Smt. Ramkanya Bai
& Anr. Vs. Jagdish & Ors.
J U D G M E N T
R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J.
1.
Leave
granted.
2.
The
appellants claim to be the owners of lands bearing Khasra Nos.29/2/2 and 29/1.
The first respondent Jagdish claims to be the owner of Khasra Nos.36/3 and
36/4. The first respondent made an application to the Naib Tahsildar, Tappa
Betma, Depalpur, Indore District, under section 131 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue
Code, 1959 (`Code' for short) claiming a right of way over Khasra Nos.29/2/2
and 29/1 of the appellants, to reach his lands bearing Khasra Nos.36/3 and 36/4.
The Naib Tahsildar made on order dated 25.10.2001, under section 131 of the
Code, holding that first respondent, with his agricultural equipments, bullock-cart
etc., was entitled to pass through the Government Road, Khasra No.21 (East to
West) of the village Salampur and thereafter pass through Khasra Nos. 29/1 and 29/2/2
belonging to the appellants, for reaching his land bearing Khasra Nos.36/3 and
36/4 and the appellants shall not obstruct such passage. The appeal by the
appellants filed against the said order under section 44 of the Code was dismissed
and the subsequent revision filed by the appellants under section 50 of the Act
was also dismissed.
3.
Thereafter
appellants filed Civil Suit No.66A/2002 on the file of the Civil Judge (Class
II), Depalpur, Indore district for the following reliefs :
a. a declaration that the
first respondent did not have any right of way over their lands bearing Nos.29/2/2
and 29/1 to reach his lands bearing Khasra Nos.36/3 and 36/4 and that they are
entitled to enjoy their lands without any interference from first respondent;
b. for a declaration
that the order dated 25.10.2001 passed by the Tahsildar creating a new passage,
over khasra Nos.29/1 and 29/2/2, was illegal; and
c. for a consequential injunction
restraining first respondent from creating/ constructing any new passage, over
their lands. The said suit was dismissed by the trial court, by judgment dated
4.12.2004 on the ground that having regard to section 131 read with section 257
of the Code, the revenue court (Tahsildar) alone had jurisdiction 3to grant
relief on the basis of custom and convenience of parties, and it did not have any
jurisdiction.
The appeal (Appeal No.3-A/2005)
filed by the appellants was dismissed by the first appellate court on 19.4.2005.
The subsequent second appeal filed by the appellants was also dismissed by the High
Court on 19.1.2007. The said judgment is under challenge in this appeal by
special leave.
4.
On
the contentions urged by the parties, the following questions arise for our
consideration:
a. Whether the jurisdiction
of the civil court to entertain a suit for declaration or injunction, claiming
a customary easement of right of way or right to take water, through the land
of a servient owner, is barred by section 257 of the Code, on the ground that
it is a matter which the Revenue Officer (Tahsildar) is empowered to decide
under section 131 of the Code?
b. Whether the civil court
has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit by the owner of a land for a declaration
that the defendant does not have an easementary right, customary or otherwise,
over his property and the order of Tahsildar under section 131 of the Code
recognizing such right, is illegal and erroneous?
5.
Section
131 of the Code deals with rights of way and other private easements. It is
extracted below : "131. Rights of way and other private easements.--(1) In
the event of a dispute arising as to the route by which a cultivator shall have
access to his fields or to the waste or pasture lands of the village, otherwise
than by the recognized roads, paths or common land, including those road and
paths recorded in the village Wajib-ul-arz prepared under section 242 or as to the
source from or course by which he may avail himself of water, a Tahsildar may,
after local enquiry, decide the matter with reference to the 4 previous custom
in each case and with due regard to the conveniences of all the parties
concerned. (2) No order passed under this section shall debar any person from establishing
such rights of easement as he may claim by a civil suit.
"Section 257 deals
with the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities in regard to revenue matters
under the Code, and bar of jurisdiction of civil courts in regard to such matters.
The relevant portion thereof is extracted below : "257. Exclusive jurisdiction
of revenue authorities.--Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any
other enactment for the time being in force, no Civil Court shall entertain any
suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter
which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered
to determine, decide or dispose of, and in particular and without prejudice to
the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction
over any of the following matters-- (a) to (z-2) xxxxx [not extracted as not
relevant]"
6.
