J&K National
Panthers Party Vs The Union of India and others
J U D G M E N T
GANGULY, J.
1.
Leave
granted.
2.
Jammu
and Kashmir National Panthers Party, a recognized political party in the State
of Jammu and Kashmir has filed this appeal before this Court seeking to impugn
the judgment of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, dated 2nd of June 2009. The High
Court dismissed both the writ petitions which raised identical questions. They were
heard together and disposed of by the impugned judgment.
3.
The
main thrust of the challenge before the High Court, as well as before this
Court is on the following question: whether or not the action of the government
in postponing the delimitation of territorial constituencies of the State pertaining
to the Legislative Assembly until the relevant figures published after the first
census taken after 2026 is legally sustainable?4. In fact the appellant is aggrieved
by an amendment to the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act 1957,
especially the amendment in Section 3 thereof. This amendment has been brought
about in 2002. Section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act
1957 (hereinafter the said Act), as amended from time to time, is set out
below:- "
4.
Constitution
of Delimitation Commission (1) {As soon as may be after the completion of each
census} the Government shall constitute a Commission to be called the Delimitation
Commission which shall consist of three member as follows: (a) two members,
each of whom shall be a person {who is or has} been a judge of the Supreme
Court or of a High Court in India; and (b) a Deputy Election Commissioner nominated
by the Chief Election Commissioner: {Provided that until the relevant figures for
the first census taken after the year 2026 have been published, it shall not be
necessary to constitute a Commission to determine the delimitation of Assembly Constituencies
in the State under this sub- section} (2) The Governor shall nominate one of
the members appointed under clause (a) of sub- section (1) to be the Chairman
of the Delimitation Commission. (3) The Delimitation Commission shall determine
the delimitation of Assembly Constituencies in the State within such period as may
be specified by the Governor."
5.
There
has been a corresponding amendment also in the sub-section 3 of Section 47 of the
Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, 1957, (here in after referred to as
Constitution of J & K). Section 47 (3) as amended is set out below:- "47(3)
Upon the completion of each census, the number, extent and boundaries of the territorial
constituencies shall be readjusted by such authority and in such manner as the
Legislature may by law determine: Provided that such readjustment shall not effect
representation in the Legislative Assembly until the dissolution of the then existing
Assembly {;Provided that until the relevant figures for the first census taken
after the year 2026 have been published, it shall not be necessary to readjust
the total number of seats in the Legislative Assembly of the State and the
division of the State into territorial constituencies under this sub- section}."
6.
The
main grievance of the appellant seems to be that in view of the postponing of the
delimitation of the constituencies as a result of the aforesaid amendments, the
growing imbalance in the matter of composition of various constituencies would continue
despite the census operation being carried out. It has been argued before this
Court that normally the delimitation exercise is consequent upon a census operation.
As a result of the census operation the composition of the population is reflected.
That gives rise to an exercise in delimitation for a proper representation of rights
of the people in a democratic polity. The further contention is that without these
demographical changes being properly reflected in the composition of
constituencies by way of a delimitation exercise, the essence of democracy will
be defeated in the election. The appellant, therefore, urge that without an exercise
in delimitation immediately upon the completion of census operation, the
election in the State of Jammu and Kashmir will not reflect the true voice of
democracy and the popular view would, therefore, be gagged and would not find a
proper representation.
7.
In
this case we are not concerned much with any factual controversy. In this case
the Court has been called upon to decide the correctness or otherwise of
contention of the appellant in the context of the relevant laws and the constitutional
provisions.
8.
Admittedly,
in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the census operation was completed in 2001,
but the delimitation was done in 1995.
9.
At
present in the State of Jammu and Kashmir there are 87 constituencies. Out of
that 46 are in Kashmir Valley, 37 in Jammu and 4 are in Ladakh region. Under Section
47(1) of the Constitution of J & K, it is provided that the Legislative Assembly
shall consist of 111 members chosen by direct election from territorial
constituencies of the State. Under proviso to Section 47 of the Constitution of
J & K, it is provided that if the Governor is of the opinion that women are
not adequately represented in the assembly, he may nominate not more than two
women members. However, it is provided in Section 48 of the Constitution that until
the area of the State which is under the occupation of Pakistan ceases to be so
occupied and the people residing in that area elect their representatives, those
24 seats in the Legislative Assembly shall remain vacant for Pakistan occupied
Kashmir and will not be taken into account for counting the total membership of
the assembly. The said area would be excluded in delimiting the territorial
constituencies of the state.
