M/S Kranti Asso. Pvt.
Ltd. & ANR. Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors.  INSC 715 (8 September
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010 (Arising
out of SLP (Civil) No.20428 of 2007) M/s. Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. &
Anr. ..Appellant(s) Versus Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan & Others ..Respondent(s)
WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (C) NO.12766 OF 2008)
two appeals, one at the instance of the builder and the other at the instance
of the Corporation Bank, have been filed impugning the Order of National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter, the said Commission).
the case of the builder, the said Commission has not given any reason and
dismissed the revision petition by passing a cryptic order dated 31.8.2007
which reads as under:
In view of the
concurrent findings of the State Commission, we do not find any force in this
The revision Petition
so far as the case of the builder is concerned, this Court is of the opinion
that the said Commission cannot, considering the way it is structured, dismiss
the revision petition by refusing to give any reasons and by just affirming the
order of the State Commission.
said Commission has been defined under Section 2(k) of the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986 (hereinafter CP Act) as follows:
"National Commission" means the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission established under clause (c) of Section 9;"
section 9(c) of CP Act, the said Commission has been established by the Central
Government by a notification.
composition of the said Commission has been provided under Section 20 of the CP
Act and wherefrom it is clear that the said Commission is a high-powered
adjudicating forum headed by a sitting or a retired judge of the Supreme Court.
21 of the CP Act provides for the jurisdiction of the said Commission.
order to appreciate the questions involved in this case, the provision relating
to jurisdiction of the said Commission is set out hereunder:
Jurisdiction of the National Commission.- Subject to the other provisions of
this Act, the National Commission shall have jurisdiction- (a) to entertain-
(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if
any, claimed exceeds [rupees one crore]; and (ii) appeals against the orders of
any State Commission;
and (b) to call for
the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is
pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to
the National Commission that such State Commission has exercised a jurisdiction
not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a 3 jurisdiction so vested,
or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material
Section 23 of the CP Act, an appeal would lie against the order of the said
Commission passed in exercise of its powers under Section 21(1)(a), to this
Court, within 30 days, subject to extension of time by this Court on sufficient
cause being shown.
21(1)(b), the said Commission exercises revisional power over orders of State
power and procedure applicable to the said Commission has been provided under
Section 22 of the CP Act. A perusal of Section 22(1) would show that Sections
12, 13 and 14 of CP Act, with necessary modification, are applicable to the
decision making process by the said Commission. Under Section 13 of the CP Act,
the District Forum has been vested, in certain matters, with the powers of a
Civil Court while trying a suit. Section 13(4) of CP Act is applicable to the
said Commission in view of Section 22(1) thereof. Similarly, Sections 13(5),
(6) and 4 (7) will also apply to the said Commission in view of Section 22(1).
a perusal of Sections 13(4), (5), (6) and (7) of the CP Act, it is clear that
the said Commission has been vested with some of the powers of a Civil Court.
The following powers have been vested on the said Commission:
"(4) For the
purposes of this section, the District Forum shall have the same powers as are
vested in a civil court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while
trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:- (i) the summoning
and enforcing the attendance of any defendant or witness and examining the
witness on oath, (ii) the discovery and production of any document or other
material object producible as evidence, (iii) the reception of evidence on
affidavits, (iv) the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis or
test from the appropriate laboratory or from any other relevant source, (v)
issuing of any commission for the examination of any witness, and (vi) any
other matter which may be prescribed.
Section 13(5) of CP Act, every proceeding of the said Commission will be deemed
to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the
Indian Penal Code, and the said Commission shall be deemed to be a Civil Court
for the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal
above provisions make it clear that the said Commission has the trappings of a
Civil Court and is a high-powered quasi-judicial forum for deciding lis between
necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision
came up for consideration before this Court in several cases.
Initially this Court
recognized a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-
judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two
got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the
judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak and others vs. Union of India and others
reported in AIR 1970 SC 150.
Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and others reported in AIR
1973 SC 389, this Court approvingly referred to the opinion of Lord Denning in
Rigina vs. Gaming Board Ex parte Benaim [(1970) 2 WLR 1009] and quoted him as
saying "that heresy was scotched in Ridge and Boldwin, 1964 AC 40".
expression `speaking order' was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in
a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of
Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record
and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order.
