Ranjit Singh &
Ors. Vs State of Madhya Pradesh
JUDGMENT
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1.
This
appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 20.10.2005
passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh(Indore-Bench) in Criminal Appeal
Nos.149 and 180 of 1995, by which the High Court has dismissed the appeals
against the judgment and order dated 8.2.1995 passed by the Sessions Court
convicting the appellants under sections 148, 365, 342, 323, 324 and 324/149 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called the `IPC'), and awarded them
life imprisonment along with other
2.
Facts
and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:(A) That on 21.1.1988, the
First Information Report (hereinafter called as FIR) bearing No.18/88 was
lodged at 9 A.M. under sections148, 365, 342, 323, 324 and 324/149 IPC in the
Police Station, Namli District, Ratlam by Nagu, informant/complainant, stating
that on19.1.1988 Nagu and Gangaram (PW.24) had gone to the District Court,
Ratlam to attend a case and at about 3 P.M. the accused persons, namely, Ranjit
(A.3), Kamal Das (A.12), Vikramsingh (both of whom died during the course of
trial), Ramesh Patidar (A.4),Shantilal (A.6) and Pooran Das (A.2) reached the
court compound and took Nagu and Gangaram (PW.24) on their bicycle to an iron
factoryon the pretext of reaching some compromise in the case and thereafter
they had been taken in a truck loaded with sand to the outskirts ofvillage
Amleta. From there they had been taken to village Bhaisatiya.Nagu and Gangaram
(PW.24) were assaulted by the accused persons with lat his and were asked the
whereabouts of Shantilal, Shambhu and Mohan. Nagu disclosed that Shantilal was
in village Bamankhedi and Shambhu, Kailash and Mohan were in village Budheda.
The accused persons wrongly confined Nagu inside the house of Nandu and
tookaway Gangaram (PW.24) with them. They brought Shantilal in a tractor in the
night at 2 A.M. and put him inside the room with Naguand locked the room from
outside. On the next day, i.e., 20.1.1988 atabout 8-9 A.M., they brought Kailash
(PW.25), Shambhu and Gangaram (PW.24) and confined them also in the same room
along with Nagu and Shantilal. After some time, they took all of them to the
well of Gopal Maharaj situated at village Panched and the accused persons
assaulted Shantilal with lathis as a consequence of which Shantilal became
unconscious. Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu were also assaulted. Again they took
Shantilal (in unconscious condition) in the field of one Dhula Chowkidar and
they assaulted Shantilal,Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu with lathis. Shantilal
died on the spot.Shambhu also received grievous injuries on his person. The accused
persons left the injured persons and moved to a distance watching forthe
consequences. After some time, the accused persons reached near Shantilal and
checked whether he was dead or alive and once theywere satisfied that Shantilal
was no more, they fled.
(B) The FIR lodged by
the complainant, Nagu was recorded by SHO Govardhan Singh (PW.30) vide Ex.P-63.
Shailendra KumarShrivastava (PW.29) and another Police Officer reached the spot
and found Shantilal dead whereas Shambhu, Gangaram (PW.24) and Kailash (PW.25)
were lying there in injured condition. ShailendraKumar Shrivastava (PW.29)
prepared the inquest (Ex.P-5) of the deceased Shantilal, seized blood-stained
cloth, and collected earth and blood-stained earth. He sent the dead body of
Shantilal for post-mortem examination. The injured persons, namely, Nagu,
Shambhu,Kailash (PW.25) and Gangaram (PW.24) were sent for medical examination
to Government Hospital, Ratlam. Kanhaiya Lal Dharia,Naib Tehsildar (PW.26)
recorded the statement of the injured witness,Kailash (PW.25). On 21.1.1988,
Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1) performed the autopsy of the deceased Shantilal and
prepared the report (Ex.P-3).He also examined on the same day the injured
Kailash (PW.25) andNagu. On the same day, i.e., 21.1.1988 Dr. Virendra Singh
(PW.15) examined Shambhu and also took his X-ray and found fractures of
thefifth metacarpal bone of left hand, right humerus and radius bones.On the
same day, Dr. Jayant Mukund Subedar (PW.16) medically examined Shambhu.
