Transport & Dock
Workers Union & Ors. Vs Mumbai Port Trust & ANR.
14 of the Constitution (the equality provision) is a slippery slope, and a fine
balancing act must be done by the Court to avoid slipping down the slope.
observed by Lord MacMillan in `Law and Ethics' Scot. L.Rev.61, 69 (1933) : "The
judiciary is constantly confronted with the necessity of making a choice
between a legal principle which is sought to be applied in a particular case,
and the choice which it makes in the particular instance resulting inevitably
in the expansion or restriction of the principle applied or rejected."
judicial process is thus not a bucket of readymade answers, but a process, or
technique, for easing an endless flux of changing social tensions. This is
illustrated in this case.
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Special Leave Petition has been filed against the impugned judgment of the
Bombay High Court dated 9th October, 2009 passed in Writ Petition No.3059 of
appellants had filed a writ petition in the High Court complaining of violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that those Typist-cum-Computer
Clerks who had been appointed in the Mumbai Port Trust prior to 1.11.1996 have
to work for six and half hours a day, whereas Typist-cum-Computer Clerks (like
the appellants) who have been appointed after 1.11.1996 have to work for seven
and half hours (excluding lunch break). This, it was alleged, violates Article
14 of Constitution.
appellant no.1 is a registered Trade Union, which represents the employees of
the respondent no.1 - Mumbai Port Trust, a body corporate constituted under
Section 3 of the Major Port Trusts Act. The appellant nos.2 and 3 are working
as Typist-cum-Computer Clerks with the respondent no.1 and were appointed to
that post after 1.11.1996. The case of the appellants, in short, is that as regards
the employees who were recruited as Typist-cum-Computer Clerks before
1.11.1996, their duty hours are six and half hours per day, whereas for the
personnel who were recruited as Typist-cum-Computer Clerks after 1.11.1996 they
are seven and half hours. According to the appellants, this is discriminatory
and violates Article14 of the Constitution. The appellants also claim that this
practice is contrary to Clause 24 of the settlement dated 6th December,
1994reached between the employees Union and the respondent Port, and also
violates Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellants prayed that
either their duty hours be reduced by one hour, or else they be given overtime
allowance for one hour.
reply of the respondent-Port is that the duty hours of the Typist-cum-Computer
Clerks recruited before 1.11.1996 is seven hours per day, which includes half
an hour lunch break, while the duty hours for the Typist-cum-Computer Clerks
recruited after 1.11.1996 it is eight hours per day with half an hour lunch
break. Thus, according to the respondent no.1, the difference in the duty hours
of the personnel recruited before 1.11.1996 and after 1.11.1996 is one hour.
According to the respondent no.1, though there is no settlement reached in this
behalf, as a matter of practice and usage the duty hours of the personnel in
indoor establishment was six and half-hours. However, due to change in the
technology and with introduction of privatization and setting up private Ports
with whom the respondent-Port has to compete, the respondent-Port decided as a
policy to have uniform working hours for the personnel working on the indoor
establishment and the outdoor establishment. It is claimed that from the
beginning so far as personnel working on outdoor establishment are concerned,
their duty hours were seven and a half hours and therefore, to bring about
uniformity in the duty hours of the personnel working on the indoor
establishment and outdoor establishment, a policy decision was taken to change
the duty hours of personnel working in the indoor establishment. However, in order
to avoid any litigation it was decided that the working hours of the personnel
who were in the indoor establishment, will not be disturbed. While making new recruitment
of personnel in the indoor establishment, it was made clear that they will have
to work for eight hours, and it is only on acceptance of that condition by them
that they were given employment. According to the respondent no.1, this
condition was accepted by the personnel who were appointed on indoor
establishment after 1.11.1996.
to the respondent no.1, since the newly recruited personnel on the indoor
establishment appointed after 1.11.1996 had agreed to eight hours as their duty
hours, with the retirement of personnel who were recruited before 1.11.1996 in
the indoor establishment, working hours of the personnel working in the indoor
establishment would uniformly be eight hours, and thus the uniformity in the
working hours of the personnel working on the indoor and outdoor establishments
will be brought about. It was submitted by the respondent no.1 that by adopting
such practice the respondentno.1 has not violated Article 14 of the
Constitution. It was also claimed that the reliance placed by the appellants on
Clause 24 of the settlement dated 6th December, 1994 is misplaced because by that
settlement no provision was made in relation to the duty hours. What was done
by Clause 24 was that none of the clauses contained in that settlement were to
be taken to have modified or cancelled any award, practice or usage, which was
in existence. It was, therefore, submitted that the policy decision of the
respondent-Port cannot be said to be contrary to Clause 24 of that settlement.
so far as the provision of Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act is
concerned, it was submitted that since by the policy decision no change in
relation to the personnel who were working was intended to be brought about,
there was no question of giving any notice of change.
learned counsel appearing for the appellants relied on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of People's Union for Democratic Rights and Ors. vs.
