Sushil Suri Vs.
C.B.I. & ANR.
J U D G M E N T
D.K. JAIN, J.:
1.
Leave
granted.
2.
This
appeal, by special leave, is directed against judgment dated 21st May 2009
delivered by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Misc. Case No.3842 of 2008, in
a petition filed by the appellant herein under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short "the Cr.P.C."). By the impugned judgment,
a learned Single Judge of the High Court has declined to quash the Chargesheet
filed against the appellant and other directors of a Company, namely, M/s
Morpen Laboratories Ltd. (for short "the Company") for offences
punishable under Sections 120B, 420, 409, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short "the IPC").
3.
Briefly
stated, the facts, material for adjudication of the issue, arising in this
appeal, are as follows: A source information was received by the Central Bureau
of Investigation (for short "the CBI") that in the year 1999 two Chartered
Accountants, namely, Sanjay Malik and Bipin Kakkar, had dishonestly and fraudulently
opened/caused to be opened several fictitious accounts in some banks in the names
of certain concerns, with an intention and object to facilitate the diversion of
bank finance availed by various public limited companies for the purpose other than
what had been stated in the loan application.
On the basis of the
said information, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered against the
afore-mentioned Company and its directors. The relevant portion of the FIR
reads thus: "That in June 1999, S/Sh. K.B. Suri, Sushil Suri and Smt.
Kanta Suri, the Executive Directors of M/s. Morepen Labs Ltd. having their
office at 416-418, Antriksh Bhawan (sic), 22, K.G. Marg, New Delhi, conspired together
and in furtherance of the said criminal conspiracy they, dishonestly and
fraudulently made an application to Punjab & Sind Bank, Connaught Place, New
Delhi for Hire-Purchase Finance to the tune of `300 Lacs, by submitting fake
and forged purchase orders, invoices and bills relating to supply of
machineries and equipments to be installed in their factory/works situated in
Distt. Solan (HP). That the above Executive Directors of the company, dishonestly,
fraudulently and in conspiracy with other accused persons submitted to the bank,
fake and forged invoices of fictitious/non-existent supplier i.e. M/s. R.K. Engineers,
M/s. Teem Metals Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Malson Impex, made accommodation payments representing
as genuine advance payments to suppliers and thereby caused the bank to release
funds to the tune of `300 lacs towards cost of machineries and 2equipments and pay
orders in various amounts issued by the bank for the purpose of making payments
to suppliers.
These amounts were then
fraudulently deposited in several fictitious accounts of S/Sh. Sanjay Malik and
Bipin Kakkar at Corporation Bank and Canara Bank and encashed. The bank finance
raised by the company on the pretext of procurement of machineries and equipments
were not used for the purpose stated in the application for loan, instead the bank
loan was diverted by the above Executive Directors, in collusion with S/Sh. Sanjay
Malik and Bipin Kakkar, for other undisclosed non-business purposes.That during
the year 1998 also the above Executive Directors of M/s. Morepen Labs Ltd. had
adopted a similar modus-operandi in collusion with some other unknown persons/Chartered
Accountants and applied for bank finance to the tune of `200 lacs for purchase
of machineries and equipments with an object to divert bank finance for undisclosed
non-business orders, invoices and bills of fictitious suppliers, i.e. M/s. B.K.
Chemi-Plant Industries and M/s. Flexon Hose and Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. and caused
the bank to release loan of `200 lacs for the purpose of procurement of machineries
and equipments to be installed in their factory works situated in Distt. Solan (HP).
The bank loan thus released
by Punjab & Sind Bank (Hire-Purchase Branch), Connaught Circus, New Delhi was
not actually used for the purpose stated in the loan proposal rather the pay orders
issued by the bank in the name of fictitious suppliers M/s. Chemi-Plant Industries
and M/s. Flexon Hose and Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. were deposited in fictitious
accounts opened in the above name and style at Bank of Rajasthan, Kamla Nagar Branch,
Delhi and encashed. No suppliers of machineries and equipments were made by M/s.
