Sudhakaran Vs State
of Kerala
JUDGMENT
SURINDER SINGH
NIJJAR, J.
1. The present appeal is
directed against the judgment and final order in Criminal Appeal No. 1092 of
2003 dated 21.10.2005 whereby the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulum dismissed
the criminal appeal filed by the appellant and thereby affirmed his conviction under
Section 302 IPC as held by the trial court vide judgment dated 30.11.2002.
2. Shorn of unnecessary
details, the facts essential for adjudication of the present appeal are: The
appellant herein was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life
under Section 302 IPC for murdering his wife on 3.11.2000 at about 7.30 p.m. He
had killed his wife by assaulting her with a chopper on her neck in the bedroom
of his house. There is no direct evidence of the murder. However, the factum of
death of the appellant's wife by the injuries noticed in postmortem report
(Exb.P5) is not disputed. The appellant had taken the defence of
insanity based on Section 84 IPC. He had examined four witnesses in
support of his defence. Now, the appellant had claimed the defence of insanity
at the time of murder; no such plea was taken at the time of the trial.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, the appellant had approached the
High Court in Criminal Appeal No.1092 of 2003. The aforesaid appeal was
dismissed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court by the
judgment dated21.10.2005. It is this judgment which is impugned before us in
the present appeal.
3. We may now notice the
prosecution version as it emerges through the evidence of PW1 and PW5. It was
alleged that on 3.11.2000 at about 7.30 p.m. The appellant with the intention
of killing his wife, namely, Ajitha @ Poonamma had struck her on her neck with
a chopper when she was in the bedroom of his house which is named
`Kallumkuzhi', bearing No.289 situated in ward No. IX of Kanjikuzhy panchayat.
After committing the murder, the appellant came out of the house and
met PW1 and PW5 who were sitting in front of their house. PW1 is the son of
PW5. At the time when the appellant approached them he was carrying his child
in one arm. He asked PW5 as to whether he could hold the child. When PW5
stepped towards the appellant to take the child, he saw that the appellant was carrying
a chopper in the other hand. Immediately PW1 and his father rushed into their
house and closed the door. At that time the appellant was seen roaming around
their house. He was trying to lay 3down the child in a lean-to attached to
their house. At that stage, PW1 had pointed the beam of a torch on to the
appellant, through the window. He saw, in the torch light, that the shirt of
the appellant was blood stained and he was also carrying a bloodstained
chopper. PW1 then came out of his house and went to the nearby house of PW2 and
narrated the entire incident to him. Thereafter PW1 and PW2together went to the
adjacent house of PW3. When they came back together, they saw that appellant
had left the house of PW1. At that stage they were told by PW5 that the
appellant had come after killing his wife. According to PW5, the appellant had
confessed to the crime. Thereafter all the people in the nearby houses got
together and went to the house of the appellant where they found that his wife
Ajitha was lying on a cot in her bedroom with blood splattered all over her.
They also found that there was no movement in the body of Ajitha. It is further
the case of the prosecution that when all the neighbours had gathered in the
house of the appellant he had confessed to all of them that he had killed his
wife.
4. The FIR was
registered on the basis of the statement Exb.P1 made by PW1 wherein he narrated
the incident as stated above. This witness PW1 has also identified M.O.1 knife
which he had seen in the hand of the appellant on the evening of 3.11.2000. PW2
also gave a similar statement. He further stated that the appellant had come to
him and asked him to look after the child as he was going to the police
station. He is alleged to have stated to PW2 that - "I have child in my
hand. Kindly hold him. I am going to the police station."
5. PW2 further stated
that the appellant had put the knife on the ground in the verandah on being
asked by one of the neighbours. While putting the knife down the appellant said
"till today she had been cheating upon me." After putting the knife
down the appellant went to the house of PW3. He is stated to have entrusted the
child to PW3. Thereafter the appellant had gone to a place named Aippara City.
PW4 is another neighbor who stated that the appellant had come to the house
ofPW1 with his 8 months old child in one hand and the knife in the other hand.
He came to know about the incident when PW1 and PW2 came to his house and
narrated the story. Thereafter he saw the appellant in the residential compound
of Poonamakkal Thomas. He also deposed that on the request of his father and
Narayan, appellant had put the knife on the floor. PW5 also corroborated the
statement given by PW1 to PW4. PW6 is another witness who came to know about
the incident while he was in the Aippara City. According to him, he came to
know about the murder of the wife of appellant at about 8 o'clock on 3.11.2000.
According to PW11,Sub-Inspector of Police Kanjikuzhi police, the appellant was
produced early in the morning by PW2, 3 and 4. He was arrested by PW12, C.I. of
Police.