Union of India and Ors. AIR1982 SC 1473 to contend that a writ petition by
workers, when they claim any violation of fundamental right, is maintainable.
The learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of Moti Ram vs. N.E. Frontier Railway AIR 1964 SC 600 to claim that the
respondent-Port could not have framed a policy which violates the guarantee of
Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned counsel appearing for the
appellants further relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Olga Tell is and Ors. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180
to contend that even if an undertaking is given, that undertaking does not stop
the person who has given the undertaking from asserting his fundamental right.
learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand relied on the judgments
of the Supreme Court, in the case of Ravi Paul and Ors. vs. Union of India and
Ors. 1995 (3) SCC 300, and M.P. State Textile Corporation Ltd. vs. Mahendra and
Ors.2005(10) SCC 675, and submitted that in one establishment there can be
employees having separate duty hours.
our opinion the writ petition filed by the appellants should have been
dismissed by the High Court on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy
under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is
discretionary jurisdiction, and the discretion should not ordinarily be
exercised if there is an alternative remedy available to the appellant. In this
case there was a clear alternative remedy available to the appellant by raising
an industrial dispute and hence we fail to understand why the High Court
entertained the writ petition. It seems to us that some High Courts by adopting
an over liberal approach are unnecessarily adding to their load of arrears
instead of observing judicial discipline in following settled legal principles.
However, we may also consider the case on merits.
the record the following facts emerge :
(i) As a matter of
practice, duty hours of the personnel working on indoor establishment including
typist-cum-computer clerk was seven hours, which included half an hour lunch
respondent-Port as a matter of policy decided to include a condition in the
offer of appointment that was given to the personnel who were selected for
being appointed as a typist-cum- computer clerk after1.11.1996 that they will
have to work in shift of eight hours duration;
(iii) They were to
give their acceptance of this term, and it was only on their acceptance of the term
that they were given appointment;
(iv) It is an
admitted position that so far as the personnel working on outdoor establishment
of the respondent no.1 are concerned their duty hours were identical to the
typist-cum-computer clerk appointed after 1.11.1996;
(v) As a result of
change in the policy after 1.11.1996 in the indoor establishment of the respondent-Port,
there were typist-cum-computer clerks appointed before 1.11.1996 whose duty hours
were seven hours and there were typist-cum- computer clerks appointed after
1.11.1996 whose duty hours are eight hours; Except for different duty hours
all other conditions of service of typist-cum-computer clerks working on the
indoor establishment of the respondent no.1 were identical.
the light of these admitted facts, the question to be considered is whether the
action of the respondent no.1 in prescribing different working hours for
typist-cum-computer clerks working in their indoor establishment with reference
to their date of appointment is contrary to the guarantee contained in Article
14 of the Constitution. The reason that has been given by the respondent-Port
for prescribing different working hours for typist-cum-computer clerks with
reference to their date of appointment as found in paragraph of the counter
affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent in the writ petition in the High
Court is as follows : "At many points the typist-cum-computer clerks had
to work in shift timings of the docks and other operational departments for
eight hours. Thus in subsequent appointments a provision for working in shift
timing as required by the management was included. The management also
considered that with computerization under the MIS project and operation of
the Container Traffic Control System and the Cargo Management and Information
System, persons to be recruited in the category of Typist-cum-Computer Clerks
had to work full time on operation of computers in consonance with the operation
paragraph 10 of their Affidavit the respondents stated: "10. That the
general objective in changing the timings of the newly recruited Typist-cum- Computer
Clerks was to have persons working in timings in tune with the dock working,
to do away with the distinction between indoor and outdoor and to bring about
uniformity in the working hours in various fields and administrative posts in
the organization and thus promote operational efficiency."
paragraph 5 of their Affidavit, the respondent no.1 has further stated : "5.