However, he died in the night at 11.25 P.M. in the hospital. Dr. Jayant Mukund
also examined Gangaram (PW.24).Dr. Uday Yarde (PW.17) performed post mortem of
the deceased Shambhu and prepared the post-mortem report.
(C) The investigation
proceeded, a large number of persons were apprehended and after completion of
the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against 34 persons out of which
two, namely, Vikram Singh(A.33) and Ranjit, son of Rattan Lal Patidar (A.34)
died during the trial and thus, the remaining 32 accused were put to trial. The
prosecution examined in total 31 witnesses and got 79 documents proved. The
trial court vides judgment and order dated 8.2.1995acquitted 22 accused and
convicted 10 including the present appellants.
(D) All the said 10
convicts preferred Criminal Appeal Nos.149 and180 of 1995. Both the said
appeals were heard together and disposed of by common judgment and order dated
20.10.2005. The High Court acquitted two accused/appellants, namely, Pooran Das
(A.2) and Mukesh (A.20). However, it dismissed the appeal of the remaining
8appellants maintaining their conviction and sentences. Out of the said8
accused, only 5 convicts approached this Court by filing this appeal and Bagadi
Ram Das (A.1), Kamal Das (A.12) and Ratan (A.24) didnot prefer any special
leave petition against the confirmation of their conviction by the High Court.
During the pendency of this appeal, opal Das (A.17) died. So, at present, we are
concerned only with four appellants, namely, Ranjit Singh (A.3), Balaram
(A.14),Ramchandra (A.18) and Shambhu (A.22).
3.
Shri
Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, has submitted
that the deceased persons/complainant party had been involved in a large number
of criminal cases and had created menace as all of them were involved in cases
of theft. Complaints had been filed against them and villagers had been afraid
of the complainant party. The Police had been investigating theft cases against
them. In fact, the complainant/deceased party had been absconding because of
the pendency of cases of theft against them. One police Constable had been
posted in the village to keep an eye on them. The name of Ramchandra (A.18) was
not mentioned in the FIR. None of the other appellants had been named by more
than one witness as being involved in the case and in respect of some of the
accused the evidence of the witness had been disbelieved by the courts below,
thus, it was not proper for the High Court to maintain the conviction of the
appellants on the basis of the same evidence against the present appellants.
All the witnesses were partisan and had falsely implicated the appellants
because of enmity. Nagu, who lodged the FIR, could not be examined as died
during the course of trial and therefore, the FIR lodged by him could not be
relied upon. The FIR which could have been relied upon was by Dhula
Chowkidar(PW.5). There was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause
death, otherwise they could have eliminated the deceased persons on the very
first day. According to the prosecution, some of the accused were armed with
deadly weapons. The same had not been used as the deceased and other injured
persons had allegedly been beaten with sticks and lathis. Injuries had been
caused on non-vital parts of their bodies. Thus, their conviction cannot be
maintained under section 302IPC even with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The
prosecution case is to be disregarded as a whole. Thus, appeal deserves to be
allowed.
4.
On
the contrary, Shri C.D. Singh, learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh,
has vehemently opposed the appeal contending that no case was pending against
the deceased/complainant party and none of them had been absconding. The
appellants had caused injuries which were sufficient to cause death of two
persons. The appellants also caused injuries to the other eye-witness.
Statement of Kailash (PW.25) was recorded by a Magistrate under the
apprehension of his death, so his statement is to be considered as a statement
made under section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter
called Cr.P.C.). Deposition of the injured witnesses is to be given due weight
age. The Court has a duty to separate the grain from the chaff and in case, some
of the accused persons had been acquitted by the trial court and some by the
High Court, that does not mean that the deposition of the witnesses cannot be relied
upon for conviction of the appellants. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to
be dismissed.
5.
We
have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for
the parties and perused the record.