10.
The
learned Counsel, Professor Bhim Singh, appearing for the appellant submits that
of the 37 constituencies in Jammu, some are reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes whereas of the 46 constituencies in Kashmir valley, not a single one is reserved
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. But if the census operation is properly
perused, it becomes clear that some of the constituencies in the Kashmir valley
should also have been reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, had a
delimitation exercise been conducted on the basis of census operation. The impugned
amendment is, therefore, unfair, undemocratic and unconstitutional as it seeks
to defer the delimitation exercise only upon the declaration of census results
after 2026.
11.
In
the writ petition filed before the High Court no substantial challenge has been
made to the amendment of the Constitution of the J & K. In the writ
petition in paragraph 16, very vaguely this challenge has been made and which
is set out below: "16. If no Delimitation Commission is constituted till
2026, it would mean that there will be no rotation of the Assembly constituencies
till the census in 2031. It would mean that reserved Assembly constituencies
shall not be rotated from 1996 to 2031 i.e. for 35 years reserved seats shall
not be changed. This is an unparallel (sic) instance of the massacre of the
rule of law, the principles of the natural justice and of course, denial of justice
and equity guaranteed by Article 8 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
This Act violates the letter of spirit of Section 47 among other provisions as
well as that of the J & K Representation of the People Act."
12.
In
the prayers made in that Writ Petition, prayers B and C have become in
fructuous. Prayer D is aimed at Section 47 of the Constitution of J & K but
we do not find adequate pleading challenging the amendment to Section 47 of the
Constitution of J & K.
13.
Professor
Bhim Singh submitted that he was arguing this case on behalf of about 10, 143, 700
people (as per 2001 Census) of Jammu and Kashmir. He stated that on 27th
October 1947, Jammu and Kashmir became a part of India and on 26th January
1957, the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was adopted. He also urged that in
view of Article 370 of the Constitution of India, autonomy has been granted to
the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The learned counsel repeatedly harped on the
question that not holding of a delimitation exercise immediately after the completion
of the census as a result of the aforesaid amendment is unconstitutional. In fact,
the learned counsel argued that the said amendment to the Constitution of J &
K was itself violative of the Basic Structure of the Constitution of India as
applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as the Constitution of J
& K.
14.
Dealing
with the aforesaid arguments of the appellant (petitioner before the High
Court), the Division Bench of the High Court, inter alia, held that
delimitation for the purpose of dividing the State into single member territorial
constituency maybe a Basic Feature of democracy contemplated in the
Constitution. However, High Court opined that the readjustment of the extent
and boundaries of such territorial constituency upon completion of each census
was neither a mandate of the Constitution, nor the essence of democracy as per
the Basic Structure doctrine of the Indian Constitution.
15.
The
High Court dealt with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of
America in the case of Charles W. Baker vs. Joe C. Carr reported in 369 US 186.
In this decision, the plaintiffs who were entitled to vote to elect members of
Tennessee legislature filed a class action for a declaration that Tennessee Apportionment
Act of 1901 was unconstitutional as it violated the 14th Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. It was alleged that the impugned act sought to bring about
a gross disproportion of representation to the members of the public in respect
of their voting right. Thus, the Act placed the plaintiffs in a position of constitutionally
unjustifiable equality. Initially the District Court, where the case was filed,
held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue. Thereupon, on appeal the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the District Court
holding, inter alia, that the District Court has the jurisdiction in the matter
and also held that the plaintiffs had the locus to challenge the Tennessee
Apportionment act.
16.
However,
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan dissented and held that the nature of controversy
is unfit for federal judicial action, and that the existing apportionment was not
so unreasonable so as to offend the equal protection clause. The majority
opinion in that case was, however, based on the principle of approximate equality
in the voice of every voter.
17.