The respondents submit at the outset that Mumbai Port is a Commercial
organization, which now competes not only with other Indian major ports but
also private ports and terminals within India and the surrounding region. In
this competitive world, the only way for survival is through cost efficient
service to port users. Thus systems and work procedures have to be changed to
meet the demands of the Trade. This is one step to provide better and cost
the reason that has been given by the respondent-Port for adopting the
practice of prescribing different working hours for Typist-cum-Computer Clerks
recruited after 1.11.1996 is the change in the situation, change in
technology, the desire to bring in uniformity in working hours of the
personnel working on indoor establishment and outdoor establishment. It was
submitted before us that the Port considered the option of increasing the
duty hours of the existing personnel working at that time on the indoor
establishment. However, it was thought that effecting change in that regard may
involve the Port in litigation and introduction of the change may get delayed.
Therefore, it was decided by the Port to change the duty hours of the
personnel recruited on indoor establishment after 1.11.1996 without
disturbing the duty hours of the personnel working at that time on the indoor
establishment, after giving the personnel, to be newly recruited, a clear
understanding that in case they accept the offer of appointment, they will
have to work for eight hours and it is only on their acceptance of this term
that they were given the appointment. Thus, for the achievement of the object
i.e. bringing in uniformity in the duty hours of the personnel working on the indoor
establishment and outdoor establishment, the respondent- Port classified
persons working on the indoor establishment for the purpose of duty hours into
two classes, the basis for classification being the date of their appointment,
and the object being to become competitive in business and efficient.
our opinion Article 14 of the Constitution does not take away from the State or
its instrumentality the power of classification, which to some degree is bound
to produce some inequality vide State of Bombay vs. Balsara AIR 1951 SC 318.
However, in our opinion, mere inequality is not enough to violate Article 14. Differential
treatment, per se, does not constitute violation of Article 14. It denies equal
protection only when there is no reasonable basis for differentiation vide
Ameerunnissa Begum vs. Mahaboob Begum AIR 1953 SC 91 (para 11), Babulal Amthalal
Mehta vs. Collector of Customs AIR 1957 SC 877 (para 16) etc.. If the law or
the practice deals equally with members of a well defined class, it is not
obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the
ground that it has no application to other persons.
has been repeatedly held by this Court that Article 14 does not prohibit
reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation or for the purposes of
adoption of a policy of the legislature or the executive, provided the policy
takes care to reasonably classify persons for achieving the purpose of the
policy and it deals equally with all persons belonging to a well defined class.
It is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the
new policy does not apply to other persons. In order, however, to pass the test
of permissible classification, as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the
catena of its decisions, two conditions must be fulfilled; (1) that the classification
must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (2) that
the differentia must have a rational relation to the object ought to be
achieved by the statute in question, vide Gopi Chand vs. Delhi Administration
AIR 1959 SC 609 (see also Basu's `Shorter Constitution of India, fourteenth edition
2009 page 81).
the classification would not violate the equality provision contained in
Article 14 of the Constitution if it has a rational or reasonable basis.
the question remains: what is `rational' or` reasonable'? These are vague
words. What may be regarded as rational or reasonable by one Judge may not be
so regarded by another. This could lead to chaos in the law.
this vagueness or uncertainty be allowed to remain so that Judges may have
total freedom or discretion? We think not. The law should be, as far as
possible, clear and certain so that people know where they stand and conduct
their affairs accordingly. Also, if total freedom is given to Judges to decide
according to their own individual notions and fancies the law will run riot.
in our opinion an attempt should be made to clarify the meaning of the words
`reasonable' or `rational'.
decisions of this Court on Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution have no doubt
held certain classifications to be reasonable while other classifications have
been held to be unreasonable. But what is reasonable and what is unreasonable does
not appear to have been discussed in depth by any decisions of this Court, and
no tests have been laid down in this connection. All that has been said is that
it is not prudent or pragmatic to insist on a mathematically accurate
classification covering diverse situations and all possible contingencies in
view of the inherent complexities involved in society, vide State of Karnataka
vs. Mangalore University Non Teaching Employees Association (2002) 3 SCC302
(para 10), Ombalika Das vs. Hulisa Shaw (2002) 4 SCC 539 (para 11) etc.