Legal Issues: Accused-not
named in the FIR:
6.
In
Rotash v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 12 SCC 64, this Court while dealing with a
similar issue held as under: "The first information report, as is well
known, is not an encyclopedia of the entire case. It need not contain all the
details. We, however, although did not intend to ignore the importance of
naming of an accused in the first information report, but herein we have seen
that he had been named in the earliest possible opportunity. Even assuming that
PW 1 did not name him in the first information report, we do not find any
reason to disbelieve the statement of Mooli Devi, PW 6. The question is as to
whether a person was implicated by way of an afterthought or not must be judged
having regard to the entire factual scenario obtaining in the case. PW 6
received as many as four injuries." In Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., AIR
1997 SC 768, this Courtheld as under: "Omission of the said detail is
there in the First Information Statement, no doubt. But Criminal Courts should
not be fastidious with mere omissions in First Information Statement, since such
Statements cannot be expected to be a chronicle of every detail of what
happened, nor to contain an exhaustive catalogue of the events which took
place. The person who furnishes first information to authorities might be fresh
with the facts but he need not necessarily have the skill or ability to reproduce
details of the entire story without anything missing therefrom. Some may miss
even important details in a narration.
7.
Quite
often the Police Officer, who takes down the first information, would record
what the informant conveys to him without resorting to any elicitatory exercise.
It is the voluntary narrative of the informant without interrogation which
usually goes into such statement. So any omission therein has to be considered
along with the other evidence to determine whether the fact so omitted never happened
at all."(See also Podda Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC
1252; Sone Lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1978 SC 1142; Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh
& Ors., AIR 1981 SC 631; and Kirender Sarkar & Ors. v. State of Assam,
(2009) 12 SCC 342).
8.
While
dealing with a similar issue in Animireddy Venkata Ramana & Ors. v. Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 5 SCC 368, this Court held as
under:
"While
considering the effect of some omissions in the first information report on the
part of the informant, a court cannot fail to take into consideration the
probable physical and mental condition of the first informant. One of the important
factors which may weigh with the court is as to whether there was a possibility
of false implication of the appellants. Only with a view to test the veracity
of the correctness of the contents of the report, the court applies certain
well-known principles of caution."
9.
Therefore,
from the law referred to hereinabove, it is evident that in case the informant
fails to name a particular accused in the FIR, and the said accused is named at
the earliest opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are recorded, it
cannot tilt the balance infamous of the accused. Falsus in Uno, Falsus in
Omnibus:
10.
In
Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1962, thisCourt observed as
under:- "It is true that, as laid down by this Court in Zwinglee Ariel v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 15, and other cases which have followed that
case, the Court must make an attempt to separate grain from the chaff, the
truth from the falsehood, yet this could only be possible when the truth is
separable from the falsehood. Where the grain cannot be separated from the
chaff because the grain and the chaff are so inextricably mixed up that in the
process of separation the Court would have to reconstruct an absolutely new
case for the prosecution by divorcing the essential details presented by the
prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they
are made, then this principle will not apply."
11.
In
Ugar Ahir & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 277, thisCourt held as
under:- " The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
(false in one thing,
false in everything) is neither a sound rule of law nor a rule of practice.
Hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of
untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments. It is,
therefore, the duty of the court to scrutinise the evidence carefully and, in
terms of the felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff. But, it cannot
obviously disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the material
parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest."
12.
A
similar view was taken in Nathu Singh Yadav v. State ofMadhya Pradesh, (2002)
10 SCC 366.
13.
The
maxim has been explained by this Court in Jakki @Selvaraj & Anr. v. State
represented by the IP, Coimbatore, (2007) 9SCC 589, observing:-
"The maxim
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has not received general acceptance nor has
this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of
caution. All that it amounts to is, that in such cases testimony may be disregarded,
and not that it must be discarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of
weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but
it is not what may be called `a mandatory rule of evidence'."
14.
It
is well settled in law that the maxim falsus in uno, fals us in omnibus (false
in one false in all) does not apply in criminal cases inIndia, as a witness may
be partly truthful and partly false in theevidence he gives to the Court.
