Md. Nooman & Ors.
Vs. Md. Jabed Alam & Ors. [2010] INSC 764 (22 September 2010)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2579 OF 2004 Md. Nooman
& Ors. ....Appellants Versus Md. Jabed Alam & Ors. ....Respondents
AFTAB ALAM, J.
1.
A
finding on the question of title recorded in a suit for eviction would how far
be binding in a subsequent suit for declaration of title and recovery of
possession between the same parties? This is the question that arises for
consideration in this appeal. The answer to the question would depend on, in
what manner the question of title was raised by the parties and how it was
dealt with by the court in the eviction proceedings. Ordinarily, it is true, in
a suit for eviction even if the court goes into the question of title, it
examines the issue in an ancillary manner and in such cases (which constitute a
very 2 large majority) any observation or finding on the question of title
would certainly not be binding in any subsequent suit on the dispute of title.
But there may be exceptions to the general rule and as we shall find presently,
the case in hand seems to fall in that exceptional category of very limited
number of cases.
2.
Amina
Khatoon, the mother of respondent nos.1-4, (who were substituted in her place
and brought on record after her death) instituted a suit for eviction (Title
Suit No.36 of 1973) in the Court of Second Munsif, Arrah, against Md. Lukman,
the father of appellant nos.1-6 (who were similarly substituted in his place
and brought on record after his death).
According to the
plaintiff Amina Khatoon, the suit property originally belonged to her
mother-in-law, Sulakshana. Sulakshana had two other sons, Md. Lukman (the
original defendant) and Md. Jan, apart from Amina's husband, Mahmood Hassan.
Amina further claimed that Sulakshana sold the suit house to her through a
registered sale deed dated August 13, 1957.
Following the
purchase of the suit house, she moved the Block Development Officer (BDO) and
the municipality for mutation of her name in respect of the suit house in the
revenue and municipal records. The defendant Md. Lukman, filed an objection
before the BDO, but his objection was disallowed and her name was entered in
the revenue and municipal records.
3 Later on, the
municipality filed a suit against her for arrears of tax whereupon all the
outstanding dues of tax were paid by her. It was further the case of Amina,
that she had let out the suit house to the defendant about 4 or 5 years prior
to the filing of the suit on a monthly rent of Rs.10.00 (rupees ten only). The
defendant did not pay the rent from September, 1971 to February 13, 1973. She
then sent a registered notice to him under section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 through her lawyer determining the defendant's tenancy and
asking him to vacate the house by March 31, 1973. The defendant did not vacate
the house forcing her to go to the court.
3.
The
defendant in his written statement, apart from the formal objections to the
maintainability of the suit, denied that Sulakshana executed any sale deed with
respect to the suit house in favour of the plaintiff. He described the sale
deed, relied upon by the plaintiff as the basis of her title, as a forged and
fabricated document. In this connection, the defendant stated that Sulakshana
had an attack of paralysis before August 13, 1957 when the sale was said to
have been executed by her. She had lost her senses and she was not in a
position to execute any sale deed. No consideration was paid by the plaintiff
to Sulakshana and the title to the house never passed to her. The defendant set
up a rival claim of title over the suit house. He stated that Sulakshana had
transferred the suit house in his favour in 1950, by Hiba 4 (oral gift) and
since then he was coming in possession of the suit property.
Originally, it was
parti (vacant) land. He submitted a plan in the municipality for construction
of the house on it and constructed the house after the plan was sanctioned. He
was living in the house constructed by him over the land which was given to him
by his mother by Hiba. He denied any relationship of landlord and tenant with
the plaintiff and also denied to have taken the suit house from the plaintiff
on a monthly rent of Rs.10.00 (rupees ten only). He never paid any rent to the
plaintiff, nor was any rent due against him.
4.
On
the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed seven issues,
of which issue nos.3 & 4 relating to the plaintiff's claim of title over
the suit property and issue no.5 about the relationship of landlord and tenant
between the parties are relevant for this appeal. Those three issues are as
under:
"3. Has the
plaintiff got title to the suit land?
4. Is the sale deed
genuine, valid and for consideration?