(See 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report)
Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial
authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties,
must speak. It must not be like the `inscrutable face of a Sphinx'.
the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala and
others, AIR 1961 SC 1669, the question of recording reasons came up for
consideration in the context of a refusal by Harinagar to transfer, without
giving reasons, shares held by Shyam Sunder. Challenging such refusal, the
transferee moved the High Court contending, inter alia, that the refusal is mala
fide, arbitrary and capricious. The High Court rejected such pleas and the
transferee was asked to file a suit. The transferee filed an appeal to the
Central Government under Section 111 Clause (3) of Indian Companies Act, 1956
which was dismissed.
Thereafter, the son
of the original transferee filed another application for transfer of his shares
which was similarly refused by the Company. On appeal, the Central Government
quashed the resolution passed by the Company and directed the Company to
register the transfer. However, in passing the said order, Government did not
give any reason. The company challenged the said decision before this Court.
other question which arose in Harinagar (supra) was whether the Central
Government, in passing the 8 appellate order acted as a tribunal and is
amenable to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court.
though in Harinagar (supra) the decision was administrative, this Court
insisted on the requirement of recording reason and further held that in
exercising appellate powers, the Central Government acted as a tribunal in
exercising judicial powers of the State and such exercise is subject to Article
136 jurisdiction of this Court.
Such powers, this
Court held, cannot be effectively exercised if reasons are not given by the
Central Government in support of the order (Para 23, page 1678-79).
in the case of Bhagat Raja vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1967 SC 1606, the
Constitution Bench of this Court examined the question whether the Central
Government was bound to pass a speaking order while dismissing a revision and
confirming the order of the State Government in the context of Mines and
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, and having regard to the
provision of Rule 55 of Mineral and Concessions Rules. The Constitution 9
Bench held that in exercising its power of revision under the aforesaid Rule
the Central Government acts in a quasi-judicial capacity (See para 8 page
Where the State
Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not,
and the Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government
without specifying any reason, this Court, exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 136, may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds on which
Central Government upheld the order of the State Government (See para 9 page
1610). Therefore, this Court insisted on reasons being given for the order.
M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of U.P and others, AIR 1970 SC
1302, while dealing with U.P. Sugar Dealers License Order under which the
license was cancelled, this Court held that such an order of cancellation is
quasi-judicial and must be a speaking one. This Court further held that merely
giving an opportunity of hearing is not enough and further pointed out where
the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reason is even greater.
The learned Judges held that the recording 10 of reasons in support of a
decision on a disputed claim ensures that the decision is not a result of
caprice, whim or fancy but was arrived at after considering the relevant law
and that the decision was just. (See para 7 page 1304).
the case of M/s. Travancore Rayons Ltd. vs. The Union of India and others, AIR
1971 SC 862, the Court, dealing with the revisional jurisdiction of the Central
Government under the then Section 36 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944,
held that the Central Government was actually exercising judicial power of the
State and in exercising judicial power reasons in support of the order must be
disclosed on two grounds. The first is that the person aggrieved gets an
opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons are erroneous and secondly, the
obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary
action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power (See para 11
M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd. vs. Woolcombers Workers Union and another, AIR
1973 SC 2758, this Court while considering an award under Section 11 of 11
Industrial Disputes Act insisted on the need of giving reasons in support of
conclusions in the Award. The Court held that the very requirement of giving
reason is to prevent unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching conclusions. The
second principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine that justice should
not only be done, it should also appear to be done as well. The learned Judges
said that a just but unreasoned conclusion does not appear to be just to those
who read the same.
Reasoned and just
conclusion on the other hand will also have the appearance of justice. The
third ground is that such awards are subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of
this Court and in the absence of reasons, it is difficult for this Court to
ascertain whether the decision is right or wrong (See para 5 page 2761).
Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and others, AIR 1974 SC 87, this Court
while dealing with the question of selection under Indian Administrative
Service/Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion Regulation) held that
the expression "reasons for the proposed supersession" should not 12
be mere rubber stamp reasons. Such reasons must disclose how mind was applied
to the subject matter for a decision regardless of the fact whether such a
decision is purely administrative or quasi-judicial.