An
analysis of section 131 of the Code shows that it provides for the adjudication
by the Tahsildar, in respect of disputes raised by a cultivator, relating to
any of the following three private easementary rights:- a) the route by which a
cultivator shall have access to his fields; b) the route by which a cultivator shall
have access to waste or pasture lands of the village; and c) the route by which
a cultivator shall have access to the source from which, or the course by
which, he may avail himself of water. 5Section 131 provides that such disputes
shall be decided in each case, by the Tahsildar, after a local enquiry, with
reference to the previous custom and with due regard to the convenience of all parties
concerned. The disputes relating to recognized roads, paths or common land including
those roads and paths recorded in the village Wajib-ul-arz prepared under
section 242 of the Code are expressly excluded from the scope of section 131 of
the Code. It is thus clear that what could be decided under section 131 of the
Code is a dispute relating to a claim for a customary easement over a private land,
relating to a right of way or right to take water, which is not recognized and recorded
as a customary easement in the village Wajib-ul-arz.
7.
The
definition of different easements, the manner of imposition and acquisition of easementary
rights, the incidents of easements and the remedies in case of interference or
disturbance with easements are governed by the provisions of the Indian
Easements Act, 1882. Easement Act refers to the different methods by which
easements are acquired or imposed, that is, namely easements by grant, easements
of necessity, easements by prescription and customary easements. Acquisition of
an easementary right, by any of the aforesaid methods, requires fulfillment of the
conditions prescribed under the Easements Act. A private easement, including a
right of way to a person's land or right to take water from a source to his land,
cannot be acquired in a manner not contemplated or prescribed by the Easement Act.
Easements by grant require a grant by the owner of the servient heritage. Easements
of necessity are based on implied grants or reservations made by the owner of a
servient heritage, at the time of disposition such as transfers and partitions.
Easements by prescription can be acquired only by peaceable and open enjoyment,
without interruption for twenty years. Customary easement can be are acquired
by virtue of a local custom.
8.
Having
regard to section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a civil court can entertain
any suit of civil nature except those, cognizance of which is expressly or
impliedly barred. In Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay [AIR 1965 SC 1942]
this court held : "The normal rule prescribed by section 9 of the Code of
Civil Procedure is that the courts shall (subject to the provisions contained
in the Code) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting
suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly
barred......... Whenever it is urged before a civil court that its jurisdiction
is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain claims of
a civil nature, the Court naturally feels inclined to consider whether the remedy
afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by a special statute is sufficient
or adequate.
In cases where the
exclusion of the civil Courts' jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the
consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or
the sufficiency of the remedies provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be
decisive. But where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication,
such considerations would be very important, and in conceivable circumstances,
might even become decisive. If it appears that a statute creates a special
right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and
liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that behalf,
and it further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability
shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, it becomes pertinent to
enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are
prescribed by the said statute or not." (emphasis supplied)In Dhulabhai v.
State of Madhya Pradesh - 1968 (3) SCR 662, a Constitution Bench of this Court
held that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be
inferred with, unless the following, among other conditions apply : "
(1) Where the statute
gives finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court's
jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what
the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not
exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied
with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental
principles of judicial procedure............
(2) Where there is an
express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of
the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided
may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil
court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and
the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment become necessary
and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is
necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides
for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions
about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so
constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil
courts are prescribed by the said statute or not."
9.
The
Code nowhere bars the jurisdiction of civil courts to decide upon easementary rights
relating to agricultural or other lands. The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code neither
creates nor recognizes any new 8category of private easementary rights either
by way of right of way or right to take water, which is not covered by the
provisions of the Easements Act or which is not required to fulfill the requirements
prescribed by the Easements Act.
An easement cannot be
acquired otherwise than in the manner provided in the Easement Act. Section 131
of the Code does not provide for or recognize a new type of easement which is
not contemplated or recognized in Easement Act, but merely deals with customary
easements covered by section 18 of the Easements Act. Nor can it be said that the
elements of an easement required to be fulfilled under the Easement Act are not
required in respect of a private easement under section 131 of the Code. Apart from
the fact that section 131 of the Code does not deal with acquisition of any
special easement by some method which is not referred in the Easements
Act, sub-section (2) of
section 131 expressly provides that irrespective of any order passed by the Tahsildar
under section 131, any person can establish any right relating to an easement
by a civil suit. There is nothing in section 131 or any other provision of the
Code, which makes the decision of the Tahsildar final and not open to question in
a civil court. Therefore, the decision of the Tahsildar will not bar a
subsequent civil suit by either party to a proceeding under section 131 of the
Code, in respect of the easement claimed in the proceedings under section 131
of the Code.
10.
When
a person (dominant owner) has an easementary right, and the servient owner
disturbs, obstructs or interferes with his easementary right, or denies his easementary
right, the remedy of the dominant owner is to approach the civil court for the relief
of declaration and/or injunction. Similarly, when a person who does not have an
easementary right, tries to assert or exercise any easementary right over
another's land, the owner of such land can resist such assertion or obstruct the
exercise of the easementary right and also approach the civil court to declare that
the defendant has no easementary right of the nature claimed, over his land and/or
that the defendant should be prevented from asserting such right or interfering
with his possession and enjoyment.