In
the judgment impugned herein, the High Court held that our Constitution never
contemplated equality in the value of vote in view of the several other
provisions of the Constitution. Supporting the judgment, the learned Solicitor
General of India drew the attention of this Court to the various provisions of
the Constitution of India namely, Articles 81, 82and 170. The learned Solicitor
General also referred to a decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in
R. C. Poudyal and others vs. Union of India and others, (1994) Supp 1 SCC324,
wherein this Court examined Article 170 (2)while dealing with the reservation
of 12 seats for Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin in the State of Sikkim. One
of the main questions which were raised in that case is as
follows:"Whether Section 7(1-A) and Section 25-A of the Representation of
the People Act,1950 [as inserted by Election Laws(Extension to Sikkim) Act, 1976
and Representation of the People (Amendment)Act, 1980 respectively] and section
5-A(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 [as inserted by the
Representation of the People (Amendment)Act, 1980] providing for reservation of
12seats, out of 32 seats in the Sikkim Legislative Assembly in favour of
Bhutias-Lepchas, are unconstitutional as violative of the basic features of
democracy and 13 republicanism under the Indian Constitution?" (Para 85,
page 373 of the report)
18.
While
deciding the said issue, this Court took into consideration the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Charles W. Baker [supra], and B. A.
Reynolds etc. vs. M. O. Sims - 377 US 533.
19.
This
Court relied on the opinion of Chief Justice Earl Warren in B.A. Reynolds
(supra). At page 536 of the report the learned Chief Justice held as follows:- "......We
realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so
that each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters. Mathematical
exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement."
20.
The
learned Chief Justice also relied on historical factors in support of his
opinion and held:- "History indicates, however, that many States have deviated,
to a greater or 14 lesser degree, from the equal-population principle in the
apportionment of seats in at least one house of their legislatures. So long as
the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some
deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible
with respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses
of a bicameral state legislature." (page 537 of the report)
21.
After
relying on the aforesaid judgments and noticing the position in Australian
Constitution the majority opinion of this Court was rendered by Justice
Venkatachaliah (as His Lordship then was). By a remarkably erudite formulation of
principles, His Lordship held:- "It is true that the right to vote is central
to the right of participation in the democratic process. However, there is less
consensus amongst theorists on the propriety of judicial activism in the voting
area. In India, the Delimitation Laws made under Article 327 of the Constitution
of India, are immune from the judicial test of their validity and the process of
allotment of seats and constituencies is not liable to be called in question in
any court by virtue of Article 329 (a) of the Constitution." (Para 119,
page 383 of the report)
22.
It
was repeatedly held in Poudyal (supra) that "a perfectly arithmetical
equality of value of votes is not a constitutionally mandated imperative of
democracy and, secondly, that even if the impugned provisions make a departure
from tolerance limits and the constitutionally permissible latitudes, the discriminations
arising are justifiable on the basis of the historical considerations peculiar to
and characteristic of the evolution of Sikkim's political institutions."
23.
In
this case the same is true of the evolution of the political institutions of Jammu
and Kashmir. This position has been again reiterated in para 126 in Poudyal's
case in the following words: "An examination of the constitutional scheme
would indicate that the concept of `one person one vote' is in its very nature
considerably tolerant of imbalances and departures from a very strict 16 application
and enforcement. The provision in the Constitution indicating proportionality of
representation is necessarily a broad, general and logical principle but not
intended to be expressed with arithmetical precision...The principle of mathematical
proportionality of representation is not a declared basic requirement in each
and every part of the territory of India. Accommodations and adjustments, having
regard to the political maturity, awareness and degree of political development
in different parts of India, might supply the justification for even non-elected
Assemblies wholly or in part, in certain parts of the country. The differing degrees
of political development and maturity of various parts of the country, may not justify
standards based on mathematical accuracy." (Page 385 of the report)
24.
Even
Justice S.C. Agrawal, who partly dissented with the majority, agreed with the majority
opinion on this aspect of the matter by holding as under:- "The principle
of one man one vote envisages that there should be parity in the value of votes
of electors. Such a parity though ideal for a representative democracy is
difficult to achieve. There is some departure in every system following this
democratic path. In the matter of delimitation of constituencies, it often
happens that the population of one constituency differs from that of the other constituency
and as a result 17 although both the constituencies elect one member, the value
of the vote of the elector in the constituency having lesser population is more
than the value of the vote of the elector of the constituency having a larger population...".