This Court held that
the reasons in such context would mean the link between materials which are
considered and the conclusions which are reached.
Reasons must reveal a
rational nexus between the two (See para 28 page 98).
Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. vs. The Union of India
and another, AIR 1976 SC 1785, this Court held that it is far too well settled
that an authority in making an order in exercise of its quasi-judicial
function, must record reasons in support of the order it makes. The learned
Judges emphatically said that every quasi- judicial order must be supported by
reasons. The rule requiring reasons in support of a quasi- judicial order is,
this Court held, as basic as following the principles of natural justice. And
the rule must be observed in its proper spirit. A mere pretence of compliance
would not satisfy the requirement of law (See para 6 page 1789).
Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597, which is a
decision of great jurisprudence significance in our Constitutional law, Chief
Justice Beg, in a concurring but different opinion held that an order impounding
a passport is a quasi-judicial decision (Para 34, page 612). The learned Chief
Justice also held when an administrative action involving any deprivation of or
restriction on fundamental rights is taken, the authorities must see that
justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done as well. This
principle would obviously demand disclosure of reasons for the decision.
Y.V. Chandrachud (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring but a separate
opinion also held that refusal to disclose reasons for impounding a passport is
an exercise of an exceptional nature and is to be done very sparingly and only
when it is fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon situation.
learned Judge further held that law cannot permit any exercise of power by an
executive to keep the reasons undisclosed if the only motive for doing so is to
keep the reasons away from judicial scrutiny. (See para 39 page 613).
Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran vs. State of Kerala and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1918,
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer speaking for a three-Judge Bench held that the
functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial in character. One of the attributes
of quasi- judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in support of
decisions taken and the other requirement is following the principles of
Learned Judge held
that natural justice requires reasons to be written for the conclusions made
(See para 14 page 1922).
Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 368, this Court,
dealing with a service matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor (supra), held
that "rubber-stamp reason" is not enough and virtually quoted the
observation in Capoor (supra) to the extent that reasons "are the links
between 15 the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual
conclusions." (See para 18 page 377).
a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt
etc. etc. vs. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Dept.
and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1, while giving the majority judgment Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud
referred to Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edition, page 97) where the principle in
Latin runs as follows:
Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex"
English version of the said principle given by the Chief Justice is that:
"Reason is the
soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the
law itself." (See para 29 page 11)
M/s. Bombay Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1984 SC
160, this Court held that while disposing of applications under Monopolies and
Restrictive Trade Practices Act the duty of the Government is to give reasons
for its order. This court made it very clear that the faith 16 of the people
in administrative tribunals can be sustained only if the tribunals act fairly
and dispose of the matters before them by well considered orders. In saying so,
this Court relied on its previous decisions in Capoor (supra) and Siemens
Engineering (supra), discussed above.
Ram Chander vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 1173, this Court was
dealing with the appellate provisions under the Railway Servants (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1968 condemned the mechanical way of dismissal of appeal in
the context of requirement of Rule 22(2) of the aforesaid Rule.
This Court held that
the word "consider" occurring to the Rule 22(2) must mean the Railway
Board shall duly apply its mind and give reasons for its decision. The learned
Judges held that the duty to give reason is an incident of the judicial process
and emphasized that in discharging quasi-judicial functions the appellate
authority must act in accordance with natural justice and give reasons for its
decision (Para 4, page 1176).
M/s. Star Enterprises and others vs. City and Industrial Development
Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and others, (1990) 3 SCC 280, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court held that in the present day set up judicial review of
administrative action has become expansive and is becoming wider day by day and
the State has to justify its action in various field of public law. All these
necessitate recording of reason for executive actions including the rejection
of the highest offer. This Court held that disclosure of reasons in matters of
such rejection provides an opportunity for an objective review both by superior
administrative heads and for judicial process and opined that such reasons
should be communicated unless there are specific justification for not doing so
(see Para 10, page 284-285).
Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education vs. K.S. Gandhi
and others, (1991) 2 SCC 716, this Court held that even in domestic enquiry if
the facts are not in dispute non-recording of reason may not be violative of
the principles of natural justice but where facts are 18 disputed necessarily
the authority or the enquiry officer, on consideration of the materials on
record, should record reasons in support of the conclusion reached (see para
22, pages 738-739)
the case of M.L. Jaggi vs. Mahanagar Telephones Nigam Limited and others,
(1996) 3 SCC 119, this Court dealt with an award under Section 7 of the
Telegraph Act and held that since the said award affects public interest,
reasons must be recorded in the award. It was also held that such reasons are
to be recorded so that it enables the High Court to exercise its power of
judicial review on the validity of the award. (see para 8, page 123).
Charan Singh vs. Healing Touch Hospital and others, AIR 2000 SC 3138, a
three-Judge Bench of this Court, dealing with a grievance under CP Act, held
that the authorities under the Act exercise quasi-judicial powers for redressal
of consumer disputes and it is, therefore, imperative that such a body should
arrive at conclusions based on reasons. This Court held that the said Act,
being one of the benevolent pieces of legislation, is 19 intended to protect a
large body of consumers from exploitation as the said Act provides for an
alternative mode for consumer justice by the process of a summary trial. The
powers which are exercised are definitely quasi-judicial in nature and in such
a situation the conclusions must be based on reasons and held that requirement
of recording reasons is "too obvious to be reiterated and needs no
emphasizing". (See Para 11, page 3141 of the report)
in cases of Court Martial, this Court struck a different note in two of its
Constitution Bench decisions, the first of which was rendered in the case of
Som Datt Datta vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1969 SC 414, Mr. Justice
Ramaswami delivering the judgment for the unanimous Constitution Bench held
that provisions of Sections 164 and 165 of the Army Act do not require an order
confirming proceedings of Court Martial to be supported by reasons. The Court
held that an order confirming such proceedings does not become illegal if it
does not record reasons. (Para 10, page 421- 422 of the report).
two decades thereafter, a similar question cropped up before this Court in the
case of S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984. A unanimous
Constitution Bench speaking through Justice S.C. Agrawal confirmed its earlier
decision in Som Datt (supra) in para 47 at page 2000 of the report and held
reasons are not required to be recorded for an order confirming the finding and
sentence recorded by the Court Martial.
must be remembered in this connection that the Court Martial as a proceeding is
sui generis in nature and the Court of Court Martial is different, being called
a Court of Honour and the proceeding therein are slightly different from other
proceedings. About the nature of Court Martial and its proceedings the
observations of Winthrop in Military Law and Precedents are very pertinent and
are extracted herein below:
to the judicial branch of the Government, it follows that courts-martial must
pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the
President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the Army and
Navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those
of his authorized military representatives."
Constitution also deals with Court Martial proceedings differently as is clear
from Articles 33, 136(2) and 227(4) of the Constitution.
England there was no common law duty of recording of reasons. In Marta Stefan
vs. General Medical Council, (1999) 1 WLR 1293, it has been held, "the
established position of the common law is that there is no general duty imposed
on our decision makers to record reasons". It has been acknowledged in the
Justice Report, Administration Under Law (1971) at page 23 that "No single
factor has inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously
as the absence of any general obligation upon public authorities to give
reasons for their decisions".
then in the case of R vs. Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Cunningham
reported in (1991) 4 All ER 310, Lord Donaldson, Master of Rolls, opined very
strongly in favour of disclosing of reasons in a case where the Court is acting
in its discretion.
The learned Master of
22 "..It is a
corollary of the discretion conferred upon the board that it is their duty to
set out their reasoning in sufficient form to show the principles on which they
have proceeded. Adopting Lord Lane CJ's observations (in R vs. Immigration
Appeal Tribunal, ex p Khan (Mahmud)  2 All ER 420 at 423, (1983) QB 790
at 794-795), the reasons for the lower amount is not obvious.
Mr. Cunningham is
entitled to know, either expressly or inferentially stated, what it was to
which the board were addressing their mind in arriving at their conclusion. It
must be obvious to the board that Mr. Cunningham is left with a burning sense
of grievance. They should be sensitive to the fact that he is left with a real
feeling of injustice, that having been found to have been unfairly dismissed,
he has been deprived of his just desserts (as he sees them)".
learned Master of Rolls further clarified by saying:
"..thus, in the
particular circumstances of this case, and without wishing to establish any
precedent whatsoever, I am prepared to spell out an obligation on this board to
give succinct reasons, if only to put the mind of Mr. Cunningham at rest. I
would therefore allow this application."
however, the present trend of the law has been towards an increasing
recognition of the duty of Court to give reasons (See North Range Shipping
Limited vs. Seatrans Shipping Corporation, (2002) 1 WLR 2397). It has been
acknowledged that this trend is consistent with the development towards
openness in Government and judicial administration.