6. The trial court
notices that the prosecution has relied on the oral evidences given by PW1 to
PW12. The prosecution had also produced the blood stained chopper which had
been recovered from the appellant. After examining the dead body of the
deceased, inquest report was prepared by PW11 in the presence of the witnesses.
The chopper had been seized by him as per Ext.P2Mahaska. Ext.P3 is the Mahaska
prepared by him for seizure of the shirt and dhoti worn by the appellant. These
materials were produced before the court as Ext.P7and P8. The articles
recovered from the body of the deceased were produced as M.O.3 to 10 and 10(a).
These included night gown, and other under garments, gold ornaments worn by the
deceased at the time of the murder. All the recovered articles were sent for Forensic
Examination. The Forensic Report was relied upon by the prosecution at the
trial. Ext.P10 is the Forensic Science Report. This report revealed that all
the items examined, contained human blood belonging to group A.
7. 7. Taking note of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the trial court noticed that Ext.P5
postmortem certificate revealed nine injuries on the body of the deceased.
These injuries may be tabulated asunder: - 1. Incised wound, 14x4x6 cm
horizontal, on the middle of back of neck, 6 cm below occipital protuberance.
The muscles of the back of neck found but and vertebral column was found cut
and separated between 2nd and 3rd cervical vertebra. Spinal
cord underneath and vertebral arteries were found several. 2. Incised wound
9x2x2cm oblique, on right side of back of head upper inner end at the level of
occipital protuberance and lower outer and just above right ear Incised wound
5x1x1cm oblique on right side of neck, upper outer end just below right ear
and lower inner end 1cm, below right angle of mandible Incised wound, 2x1cm
oblique on pine of right ear involving its entire thickness5. Incised wound
5x1x2 cm oblique on the back of chest over right shoulder blade. 6. Incised
wound 2x1x0.5 cm oblique on the outer aspect of left shoulder. Incised wound
3x1x0.5 cm oblique on the out aspect of left shoulder 2 cm below injury No.6.
8. 8. Incised wound
5.5x1 cm. oblique on the back of left little finger, 3 cm above its trip with
distal potion connected by skin only Incised wound, 5x4x1cm on the
left palmate the root of thumb."8. PW9, the doctor who conducted the
post mortem opined that the injuries noted by him could be caused by an attack
with a chopper such as M.O.1. The doctor also opined that there were wounds on
palm and fingers of the deceased. This would indicate that she was defending
herself, therefore, she was attacked while she was awake and not when she was
asleep. The injuries noted by the doctor in Ext.P5 also indicate that the
appellant had caused the death of his wife by attacking her with chopper M.O.1.
The trial court upon consideration of the entire evidence observed that the
entire sequence of events led to the only conclusion that the appellant had
killed his wife by striking her on her neck with a chopper. The trial court
specifically held that it did not find any missing link fatal to the
prosecution case.
9. The trial court
thereafter considered the defence pleaded by the appellant under Section 84
IPC. Upon examination of the entire medical evidence, the trial court concluded
that there is no material to indicate that at the time of the commission of the
offence or immediately before the occurrence of the incident, the appellant was
suffering from any mental illness. Although he had taken some treatment in the
year 1985 for mental illness but he had fully recovered from that.
Subsequently, long after that he had married the deceased. Even though they
were living a disturbed married life, a child was born out of the wedlock. The
child was 8 months old at the time when the crime was committed. The trial
court also 10noticed that, although the appellant was irregular, he used to
take on casual jobs for his sustenance. The trial court concluded that even
after taking note of the evidence produced by the defence, the conclusion was
that the appellant was capable of understanding the nature of the act and the
consequences thereof.
10. 10. The High Court,
in appeal, re-examined the entire issue and concluded that the evidence given
by PW1 toPW5 is unimpeachable. Therefore, the conclusions reached by
the trial court were duly affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The
defence under Section 84 was held to be not proved.
11. We have heard the
learned counsel for the parties.
12. Learned counsel for
the appellant submitted that the entire story is unbelievable. The appellant
was living with his wife in a thickly populated locality. The houses of the neighbors
are in a close proximity. The defence of the appellant has been illegally
discarded by the trial court as well as by the High Court. The appellant had
produced expert witnesses. In support of the medical history of his mental
illness, DW2 and DW4 had produced the record relied upon by them which
showsthat the appellant had been treated for paranoid schizophrenia, 11 days
after the alleged murder. Even during the trial, the appellant had to be taken
to the mental hospital on 15.11.2000.