5. Is there any
relationship of landlord and tenant between the Parties?"
5.
In
support of the rival claims of title over the suit property, both the plaintiff
and the defendant led their respective evidences, both oral and documentary.
The defendant also examined the third brother, Md. Jan from his side as DW11.
On a consideration of the evidences adduced before it, the trial court upheld
the plaintiff's claim of title to the property arriving at the following
finding:
"In view of the
discussion made above I hold that the sale deed (Ext.4) is genuine and that
story set up by the defendant that an oral hiba was made by Sulachna to him has
not been proved.
The plaintiff has got
Title to the suit land and the sale deed is genuine valid and for
consideration."
6.
It
then took up issue nos.5 and 6 (about the plaintiff's entitlement to a decree
of eviction) together and came to hold and find that the relationship of landlord
and tenant between the parties had not been proved. In light of its finding on
issue no.5, the court further observed that in case the question of title is
raised by the defendant and if it is found that there is no contract of
tenancy, the proper course would be to dismiss the suit and not to convert it
into a declaratory or possessory suit which is of altogether a different
nature.
The court further
pointed out that the suit before it was neither for declaration of title nor
the plaintiff had paid ad valorem court fee. The plaintiff was, therefore, not
entitled to a decree of eviction since the relationship of landlord and tenant
was not established between the parties.
It, accordingly,
dismissed the suit by judgment and order dated December 23, 1974.
7.
The
plaintiff took the matter in appeal, (Title Appeal No.12 of 1975) which too was
dismissed by the Second Additional District Judge, Arrah, by judgment and order
dated February 19, 1975. From the judgment of the first appellate court, it
appears that before it the main focus was on the issue of relationship of
landlord and tenant between the parties. The trial court found that the suit
property was vacant land and not a house (the case of the plaintiff was that
the suit property was a piece of land 3 kathas and 5 dhurs in area with a
fallen down house). It also noted that on behalf of the respondent no argument
was advanced on the invalidity of the sale deed and the controversy was mainly
about the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. On this
issue, the appellate court came to the same finding as the trial court and
dismissed the plaintiff's appeal observing as follows:
"10. It is quite
clear from the above enunciated principle that in order to get a decree in such
a suit the plaintiff must not come to the Court with a false story. In the
present case, it is quite obvious the plaintiff has come with a false case that
she let out a house on the suit land to the deft (sic defendant) on a rent of
Rs.10/- per month. If there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between
the parties the plaintiff should have prayed for declaration her title and
recovery of possession after paying advalorem Court fee on the current market
value of the suit property. By filing a suit for eviction of the defendant and
paying small Court fee on twelve month alleged rent of the house, the plaintiff
has adopted a tricky way of getting her title 7 declared and possession of the
suit house recovered after paying very low amount of the court fee."
8.
The
plaintiff did not take the matter any further but filed another suit (Title
Suit No.16/82 of 1978-79) against Md. Lukman seeking declaration of title over
the property and recovery of its possession from the defendant. In this suit,
her claim of title over the suit property was exactly the same as in the
previous suit. The defendant too, apart from raising the objections based on
limitation and res judicata and similar other formal pleas mainly stuck to the
same story as in the previous case. According to the defendant, the sale deed
relied upon by the plaintiff was not a genuine document for consideration and
it was not executed by Sulakshana, who was the mother of the defendant. It was
stated on behalf of the defendant that Sulakshana died in 1957. In the
beginning of that year she suffered from fever for about a month and remained
confined to bed and thereafter she suffered an attack of paralysis. She lost
all power of understanding and continued in that state till her death in August
1957. The defendant specifically pleaded that on August 13, 1957 when the
disputed sale deed was shown to have been executed, she had no power of
understanding. It was further stated on his behalf that 8 the plaintiff's
husband was a clever litigant and he manoeuvred to fabricate the sale deed by
setting up some other woman as Sulakshana. It was also stated that if there was
in existence any sale deed purportedly executed by Sulakshana, it must have
been manufactured in collusion with the scribe, the attesting witnesses and the
registrar and it would not confer any right, title or interest in the suit
property on the plaintiff. It was further the case of the defendant that the
disputed sale deed was never acted upon and the plaintiff never came in actual
possession of the suit property on this basis. The defendant also denied the
case of the plaintiff that she had inducted him as a tenant in the suit
premises on a monthly rental of Rs.10.00 (rupees ten only) or as a licensee, as
totally false and concocted. The defendant claimed that his mother Sulakshana
had given him the suit property in the year 1950 by Hiba (oral gift) and put
him in actual physical possession of the suit premises and since then he was
coming in its possession. He constructed a boundary wall around the land and a
house consisting of five rooms, etc. It was lastly claimed that the defendant
was coming and continuing in possession to the knowledge of everyone, including
the plaintiff and, thus, the defendant had, in any event, acquired title by
adverse possession.
