy the
requirements prescribed in the prescribed form.
As per Rule 5(v)(c)
at the end of two years period from the date of approval of temporary membership
by the Executive Committee, if such temporary member pays SCBA dues without any
default during such period and produces the proof of either of the following of
requirements before the Executive Committee, his name would be considered for being
made a regular Member of the Association - (i) appearance in Supreme Court as
lead counsel in at least five matters in each year of the two years period, or (ii)
appearance in Supreme Court as a junior advocate appearing with any senior advocate/advocate-on
record in at least twenty matters in each year of the two years period, (iii)
only such of the temporary members on satisfying the above requirements at the
end of two years period would be made a member of the Association with an
entitlement to all the privileges of the Association including the right to contest
and vote and Library Card etc., else, he/she shall continue to remain a
temporary member till such time he/she fulfills these conditions.
5.
A
requisition dated January 10, 2003 signed by 343 Members was received in the Office
of the SCBA on January 23, 2003. By the said requisition an amendment was
sought in Rule 18 regarding the eligibility of the members to contest and vote
at an election. It was proposed that the member, who exercises his right to vote
in any High Court or District Court, Advocates'/Bar Association, shall not be eligible
to contest for any post of the SCBA or to cast his vote at the elections. It was
further proposed that every member before casting his vote shall in a prescribed
form give a declaration that he is not voting in any other election of advocates
in the High Court/District Court Bar Association. It was also proposed that if such
a declaration is found to be false, it shall entail automatic suspension of the
member giving such false declaration from membership of SCBA for a period of three
years.
The requisition dated
January 10, 2003 was considered in the Executive Committee meeting held on
February 1, 2003 and it was decided to hold a special General Body Meeting on February
18, 2003 to consider the requisition. Rule 22 of the Rules and Regulations of
SCBA provides that the Executive Committee may call a General Body Meeting on
seven days' notice to the members whereas Rule 23 stipulates the manner in which
notice of meeting has to be given to a member. Accordingly notices for the aforesaid
General Body Meeting were issued by the SCBA on February 6, 2003. The notices were
sent to the members along with the cause list.
The notice was also displayed
on the notice board of the Office of the SCBA situated at Supreme Court
premises. The notices were also sent to different Bar Associations at Delhi
including the Delhi Bar Association. On February 18, 2003 the General Body Meeting
was convened wherein more than 278 Members had participated. Mr. Ved Sharma and
Mr. Rajiv Khosla, Office Bearers/Members of the District/Delhi Bar Association had
participated and had spoken against the resolution in the General Body Meeting.
After due deliberations and discussion, the resolution proposing amendment in Rule
18 of the Rules was put to vote. It was passed by majority of 85% of the
members present and voting.
Thereafter, a meeting
of the Executive Committee was convened on March 3, 2003. In the said meeting
it was resolved to hold election of the Office Bearers/Executive Members for the
next session and for the constitution of Election Committee. It was further
resolved to hold election on April 25, 2003. An election Committee of three
members of the SCBA was constituted for the purposes of conducting election. Further
in the said meeting a requisition signed by 237 Members of SCBA to recall resolution
dated February 18, 2003 was considered and dealt with. It was decided to defer the
consideration of the said resolution in view of the fact that elections were declared.
Moreover, in the meeting
of the Executive Committee held on March 10, 2003 it was resolved to constitute
an Implementation Committee to implement the resolution "One Bar One Vote",
which was adopted in the General Body Meeting dated February 18, 2003. The
notices of the election and about formation of the Implementation Committee were
sent to the Members of the Bar Association on March 11, 2003 again along with the
cause list and conveyed also by displaying the same on the notice board of the SCBA.
On March 13, 2003, meeting of the Implementation Committee was held and the declaration
form was finalized and programme for implementation was also decided.
The notices regarding
declaration form were again issued on March 25, 2003. Meanwhile, Mr. B.D.
Kaushik, who is one of the members of the SCBA as well as a member of the High Court
Bar Association, Delhi Bar Association, Tis Hazari Courts, filed Suit No. 100
of 2003 in the Court of Shri Sanjeev Jain, Commercial Civil Judge, Delhi,
challenging validity of resolution dated February 18, 2003. He has sought a
decree declaring that Resolution dated February 18, 2003, passed by the General
Body Meeting of SCBA inserting Rule 18-III, is illegal and ineffective.
He had also prayed for
a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the SCBA and its Office Bearers
from implementing the Resolution dated February 18, 2003 in the elections of SCBA,
which were proposed to be held on April 25, 2003. Further, the prayer to restrain
the SCBA and its election officers from debarring any of the members of the
SCBA, who had already paid their subscription from casting their votes in the ensuing
elections was also sought. Mr. A.K. Manchanda, another member of the SCBA,
filed suit No. 101 of 2003 in the Court of Shri Sanjeev Jain, Commercial Civil
Judge, Delhi, seeking the reliefs which were sought by Mr. B.D. Kaushik in his
suit No. 100 of 2003.
6.
Mr.
B.D. Kaushik and Mr. A.K. Manchanda, the plaintiffs in Suit Nos. 100 of 2003 and
101 of 2003 respectively, filed applications under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to restrain the defendants, who are appellants
herein, from implementing the Resolution dated February 18, 2003 till the final
disposal of the suits. Both the applications were taken up together for hearing
by the learned Judge. The learned Judge disposed of those applications seeking
temporary injunction by common order dated April 5, 2003. By the said common order
the applications filed by the plaintiffs under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 were allowed
and the appellants were restrained from implementing the Resolution dated
February 18, 2003 amending Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations of the SCBA till
the final disposal of the suits.
As the injunction granted
by the learned Judge had far reaching repercussions, the appellants straightway
approached this Court by filing Special Leave Petition No. D-7644 of 2003 against
order dated April 5, 2003 in Suit No. 100 of 2003, passed by the learned Civil
Judge, Delhi. The SCBA also filed Special leave Petition No. D-7645 of 2003 against
order dated April 5, 2003 in Suit No. 101 of 2003. The matters were placed before
this Court in mentioning list on April 10, 2003. This Court had heard the then
learned Attorney General and other learned senior advocates practicing in this
Court.
The matters were taken
on Board and straightway leave was granted. Pending proceedings, stay of the
common order passed by the trial court was also granted. It was made clear that
if any elections were held, the same shall be subject to the result of these
appeals. It was also clarified that the order shall be effective
notwithstanding any other order made by any court or authority in any other proceedings
filed or yet to be filed. On leave being granted Special Leave Petition No. D-7644
of 2003 is numbered as Civil Appeal No. 3401 of 2003 whereas Special Leave Petition
No. D-7645 of 2003 is numbered as Civil Appeal No. 3402 of 2003.
7.
This
Court had appointed Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel practicing in this
Court, as Amicus Curie to assist the Court in the matters. This Court has also requested
learned Attorney General Mr. Goolam Vahanvati to express his views in the
matters and to assist the Court. Accordingly, this Court has heard learned Attorney
General as well as learned senior counsel Mr. Ranjit Kumar. The Court has also heard
Mr. Rajesh Aggarwal, who has appeared on behalf of the appellants as well as Mr.
Dinesh Kumar Garg, learned advocate who appeared on behalf of the original plaintiffs.
This being a matter, which affects the learned advocates practicing in this
Court, the Court has also heard learned senior counsel Mr. P.P. Rao, former President
of SCBA, Mr. Pravin Parekh, present President of SCBA and Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain,
President of Association of Advocates-on-Record. The Court has considered the Memorandum
of Association of SCBA as well as Rules and Regulations of SCBA.
8.