our opinion while it is true that a mathematically accurate classification
cannot be done in this connection, there should be some broad guidelines.
may be several tests to decide whether a classification or differentiation is
reasonable or not. One test which we are laying down and which will be useful
in deciding this case, is : is it conducive to the functioning of modern
society? If it is then it is certainly reasonable and rational.
the present case, as we have noted, the purpose of the classification was to
make the activities of the Port competitive and efficient. With the
introduction of privatization and setting up private Ports, the respondent had
to face competition. Also, it wanted to rationalize its activities by having
uniform working hours for its indoor and outdoor establishment employees, while
at the same time avoiding labour disputes with employees appointed before01.11.1996.
the modern world businesses have to face competition with other businesses. To
do so they may have to have longer working hours and introduce efficiency,
while avoiding labour disputes.
at from this point of view the classification in question is clearly reasonable
as it satisfies the test laid down above.
do not mean to say that the above is the only test to decide what is
reasonable, but in our opinion it is certainly one of the tests to be adopted
if we want our country to progress. We have to take a practical view of the
matter instead of relying on abstract, a priori notions of equality.
back to the present case, the object of the new policy adopted by the
respondent-Port was to bring about uniformity in the working hours of the
personnel working on the indoor and outdoor establishment. For achieving that purpose
the Port took a policy decision to lay down a condition in the appointment
orders of the personnel recruited on indoor establishment after 1.11.1996 that
they will have to work for eight hours. For the purpose of classification the date
1.11.1996 was chosen, because different duty hours were to be made applicable
from the one which were applicable to the existing personnel working on the
indoor establishment in relation to the persons to be employed after that date.
The purpose of this was to make the organization competitive and efficient.
the purpose of bringing about uniformity in the working hours of the personnel
working on the indoor establishment, two options were available to the Port;
(i) either to take steps to bring about change in the working hours of the
personnel presently working on the establishment and then apply that change to
the personnel who are recruited in future, or (ii) to apply the changed
practice incase of new recruits after obtaining their consent for adoption of the
new practice and thus introduce the change gradually because personnel
recruited before 1.11.1996 were bound to retire sooner or later with their
retirement, and a day would come when in the indoor establishment the only
personnel working will be those who have been recruited after 1.11.1996.
these two options the Port appears to have chosen the second option because in
the opinion of the Port it would be relatively hassle free. It was submitted
before us that the Port apprehended that if it had decided to take the first
option, it would have been involved in labour disputes and that litigation
would have prevented the Port from introducing the change. We do not see
anything unreasonable in the stand of the Port.
is nobody's case before us that the decision of the Port was not bona fide. In
our opinion, the decision of the Port was bona fide, and hence no fault can be
found with the said decision and it cannot be said that it violates Article 14
of the Constitution.
policy decision of the Port cannot be said to cause any prejudice to the
interest of the personnel recruited after 1.11.1996because before their
recruitment they were clearly given to understand as to what would be their
working hours, in case they accept the appointment. In our opinion the
introduction of the new policy was a bona fide decision of the Port, and the
acceptance of the conditions with open eyes by the appellants and the recruits
after1.11.1996 means that they can now have no grievance. It is well settled
that Courts should not ordinarily interfere with policy decisions.
our opinion, since the classification with reference to the date of appointment
of typist-cum-computer clerks was for the purpose of bringing about uniformity
in working hours of the personnel working in indoor and outdoor establishments,
and its aim was to make the organization competitive and efficient, it cannot
be said that it was unreasonable and hence violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Also, avoidance of labour disputes is a reasonable basis for the classification.
our opinion, Article 14 cannot be interpreted in a doctrinaire or dogmatic
manner. Absolute and inflexible concepts are an anathema to progress and
change. As observed by the great Justice Holmes of the U.S. Supreme Court, the
machinery of the government would not work if it were not allowed some free
play in its joints vide Missourie, Kansas and Tennesee Railroad vs. May 194
U.S.267(1904). Excessive interference by the judiciary in the functions of the
executive is not proper. In several decisions, we have held that there must be
judicial restraint in such matters, vide Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club
vs. Chander Hass (2008) 1 SCC 683.In Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. P. Laxmi
Devi (2008) 4SCC 720 the doctrine of judicial review of statutes has been discussed
in great detail, and it has been observed that the judiciary must show great
restraint in this connection.