13. 13. According to
the learned counsel, both the courts below have failed to appreciate the exact
nature of the disease "paranoid schizophrenia". Such patients
experience an extremely rapid change of emotion within amatter of seconds and
minutes, they may be angry, depresses, perplexed, ecstatic and anxious.
Therefore, it is not possible to say that at the time of the murder the
appellant was in his senses.
14. 14. We are unable
to accept the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. So far
as the actual physical murder is concerned, all the circumstances adverted to
above, chillingly point towards the guilt of the appellant. PW1 and PW5 have
clearly stated how the appellant had approached them with a chopper soaked in
blood in one hand and his 8 months old son in other arm. The blood stained
chopper remained in the possession of the appellant till he was asked to put the
same on the ground. PW1 actually saw the blood stained chopper in the hand of the
appellant when he pointed the torchlight on the appellant through the window. After
entrusting the child to PW3, the appellant went away. The dead body of his wife
was discovered by the neighbours which was soaked in blood. According to thePW3
there was so much blood on the body that she seemed to have taken a bath in a
pool of blood. The ocular evidence has been corroborated by medical evidence.
The doctor, PW9, who conducted the postmortem, has clearly stated that the
injuries which were 13found on the body of the deceased could have been
caused with a weapon which was seized from theappellant.
15. Therefore, in our
opinion, both the courts below have correctly concluded that the circumstances
lead to the only conclusion that the appellant has committed the murder of his
wife.
16. 16. As far as, the defense
under Section 84 is concerned, we also see no reason to differ with the opinion
expressed by the trial court as also the High Court. The evidence given by DW1,
Assistant Surgeon of Idduki District Hospital has been rightly discarded by the
High Court. It is true that DW1 had stated on the basis of the outpatient
register that the appellant had come for consultation. However, no records were
produced as to what treatment had been given to him. Even the outpatient ticket
was not produced. Ultimately, this doctor admitted that he cannot say that the
appellant had come there for psychiatric treatment. He did not even
remember the medicine which had been given to the appellant. Similarly, the
evidence of Superintendent of Jail DW2 also only indicates that the appellant
had been sent to Medical Health Centre. Even the evidence of the Health Centre
was incomplete and wholly unreliable. The entire medical evidence produced was
not sufficient to show that at the time of the commission of the murder the
appellant was medically insane and incapable of understanding the nature of the
consequences of the act performed by him.
17. 17. The defence of
insanity has been well known in the English Legal System for many centuries. In
the earlier times, it was usually advanced as a justification for seeking
pardon. Over a period of time, it was used as a complete defence to criminal
liability in offences involving mens rea. It is also accepted that insanity in
medical terms is distinguishable from legal insanity. In most cases, in India,
the defence of insanity seems to be 15 pleaded where the offender is said to
be suffering from the disease of Schizophrenia. The plea taken in the present
case was also that the appellant was suffering from "paranoid
schizophrenia". The term has been defined in Modi's Medical Jurisprudence
and Toxicology1 as follows: "Paranoia is now regarded as a mild form of paranoid
schizophrenia. It occurs more in males than in females. The main characteristic
of this illness is a well-elaborated delusional system in a personality that is
otherwise well preserved. The delusions are of persecutory type. The true
nature of this illness may go unrecognized for a long time because the personality
is well preserved, and some of these paranoiacs may pass off as a social reformers
or founders of queer pseudo- religious sects. The classical picture is rare and
generally takes a chronic course. Paranoid Schizophrenia, in the vast majority
of case, starts in the fourth decade and develops insidiously. Suspiciousness
is the characteristic symptom of the early stage. Ideas of reference
occur, which gradually develop into delusions of persecution. Auditory hallucinations
follow which in the beginning, start as sound or noises in the ears, but later change
into abuses or insults. Delusions are at first indefinite, but gradually they
become fixed and definite, to lead the patient to believe that he is persecuted
by some unknown person or [23rd Ed. Page 1077] 16 some superhuman agency. He
believes that his food is being poisoned, some noxious gases are blown into his
room and people are plotting against him to ruin him. Disturbances of general
sensation give rise to hallucinations which are attributed to the effects of hypnotism,
electricity, wireless telegraphy or atomic agencies. The patient gets very
irritated and excited owing to these painful and disagreeable hallucinations
and delusions. "The medical profession would undoubtedly treat the appellant
herein as a mentally sick person. However, for the purposes of claiming the
benefit of the defence of insanity in law, the appellant would have to prove that
his cognitive faculties were so impaired, at the time when the crime was
committed, as not to know the nature of the act. Section 84 of the Indian Penal
Code recognizes the defence of insanity. It is defined as under:- "Nothing
is an offence which is done by a person who at the time of doing it, by reason
of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that
he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law."A bare perusal of the
aforesaid section would show that in order to succeed, the appellant would have
to prove that by reason of unsoundness of mind, he was incapable of knowing
the nature of the act committed by him. In the alternate case, he would have to
prove that he was incapable of knowing that he was doing what is either wrong
or contrary to law. The aforesaid section clearly gives statutory recognition to
the defence of insanity as developed by the Common Law of England in a decision
of the House of Lords rendered in the case of R. Vs. Daniel Mc Naughten2. In