11.
Section
257 relates to the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. Any statutory
provision ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts should be strictly
construed. A suit for enforcement of an easementary right or for a declaration
that the defendant does not have any easementary right over plaintiff's
property or a suit for injunction to restrain a defendant from interfering with
the possession of plaintiff or exercising any easementary right over
plaintiff's property, is not barred by the Code. Such suits do not fall under
any of the excluded matters enumerated in clauses (a) to (z-2) of section 257
of the Code. Section 257, no doubt, also provides that no civil 10court shall
entertain any suit instituted to obtain a decision or order on any matter which
the State Government, the Board or any Revenue Officer is empowered to
determine by the provisions of the code. But this is subject to the opening
words of the section "except as otherwise provided in this Code or in any other
enactment for the time being in force".
We have already noticed
that sub-section (2) of section 131 of the Code reserves and retains specifically
the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits relating to any easements,
irrespective of the decision of the Tahsildar on a similar issue. Sub-section
(2) of section 131 provides that no order passed under section 131 shall debar
any person from establishing such rights of easements as he may claim by a
civil suit. Therefore the right to decide upon the nature of easements and
enforcement of easements is expressly preserved for decision by a civil court in
a civil suit.
The two fold object of
sub-section (2) of section 131 is to declare that section 131(1) of the Code
does not deal with a matter which is in the exclusive province of revenue
authorities and also to enable either party to approach the civil court in
regard to any easementary right, irrespective of the decision under section
131(1) by the Tahsildar. The effect of section 257 and section 131(2) is that
the enquiry and decision by the Tahsildar based on "previous custom"
and "conveniences of parties" in regard to any private easementary
rights relating to right of way or right to water will always be subject to the
decision of the civil court in any civil suit by any party relating to that
matter. Therefore it has to be held that section 257 providing for exclusion of
jurisdiction of civil court in regard to certain matters, does not apply to any
suit involving or relating to easementary rights.
12.
But
some decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court have proceeded on the
assumption, rather erroneously and without any basis, that the private
easements including right of way referred under section 131 of the Code, are
not the easements which are dealt with in the Indian Easement Act, but are a
new type of easement unknown to general law of easements, which require to be decided
by the Tahsildar only with reference to the previous customs and conveniences
of parties. A distinction is sought to be drawn by those decisions, between
easements under the Easement Act and easements under section 131 of the Code,
by holding that the Easement
Act deals with
easements perfected by prescription, whereas section 131 of the Code refers to private
easements, which are not perfected by prescription. They also proceed on the basis
that in view of section 131 of the Code providing for a Revenue Authority, that
is a Tahsildar, to deal with the special type of private easements provided for
in section 131 of the Code, civil courts will have no jurisdiction to entertain
or decide any matter relating to such type of private easements, having regard
to the bar contained 12in section 257 of the Code; and consequently any
decision of the Tahsildar under section 131 of the Code is amenable only to an
appeal and thereafter a revision provided under the Code itself, and is not open
to challenge in a civil suit [See : Nathuram v. Siyasharan - 1969 JLJ 115 and Rambai
v. Harchand - 1979 RN 532].
13.
On
the other hand, other decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court have taken the
view that a civil court is not barred from entertaining suits for declaration and/or
injunction, against a person who has secured an order under section 131 of the
Code, to declare such order of Tahsildar as illegal and not binding or to restrain
the defendant from exercising the right recognized by the Tahsildar [Gopidas
(Mahant) v. Ram Krishna Pandey - 1971 JLJ 825 and Fakka v. Hariram - 1984 RN
422]. In Gopidas (supra), a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court (A.P. Sen, J., as he then was) explained the position succinctly, thus:
"The scheme
underlying the section, envisages a suit under section 131(2) by the claimant for
the establishment of his right, if such right is not recognized by the
Tahsildar. This necessarily implies that the correctness of the finding reached
by the Tahsildar may be questioned in subsequent legal proceedings in the
ordinary Courts of law. No doubt, the language of section 131(2) is susceptible
of the construction suggested by the learned counsel that the right of a suit
is confined to the claimant.
This, however, does
not result in the consequence that a person, on whose property a right of way
is declared by Tahsildar to exist, should have no remedy for the protection of his
rights in property, against an arbitrary or erroneous assumption of
jurisdiction by the Tahsildar." We respectfully agree with the said observations.
The decisions in Nathuram and Rambai are not good law.