B.K. Chemi-Plant Industries and M/s. Flexon Hose and Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd.
to M/s. Morepen Labs. Ltd. and bank finance availed by the company for the said
purpose were again used for some undisclosed non-business purposes.The above
facts and circumstances disclose the commission of offences u/s 120-B, IPC r/w 420,
409, 468 and 471 IPC and substantive offences thereunder against Chartered
Accountants S/Sh. Sanjay Malik and Bipin Kakkar and S/Sh. K.B. Suri, Sushil Suri
and Smt. Kanta Suri, Executive Directors of M/s. Morepen Labs. Ltd., New Delhi and
other unknown persons. 3 Therefore, a regular case is registered and entrusted
to Sh. A.K. Singh, Dy. SP/SIU-VII, for investigation."
4.
The
Company is a public limited company, engaged in the manufacturing of
pharmaceutical products. In order to run its affairs, from time to time, the Company
had been raising funds from different sources, like loans from different
banks/financial institutions as also from the open market by way of `public
issues', `rights issues' and `bonds' etc. Investigations revealed that in the
year 1998, the Company, through its directors, including the appellant in this
appeal, applied for a hire purchase advance of `2 crores from Punjab and Sind Bank
(for short "PSB"), Hire Purchase Branch, New Delhi, for purchase of
various machinery items to be installed at their manufacturing units at
different places.
It transpired that
the machinery for which the loan was raised from PSB was never purchased by the
Company and, in fact, to defraud PSB, photographs of the existing/some other
machinery were taken by affixing labels of PSB and the same were filed with
PSB, as confirmation for having purchased the machinery, for which the loan was
raised under the hire purchase limit. It was discovered that although the loan
taken by the Company from PSB had been repaid, but the Company never purchased
any machinery, utilising the funds disbursed by PSB against the purchase of machinery.
Furthermore, the value of the machinery, purportedly purchased with these funds,
was reflected in the balance-sheet of the Company and even depreciation on the said
machinery, amounting to `52,33,066/-, was 4also claimed in the Income Tax
Return/Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) for the assessment year 1998-1999, without any
such machinery having been actually acquired.
5.
In
the year 1999, the Company and its directors again applied for hire purchase
advance of `3 crores from PSB for purchase of more machines. In their
balance-sheet for the assessment year 1999-2000, the Company again claimed the
benefit of depreciation in the Income Tax/Minimum Alternate Tax amounting to
`1,44,88,605/- although no such machinery was purchased by the Company. It
further transpired that loan proposals were supported by forged proforma invoices,
purportedly issued by some suppliers in whose name fictitious bank accounts were
opened to encash the Demand Drafts/Pay Orders issued by PSB in favour of these firms.
The investigations thus, revealed that the appellant and a number of other persons
had committed the afore-mentioned offences. Accordingly, a Chargesheet was filed
by the CBI on 13th October, 2004 in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Delhi.
6.
The
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and summoned the
accused to stand trial. On being so summoned, the appellant filed the
afore-stated petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., praying for quashing of
the Chargesheet mainly on the ground that once the Company had repaid the loan
to PSB along with interest, no loss was caused to PSB and, therefore, they had
not committed any offence for which Chargesheet had been filed. In support of
the said plea, decision of this Court in Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation & Anr.1 was pressed into service. On behalf of the CBI, it
was pleaded that the appellant and others, by forging documents/vouchers to show
purchase of machinery, a pre-condition for release of instalments of loan, had
not only duped PSB but also defrauded the revenue by claiming depreciation on
non-existent machinery and in the process cheated the public exchequer of
crores of rupees.
7.
As
already stated, the High Court has come to the conclusion that merely because
the Company and its directors had repaid the loan to PSB they could not be exonerated
of the offences committed by forging/fabricating the documents with the intention
of defrauding the bank as well as the exchequer. The High Court was of the view
that the ratio of the decision of this Court in Rumi Dhar (Smt) Vs. State of West
Bengal & Anr.2, was applicable on the facts of the present case and the
decision of this Court in Nikhil Merchant (supra) was clearly distinguishable on
facts. Thus, the High Court held that on the peculiar facts of the case, the
appellant was not entitled to any relief. Accordingly, the petition filed by
the appellant was dismissed with costs. He was directed to appear before the trial
court. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before us in this appeal.
8.
Mr.
Vijay Aggarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant assailed
the judgment of the High Court on the ground that all the dues, as 1 (2008) 9
SCC 6772 (2009) 6 SCC 364 6claimed by PSB having been paid by the debtor
Company without demur, more so, when the Bank had not initiated any action for the
recovery of money, the case of the appellant is on a much stronger footing as
compared to the case of Nikhil Merchant (supra), wherein this Court had quashed
the criminal proceedings initiated against the borrower in view of their compromise
with the Bank. It was contended that since in the present case, there is no
allegation that the appellant had committed any offence under the Prevention of
Corruption Act 1988, at best, the allegation in the Chargesheet may attract Section
420 of the IPC, which offence is otherwise compoundable under Section 320 of the
Cr.P.C.