It
is not disputed by any of the learned advocates appearing in the matters that after
stay of common order dated April 5, 2003, passed in Civil Suit No. 100 of 2003
and Civil Suit No. 101 of 2003 was granted by this Court on April 10, 2003,
elections of the office bearers of the SCBA have taken place and Rule 18 of the
Rules and Regulations, as was amended by the Resolution dated February 18,
2003, has been implemented.
9.
Article
145 (1)(a) of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to make Rules for regulating
generally the practice and procedure of the Court including Rules as to the persons
practicing before the Court. In exercise of this constitutional power, the Supreme
Court has framed Rules called Supreme Court Rules, 1966. Rule 2(1)(b) provides that
an advocate-on-record to be the only person to "act" as well as to
"plead" before this Court. The other two categories of persons, namely,
"senior advocate" and "non-advocate-on-record" can only plead,
but cannot act on behalf of the client.
Their
appearances/pleadings in a case before this Court cannot be without an advocate-on-record
and without his instructions. Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 deals with
"advocates". Rule 1 states that subject to the provisions of the Rules
only those advocates whose names are entered on the roll of any State Bar Council,
maintained under the Advocates Act, 1961, shall be entitled to appear and plead
before the Court. As per Rule 2(b) certain restrictions have been placed on senior
advocate who is recognized as such under Rule 2(a), mentioning inter-alia that he
cannot file a vakalatnama or act in any court or tribunal in India or accept
instructions to draw pleadings or affidavits, etc.
Explanation (iii) appended
to the Order IV defines "junior" to mean an advocate other than a
senior advocate. Rule 6(a) provides that an advocate-on-record shall, on his filing
a memorandum of appearance on behalf of a party accompanied by a vakalatnama
duly executed by the party, is entitled to act as well as to plead for the party
in the matter and to conduct and to prosecute before the Court all proceedings that
may be taken in respect of the said matter. Clause (b) of Rule 6 mentions that no
advocate other than an advocate-on-record shall be entitled to file an
appearance or act for a party in the court. Rule 10 of the Rules provides that
no advocate other than an advocate-on-record shall appear and plead in any matter
unless he is instructed by an advocate-on-record,
whereas Rule 12
enables an advocate-on-record or a firm of advocates to employ one or more clerks
to attend the registry for presenting or receiving any papers on behalf of the said
advocate or firm of advocates. Rule 12(2) mandates that notice of every application
for the registration of a clerk shall be given to the Secretary, SCBA, who shall
be entitled to bring to the notice of the Registrar within seven days of the
receipt of the notice any facts, which, in his opinion, may have a bearing on the
suitability of the clerk to be registered.
Rule 13(1) requires
the Registrar to publish list of persons proved to his satisfaction by evidence
of general repute or otherwise, habitually to act as touts to be known as list of
touts. Explanation (b) appended to Rule 13(1) mentions that the passing of a resolution
by the SCBA or by High Court Bar Association declaring any person to be tout shall
be evidence of general repute of such person for the purpose of this Rule.
10.
The
Advocates Act, 1961 provides for the creation of different State Bar Councils,
whose one or the main function is to admit advocates on its rolls and to
promote the growth of Bar Associations for the purpose of effective implementation
of the welfare schemes. It further enables the Bar Councils to make their own
rules. Section 17 of the Advocates Act provides that every Sate Bar Council shall
prepare and maintain roll of advocates. Section 17(4) further states that no
person shall be enrolled as an advocate on the roll of more than one State Bar
Council. Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961 empowers the Bar Council of
India to make rules.
In exercise of the
said power Bar Council of India has framed Rules. Chapter III of Bar Council
Rules provides that every advocate shall be under an obligation to ensure that
his name appears on the roll of the State Bar Council in whose jurisdiction he
ordinarily practices and if that advocate does not apply for transfer of his
name to the roll of State Bar Council within whose jurisdiction he ordinarily
practices within six months of the start of such practice, it shall be deemed that
he is guilty of professional misconduct. Section 34 of the Advocates Act, 1961
also empowers the High Courts to make Rules regarding the advocate practicing in
the High Court and courts subordinate thereto.
11.
The
learned counsel, appearing in the matters, pointed out to the Court that problem
of bogus voting in the election of office bearers of SCBA started since the year
1978. According to the learned counsel, in the year 1978, 101 Members contested
election for the post of Members of Executive Committee. The grievance made by
the learned counsel was that those advocates, who were not regularly practicing
in this Court, were enrolled as Members of the SCBA only to vote at the election
of office bearers of the SCBA.
According to the learned
counsel, the advocates, who have been enrolled as Members of the SCBA are practicing
either at Kanpur or at Gurgaon and other courts situated in India, but they
never practice in this Court regularly nor are even able to recognize the Hon'ble
Judges of this Court. The learned counsel emphasized that those advocates, who are
not practicing in this Court and are enrolled as members of the SCBA, have outnumbered
the actual practitioners in this Court and do not permit the actual
practitioners to be office bearers of the SCBA. Thus the learned advocates
appearing in the matters have called upon this Court to consider the problem posed
in the appeals in the light of facts mentioned by them.
12.
The
Supreme Court Bar Association, as the name suggests, is a society primarily
meant to promote the welfare of the advocates generally practicing in the Supreme
Court. The name, i.e., the Supreme Court Bar Association was formally registered
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 only on August 25, 1999. One of the
prime objectives of the SCBA is to establish and maintain adequate library for the
use of the members and to provide other facilities and convenience of the members.
Thus, the formation of the SCBA is in the nature of aid to the Advocates Act, 1961
and other relevant statutes including Article 145 of the Constitution.
13.
There
is no manner of doubt that court annexed Bar Associations constitute a separate
class different from other lawyers associations such as Lawyers' Forum, All
India Advocates' Association, etc. as they are always recognized by the concerned
court. Court annexed Bar Associations function as part of the machinery for administration
of justice. As is said often, the Bench and Bar are like two wheels of a chariot
and one cannot function without the other. The court annexed Bar Associations start
with the name of the court as part of the name of the Bar Association concerned.
That is why we have Supreme
Court Bar Association, Tis Hazari District Court Bar Association, etc. The very
nature of such a Bar Association necessarily means and implies that it is an association
representing members regularly practicing in the court and responsible for proper
conduct of its members in the court and for ensuring proper assistance to the
court. In consideration thereof, the court provides space for office of the association,
library and all necessary facilities like chambers at concessional rates for
members regularly practicing in the court, parking place, canteen besides several
other amenities. In the functions organized by the court annexed Bar Associations
the Judges participate and exchange views and ascertain the problems, if any,
to solve them and vice-versa. There is thus regular interaction between the members
of the Bar Association and the Judges. The regular practitioners are treated as
officers of the court and are shown due consideration.
14.
Enrolment
of advocates not practicing regularly in the court is inconsistent with the main
aim and object of the Association. No court can provide chambers or other facilities
for such outside advocates, who are not regular practitioners. Neither the Association
nor the court can deal with them effectively if they commit any wrong. There are
sufficient indications in the Memorandum of Association and the Rules and Regulations
of SCBA, which indicate that the Association mainly tries to promote and protect
the privileges, interest and prestige of the Association and to promote union
and cooperation among the advocates practicing in the court and other
associations of advocates.
This is quite evident
if one refers to sub-clause (iii) of clause (3) of the Aims and Objectives of
the Association. It is significant to note that the signatories of the Memorandum
of Association, namely, Members of the Executive Committee, whose names are mentioned,
are all regular practitioners, who got the Association registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel has given all
credit for registration of Association to Shri K.K. Venugopal, one of the
senior-most counsel of this Court.