(para 182, page 402 of the report)
25.
On
a perusal of the aforesaid principles as laid down by this Court in the
Constitution Bench judgment, we are of the opinion that a right to caste vote
is a valuable right but to demand any uniform value of one's voting right
through the process of delimitation, disregarding the statutory and
constitutional dispensation based on historical reasons is not a justiciable right.
26.
In
the context of this question we must keep in mind the constitutional scheme in Part
XV relating to election. Article 327 of the Constitution empowers the
Parliament to make a law relating to delimitation of constituencies. The
mandate of Article 329A is that any law relating to the delimitation of
constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies shall not be
called in question in any Court. Identical provisions have been made in Section
142 of the Constitution of J & K. Section 142(a) is set out below:- "142.
Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters. - Notwithstanding anything
in this constitution- (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of
territorial constituencies for the purpose of electing members of the
Legislative Assembly or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting
to be made under section 141, shall not be called in question in any
court;"
27.
It
is, therefore, clear that there is an express constitutional bar to any
challenge being made to the delimitation law which is made under Constitutional
provisions. Therefore, the substantial challenge of the appellant in this proceeding
is not to be entertained by any Court, including this Court. The other aspect
of the question is that the amendment to Section 47(3) of the Constitution of J
& K violates Basic Structure of the Constitution. This challenge is also not
based on a sound principle.
28.
The
judgment of this Court in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v.
State of Kerala and another, (1973) 4 SCC 225, which introduced the concept of
Basic Structure in our constitutional jurisprudence is the spontaneous response
of an activist Court after working with our Constitution for about 25 years. This
Court felt that in the absence of such a stance by the constitutional Court
there are clear tendencies that the tumultuous tides of democratic majoritarianism
of our country may engulf the constitutional values of our nascent democracy. The
judgment in Kesavananda Bharti (supra) is possibly an "auxiliary precaution
against a possible tidal wave in the vast ocean of Indian democracy".
29.
But
we must have a clear perception of what the Basic Structure is. It is hazardous
to define what is the Basic Structure of the Constitution as what is basic does
not remain static for all time to come. However, the basic features have been
culled out from various pronouncements of this Court. In the 14th Edition of Shorter
Constitution of India by D.D. Basu, these features have been noted as under:-
30.
Supremacy
of the Constitution.
a. Rule of law.
b. The principle of Separation
of Powers.
c. The principles behind
fundamental rights.
d. The objectives specified
in the Preamble to the Constitution.
e. Judicial review; Art.32.;
Arts.226/227.
f. Federalism
g. Secularism.
h. The sovereign,
democratic, republican structure.
i. Freedom and dignity of
the individual.
j. Unity and integrity
of the Nation.
k. The principle of
equality; not every feature of equality, but the quintessence of equal justice
l. The rule of equality
in public employment.
m. The `essence' of
other Fundamental Rights in Part III.
n. The concept of social
and economic justice-to build a welfare State; part IV in toto. 21
o. The balance between Fundamental
Rights and Directive Principles.
p. The Parliamentary system
of government.
q. The principle of free
and fair elections.
r. Limitations upon the
amending power conferred by Art. 368.
s. Independence of the
judiciary; but within the four corners of the Constitution and not beyond that.
t. Independent and
efficient judicial system.
u. Powers of the Supreme
Court under Arts. 32, 136, 141, 142.
v. Effective access to justice."
(see page 2236-2238)30. Of these features `free and fair election' in Clause (r)
comes closest with the question discussed in this case.
31.
This
Court has already held relying on the Constitution Bench judgment in Poudyal
(supra) that ensuring uniformity in the value of votes is not a
constitutionally mandated imperative of free and fair election under our
constitutional dispensation. Therefore, the argument on the question of Basic
Structure is also without substance and is rejected.
32.
For
the reasons aforesaid, this Court does not find any merit in the appeal and which
is accordingly dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
.......................J.(G.S.
SINGHVI)
.......................J.(ASOK
KUMAR GANGULY)
New
Delhi
November
09, 2010
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