English vs. Emery Reimbold and Strick Limited, (2002) 1 WLR 2409, it has been
held that justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why one
has won and the other has lost. The House of Lords in Cullen vs. Chief
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, (2003) 1 WLR 1763, Lord Bingham of
Cornhill and Lord Steyn, on the requirement of reason held, "First, they
impose a discipline ... which may contribute to such decisions being considered
with care. Secondly, reasons encourage transparency ... Thirdly, they assist
the Courts in performing their supervisory function if judicial review
proceedings are launched." (Para 7, page 1769 of the report)
position in the United States has been indicated by this Court in S.N.
Mukherjee (supra) in paragraph 11 at page 1988 of the judgment. This Court held
that in the United States the Courts have always insisted on the recording of
reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their powers. It was
further held that such recording of reasons is required as "the Court
cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the 24
considerations underlying the action under review".
In S.N. Mukherjee
(supra) this court relied on the decisions of the U.S. Court in Securities and
Exchange Commission vs. Chenery Corporation, (1942) 87 Law Ed 626 and John T.
Dunlop vs. Walter Bachowski, (1975) 44 Law Ed 377 in support of its opinion
the above discussion, this Court holds:
a. In India the
judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative
decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
b. A quasi-judicial
authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.
c. Insistence on
recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that
justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.
d. Recording of
reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise
of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.
e. Reasons reassure
that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds
and by disregarding extraneous considerations.
f. Reasons have
virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as
observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by
g. Reasons facilitate
the process of judicial review by superior Courts.
h. The ongoing
judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional
governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is
virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle
that reason is the soul of justice.
i. Judicial or even
quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and
authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose
which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been
objectively considered. This is important for 26 sustaining the litigants'
faith in the justice delivery system.
j. Insistence on
reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.
k. If a Judge or a
quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making
process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful
to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
l. Reasons in support
of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or
`rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making
m. It cannot be
doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial
decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to
errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in
Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737).
n. Since the
requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in
decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human
rights and was considered part 27 of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19
EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405,
wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights
which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for
o. In all common law
jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the
future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for
the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due
the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the order of the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission and remand the matter to the said forum for deciding the
matter by passing a reasoned order in the light of the observations made above.
Since some time has elapsed, this Court requests the forum to decide the matter
as early as possible, preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of
service of this order upon it.
so far as the appeal filed by the Bank is concerned, this Court finds that the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in its order dated 4th April
2008 has given some reasons in its finding. The reasons, inter alia, are as
"We have gone
through the orders of the District Forum and the State Commission, perused the
record placed before us and heard the parties at length. The State Commission
has rightly confirmed the order of the District Forum after coming to the
conclusion that the Petitioner and the Builder - Respondents No.3 and 4 have
colluded with each other and hence, directed them to compensate the complainant
for the harassment caused to them."
the order of the State Commission dated 26.7.07 in connection with the appeal
filed by the Bank, we do not find that the State Commission has independently
considered Bank's appeal. The State Commission dismissed the Bank's appeal for
the reasons given in its order dated 6.7.07 in connection with the appeal of
Court is of the view that since the Bank has filed a separate appeal, it has a
right to be heard independently in support of its appeal. That right has been
denied by the State Commission. In that view of the matter, this Court quashes
the order 29 dated 26.7.07 passed by the State Commission as also the order of
the National Commission dated 4th April 2008 which has affirmed the order of
the State Commission.
case is remanded to the State Commission for hearing on merits as early as
possible, preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of service of
this order to the State Commission.
is expected that the State Commission will hear out the matter independently
and give adequate reasons for its conclusions. We, however, do not make any
observations on the merits of the case.
these appeals are allowed. No order as to costs.