15.
Rule
6 of the Rules and Regulations of the SCBA mentions the duties of Members. It inter
alia provides that (i) a member shall endeavour to provide full assistance to the
court and competent representation to a client, (iii) a member shall not knowingly
(a) make a false statement of material fact or of law to the court, (b) shall
not seek to influence the court or Judges or officers of the court in any matter
by means prohibited by law or by false representation on behalf of his client nor
shall such member communicate with such persons ex-parte or engage in conduct
intending to bring disrepute to the functioning of the court. Rule 6(iii)(c) provides
that a member of the Association shall participate in serving those persons/groups
of persons who are unable to pay all or portion of reasonable fees or who are unable
to obtain representation by counsel. Clause (c) of Rule 6(iii) inter alia states
that a member may discharge his duty to serve those persons who are unable to
pay all or portions of reasonable fees by providing professional services at no
fees or at a substantially reduced fee.
A member of the Association
has to charge reasonable fees from his client which has to be determined on the
basis of the time and labour spent over the matter and is not entitled to
charge a contingent fee. Thus duties of members contemplate that the members should
be regular practitioners in the Supreme Court.
16.
As
noticed earlier, no person can be enrolled as an advocate on the roll of more than
one State Bar Council. A citizen of India is entitled to cast his vote at an
election of Legislative Assembly or an election of M.P. only in the
constituency where his name appears as a voter in the voting list and he cannot
claim right to vote at another place where he may be residing because of his occupation,
service, etc. Thus "one person one vote" is recognized statutorily
since long. Viewed in the light of these facts, the concept of voting introduced
by amendment of Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations of the SCBA cannot be
regarded as illegal or unconstitutional.
It is well settled by
catena of reported decisions of this Court that the right to vote is not an absolute
right. Right to vote or to contest election is neither a Fundamental Right nor
a common law right, but it is purely a statutory right governed by statute/ rules/regulations.
The right to contest an election and to vote can always be restricted or abridged,
if statute/ rules or regulations prescribe so. Voting right restrictions also
existed in Rule 18 and 18A before Rule 18 was amended. By amendment a further
restriction is imposed by the Resolution adopted in the General Body Meeting.
17.
The
argument that by the said amendment of Rule 18 the Aims and Objects of the SCBA
are amended without prior approval of the Registrar of Societies and, therefore,
the same is illegal, cannot be accepted. The impugned order makes it more than clear
that this ground has heavily weighed with the learned Judge in granting the injunction.
The substance and purpose of the amendment made in Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations
of the SCBA cannot be lost site of. It does not affect any of the aims and
objectives of the SCBA. On the contrary, it promotes and protects privileges, interest
and prestige of the SCBA. There is no manner of doubt that the amended Rule 18 promotes
union and cooperation among the advocates practicing in this Court and this is
one of the prime aims and objectives of forming the SCBA. The SCBA exists for the
purpose of promoting the interest of the Supreme Court of India as well as that
of advocates regularly practicing in the Court and not of the advocates, who are
not regularly practicing in the Court.
18.
It
has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that
restrictions placed on right of voting can hardly be regarded as altering or
amending Aims and Objects of SCBA. The Aims and Objects of SCBA have been
enumerated in earlier part of this judgment. The basic principle underlying the
amendment of Rule 18 is that those advocates who are not practicing regularly in
this Court cannot be permitted to take over the affairs of the SCBA nor on
ransom. One of the Aims and Objects of the SCBA is to promote and protect the privileges,
interest and prestige of the Association whereas another objective is to promote
and maintain high standards of profession among members of the Bar. To achieve these
objectives Rule 18 is amended. It is wrong to hold that
limitations/restrictions on the exercise of right to vote and contest the
elections amount to altering and/or amending and/ or changing Aims and Objects
of the SCBA and this could not have been done without the consent of Registrar
as provided in Societies Registration Act, 1860.
19.
Section
12 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 invests a society with the power to frame
rules/ regulations to govern the body of any society under the Act, which has been
established for any particular purpose or purposes. In built in it is the
authority to alter or abridge such power. If such a wide power is conferred
including power to alter, amend or abridge the purpose itself, it could never be
successfully contended that the power to amend, vary or rescind the rules does not
exist in such society.
20.
As
noticed earlier `Associate Member' means an association of advocates practicing
in a High Court or Judicial Commissioners' Court and enrolled as such a member.
As an association of advocates cannot practice in a High Court or Judicial
Commissioners' Court, it is obvious that an associate member is a member of
association of advocates practicing in a High Court and enrolled as such a Member.
The intention, therefore, is obvious that it is only an advocate, who is
practicing in a High Court or in a court of Judicial Commissioner and enrolled as
a member, who is entitled to the status of an `Associate Member' for the purpose
of the Rules and Regulations of the SCBA. When it comes to the question of voting
or contesting for an election, Rule 18(1)(iv) declares that non-active members and
associate members shall not have right to vote. It is, therefore, clear that
the SCBA is constituted primarily for those advocates who are regularly practicing
in the Supreme Court. Other advocates can become non-resident senior members, non-resident
members, associate members and non-active members, but they will not be eligible
to vote much less to contest the election. Thus, the amendment in Rule 18 is wholly
consistent with the aims and objectives of the SCBA.
21.
This
Court further finds that in the application filed by the respondents/plaintiffs
in each suit under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC, injunction
against the appellants to restrain them from implementing resolution dated February
18, 2003 amending Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations of SCBA till the final disposal
of the suits, was claimed. A bare perusal of the plaint of Civil Suit No. 100
of 2003 indicates that the respondent has claimed following reliefs in the
plaint: -
"a. A decree of
declaration declaring that the resolution dated 18.2.2003 passed by the alleged
General Body Meeting of Supreme Court Bar Association amending Rule 18-III is illegal
and ineffective;
b. pass a decree of perpetual
injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 Association and its office bearers from
implementing the resolution dated 18.2.2003 in the ensuing elections of Supreme
Court Bar Association proposed to be held on 25.4.2003;
c. This Hon'ble Court
may also be pleased to restrain the defendant No. 1 association, its election officer(s)
from debarring any of the members of Supreme Court Bar Association who have already
paid their subscription from casting their vote in the ensuing elections.
d. Any other proper and
further order which this Hon'ble Court deems fit may kindly be passed in favour
of the plaintiff and against the defendants."Thus, the learned Judge has decreed
the suit partially by granting injunction without adjudicating rival claims of the
parties. This Court in catena of reported decisions has laid down the principle
that interim relief, which has tendency to allow the final relief claimed in
the proceedings, should not be granted lightly. No special circumstances have been
mentioned in the two impugned orders which would justify decreeing the suits at
interim stage. The relief granted by the learned Judge at the interim stage was
not warranted by the facts of the case at all. Therefore, the impugned orders
are also liable to be set aside on this ground.
22.
Further,
Order 39 Rule 1 deals with cases in which temporary injunction may be granted and
inter alia provides that where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise
- (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted,
damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of
a decree, (b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of
his property with a view to defrauding his creditors, (c) that the defendant threatens
to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation
to any property in dispute in the suit, the Court may, by order, grant a temporary
injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying
and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale removal or disposition of
the property or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the
plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the Court
thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.
Order 39 Rule 2 deals
with injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach and inter alia
provides that in any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a
breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed
in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the
suit and either before or after judgment, apply to the court for a temporary
injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury
complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out
of the same contract or relating to the same property or right.
As is well-known
Section 151 deals with saving of inherent powers of the Court and provides that
nothing in Civil Procedure Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect
the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the
ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
23.