that case, the House of Lords formulated the famous Mc Naughten Rules on the
basis of the five questions, which had been referred to them with regard to the
defence of insanity. The reference came to be made in a case where Mc
Naughten was charged with the murder by shooting of Edward Drummond,
who was the Pvt. Secretary of the then Prime Minister of England Sir Robert
Peel. The accused Mc Naughten produced medical evidence to prove that, he was
not, at the time of committing the act, in a sound state of mind. He claimed
that he was suffering from an2 [1843 RR 59: 8ER 718(HL)] 18insane delusion
that the Prime Minister was the only reason for all his problems. He had also
claimed that as a result of the insane delusion, he mistook Drummond for the
Prime Minister and committed his murder by shooting him. The plea of insanity
was accepted and McNaughten was found not guilty, on the ground of insanity.
The aforesaid verdict became the subject of debate in the House of Lords. Therefore,
it was determined to take the opinion of all the judges on the law
governing such cases. Five questions were subsequently put to the
Law Lords. The questions aswell as the answers delivered by Lord Chief Justice
Tindal were as under:- "Q.1 What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed
by persons afflicted with insane delusion in respect of one or more particular
subjects or persons: as, for instance, where at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but
did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion,
of redressing a revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing
some public benefit? 19Answer"Assuming that your lordships' inquiries are
confined to those persons who labour under such partial delusions only, and are
not in other respects insane, we are of opinion, that, notwithstanding the
party did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane
delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of
producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable, according to the
nature of the crime committed, if he knew, at the time of committing such
crime, that he was acting contrary to law, by which expression we understand
your lordships to mean the law of the land.Q.2. What are the proper questions
to be submitted to the jury when a person alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion
respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with
the commission of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?Q.3.
In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's
state of mind at the time when the act was committed? Answers - to the second
and third questions That the jury ought to be told in all cases that every man
is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be
responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction;
and that, to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, 20it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the
latter part of the question to the jury on these occasions has generally been, whether
the accused, at the time of doing the act, knew the difference between right
and wrong, which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake with the
jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put generally, and in the
abstract, as when put as to the party’s knowledge of right and wrong in respect
to the very act with which he is charged. If the question were to be put as to
the knowledge of the accused, solely and exclusively with reference to the law
of the land, it might tend to confound the jury, by inducing them to believe
that an actual knowledge of the law of the land was essential in order to lead
to a conviction, whereas the law is administered upon the principle that everyone
must be taken conclusively to know it without proof that he does know it. If
the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if
that act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable;
and the usual course, therefore, has been to leave the question to the jury,
whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was
doing an act that was wrong: and this course, we think, is correct,
accompanied with such observations and explanations as the
circumstances of each particular case may require. 21Q.4. If a person under
an insane delusion as to the existing facts commits and offence in consequence
thereof, is he thereby excused? Answer The answer must, of course, depend on the
nature of the delusion, but making the same assumption as we did before, that
he labours under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects
insane, we think he must be considered in the same situation as to
responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were
real. For example, if, under the influence of his delusion, he supposes
another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills
that man, as he supposes in self-defence, he would be exempted from punishment.
If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his
character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury,
he would beliable to punishment.Q.5. Can a medical man, conversant with the disease
of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previously to the trial, but who was
present during the whole trial, and the examination of all the witnesses, be asked
his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was conscious, at the
time of doing the act, that he was acting contrary to law, or whether he was
labouring under any and what delusion at the time? 22 Answer We think
the medical man, under the circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness be
asked his opinion in the terms above stated, because each of those questions
involves the determination of the truth of the facts deposed to, which it
is for the jury to decide; and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter
of science, in which case such evidence is admissible. But where the facts
are admitted or not disputed, and the question becomes substantially one of
science only, it may be convenient to allow the question to be put in that
general form, though the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of
right." 3 A comparison of answers to question no. 2 and 3 and the provision
contained in Section 84 of the IPC would clearly indicate that the Section is
modeled on the aforesaid answers.