(Vide: Kulwinder Singh v. State ofPunjab, (2007) 10 SCC 455; Ganesh v. State of
Karnataka, (2008)17 SCC 152; Jayaseelan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 12
SCC275; Mani @ Udattu Man & Ors. v. State represented by Inspectorof
Police, (2009) 12 SCC 288; and Balraje @ Trimbak v. State of Maharashtra,
(2010) 6 SCC 673).
15.
This
position of law has been reiterated by this Court in PremSingh & Ors. v.
State of Haryana, (2009) 14 SCC 494, wherein the Court clearly held as under: "It
is now a well-settled principle of law that the doctrine "falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus" has no application in India."
16.
In
view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that the aforesaid
legal maxim is not applicable in India and the courthas to assess to what
extent the deposition of a witness can be reliedupon. The court has to separate
the falsehood from the truth and it isonly in exceptional circumstances when it
is not possible to separatethe grain from the chaff because they are
inextricably mixed up, that the whole evidence of such a witness can be
discarded.Number of witnesses required to prove the offence by members of a
large unlawful assembly:
17.
This
question has been definitively dealt with by a ConstitutionBench of this Court
in Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965SC 202, wherein the Court
observed as under: "... under the Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence
given by a single witness would be enough to convict an accused person, whereas
evidence given by half a dozen witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be
enough to sustain the conviction. That, no doubt is true; but where a criminal
court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the commission of an offence involving
a large number of offenders and a large number of victims, it is usual to adopt
the test that the conviction could be sustained only if it is supported by two
or three or more witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident. In a sense,
the test may be described as mechanical; but it is difficult to see how it can
be treated as irrational or unreasonable." (Emphasis added)
18.
In
Muthu Naicker & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR1978 SC 1647, this Court
explained the aforesaid judgment by stating that in a situation where a witness
has been attacked by the members of an unlawful assembly composed of a large
number of persons, the court should carefully consider the question of the
credibility of such a witness. Where the court is of the view that the
testimony of such a witness is in the facts and circumstances of the case not
reliable, it should insist that such testimony be corroborated by one or more other
witness before it can be accepted by the court.
19.
A
similar view has also been taken by this Court in Binay Kumar Singh v. State of
Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 322,wherein the Court has held:- "There is no rule of
evidence that no conviction can be based unless a certain minimum number of witnesses
have identified a particular accused as a member of the unlawful assembly. It
is axiomatic that evidence is not to be counted but only weighed and it is not
the quantity of evidence but the quality that matters. Even the testimony of
one single witness, if wholly reliable, is sufficient to establish the
identification of an accused as a member of an unlawful assembly. All the same,
when the size of the unlawful assembly is quite large (as in this case) and
many persons would 1 have witnessed the incident, it would be a prudent exercise
to insist on at least two reliable witnesses to vouchsafe the identification of
an accused as a participant in the rioting." (Emphasis added)
20.
Similarly,
in Kamaksha Rai & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1999) 8 SCC 701, this
Court observed: "Taking into consideration the nature of attack and the
possibility or otherwise of the identification of these accused persons by the prosecution
witnesses and bearing in mind the principles laid down by this Court in the
above- cited judgments, we are of the opinion that it is not safe to rely on
the evidence of witnesses who speak generally and in an omnibus way without specific
reference to the identity of the individuals and their specific overt acts in
regard to the incident ..." (Emphasis added) Consequently, the Court took
the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, as a lot of witnesses
had referred to the accused in a vague and general manner rather than making
specific reference to the identity of the individuals and their specific overt
actsin the incident, prudence dictated that it was necessary to fix a minimum
number of witnesses needed to accept the prosecution case to base a conviction.
21.
A
similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Chandrasekhar Bind & Ors.
v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 690.
22.