It
hardly needs to be emphasized that in any Body governed by democratic principles,
no member has a right to claim an injunction so as to stall the formation of the
Governing Body of the Association. No such right exists in election matters since
exercise of a right conferred by a rule is always subject to the qualifications
prescribed and limitations imposed thereunder. The contention of the respondents
that the amendment to Rule whereunder the right to be eligible to contest for
any post for the Association or the eligibility to cast the vote at the election,
takes away the right completely, is misconceived since by the amendment the right
is not taken away but is preserved subject to certain restrictions on its
exercise and this could always be done.
24.
It
is important to notice that what the impugned Rule does is that it only
declares the eligibility of a member to contest and vote and does not take away
ipso facto the right to vote. The impugned Rule only prescribes the eligibility
or makes a person ineligible in the circumstances stated therein which is the nature
of a reasonable restriction as the right to vote is neither a common law right nor
Fundamental Right but a statutory right prescribed by the statute as has been held
in several reported decisions of this Court.
What is necessary to be
noticed here is that the impugned clause in the Rule is not the only clause prescribing
ineligibility to vote as there are other eligibility conditions or
ineligibility restrictions within Rule 18, which may also make a person ineligible
to vote. The challenge, therefore, to this ineligibility of filing a
declaration not to vote at the elections to any other Bar Association is
erroneous in law. If a person is the member of several associations of advocates
and wants to participate in the affairs of different associations of which he/she
is a member, he/she may not be in a position to be really involved in the
affairs of all associations of which he/she is the member.
A person who is a
member of more than one association would form a different class than the
person who is a member of only one association of lawyers, particularly, the association
of the Court in which he/she regularly practices. Though an advocate can be
member of several associations, the right to form an association or be a member
of an association does not necessarily include the right to vote at every such
association's General Body Meeting or election meetings and the rules of the
association can circumscribe the voting rights of members of such association by
prescribing eligibility and ineligibility. It is an admitted position that SCBA
today has temporary members who do not have a right to vote.
Similarly, non-active
members and associate members do not have a right to vote. Thus, these are all
reasonable restrictions which have been prescribed and are not open to
challenge as there is no Fundamental Right to vote. After all a Bar Association
in a court is formed for the purpose of seeing that all lawyers practicing normally
and regularly in that court work under one umbrella and be in a position to
interact with the Judges or officials of that court for any grievance through their
elected body because individual lawyers are not supposed nor it is proper for them
to interact with the Judges so as to preserve and secure the independence of judiciary.
25.
The
argument of the respondents was that the right to vote available to a member has
been infringed or curtailed but this argument does not appear to be correct for
the simple reason that though the Rule is couched in a negative language, it preserves
the right of a Member to either contest or to cast his vote in the election subject
to his exercising an option to vote only in the SCBA and not in any High Court/District
Court Bar Association.
This is amply clear from
the amended provision whereunder every member before casting his vote, is
required, in the prescribed form, to give a declaration that he has not voted in
any other election of any advocates in the High Court/District Court Bar
Association. The restriction on the right to vote of a member is provided with an
avowed object of better welfare and convenience of those advocates, who are regularly
practicing in this Court and who are directly concerned with day-to-day affairs
of the Supreme Court.
Such restriction in fact
subserves Article 145 of the Constitution and other statutory provisions relating
to advocates. As right to vote is not an absolute right recognized in common
law and is always subject to the statute/Rules creating such rights, it is equally
well settled that the exercise of such right could always be subject to the provisions
of the Statute/Rules creating it. Under the circumstances, the contention advanced
by the respondents that their right to vote was either curtailed or abridged should
not have been lightly accepted by the learned Judge.
26.
The
right to form an association is recognized as a Fundamental Right under Article
19(1)(c) of the Constitution. The provision in the SCBA Rules for prescribing
eligibility to vote at only one of the associations, i.e., "One Bar One Vote"
is a prescription which is in furtherance of the right to form association and be
able to manage the affairs of the association by those who regularly practice
in the courts of which the association is formed and of which the members are regular
practitioners.
It will not be out of
place to mention that a person having become ineligible to vote because of having
voted at another association election does not (a) lose the membership of the association
nor (b) is in any way hampered or restricted in the use of other facilities, which
the association provides to its members such as library, canteen,
telecommunication, car parking, etc. Having regard to the aims and objects as set
out in the Memorandum of Association, it is evident that one of the primary objectives
of formation of the association was to have a Body of Advocates who are attached
to and practicing in the Supreme Court of India.
In Smt. Damyanti Naranga
vs. The Union of India and others (1971) 1 SCC 678, this Court has
authoritatively laid down that the right to form an association necessarily
implies that persons forming the association have also the right to continue to
be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the association. In
Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. and others vs. District Registrar,
Cooperative Societies (Urban) and others (2005) 5 SCC 632, in the context of
Fundamental Right to form an association excluding others and the right of the
Members of the association to keep others out, it has been held in para 17 at
page 651 as under: -
"Section 24 of
the Act, no doubt, speaks of open membership, but Section 24(1) makes it clear that
open membership is the membership of a person duly qualified therefore under the
provisions of the Act, the Rules and the bye-laws of the Society. In other words,
Section 24(1) does not contemplate an open membership dehorns the bye-laws of
the society. Nor do we find anything in the Act which precludes a society from prescribing
a qualification for membership based on a belief, a persuasion or a religion for
that matter. Section 30(2) of the Act even places restrictions on the right of a
member to transfer his right. In fact, the individual right of the member,
Respondent 2, has got submerged in the collective right of the Society. In State
of U.P. v. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees' Coop. Society Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC 681, this Court
after referring to Daman Singh vs. State of Punjab (1985) 2 SCC 670, held in para
16 that: (SCC p. 691)
"16. Thus, it is
settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) to
become a member of a cooperative society. His right is governed by the provisions
of the statute. So, the right to become or to continue being a member of the
society is a statutory right. On fulfillment of the qualifications prescribed
to become a member and for being a member of the society and on admission, he becomes
a member. His being a member of the society is subject to the operation of the Act,
rules and bye- laws applicable from time to time. A member of the society has no
independent right qua the society and it is the society that is entitled to represent
as the corporate aggregate. No individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality
of the provisions of the Act, rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under
the Act, rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot
rise higher than the source."
27.
In
matters of internal management of an association, the courts normally do not
interfere, leaving it open to the association and its members to frame a particular
bye-law, rule or regulation which may provide for eligibility and or qualification
for the membership and/or providing for limitations/restrictions on the exercise
of any right by and as a member of the said association. It is well settled legal
proposition that once a person becomes a member of the association, such a
person looses his individuality qua the association and he has no individual
rights except those given to him by the rules and regulations and/or bye-laws of
the association.
28.
It
should have been noticed by the learned Judge that the plaintiffs/respondents claimed
injunction on the basis that the right to contest and vote in the election of the
SCBA had been adversely affected and, therefore, they invoked the provisions of
Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC. The amended Rule 18 has not taken
away right to vote completely but has put restrictions to promote and protect the
privileges, interest and prestige of the SCBA. Rule 18 was also amended to promote
and maintain high standards of profession amongst Members of the Bar. Having
regard to the objects of amendment of Rule 18, this Court is of the opinion that
the learned Judge should not have granted the injunction as claimed by the plaintiffs/respondents
for mere asking.
29.
