Man Singh Vs. Maruti
Suzuki India Ltd. & another
O R D E R
1.
Leave
granted.
2.
The
relationship of employer and workman between the appellant and the respondent -
company was brought to end in terms of a voluntary retirement scheme (in short
"VRS") introduced by the management of the company in September, 2011.
The appellant, however, alleged that he was made to take voluntary retirement under
duress and, in reality, his removal from service was illegal and unjustified. On
those allegations he raised an industrial dispute. The appropriate Government referred
the dispute for adjudication before the Labour Court, Gurgaon, vide order dated
December 4, 2006. The reference is in the following terms: "Whether the
termination of service of Shri Man Singh on the basis of VRS Scheme by the Management
was justified and correct, if not, to what relief is he entitled?"
3.
The
respondent - company challenged the competence and validity of the reference in
a Writ Petition (CWP No.3358/2009) before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. On
behalf of the respondent - company, it was contended that having accepted the
full monetary benefits under the VRS, it was no longer open to the appellant to
question or challenge his termination of service and, in any case, any
adjudication on the dispute raised by the appellant should not be allowed to
proceed while he retained all the monetary benefits collected by him under the
scheme.
4.
A
learned single Judge of the High Court upheld the respondent's contention and while
disposing of the Writ Petition by judgment and order dated November 23, 2009
made the following directions:- "To make the scales even, the Labour Court
will undertake the adjudication on the reference, if only the workman deposits the
amount which he has received into Court with interest from the date when he has
received to the date of deposit calculated at 7.5% per annum. If the deposit is
not made within 60 days from the date when reference was issued to him, the reference
made by the Government shall stand annulled. The writ petition is disposed of
in the above terms."
5.
The
appellant challenged the order passed by the single Judge in an intra-court
appeal but a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed his appeal [(L.P.A.
No.82 of 2010)(O & M)] by a brief order, dated January 21, 2010.
6.
The
appellant has now brought this matter to this Court. On behalf of the
appellant, it is submitted that the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction
could not interfere with the reference made by the appropriate Government and
the direction to deposit in court the amount received by him under the VRS
along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum as the condition for the reference
to proceed, was quite unreasonable, inequitable and illegal.
7.
The
submission made on behalf of the appellant is fully answered by an earlier
decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Sankla and others versus Vikram Cement
and others In Ramesh Chandra Sankla a number of workmen of Vikram Cement
Company who had ceased to be the employees of Company after accepting full
benefits under the scheme of voluntary retirement moved the Labour Court under section
31 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 making the same
allegations against the Company as the appellant in this case. In that case,
the Labour Court declined to decide certain issues framed at the instance of the
management as preliminary issues.
The management's appeal
against the decision of the Labour Court not to decide those issues as preliminary
issues was rejected by the Industrial Court. The writ petition filed by the
management was dismissed by a learned single Judge on the ground that the
orders passed by the Labour Court and affirmed by the Industrial Court were
interlocutory in nature. The management took the matter before the Division Bench
which held that the writ petitions filed by the Company were under Article 227
of the Constitution and the single Judge was exercising supervisory jurisdiction;
hence, intra-court appeals were not maintainable and the appeals filed by the
Company were liable to be dismissed on that score alone.
Even while holding
that the management's appeals were liable to be dismissed as not maintainable, the
Division Bench went on to hold that since the workmen had approached the Labour
Court after having received the benefits under the scheme, it would be
equitable to direct the concerned employees to return the benefits so received
to the employer subject to the undertaking by the 5Company that in the event the
Labour Court allowed the claim and granted benefits to the workmen, the same
would be restored to them by the Company with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum.
8.
The
workmen challenged the order of the Division Bench before this Court inter alia
on the ground that having held that the management's appeals were not
maintainable, the Division Bench had no jurisdiction to make the impugned
direction. This Court repelled the workmen's contention and in paragraphs 100 and
101 of the decision held and observed as follows:- "100. Even otherwise,
according to the workmen, they were compelled to accept the amount and they received
such amount under coercion and duress.
In our considered opinion,
they cannot retain the benefit if they want to prosecute claim petitions
instituted by them with the Labour Court. Hence, the order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court as to refund of amount cannot be termed
unjust, inequitable or improper. Hence, even if it is held that a "technical"
contention raised by the workmen has some force, this Court which again exercises
discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution,
will not interfere with a direction which is in consonance with the doctrine of
equity. It has been rightly said that a person "who seeks equity must do
equity".
Here the workmen
claim benefits as workmen of the Company, but they do not want to part with the
benefit they have received towards retirement and severance of relationship of
master and servant. It simply cannot be permitted. In our judgment, therefore, the
final direction issued by the Division Bench needs no interference, particularly
when the Company has also approached this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution. 101. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the order passed
by the Division Bench of the High Court deserves to be confirmed and is hereby
confirmed. The payment which is required to be made as per the said order
should be made by the applicants intending to prosecute their claims before the
Labour Court, Mandsour.
In view of the fact, however,
that the said period is by now over, ends of justice would be served if we
extend the time so as to enable the applicants to refund the amount. We,
therefore, extend the time up to 31- 12-2008 to make such payment. We may,
however, clarify that the claim petitions will not be proceeded with till such payment
is made. If the payment is not made within the period stipulated above, the claim
petitions of those applicants will automatically stand dismissed. The Labour Court
will take up the claim petitions after 31-12-2008." The present case is squarely
covered by the decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Sankla (supra). We, thus,
find no merit in the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the High
Court had no jurisdiction to make a direction for refund of the entire amount
received by the appellant as a condition precedent for the reference to
proceed.
9.
We,
however, feel that the imposition of interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum was
a little harsh and unwarranted. Having regard to the fact that the appellant is
no longer in service, we feel that the ends of justice would meet if the direction
for refund is confined only to the principal amount received by the appellant
under VRS. We, accordingly, modify the order of the High Court to this limited
extent and direct the appellant to refund the amount received by him under VRS,
without any interest. In case the amount, as directed, is deposited by the
appellant by November 30, 2011, the reference shall proceed in accordance with
law, otherwise it would stand quashed.
10.
The
appeal stands disposed of subject to the above observations and directions.
................................J.
(Aftab Alam)
................................J.
(R.M. Lodha)
New
Delhi;
August
26, 2011.
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