Thus,
from the above, the law on the issue remains that in a case involving an
unlawful assembly with a very large number of persons, there is no rule of law
that states that there cannot be any conviction on the testimony of a sole
eye-witness, unless that the court is of the view that the testimony of such
sole eye-witness is not reliable. Though, generally it is a rule of prudence
followed by the courts that a conviction may not be sustained if it is not
supported by two or more witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident
in a fit case the court may believe a reliable sole eye-witness if in his
testimony he makes specific reference to the identity of the individual and his
specific overt acts in the incident. The rule of requirement of more than one
witness applies only in a case where a witness deposes in a general and vague
manner, or in the case of a riot. Statement under Section 32 recorded-Injured
witness survives:
23.
In
Sunil Kumar & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 1997 SC 940,this Court dealt with
the issue and held:
"..........that
immediately after PW.1, injured witness was taken to the hospital and his
statement was recorded as a dying declaration which, consequent upon his
survival, is to be treated only as a statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC
and can be used for corroboration or contradiction. This statement recorded by
the Magistrate at the earliest available opportunity clearly discloses the
substratum of the prosecution case including the names of the appellants as assailants
and there is not an iota of material on record to show that this was the upshot
of his tutoring. On the contrary, this statement was made at a point of time
when PW.1 was in a critical condition and it is difficult to believe that he
would falsely implicate the appellants leaving aside the real culprits.....that
there was only some minor inconsequential contradictions which did not at all impair
his evidence. Then, again, as already noticed, the evidence of the doctors
fully supports his version of the incident." (Emphasis added)
24.
In
Maqsoodan & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 126, this court dealt with a
similar issue wherein a person who had made a statement in expectation of death
did not die. The court held that it cannot be treated as a dying declaration as
his statement was not admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872(hereinafter called the Act 1872), but it was to be dealt with under
Section 157 of the Act 1872, which provides that the former statement 1of a
witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to the same fact. A
similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Ramprasadv. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1999 SC 1969, as the Court held: "Be that as it may, the
question is whether the Court could treat it as an item of evidence for any purpose.
Section 157 of the Evidence Act permits proof of any former statement made by a
witness relating to the same fact before "any authority legally competent
to investigate the fact" but its use is limited to corroboration of the
testimony of such a witness. Though a police officer is legally competent to
investigate, any statement made to him during such an investigation cannot be
used to corroborate the testimony of a witness because of the clear interdict
contained in Section 162 of the Code. But a statement made to a Magistrate is
not affected by the prohibition contained in the said section. A Magistrate can
record the statement of a person as provided in Section 164 of the Code and
such a statement would either be elevated to the status of Section 32 if the
maker of the statement subsequently dies or it would remain within the realm of
what it was originally. A statement recorded by a Magistrate under Section 164
becomes usable to corroborate the witness as provided in Section 157 of the
Evidence Act or to contradict him as provided in Section 155 thereof." This
has also been reiterated in Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao& Anr. v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2791; and State of U.P. v. Veer Singh & Ors.,
AIR 2004 SC 4614. Thus, in view of the above, it can safely be held that in
such an eventuality the statement so recorded has to be treated as of a superior
quality/high degree than that of a statement recorded under Section161 Cr.P.C.
and can be used as provided under Section 157 of the Act1872.26. The instant
case requires to be considered in the light of the aforesaid settled legal
propositions.27. In the instant case, two persons lost their lives and three were
injured. Nagu, complainant/informant, died before the trial could commence and
thus, the contents of the FIR could not be substantiated by him as he could not
be examined. However, the two injured witnesses Gangaram (PW.24) and Kailash
(PW.25) had deposed along with other eye-witnesses about the incident. Sohan
Bai alias Soni Bai (PW.2), Shaku Bai (PW.3) and Rambha Bai (PW.8) were examined.
Post mortem was conducted on the body of Shantilal(deceased) by Dr. M.A.
Qureshi (PW.1). Dr. Udai Yarde (PW.17) conducted the post mortem on the body of
Shambhu (deceased). Dr.Jayant Mukund Subedar (PW.16) had medically examined
Gangaram(PW.24). Dr. M.A. Qureshi (PW.1) had medically examined Kailash(PW.25).