Originally
enacted Rule 18 provided for eligibility of members to contest and vote at/in the
elections. An important provision is contained in Rule 18(II)(4) to the effect that
non-active members and associate members shall not have the right to vote. In
light of the above provisions of the Rules, more particularly, Rule 5(1)(v), the
eligibility of every advocate entitled to practice law for being a member of the
Supreme Court Bar Association is subject to the provisions of the said Rules. In
other words, an absolute right as is sought to be asserted by the plaintiffs/respondents
is controlled by conditions, qualifications, disqualifications and restrictions
imposed by the said Rules.
30.
The
power to amend Rules is specifically conferred under Rule 39 whereunder it is provided
that the Rules and the bye-laws of the Association shall be subject to such conditions
and/or modifications, as may from time to time, by resolution passed by at least
2/3rd of the Members present and voting at the General Body Meeting. Therefore,
any part of the Rules could always be amended. As noticed earlier, SCBA being a
Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, is governed by its
Memorandum of Association.
The said Association
is entitled to have its own Rules and Regulations. In fact, it is contemplated in
the Act that a Committee of management can be constituted to manage the affairs
of the Society as specified in the Rules and Regulations. The Memorandum of
Association is a contract amongst the members of the Society, which though
required to be registered under the Statute, does not acquire any statutory
character. These are rules which govern internal control and management of the Society.
The authority to frame, amend, vary and rescind such rules, undoubtedly, vests in
the General Body of the Members of the Society. The power to amend the rules is
implicit in the power to frame rules.
31.
Yet,
another ground of attack in the suits filed by the respondents is with reference
to notice of meetings and the manner of holding of meetings including Special General
Meeting. The record produced by the SCBA before this Court indicates that the meeting
in which the amendment was carried out in Rule 18 was held in accordance with Rule
22 because it was a Special General Meeting. The holding of meetings including Special
General Meeting is governed by Rules 21, 22 and 23, which read as under: -
"21. MEETINGS
The Annual General Meeting
of the Association shall ordinarily be held not later than 15th day of May every
year. Not less than 15 days notice shall be given to the members of the Annual General
Meeting. The following shall along with other business that may be required to be
transacted, be included in the agenda of the Annual General Meeting.
a) Auditor's Report on
the Account and Balance Sheet of Budget estimate;
b) Report of the
Secretary on the activities of the terms which will include report of the work of
committee other than the Executive Committee;
c) The election of the
officers of the Association and Members of Executive Committee or other committees
and appointment of Auditors;
d) The approval of
the revenue account and the balance sheet of the affairs of the Association as on
31st March of the previous year duly passed.22. SPECIAL GENERAL MEETING The
Committee may call a General Meeting on 7 days notice to the Members provided
that a Special General Meeting may be called on a shorter notice.
Provided that the
Secretary may call an emergent General Meeting on any day by affixing a notice
to that effect on the notice board of the Association and circulating the same to
the Members as can be conveniently informed. The Committee shall call a General
Meeting or a Special General Meeting upon the requisition given in writing by at
least 150 Members of the Association in respect of any matter. The requisition
specified the matter or question to be laid before the meeting and shall be addressed
to the Secretary. The meeting shall be called not later than 2 weeks after the
receipt of such requisition. The quorum at the Annual General Meeting or a General
Meeting or a Special General Meeting shall be 50 Members. In absence of such quorum
the meeting shall stand adjourned to such a date and time as the Chairman may
appoint and for such adjourn meeting no quorum will be necessary.
23. NOTICE OF MEETING
1. The notice of the Annual
General Meeting or any of the Special Meeting shall be given by: -
(a) Circulating the notice,
to such members as can conveniently be informed in that way;
(b) Sending out such notices
by post addressed to every non-resident and associate member and to every resident
member who may have required the Secretary to send the notice in this way and has
registered his address in the office of the Association;
The notice of the meeting
other than the Annual General Meeting shall be given by:
(a) Affixing the
notice on the notice board of the Association;
(b) Circulating the notice
to such members as may be conveniently informed in that way." As can be seen
from the bare reading of these Rules, notice by post has to go to non-resident
members and to resident members only if request in writing is made to the
Secretary that notices should be sent to him by post at his registered address,
otherwise, notice by affixation on notice board and by circulating the notice,
normally done with cause list is sufficient notice. The record does not
indicate at all that any of the plaintiffs/respondents had given any notice to the
Secretary of SCBA that he should be informed individually by a notice in
writing of holding of any meeting by sending it at his registered address. There
is weighty reason as to why notice by affixation on the notice board and by circulating
the notice with cause list should be regarded as sufficient notice. This is
obviously so because advocate members normally practicing in this Court would
be made aware by these methods of notice. Thus the ground of improper holding of
the meeting or lack of service of notice upon the plaintiffs/respondents are devoid
of merits and could not have been taken into consideration while granting
injunction claimed by them.
32.
On
page 2 of the paper book the learned trial judge has mentioned details of the
plaint and has categorically stated as under: -
"It is
disclosed in the plaint that members of defendant No. 1 are scattered in various
parts of the country including Delhi and majority of them do not visit the SCBA
office on regular basis."In para 3 of the plaint it is averred as under: -
"Since all the members
including the plaintiff do not visit the Supreme Court and office of the
defendant No. 1 Association on regular basis, they do not have an occasion to
acquaint themselves about all the notices and circulars put up by the defendant
No. 1 Association on its notice boards in the Supreme Court
building."Further, at page 19 of the paper book a finding has been arrived
at by the trial court as under: -
"Most of the members
do not ordinarily practice in the Supreme Court of India and are members of
other association." In the light of above pleadings, it is quite clear
that the plaintiffs/respondents who were seeking to challenge the impugned Rule
which prescribed an eligibility clause to enable them to vote, have candidly
admitted that they are not regular practitioners of the Supreme Court nor do
they attend the Supreme Court on regular basis nor are aware of the circulars circulated
by the SCBA or pasted on the information board of the SCBA. This is something
which has been totally overlooked by the trial court in arriving at a conclusion
in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents without examining the true and correct
import of Rule 23 of the Rules, which prescribes the method of giving notice of
the meeting. There is no manner of doubt that the trial court has committed an
error in coming to the conclusion that in any case individual notice was
required to be given when the rule does not warrant giving of any such
individual notice.
33.
The
three reasons indicated by the learned Judge in the impugned orders for grant
of injunction are not sustainable at all and, therefore, the impugned orders
will have to be set aside.
34.
Further,
the appellants had rightly pointed out to the learned Judge that election process
had already started and, therefore, injunction, as claimed, should not be
granted. Since 1952 this Court has authoritatively laid down that once election
process has started the courts should not ordinarily interfere with the said process
by way of granting injunction. The argument advanced by the appellants that election
process having started, the injunction should not be granted is dealt with by
the learned Judge by holding that in the present case the plaintiffs have not
prayed for injunction against the election process.
This Court has no doubt
at all that the injunction granted by the learned Judge has propensity to intervene
and interfere with election process which had already started. Apart from the prayers
claimed in the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section
151 CPC the Court could not have ignored the effect of granting an injunction. If
the injunction granted by the learned Judge had not been stayed by this Court, the
office bearers of the SCBA would have been required to prepare a new voters list
as if unamended Rule 18 was in operation and the exercise undertaken by them for
preparing voters list in the light of the amended Rule 18 would have been of no
consequence. Thus the injunction claimed by the plaintiffs/respondents which had
very wide repercussions on the elections, which were to be held in the year 2003,
should not have been granted by the learned Judge.
35.
The
impugned order is also liable to be set aside on yet another ground. Though the
suits were not filed in a representative capacity, the injunction is granted by
the court restraining the appellants from implementing the resolution dated February
18, 2003 in respect of all advocates and not in respect of two advocates only who
have filed Civil Suit Nos. 100 of 2003 and 101 of 2003 respectively. A perusal of
the plaint in the two suits makes it more than clear that suits are not filed in
a representative capacity. In the plaint, individual rights to vote at the election
of the Executive Committee of SCBA is claimed.