18. 18. This Court has
on several occasions examined the standard of proof that is required to be
discharged by the appellant to get the benefit of Section 84 IPC. We may make a
reference here to the observation made in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar Vs.
State of3 [Archbold 2010 Ed. Pg. No. 1880-1881] 23 Gujarat4. The
relevant aspects of the law and the material provisions relating to the plea of
insanity were noticed and considered as follows:- " Indian Penal Code 299.
Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or
with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits
the offence of culpable homicide. 84. Nothing is an offence which is done by
a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is
incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is
either wrong or contrary to law. Indian Evidence Act 105. When a person is
accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances
bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860) or within any special exception or proviso contained in any
other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon
him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. 4.
Shall presume.--Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall
presume a fact, it shall regard such facts as proved unless and until it is
disproved.4 [AIR 1964 SC 1563] 24Proved.--A fact is said to be `proved'
when after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to
exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent manought, under
the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.
Disproved.--A fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters
before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its
non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances
of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist.101.
Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability
dependent on the existence of fact which he asserts, must prove that those
facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is
said that the burden of profiles on that person."It is a fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent
and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide
shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite
intention described in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general
burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, as Section 84
of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the 25accused
at the time of doing that act, by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable
of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or
contrary to law. This being an exception, under Section 105 of the Evidence Act
the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within
the said exception lies on the accused; and the court shall presume the absence
of such circumstances. Under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, read with the
definition of "shall presume" in Section 4 thereof, the court shall
regard the absence of such circumstances approved unless, after considering the
matters before it, it believes that said circumstances existed or their
existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did
exist. To put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption
that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material before the court
sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said
circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The accused
has to satisfy the standard of a "prudent man". If the material
placed before the court such, as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions,
admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of
"prudent man", the accused will have discharged his burden. The
evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under Section
105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a
judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence
itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge
26 whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in Section 299 of
the Indian Penal Code. If the judge has such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit
the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove
conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the general
burden, which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special
burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of
insanity."Thereafter, upon further consideration, this Court
defined the doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity
in the following propositions:- "(1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the appellant had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea;
and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the
beginning to the end of the trial. (2) There is a rebuttable presumption that
the appellant was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid
down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code: the appellant may rebut it by
placing before the court all the relevant evidence - oral, documentary or circumstantial,
but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to
civil proceedings. (3) Even if the appellant was not able to establish
conclusively that he was insane at 27 the time he committed the offence, the evidence
placed before the court by the appellant or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the
offence, including mens rea of the appellant and in that case the court would
be entitled to acquit the appellant on the ground that the general burden of
proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged."
19. 19. It is also a
settled proposition of law that the crucial point of time for
ascertaining the existence of circumstances bringing the case within
the purview of Section 84 is the time when the offence is committed. We may
notice here the observations made by this Court in the case of Ratan Lal Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh5. In Paragraph 2 of the aforesaid judgment, it is
held as follows:- "It is now well-settled that the crucial point of time
at which unsoundness of mind should be established is the time when the crime
is actually committed and the burden of proving this lies on the
appellant."5 [1970 (3) SCC 533] 28
20. The High Court on
examination of the evidence before it, came to the conclusion that the
appellant had failed to prove that he was suffering from such mental illness
that would enable him to take benefit of Section84 IPC.
21. The High Court took
into consideration the totality of the circumstances and came to the conclusion
that there was no evidence indicating that appellant was suffering from mental
illness at the crucial time. The only evidence placed on record shows that the
appellant had been treated in a Psychiatric Hospital for 13 days in the year
1985 even at that time the doctor had diagnosed the disease as psychotic
disorder. The record did not indicate that the patient was suffering from such
mental disability which incapacitated him to know the nature of the act that he
had committed. The High Court further observed that there was no evidence to
indicate that the appellant suffered from mental illness post 1985. The High Court,
in our opinion, rightly concluded that the appellant was 29capable of knowing
the nature of the act and the consequences thereof on the date of the alleged incident.
Whilst he had brutally and callously committed the murder of his wife, he did
not cause any hurt or discomfort to the child. Rather he made up his mind to
insure that the child be put into proper care and custody after the murder. The
conduct of the appellant before and after the incident was sufficient to negate
any notion that he was mentally insane, so as not to be possessed of the
necessary mens rea, for committing the murder of his wife.
22. In such view of the
matter, we see no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the
courts below. The appeal is dismissed
.
..................................J. [B.SUDERSHAN REDDY]
.....................................J.
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR]
NEW
DELHI;
OCTOBER
26, 2010.
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