It was asserted that full
amount in question having been paid to the Bank, there was no monetary loss to
the Bank and, therefore, continuation of criminal proceedings against all the accused,
including the appellant, would not only be an exercise in futility but an abuse
of the process of law as well. It was thus, pleaded that it was a fit case
where the High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. and quashed the Chargesheet. In support, while relying heavily on
the decision in Nikhil Merchant (supra), learned counsel also commended us to
the decisions of this Court in B.S. Joshi & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana &
Anr.3 and Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab4. The decision in Rumi Dhar
(supra) relied upon by the High Court, was sought to be distinguished by
submitting that in that case the provisions 3 (2003) 4 SCC 6754 (2008) 4 SCC
582 7of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 had been invoked; the Bank had to
file a suit for recovery of the amount due to it and the Revision Petition filed
against framing of charge against the accused in that case had also been dismissed,
which is not the case here.
9.
Per
contra, Mr. H.P. Rawal, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, appearing
for the CBI, supporting the impugned judgment, strenuously urged that having regard
to the nature of the allegations against the appellant, based on the evidence collected
during the course of investigations, the High Court has rightly refused to
exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Relying on a decision
of this Court in Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. A. Ravishankar Prasad &
Ors.5, learned counsel contended that overwhelming material is available on
record which clearly shows that the Company and its directors, including the appellant,
and other persons had conspired to forge, fabricate and use documents in order
to avail loan from the bank and had opened or caused to be opened fictitious
bank accounts in the names of the suppliers to encash the pay orders/demand
drafts issued by PSB and played fraud with PSB as also on the public exchequer by
claiming depreciation on the machinery, which was never purchased.
It was argued that
the offences for which the appellant has been Chargesheeted would survive
irrespective of discharge of debt of PSB by the Company. Relying on the decision
of this Court in 5 (2009) 6 SCC 351 8Sajjan Kumar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation6,
learned counsel asserted that when the material on record is per se sufficient
for the Court to form an opinion that the accused have committed the offences alleged
against them and frame the said charges, there is no reason why the Chargesheet
against the appellant should be quashed at such a preliminary stage when he has
only been summoned to stand trial.
10.
Before
embarking on an evaluation of the rival submissions, it would be instructive to
briefly notice the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the High Court
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
11.
Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. itself envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised by the High Court, namely: (i) to give
effect to an order under the Cr.P.C.; (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process
of Court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is trite that although
the power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is very wide but
it is not unbridled. It has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously,
ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which alone the Court
exists. Nevertheless, it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down any
inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the
Court. Yet, in numerous cases, this Court has laid down certain broad
principles which may be borne in mind while exercising jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. 6 (2010) 9 SCC 368 9Though it is emphasised that exercise
of inherent powers would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case,
but, the common thread which runs through all the decisions on the subject is
that the Court would be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction where the
allegations made in the Complaint or Chargesheet, as the case may be, taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence
alleged.
12.
In
one of the earlier cases in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab7 this Court had culled
out some of the categories of cases where the inherent powers under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. could be exercised by the High Court to quash criminal
proceedings against the accused. These are: "(i) where it manifestly appears
that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings
e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute
an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced
clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge."
13.
In
Dinesh Dutt Joshi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.8, while explaining the object
and purpose of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., this Court had observed thus: ".......The
principle embodied in the section is based upon the maxim: quando lex aliquid alicui
concedit, concedere videtur 7 AIR 1960 SC 866 8 (2001) 8 SCC 570 1 et id sine
quo res ipsae esse non potest i.e. when the law gives anything to anyone, it
gives also all those things without which the thing itself would be unavailable.
The section does not confer any new power, but only declares that the High Court
possesses inherent powers for the purposes specified in the section. As lacunae
are sometimes found in procedural law, the section has been embodied to cover
such lacunae wherever they are discovered. The use of extraordinary powers
conferred upon the High Court under this section are however required to be reserved,
as far as possible, for extraordinary cases."
14.