Even if extremely good
case was made out by the plaintiffs/respondents of the two suits, the relief
could have been confined only to the two plaintiffs/respondents and a relief granting
blanket injunction restraining the appellants from implementing the Resolution dated
February 18, 2003 amending Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations of SCBA till the
final disposal of the suits could not have been granted.
36.
For
all these reasons impugned common order is liable to be set aside and is hereby
set aside.
37.
Mr.
K.K.Venugopal, an august and well-known senior lawyer, who is regularly practicing
in this Court since years and was also former President of SCBA at least for
three years and who was also Chairman, Interim Board of Management in 2010 when
the Executive Committee of the SCBA had dissolved itself and appointed the Interim
Board of Management, submitted that the statements of aims and objectives of the
SCBA, among others, includes the objective, viz., "to promote and protect
the privileges, interest and prestige of the association and to promote union and
cooperation among the advocates practicing in the court and other association and
advocates".
According to the learned
counsel, the phrase "to promote union and cooperation among the advocates practicing
in the court and other association and advocate" is to promote union and cooperation
among the advocates practicing in the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and other
advocates or associations of advocates, on the other, which itself indicates
that SCBA exists for the advocates practicing "in the court", i.e.,
Supreme Court of India. The learned counsel explained that SCBA exists for the benefit
of the advocates in the Supreme Court of India and SCBA owes a fiduciary duty to
such advocates and members of the SCBA for protecting their privileges, interests
and prestige.
The learned counsel asserted
that the SCBA is, therefore, entitled to seek the protection of the Court by
invoking Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure that the members practicing in
the Supreme Court are not rendered incapable of enjoying, to the full, the privileges
and benefits in the Supreme Court of India, which has provided infrastructure and
facilities in the nature of libraries, car parking, chambers, canteens,
lounges, etc. The learned counsel pointed out that the factual situation, which
has been placed before the Court, would establish that today the membership of the
SCBA has risen to an mind-boggling figure of around 10,000, of which only
around 2,000 members are regularly practicing in this Court.
Informing the Court the
learned counsel mentioned that historically, with the advocates regularly practicing
in the Supreme Court being inducted as members of the SCBA, the facilities made
available by this Court to the members were sufficient for their use, but
certain unhealthy practices and vices started creeping in to the system of elections
to the various posts/offices of the SCBA by reason of the fact that the office
of the President of SCBA carried a vast prestige and status, not merely among
lawyers but also among Governments and the political class.
It was also stated by
the learned counsel that being an office bearer of a member of the Executive
Committee of the SCBA also carried great importance and prestige. According to the
learned counsel, the main vice that crept into the system, for the last decade or
so was that aspiring office bearers started buying the application forms for membership,
in bulk, and paying the membership fee for lawyers from the various places like
Meerut, Rohtak, Saharanpur, Ghaziabad and even as far away a place as
Chandigarh.
The learned counsel
Shri Venugopal claimed as Chairman of the Interim Board of Management that one came
across as many as 100 subscription forms, paid with consecutive bank draft numbers,
as disclosed by the bank statements obtained by the Interim Board of
Management, which showed that a single sponsor had paid vast sums of money for each
of these forms and memberships, the membership fee being Rs.5,150/- for advocates
with ten years standing and Rs.3,650/- for advocates with less than ten years standing.
It was emphasized by
the learned counsel that practices like these have resulted in the present strength
of the SCBA being around 10,000 and it is a well known fact among the members of
the Bar regularly practicing in the Supreme Court of India that persons inducted
into the SCBA through such means, numbering about 8,000, are seen in the
Supreme Court premises only on the day of SCBA elections for casting their votes,
otherwise, these persons have no interest whatsoever either in the functioning of
the SCBA or the well being of its members or the functioning of the Supreme
Court of India, as a Court.
The learned counsel has
produced minutes of the meeting of the Interim Board of Management dated March 22,
2010 along with his written submissions for perusal of the Court. The learned
senior counsel lamented that all these would disclose the disgraceful condition
to which SCBA has been reduced on account of machinations and malpractices of
certain members of the SCBA, who are aspiring for offices in the Executive Committee
of the SCBA.
The learned counsel has
also appended copies of Allotment of Lawyers' Chambers Rules as amended up to
November 30, 2007 as well as letter dated August 10, 2004 inter alia
prescribing eligibility to apply for allotment of chambers along with his written
submissions. The learned counsel has pointed out that the SCBA is facing a crises
today, because of the induction of the vast number of members who do not practice
regularly in the Supreme Court of India and, therefore, have no interest
whatsoever in the function of the Apex Court or in the reputation, prestige and
well being of the SCBA whereas, on the other hand, the sole objective of such persons
is to ensure that their respective sponsor(s), who paid their subscription and
entrance fee, would be elected to one of the posts of the SCBA, including the post
of SCBA President.
The learned counsel has
expressed apprehension that the day may not be far of when the entire set of
office bearers of the SCBA may be persons with no regular practice in the
Supreme Court of India and who may have their regular practice in other courts in
Delhi or even in the adjoining towns or even in a city as far away from Delhi as
Chandigarh. The learned counsel argued that the SCBA has to shoulder great
responsibility in regard to the effective functioning of the Supreme Court itself,
the dispensation of justice and to represent the regular practicing members of
the Bar from time to time.
According to the learned
counsel the present situation, which virtually renders the regularly practicing
members strangers in their own court can only be remedied if this Court were to
step in, to exercise its vast powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, to
ensure that the functioning of the Court itself is not affected by reason of the
huge influx, into the SCBA, of advocates who have no interest in the
functioning of the Supreme Court, its Bar or its association.
The learned counsel asserted
that the circumstances prevailing are such that it is imperative for the well
being of the institution, as well as Apex Court of the country itself, and its
regularly practicing members to ensure that it is only the regularly practicing
members who will be eligible to cast votes at the SCBA elections. For this purpose
the learned counsel has suggested that it is essential that the right to vote in
the SCBA elections is restricted to the categories of persons enumerated in the
Interim Board of Management circular dated March 22, 2010, the relevant portion
whereof has been extracted in the written submissions.
Mr. P.P.Rao, learned
celebrated senior counsel regularly practicing in this Court since long and who
is also former President of SCBA, has emphasized that the very name of Bar Association,
viz., SCBA necessarily means and implies that it is an association representing
members regularly practicing in the court and responsible for proper conduct of
its members in the court and for ensuring proper assistance to the court. The learned
counsel has, in his written submissions, mentioned that SCBA needs to be salvaged
from the deluge of overwhelming numbers of outside advocates practicing not only
in the NCTR but even all other States in North India who had been enrolled by short-sighted
candidates with an eye on their election to the SCBA.
The learned counsel has
asserted that unless this Court comes to the rescue of SCBA, the association
will cease to be a court annexed Bar Association and words "Supreme Court"
will have to be dropped and substituted by the words "North India". Emphasizing
that the character of the SCBA should not be allowed to be diluted in any circumstances,
the learned counsel has asserted that this is a fit case for exercise of powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution. The learned counsel Mr. P.P. Rao has suggested
that to identify regular practitioners the criteria adopted by this Court for allotment
of chambers in Vinay Balchandra Joshi vs. Registrar General of Supreme Court of
India (1998) 7 SCC 461 at pages 465-467 para 7, may be adopted or in the alternative
criteria mentioned in the circular dated March 22, 2010 issued by the Interim
Board of Management of the SCBA consisting of M/s. K.K. Venugopal, Chairman,
Mr. P.P. Rao, Vice
Chairman and Mr. P.H. Parekh, Member - Executive and Convener may be considered
for acceptance mutatis mutandis. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, a distinguished attorney of
this Court, who is appointed as amicus curie in this matter to assist the Court,
Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned President, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association,
Mr. D.K.Garg, learned Counsel for the respondent and who was also in past President
of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association, pointed out to this Court the
difficulties being faced by regular members of the SCBA because of enlistment
of large number non-regular advocates as members of SCBA, who according to
them, now constitute a majority as a result of which the SCBA has not been able
to take any decision which would be in the interest of the Bar.