14.
At
this juncture we may refer to the relevance of Wajib-ul-arz while dealing with
cases of customary easements. Section 242 of the Code deals with Wajib-ul-arz
and is extracted below : "242. Wajib-ul-arz.--(1) As soon as may be after
this Code comes into force, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall, in the prescribed
manner, ascertain and record the customs in each village in regard to –
(a) the right to
irrigation or right of way or other easement;
(b) the right to
fishing; in any land or water not belonging to or controlled or managed by the State
Government or a local authority and such record shall be known as the Wajib-ul-arz
of the village.
(2) The record made in
pursuance of sub-section (1), shall be published by the Sub-Divisional Officer in
such manner as may be prescribed. (3) Any person aggrieved by any entry made in
such record may, within one year from the date of the publication of such
record under sub- section (2), institute a suit in a civil court to have such
entry cancelled or modified. (4) The record made under sub-section (1) shall, subject
to the decision of the civil court in the suit instituted under sub-section
(3), be final and conclusive. (5) The (Sub-Divisional Officer) may, on the
application of any person interested or on his own motion, modify an entry or
insert any new entry in the Wajib-ul-arz on any of the following grounds :
(a) That all persons
interested in such entry wish to have it modified; or 14 (b) That by a decree in
a civil suit it has been declared to be erroneous; or (c) That being founded on
a decree or order of a civil court or on the order of a Revenue Officer it is not
in accordance with such decree or order; or (d) That being so founded, such decree
or order has subsequently been varied on appeal, revision or review; or (e) That
the civil court has by a decree determined any custom existing in the
village." Rules have been made under section 242 relating to Wajib-ul-arz vide
notification dated 2.2.1966, Rule 2 thereof is extracted below : "2.
Customs under sub-section (1) of section 242 shall be ascertained and recorded
in the Wajib-ul-arz under the following heads, namely : -
(i) Right to
irrigation; (ii) Other water-rights; (ii) Right to fishing; (iv) Rights of way,
village roads, paths, drains and the like; (v) Rights of persons of other
villages over the lands of the village; (vi) Rights of the villagers over the
lands of other villages; (vii) Other easement - (a) Burial and cremation
ground, (b) Gaothan, (c) Encamping-ground, (d) Threshing-floor, (e) Bazars, (f)
Skinning-grounds, (g) Rights to graze and take fuel, (h) Manure and rubbish; (viii)
Other miscellaneous rights."
15.
Wajib-ul-arz
is thus the record of customs in a village in regard to (i) easements (including
the right to irrigation and right of way); and (ii) the right to fishing in
privately owned/held lands and water bodies. The entries therein could be modified
in the manner provided in sub-section (5) of 15section 242 of the Code. Though
the Code provides for maintaining a record of all customary easements imposed upon
privately held lands and water bodies, significantly the Code does not provide
the remedies available in the event of disturbance or interference with such
easements recorded in Wajib-ul-arz, as the remedy is only way of a suit before
the civil court. Customary easements are the most difficult to prove among
easements. To establish a custom, the plaintiff will have to show that (a) the
usage is ancient or from time immemorial; (b) the usage is regular and
continuous;
(c) the usage is certain
and not varied; and (d) the usage is reasonable. If the Wajib-ul-arz (where such
a record is maintained) records or shows the customary easement, it would make
the task of civil courts comparatively easy, as there will be no need for
detailed evidence to establish the custom. Be that as it may. If the remedy for
violation of a customary easement recognized and recorded in the Wajib-ul-arz
is by way of a civil suit, it is inconceivable that in regard to violation of a
customary easement not recognized or recorded in the Wajib-ul-arz, the remedy
would be only by way of a summary enquiry by the Tahsildar under section 131 of
the Code, and not by a suit, before the civil court. Conclusion
16.
In
the circumstances, we reject the contention that Tahsildar alone has the jurisdiction,
and not the civil court, to decide upon the existence or otherwise of a
customary easement (relating to right of way or right to take water, to a person's
land). The decision of the Tahsildar after a summary enquiry with reference to
the `previous custom' and with due regard to the conveniences of all parties, under
section 131(1) of the Code, is open to challenge in a civil suit and subject to
the decision of the civil court. The jurisdiction of the civil court to try any
suit relating to easements is not affected by section 131, 242 or section 257 of
the Code. In view of the above, this appeal is allowed and the judgments and
decrees of the courts below are set aside and it is declared that the civil
court has the jurisdiction to try the suit filed by the appellants. The trial
court is requested to dispose of the suit expeditiously.
............................J
[R. V. Raveendran]
............................J
[A. K. Patnaik]
New
Delhi;
July
4, 2011.
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