Recently,
this Court in A. Ravishankar Prasad & Ors. (supra), relied upon by learned
counsel for the CBI, referring to several earlier decisions on the point, including
R.P. Kapur (supra); State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors.9;
Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors.10; B.S. Joshi & Ors. (supra);
Nikhil Merchant (supra) etc. has reiterated that the exercise of inherent
powers would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It
has been further observed that the inherent powers should not be exercised to stifle
a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima
facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when
the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be
seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.
15.
Bearing
in mind the object, scope and width of power of the High Court under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C., enunciated above, the question for 9 1992 Supp (1) SCC 33510
(1992) 4 SCC 305 1consideration is whether on facts in hand, the High Court was
correct in law in declining to exercise its jurisdiction under the said
Section?
16.
Having
examined the case in light of the allegations in the Chargesheet, we are of the
opinion that the view taken by the High Court in the matter cannot be flawed and
deserves to be affirmed. It is manifest from a bare reading of the Chargesheet,
placed on record, that the gravamen of the allegations against the appellant as
also the co-accused is that the Company, acting through its directors in
concert with the Chartered Accountants and some other persons:
i.
conceived
a criminal conspiracy and executed it by forging and fabricating a number of documents,
like photographs of old machines, purchase orders and invoices showing purchase
of machinery in order to support their claim to avail hire purchase loan from
PSB;
ii.
on
the strength of these false documents, PSB parted with the money by issuing pay
orders & demand drafts in favour of the Company and
iii.
the
accused opened six fictitious accounts in the banks (four accounts in Bank of Rajasthan
and two in Bank of Madura) to encash the pay orders/bank drafts issued by PSB in
favour of the suppliers of machines, thereby directly rotating back the loan
amount to the borrower from these fictitious accounts, and in the process committed
a systematic fraud on the Bank (PSB) and obtained pecuniary advantage for themselves.
Precise details of all the fictitious accounts as also the further flow of
money realised on encashment of demand drafts/pay orders have been incorporated
in the Chargesheet. Additionally, by allegedly claiming depreciation on the new
machinery, which was never purchased, on the basis of forged invoices etc.; the
accused cheated the public exchequer as well.
17.
As
afore-stated, in the Chargesheet, the accused are alleged to have committed
offences punishable under Section 120B, read with Sections 420, 409, 468 and
471 IPC. We feel that at this preliminary stage of proceedings, it would neither
be desirable nor proper to return a final finding as to whether the essential
ingredients of the said Sections are satisfied. For the purpose of the present
appeal, it will suffice to observe that on a conspectus of the factual scenario,
noted above, prima facie, the Chargesheet does disclose the commission of
offences by the appellant under the afore-noted Sections. The essential
ingredient of the offence of "criminal conspiracy", defined in
Section 120A IPC, is the agreement to commit an offence. In a case where the
agreement is for accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an offence,
then in that event, unless the Statute so requires, no overt act is necessary to
be proved by the prosecution because in such a fact-situation criminal conspiracy
is established by proving such an agreement. In other words, where the
conspiracy alleged is with regard to commission of a serious crime of the nature
as contemplated in Section 120B read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of
Section 120A IPC, then in that event mere proof of an agreement between the
accused for commission of such crime alone is enough to bring about a conviction
under Section 1120B and the proof of any overt act by the accused or by any one
of them would not be necessary. (See: Suresh Chandra Bahri Vs. State of
Bihar11).
18.
Similarly,
the definition of "forgery" in Section 463 IPC is very wide. The basic
elements of forgery are: (i) the making of a false document or part of it and
(ii) such making should be with such intention as is specified in the Section
viz. (a) to cause damage or injury to (i) the public, or (ii) any person; or
(b) to support any claim or title; or (c) to cause any person to part with
property; or (d) to cause any person to enter into an express or implied contract;
or (e) to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed. As stated above, in the instant
case more than sufficient circumstances exist suggesting the hatching of criminal
conspiracy and forgery of several documents leading to commission of the aforementioned
Sections. We refrain from saying more on the subject at this juncture, lest it
may cause prejudice to the appellant or the prosecution.
19.