The learned Counsel have
stated in their written submissions filed, to supplement their oral arguments,
that there are more than ten thousand members of SCBA out of which only two thousand
advocates are regular members who actually practice in this Court and eight thousand
non-regular members have taken over the affairs of the SCBA in such a manner
that it is almost impossible for the regular members to transact any business in
the general or special meetings of SCBA. The learned Counsel emphasized that yearly
subscription for members of SCBA for many decades remained fixed at a paltry amount
of Rs. 500/- and every time when a proposal was made to increase the
subscription the same was rejected by the General Body dominated by these
non-regular members and that only recently with great difficulty the subscription
has been revised to Rs. 1500/- by secret ballot held within high security area of
Supreme Court namely Library 1, but now there is a demand to reduce it again to
Rs. 500/-.
The learned Counsel
pointed out that if the subscription for members of SCBA is again revised and reduced
to Rs.500/-, it will be a boon not only for such non-regular members but also a
boon for the candidates contesting elections who will have to shell out less, for
enrolling those advocates who are not practicing regularly in this Court, to secure
their votes and get elected. It was emphasized that the enhanced subscription is
in the interest of association as it would not only improve financial position
of SCBA but also help to keep at bay those members who are not regularly
practicing in this Court.
The learned Counsel argued
that this Court provides to the members of SCBA, who are regularly practicing
in this Court, several facilities/benefits such as bar rooms, libraries,
canteens, parking place, clinics, rest rooms etc., and as SCBA is intrinsically
and inextricably connected with the working of the Supreme Court, this Court
should give appropriate directions for effective implementation of "One
Bar One Vote" concept introduced by the amended rule in exercise of its
powers under Articles 136, 142 and 145(1) (a) of the Constitution to relieve the
SCBA of the number of maladies which have now come to be associated with it and
to improve the working of the institution as a whole. What was stressed by all the
learned Counsel was that it is not in the interest of SCBA that advocates who do
not practice in this Court regularly, vote for or get elected to the Executive
Committee of SCBA, but in past, several members who were themselves not
regularly practicing in the Supreme Court had contested elections for different
posts of Executive Committee of SCBA though they were already members of the
Executive Committees of other Court annexed Bar Associations and had come out successful
on the strength of votes of such non-regular members who are to be seen in the Court
compound only on the date of elections.
The learned Counsel
mentioned that persons so elected do not participate in the functioning of SCBA
since they are not affected by the working or non-working of the SCBA which has
affected the functioning of SCBA as a facilitator in the administration of justice
and therefore in order to maintain purity and dignity of the profession this
Court has not only power but duty to give directions under Article 136 and Article
142 particularly when request is made by the learned amicus curie, SCBA represented
by its Honorary Secretary, President of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
Association and other high-ranking lawyers like Shri K.K.Venugopal, Shri
P.P.Rao etc., who are regularly practicing only in this Court. Mr. D.K.Garg,
the
learned Counsel who
represents respondent Mr. B.D.Kaushik in C.A. No. 3401 of 2003, frankly pointed
out to this Court as an officer of the Court that in spite of other effective
alternative remedies available to the appellant SCBA against the interim order
dated April 5,2003 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Delhi, this Court had not
only entertained Special Leave Petition filed by SCBA, but also granted stay
because this Court wanted to regulate, reform and improve the functioning of SCBA
and to prevent the misuse of various facilities provided by this Court to the regular
members of SCBA so that the members of the SCBA render best assistance to this
Court in dispensation of justice.
It was also submitted
that SLP was entertained and operation of the impugned interim order was stayed
by this Court to prevent the interference of the outside members in day-to-day
functioning of SCBA and therefore this Court should give directions/frame
guidelines to regulate, reform and improve the functioning of SCBA. The learned
Counsel pointed out that it is no secret that yearly membership subscription fee
of almost all these non-regular members is paid by candidates contesting election
for the various posts of the Executive Committee of SCBA and the records of SCBA
show that hundreds of bank drafts were issued by the same branch of the same
bank in favour of SCBA for the same amount towards subscription of SCBA for such
non-regular members and that some interested persons who seek votes of these non-regular
members in the elections had paid the subscription. This last argument of Mr. D.K.Garg
was endorsed by one and all learned advocates who are appearing in the matter. Thus,
the learned advocates have urged this Court to give guidelines/directions for
effective implementation of amended rule which projects the principle of
"One Bar One Vote".
38.
This
Court has considered the request made by the learned Counsel appearing in the matter
to give appropriate directions/guidelines for effective implementation of "One
Bar One Vote" principle enunciated by the amended rule. It is a matter of common
knowledge that this Court has provided four huge libraries, three canteens, two
lounges, several rooms to be used as consultation rooms where learned advocates
regularly practicing in this Court can consult with their clients, arbitration rooms,
advocate's chambers, huge parking places, free use of electricity supply etc., to
the members of the SCBA.
It is not in dispute
that there are about ten thousand members of SCBA at present though the actual number
of advocates/practitioners, who are regularly practicing in this Court is not more
than two thousand five hundred out of which there are about nine hundred
Advocates-on-Record. It is an accepted fact that on the eve of annual elections
of the Executive Committee of SCBA, nearly more than three thousand voters turn
up from all over India to come to the premises of this Court, who are made to vote
by the advocates seeking elections for various posts. Further, enlistment of large
number of non-regular members as members of the SCBA have created problems in allotment
of chambers for this Court and it has been found that large number of non-regular
members of SCBA eats up the quota of regular members who genuinely need the chambers.
It was pointed by Shri
Sushil Kumar Jain, the learned President of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
Association that many of the non-regular members who are allotted chambers are not
even residing in or around Delhi. The Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record are advocates
primarily practicing in the Supreme Court and are directly affected by the
functioning of SCBA primary object of which is to look after the interest of advocates
actually practicing in the Supreme Court.
There is no manner of
doubt that Advocates-on-Record form an important constituent of the SCBA. All members
of the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association are also members of the SCBA
and because of malpractices committed by the candidates who contest the elections
a large number of advocates who are not regular practitioners in the Supreme
Court have become members of SCBA and claim a right, not only to vote and elect
the office bearers of the Association but also seek to be elected as office bearers
themselves on the strength and support of such non-regular members. Because such
non-regular members have become members of SCBA, they claim facilities which are
being extended to members of SCBA, who are regularly practicing in this Court. Because
of such claims, clashes, had taken place in the past.
It has been pointed out
by Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned President of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
Association that by merely becoming members of the SCBA some advocates deem themselves
to be advocates of the Supreme Court and fleece litigants on that basis. According
to Shri Sushil Kumar Jain such advocates call themselves as Supreme Court Advocates
and write/mention such a status on their letter heads, visiting cards, name
plates, etc. misleading the litigants.