9.
It
is, thus, to be seen that in the second suit too both parties went to the court
with the same stories as in the previous suit, though, it is true that this
time each side led some additional evidence in support of its case, for example,
the plaintiff relied upon and produced a copy of the judgment in the earlier
suit in which her claim of title over the suit property was upheld.
10.
The
trial court framed a number of issues, of which issue nos. III, IV, V & VI
are relevant for this appeal and are as follows:
"III) Has the
plaintiff got title over the suit property? IV) Is there any relationship of
landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant? V) Has the
plaintiff acquired title by adverse possession? VI) Is the plaintiff entitled
to recovery of possession? "
The trial court
considered issue nos. III, IV & V together and came to find and hold that
the plaintiff had succeeded in proving her title whereas the defendant had
failed to prove his adverse possession. Issue nos. III & V were therefore
decided in the plaintiff's favour while issue no. IV was decided against her.
On the basis of its findings, the trial court held that the plaintiff had valid
cause of action and it, accordingly, decreed the suit by judgment and order
dated February 28, 1981.
11.
Against
the judgment and order passed by the trial court the defendant preferred an
appeal (Title Appeal No.33 of 1981). The first appellate court (the eighth
Additional District Judge, Arrah), on a reappraisal of the evidence produced by
the parties, came to find and hold that the plaintiff had failed to prove that
Sulakshana had put her left thumb impression on the sale deed (Ext.3) after
understanding its contents and she had, thus, failed to prove her title to the
suit premises on the basis of the sale deed. The appellate court, accordingly,
allowed the appeal and by judgment and order dated May 21, 1987 set aside the
judgment and decree passed by the trial court and dismissed the plaintiff's
suit.
12.
The
original plaintiff was dead by this time and her heirs and legal
representatives, the present respondents, took the matter in second appeal
(Appeal from Appellate Decree No.236 of 1987) to the High Court. In the High
Court, the second appeal was heard on the substantial question of law framed as
under:
"...whether the
judgment and decree regarding title passed in Title Suit No.36 of 1973 (Ext.15)
shall operate as res judicata between the parties on the question of
title."
13.
The
High Court by judgment and order dated May 24, 2002 answered the question in
the affirmative, in favour of the appellants (respondents 11 herein), allowed
the appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by the appeal court below
and restored the judgment and decree of the trial court.
The High Court noted
that the earlier suit (for eviction) and the later suit for declaration of
title and recovery of possession were between the same parties and were
contested on exactly the same claims raised by the two sides. The plaintiff on
each occasion was claiming title to the suit premises on the basis of a sale
deed executed by Sulakshana in her favour in the year 1950. The defendant on
each occasion alleged that the sale deed was sham, fake and fabricated and set
up a rival claim of title on the plea that his mother Sulakshana had made an
oral gift of the suit premises in his favour in the year 1950 and since then he
was coming in possession over it. The premises, when it was given to him in
gift, was a vacant land over which he had constructed a house after obtaining
sanction from the municipality. The High Court, therefore, observed as under:
"9... The facts
of the earlier Title Suit No.36 of 1973, which was between the same parties and
present Title Suit No.16 of 1978 also between the same parties, show that the
plea taken by both the parties regarding title in both the Title Suits are
same.
10. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, the judgment and decree regarding title passed in
Title Suit No.36 of 1973 (Ext.15) shall operate as res judicata between the
parties on the question of title."
14.
Mr.
H.L. Agrawal, learned senior advocate, appearing for the appellant contended
that the High Court had seriously erred in holding that the finding in the
earlier suit of eviction would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit
for declaration of title and recovery of possession. Mr. Agrawal contended that
a court dealing with an eviction suit was a creature of the Rent Act and was a
court of limited jurisdiction. It had no authority or jurisdiction to decide
disputes of title and hence, any finding recorded by it on the larger issue of
title could not be binding on a court under the Code of Civil Procedure
adjudicating upon a dispute of title between the two sides.
He further submitted
that there may be instances where in a suit for eviction the tenant might deny
the title of the person seeking his ejectment and in those cases the rent court
may incidentally go into the question of title in order to decide on the
primary issue of eviction. But its findings on the issue of title would only be
incidental and never binding in a proper suit for declaration of title and
recovery of possession. In support of the submission he relied upon a decision
of this Court in Shamim Akhtar v. Iqbal Ahmad & Anr., (2000) 8 SCC 123, in
which it is said that in an eviction suit under the Rent Act, the question of
title can be considered by the court as an incidental question and the final
determination of title must be left to the decision of the competent court. The
decision in Shamim Akhtar arose from U.P. Urban 13 Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and the Provincial Small Cause Courts
Act, 1887 and it was on a totally different set of facts. The observation of
the court relied upon by Mr. Agrawal was of course stating the general rule and
no more than that. The decision in Shamim Akhtar in no way helps the case of
the appellants in the present appeal.
15.
The
counsel for the respondents on the other hand relied upon a decision of this
court in Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E.Edr.by LRs. (D) vs. Musa Dadabhai Ummer
and Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 350. The decision in this case dealt with the question
when a matter can be said to be directly and substantially in issue and when it
is only collaterally and incidentally in issue. The decision in Sajjadanashin
does seem to help the case of the respondents. But we may state here that Mr.
Agrawal with great fairness brought to our notice a decision of the Patna High
Court1 in Pardip Singh vs. Ram Sundar Singh, AIR (36) 1949 Patna 510, though it
is clearly against him. It is an old decision in which the division bench of
the High Court placed reliance on two earlier decisions of the Privy Council.
In Pardip Singh Meredith J., speaking for the division bench of the court
observed as follows:
1 To which both, Mr.
Agrawal and the two of us have been very closely associated at some time.
14 "The
decision in a rent suit is not res judicata on the question of title unless the
question of title had to be decided, was expressly raised, and was expressly
decided between the parties and in each case it is necessary to examine
carefully the decision in the rent suit before any opinion can be formed as to
whether it operates as res judicata on the question of title or not.
Ordinarily the
decision would be res judicata only with regard to the existence of the
relationship of landlord and tenant. The difference in the two classes of cases
is very well illustrated in two Privy Council decisions, namely, Run Bahadoor
Singh v. Mt. Lucho Koer, 12 I.A. 23: (11 Cal. 301 P.C.), where it was held that
the decision was not res judicata as the question of title had been gone into
only incidentally and collaterally, and Radhamadhub Holdar v. Manohar Mookerji,
15 I.A. 97: (15 Cal. 756 P.C.), where the question of title was directly
decided in a rent suit, and the decision was held to be res judicata."
16.
We
respectfully concur with the view expressed in the decision in Pardip Singh.
17.
We
have carefully examined the pleadings of the parties in the two suits and the
evidences led by them in support of their respective claims regarding title in
the two suits. And, we are satisfied that the issue of title was expressly
raised by the parties in the earlier eviction suit and it was expressly decided
by the eviction court. The question of title was directly and substantially in
issue between the parties in the earlier suit for eviction.
Hence, the High Court
was right in holding that the finding recorded in favour of the plaintiff in
the earlier suit for eviction would operate as res judicata in the subsequent
suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession between the parties.
18.
We,
thus, find no merit in the appeal. It is dismissed, but in the facts and
circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
Back