The injuries on the persons of deceased, as well on the injured persons had
been noted by the courts below.28. Injuries:(A) The following injuries were
found on the body of Shantilal(deceased):1. One lacerated wound =" = inch
flesh deep full with blood on right forearm.2. One incised injury - dimension
3x3 inches on left elbow.3. Lacerated wound dimension 3x3 inches flesh deep on
upper portion of right arm.4. One lacerated would 3x2 inches muscle deep on
left calf.5. Lacerated would 4x3 inches skin deep on frontal region in which
blood clot was present.(B) The following injuries were found on the body of
Kailash (PW.25):1. One lacerated wound on right elbow internal side 3x2
inches, blood was coming out on its pressing. Swelling in upper and lower
portion of elbow. X-ray was advised for this injury Swelling on right hand -
pain on pressing, x-ray was advised for this also.3. One incised wound 4x1-1/2
inches present on left hand between index and middle finger. It was flesh
deep.4. Swelling on left hand and forearm - pain on pressing. X-ray was
advised for it also.5. Pain on pressing front and back of chest and right
shoulder. Therefore, he was advised X-ray of chest and shoulder.(C) The
following injuries were found on the body of Nagu:1. Fracture of humerus bone
of left hand and X-ray was advised.2. Abrasion on left knee 3x3 inches.3. One
abrasion present on left side of face and on left ear.4. One abrasion
="x1/2" on left hip joint was present.(D) The following injuries were
found on the body of Shambhu:1. Entire left hand, from right shoulder to the
hand was swelled andwas red due to swelling and much pain for which X-ray was
advisedfor left shoulder, left humerus bone, left forearm and left hand
frontall the four portions.2. Third upper bone in upper portion of the left
hand wasfractured.3. Fracture seemed to be in the right hand radius. Ulna bone
for which also X-ray was advised.4. Swelling present in entire right hand and
elbow.
25.
(Contusion)
in forearm of left hand several marks of abrasion were present.6. Lacerated
wound in middle front part of left leg 2x2 inches skin deep.7. Lacerated wound
1.5x1 inch skin deep in front middle part of right leg.(E) The following
injuries were found on the body of Gangaram (PW.24):1. Swelling 4x2 inches back
of left knee, colour was red and black, pain on the injury.2. Abrasion 3.5x1
inch on left elbow, colour was black-red.3. He was mentioning pain on his knees
but there was no mark of any other injury.29. Prosecution examined Dr. M.A.
Qureshi (PW.1), Dr. JayantMukund Subedar (PW.16) and Dr. Udai Yarde (PW.17)
before the trial Court and they have all supported the case of the prosecution and
proved the injury reports. So far as the eye-witnesses are concerned, Gangaram
(PW.24), had named Ranjit but did not name either of the three other appellants
before us. However, he had stated that Ranjit had beaten him and the
complainant, Nagu. Kailash (PW.25),attributed serious roles to the appellant,
Ranjit Singh, and other co-accused who did not prefer special leave petitions
or had been acquitted by the trial Court.
26.
He
also named Balaram, Ramchandraand Shambhu. These two injured witnesses had
supported the prosecution case giving a complete narration of the incident from
the beginning till the end. Gangaram (PW.24) also clarified that theappellant
before us, Ranjit Singh, had beaten them and not the otheraccused named Ranjit,
who died during the trial. In addition thereto, there is evidence by Sohan Bai
(PW.2), daughter-in-law of Nagu andsister of Shantilal (deceased) involving
Ranjit Singh, Shambhu and Ramchandra, appellants.
27.
She
also deposed that she knew Ramchandraand Shambhu before the occurrence of the
incident. Shaku Bai(PW.3), sister of Shantilal (deceased) had also named
Ranjit Singhand Shambhu, along with the other co-accused who either had been acquitted
by the courts below or convicted but did not approach this court in appeal.
Rambha Bai (PW.8), sister of Shantilal (deceased) named Shambhu,
28.