As rightly pointed
out by the learned counsel Mr. P.P. Rao, enrolment of advocates not practicing regularly
in the Supreme Court is inconsistent with the main aim and object of the SCBA,
no court can provide chambers or other facilities for such outside advocates, who
are not regular practitioners. Neither the SCBA nor the court can deal with
them effectively if they commit any wrong. The power of this Court to make
certain rules, regulations and give directions to fill up the vacuum till such time
appropriate steps in order to cover the gap are taken, is recognized and upheld
in several reported decisions of this Court. In Vineet Narain Vs. Union of India
(1998) 1 SCC 226 this Court has observed as under in Paragraph 51 of the
reported decision:-
"In exercise of the
powers of this Court under Article 32 read with Article 142, guidelines and directions
have been issued in a large number of cases and a brief reference to a few of them
is sufficient. In Erach Sam Kanga Etc. Vs, Union of India, (Writ Petition No. 2632
of 1978 decided on 20th March, 1979) the Constitution Bench laid down certain guidelines
relating to Emigration Act. In Lakshmi Kant Pandey Vs. Union of India (1984) 2
SCC 244, (in re: Foreign Adoption), guidelines for adoption of minor children
by foreigners were laid down. Similarly in State of West Bengal and Ors. Etc. Vs.
Sampat Lal and Ors. Etc., (1985) 1 SCC 317, K. Veeraswami Vs. Union of India and
Others, (1991) 3 SCC 655, Union Carbide Corporation and Others Vs. Union of India
and others, (1991) 4 SCC 584, Delhi Judicial Service Association Etc. Vs. State
of Gujarat and others Etc. (Nadiad Case), (1991) 4 SCC 406, Delhi Development Authority
Vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 622 and Dinesh
Trivedi, M.P. and Others Vs. Union of India and others [1997] 4 SCC 306, guidelines
were laid down having the effect of law, requiring rigid compliance.
In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
Association and Others Vs. Union of India (IInd Judges case), (1993) 4 SCC 441,
a Nine-Judge Bench laid down guidelines and norms for the appointment and transfer
of Judges which are being rigidly followed in the matter of appointments of High
Court and Supreme Court Judges and transfer of High Court Judges. More recently
in Vishakha and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and others, (1997) 6 SCC 241, elaborate
guidelines have been laid down for observance in work places relating to sexual
harassment of working women.
"Moreover, this
Court, has framed Supreme Court Rules, 1966 in exercise of powers under Article
145(1)(a) of the Constitution regulating amongst other things advocates who are
entitled to practice in this Court. Further, necessary directions/guidelines can
always be issued when facilities and privileges are conferred on the members of
the SCBA. Thus not only power to give necessary guidelines/directions is available
under Articles 136, 142, 145(1)(a) of the Constitution but such power can also
be exercised as "Grantor" of the benefits and privileges which are
enjoyed by the members of the SCBA to restore its dignity. Having regard to the
over all conditions prevailing in SCBA, this Court proposes to give appropriate
directions for implementation of the amended rule which projects the principle
of "One Bar One Vote".
39.
Having
given thoughtful consideration to the suggestions made by the learned counsel appearing
in the matter, this Court is of the opinion that to identify regular practitioners
the criteria adopted by this Court for allotment of chambers, as explained in Vinay
Balchandra Joshi Vs. Registrar General of Supreme Court of India (1998) 7 SCC 461
at pages 465-467 para 7, should be directed to be adopted by SCBA from time to time.
Shri K.K. Venugopal, the learned senior counsel has annexed a copy of Allotment
of Lawyers' Chambers Rules, as amended up to November 30, 2007, with his
written submissions, wherein detailed procedure for allotment of chambers and conditions
precedent to be satisfied before a chamber is allotted, are laid down.
Under the
circumstances this Court directs under Article 136 of the Constitution read with
Article 142 of the Constitution that criteria adopted by this Court for allotment
of chambers, as mentioned in Allotment of Lawyers' Chambers Rules, and as
explained in Vinay Balchandra Joshi (supra) shall be adopted by the SCBA and its
office bearers to identify regular practitioners in this Court. To identify regular
practitioners in this Court, it would be open to the office bearers of SCBA or a
small committee, which may be appointed by the SCBA consisting of three senior
advocates, to collect information about those members who had contested election
in any of the Court annexed Bar Association, viz., High Court Bar Association, District
Court Bar Association, Taluka Bar Association, Tribunal Bar Association and Quasi-judicial
Bar Associations like BIFR, AIFR, CAT, etc. from 2005 to 2010.
If such an
information is sought by the office bearers of SCBA or the Committee appointed by
it, the same shall be supplied invariably and without fail by the Court annexed
Bar Associations mentioned earlier. The committee of SCBA to be appointed is hereby
directed to prepare a list of regular members practicing in this Court and
another separate list of members not regularly practicing in this Court and
third list of temporary members of the SCBA. These lists are directed to be put
up on the SCBA website and also on the SCBA notice board. A letter is directed
to be sent by the SCBA to each member of SCBA informing him about his status of
membership on or before February 28, 2012.
The aggrieved member
would be entitled to make a representation within 15 days from the date of receipt
of letter from the S.C.B.A. to the Committee, which is to be appointed by the
SCBA to identify regular practitioners stating in writing, whether personal
hearing before the Committee is required or not. If such a request is made the concerned
member shall be heard by the Committee. The representation/s shall be considered
and the decision would be rendered thereon by the aforesaid Committee on or
before April 30, 2012. The decision of that Committee shall be communicated to
the member concerned but the decision shall be final, conclusive and binding on
the member of the SCBA.
Thereafter, final list
of regular practitioners of this Court shall be displayed by S.C.B.A. After preparation
of the final list of the regular practitioners, each member shall give a written
intimation to the S.C.B.A. whether he is a member of another Court annexed Bar.
It shall be mandatory for a member, whose name is included in the said list, to
give a permanent declaration that he would vote only in the SCBA and would not
vote in any of the elections of any High Court Bar Association or District Bar Association
or Taluka Bar Association or Tribunal Bar Association or Quasi-judicial Bar
Associations like BIFR, AIFR, CAT, etc. A copy of this declaration shall be put
up/displayed on the website of the SCBA as well as on the notice board of the SCBA.
The information about
having filed such a declaration shall be sent to all the Bar Associations where
the said advocate is a member. Once such a declaration has been given, it will
be valid till it is revoked and once it is revoked a member shall forfeit his right
to vote or contest any election to any post to be conducted by the SCBA, for a
period of three years from the date of revocation.
40.
The
members of the SCBA, whose names do not figure in the final list of regular practitioners,
shall not be entitled to either vote at an election of the office bearers of
the SCBA or to contest any of the posts for which elections would be held by the
S.C.B.A.
41.
This
Court suggests that to ensure strict compliance with the directions issued by this
judgment, an Implementation Committee consisting of three learned senior
advocates may be constituted. The SCBA has suggested that Mr. K.K. Venugopal,
learned senior advocate, Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior advocate and Mr. Ranjit Kumar,
learned senior advocate, practicing in this Court be appointed as members of the
said Implementation Committee. This Court recommends that the names of three learned
senior counsel mentioned above be considered by the SCBA for being appointed as
members of the said Committee subject to their consent and convenience.
42.
In
view of the findings that the amendment made in Rule 18 is legal and valid and
that no right of the advocates, who have filed the suits, is infringed or is
violated, this Court directs the trial court to take up the two suits immediately
for hearing and to dismiss/ dispose of the two suits pending on its file in the
light of the observations made by this Court in this judgment.
43.
Subject
to above mentioned directions, the two appeals stand disposed of.
....................................J.
(J.M. PANCHAL)
....................................J.
(H.L. GOKHALE)
New
Delhi;
September
26, 2011.
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