We
may now advert to the decision of this Court in the case of Nikhil Merchant (supra),
on which great emphasis was laid, on behalf of the appellant. In that case a Chargesheet
was filed by the CBI against the accused under Section 120B read with Sections
420, 467, 468, 471 IPC read with Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The allegation under the Chargesheet was that
the accused 11 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 1persons had conspired with each other in
fraudulently diverting the funds of the Bank. Offence alleging forgery was also
included in the Chargesheet. In the meantime, the suit for recovery of money
filed by the Bank against the Company, to which the appellant in that case was also
a party, was disposed of on a written compromise arrived at between the parties.
Consequent upon the compromise of the suit and having regard to the contents of
clause 11 of the consent terms, which stipulated that neither party had any claim
against the other and parties were withdrawing all allegations and counter allegations
made against each other, the said appellant filed an application for discharge.
The application was
rejected by the trial court. A petition preferred under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. was also dismissed by the High Court. In further appeal to this Court,
accepting the contention of the appellant that this Court could transcend the
limitation imposed under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. and pass orders quashing
criminal proceedings even where non compoundable offences were involved, quashing
the criminal proceedings the Court observed thus: "30. In the instant
case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on
the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank
have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against
the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged
to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit
facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled.
The dispute involved herein
has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The question
which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently
lies with this 1 Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise
arrived at, should at all be exercised? 31. On an overall view of the facts as
indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi
case and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also Clause
11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied
that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the
way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance
of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a
futile exercise." [Emphasis supplied]
20.
A
bare reading of the afore-extracted paragraphs would indicate that the question
posed for consideration in that case was with regard to the power of this Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal
proceedings in the facts and circumstances of a given case and not in relation
to the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The Court came
to the conclusion that it was a fit case where it should exercise its powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution. In our opinion, Nikhil Merchant (supra)
does not hold as an absolute proposition of law that whenever a dispute between
the parties, having overtones of a civil dispute with criminal facets is settled
between them, continuance of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility
and, therefore, should be quashed. Similarly, in B.S. Joshi & Ors. (supra),
which has been relied upon in Nikhil Merchant (supra), the question for consideration
was whether the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash
criminal proceedings or FIR or Complaint for offences which are not
compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C.
It was held that
Section 320 cannot limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C., a well settled proposition of law. We are of the opinion that
Nikhil Merchant (supra) as also the other two judgments relied upon on behalf of
the appellant are clearly distinguishable on facts. It needs little emphasis that
even one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the
conclusions in two cases and blindly placing reliance on a decision is never
proper. It is trite that while applying ratio, the Court may not pick out a word
or sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which the said question
arose for consideration. (See: Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India
& Anr.12). In this regard, the following words of Lord Denning, quoted in Haryana
Financial Corporation & Anr. Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr.13, are also
quite apt: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between
one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may
alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the
temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one
case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line
a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all
decisive."
21.
In
the present case, having regard to the modus operandi adopted by the accused,
as projected in the Chargesheet and briefly referred to in para 17 (supra), we
have no hesitation in holding that it is not a fit case for exercise 12 (2005)
4 SCC 64913 (2002) 3 SCC 496 1of jurisdiction by the High Court under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. as also by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India. As noted above, the accused had not only duped PSB, they had also
availed of depreciation on the machinery, which was never purchased and used by
them, causing loss to the exchequer, a serious economic offence against the
society.
22.
The
view we have taken above, gets fortified by a recent decision of this Court in Rumi
Dhar (supra), wherein while dealing with a fact situation, akin to the present case,
referring to the decision in Nikhil Merchant (supra), the Court declined to quash
criminal proceedings in that case, observing thus: "24. The jurisdiction of
the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is not in dispute. Exercise
of such power would, however, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, and this Court, in terms of Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, would not direct quashing of a case involving crime against
the society particularly when both the learned Special Judge as also the High
Court have found that a prima facie case has been made out against the
appellant herein for framing the charge."
23.
We
respectfully concur with the afore-extracted observations. In the final analysis,
we hold that merely because the dues of the bank have been paid up, the
appellant cannot be exonerated from the criminal liability. Therefore, the
Chargesheet against him cannot be quashed.
24.
In
view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in this appeal and
it is dismissed accordingly. The Trial Court shall now proceed with the case as
expeditiously as possible without being influenced by any observations made by
the High Court or in this judgment on the merits of the Chargesheet.
..........................................J.
(D.K. JAIN,)
...........................................J.
(H.L. DATTU, J.)
NEW
DELHI;
MAY
6, 2011
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