Ramchandra
and Ranjit Singh, alleging that they had made forced entry into her house along
with 4-5 other persons in the presence of Sohan Bai (PW.2) and Shaku Bai (PW.3).
She identified them in the court also. All these witnesses had facedgruelling
cross-examinations by the defence, but nothing could be elicited from either of
them which may discredit their testimony. Out of these witnesses, Gangaram
(PW.24) and Kailash (PW.25) are injured witnesses. The injuries found on the
person of Kailash(PW.25) were of a grievous nature. Their evidence had to be given
due weight age as they are the stamped witnesses. (Vide: Sarwan Singh v. State
of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 3652; State of U.P. v.Jagdeo & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC
456; State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand& Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 6
29.
Krishan
& Ors. v. State of Haryana,(2006) 12 SCC 459; Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy
& Ors. v. Stateof Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 2661; and Balraje @ Trimbak
v.State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673).
30.
The
statement of Kailash (PW.25) had been recorded by the Magistrate under the
apprehension that he may die. Therefore, his evidence is to be given due weight
age, as per the law referred to hereinbefore, and generally cannot be brushed
aside on any ground.
31.
The
evidence on record and the manner in which the offence has been committed makes
it crystal clear that the appellants intended to kill Shantilal and Shambhu
(both deceased). The injuries caused to both the deceased had been grievous in
nature and inflicted on vital parts of their bodies. These injuries were
sufficient to cause the deaths 2of the deceased persons, as revealed by the
medical evidence. Kailash(PW.25) in his statement has made it clear that in spite
of the fact that Shantilal had died, the appellants twisted his body just to
see whether he was dead or alive and after ascertaining the fact that he was
dead he was given 2-3 lathi blows just to insult him and they made derogatory
statements to Kailash (PW.25) and Shambhu (deceased)who was still alive at that
time.
32.
Undoubtedly,
all the eye-witnesses including the injured witnesses are closely related to
the deceased. Thus, in such a fact-situation, the law requires the court to
examine their evidence with care and caution. Such close relatives and injured
witnesses would definitely not shield the real culprits of the crime, and name
somebody else because of enmity. The defence did not ask the injured witnesses
as to how they received the injuries mentioned in the medical reports.(See:
Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 8 SCC 270;Arjun Mahto v. State of
Bihar, (2008) 15 SCC 604; and Akhtar &Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009)
13 SCC 722).
33.
The
courts below have already examined the evidence with care and caution and
separated the grain from chaff and acquitted a large 2number of persons. More
so, it may be pertinent to mention that the High Court had acquitted Puran Das
(A.2) and Mukesh (A.8) as they have not been named by the injured witnesses
Gangaram (PW.24) and Kailash (PW.25). The trial Court had acquitted all those
who had not been attributed any specific role in causing injuries to the
deceasedand/or the injured witnesses. Therefore, the persons involved in
rioting had been acquitted as no specific role was assigned to any of them. The
case of the present appellants is quite distinguishable from the cases of those
who have been acquitted by the courts below. Merely, because some of the
accused have been acquitted by the trial Court and some by the High Court, it
does not mean that statements of these witnesses are liable to be disregarded
as a whole.
34.
There
are claims and counter-claims regarding the character and involvement of the
claimant party/deceased persons in criminal cases. However, Goverdhan Singh,
Investigating Officer (PW.30) in his deposition had made it clear that no
criminal case was pending against the claimant party/deceased persons. He also
produced the crime register to substantiate his statement and he was not aware
of whether any person of the claimant party/deceased persons had ever been sentenced
for committing any offence prior to his joining the said police station. No
complaint against the claimant party had come before him for investigation. Be
that as it may, even if some of them had been involved in criminal cases that
could not permit the appellants to become the law unto them and punish the
saidpersons.35. In view of the above, we do not find any cogent reasons to
interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The appeal
lacks merit and, is accordingly, dismissed.
.................................J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
...........................J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
New
Delhi,October
27, 2010
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