who entered service after 1.11.1996 knew that they have to work for seven and
half hours excluding lunch break and with open eyes they accepted the
employment. Hence there is no question of violation of Article 14 of the
our opinion, fixing of hours of work, provided they do not violate any statutory
provision or statutory rule, are really management functions and this Court
must exercise restraint and not ordinarily interfere with such management
treatment in our opinion does not per se amount to violation of Article 14 of
the Constitution. It violates Article 14 only when there is no conceivable
reasonable basis for the differentiation. In the present case, as pointed out
above, there is a reasonable basis and hence in our opinion there is no violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution.
our opinion it is not prudent or pragmatic for the Court to insist on absolute
equality when there are diverse situations and contingencies, as in the present
case. In view of the inherent complexities involved in modern society, some
free play must be given to the executive authorities in this connection.
regards cut-off dates, this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. vs.
N. Subbarayudu and Ors. 2008(14) SCC702 has observed vide paragraphs 5 to 9 : "5.
In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date
is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions,
financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending
circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within
the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally
interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless
such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and
arbitrary. (See State of Punjab vs. Amar Nath Goyal 2005(6) SCC 754) 22 6. No
doubt in D.S. Nakara vs. Union of India 1983(1) SCC 305 this Court had struck
down the cut-off date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in
subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken
in Nakara case as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of
Punjab vs. Amar Nath Goyal. There may be various considerations in the mind of
the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date has been
fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations.
The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the
executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with
some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. In fact several
decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a
cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is
given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government (unless it is
shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar vs. Ramjee
Prasad 1990(3) SCC 368, Union of India vs. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal 1994(4) SCC 212
(vide SCC 5), Ramrao vs. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn.
2004(2) SCC 76 (vide para 31), University Grants Commission vs. Sadhana
Chaudhary 1996(10) SCC 536, etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason
has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive
authority as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the court must
still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless
the said cut- off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result.
9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club vs. Chander Hass 2008(1)
SCC 683 and in Govt. of A.P. vs. P. Laxmi Devi 2008(4) SCC 720 the court must
maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive
our opinion, there is often a misunderstanding about Article14 of the
Constitution, and often lawyers and Judges tend to construe it in a doctrinaire
and absolute sense, which may be totally impractical and make the working of
the executive authorities extremely difficult if not impossible.
Lord Denning observed : "This power to overturn executive decision must be
exercised very carefully, because you have got to remember that the executive
and the local authorities have their very own responsibilities and they have
the right to make decisions. The Courts should be very wary about interfering
and only interfere in extreme cases, that is, cases where the Court is sure
they have gone wrong in law or they have been utterly unreasonable. Otherwise
you would get a conflict between the courts and the government and the
authorities, which would be most undesirable. The courts must act very warily in
this matter." (See `Judging the World' by Garry Sturgess Philip Chubb).
our opinion Judges must maintain judicial self restraint while exercising the
powers of judicial review of administrative or legislative decisions.
view of the complexities of modern society", wrote Justice Frankfurter,
while Professor of Law at Harvard University, "and the restricted scope of
any man's experience, tolerance and humility inpassing judgment on the worth of
the experience and beliefs of others become crucial faculties in the
disposition of cases. The successful exercise of such judicial power calls for
rare intellectual disinterestedness and penetration, lest limitation in personal
experience and imagination operate as limitations of the Constitution. These
insights Mr. Justice Holmes applied in hundreds of cases and expressed in
memorable language : It is misfortune if a judge readshis conscious or
unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law, and
forgets that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by half his
fellow men to be wrong."
writing a biographical essay on the celebrated Justice Holmes of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the dictionary of American Biography, Justice Frankfurter
wrote : "It was not for him (Holmes) to prescribe for society or to deny
it the right of experimentation within very wide limits. That was to be left
for contest by the political forces in the state. The duty of the Court was to
keep the ring free. He reached the democratic result by the philosophic route
of skepticism-by his disbelief in ultimate answers to social questions. Thereby
he exhibited the judicial function at its purest." (see `Essays on Legal
History in Honour of Felix Frankfurter' edited by Morris D. Forko sch.)
our opinion adjudication must be done within the system of historically
validated restraints and conscious minimization of the Judges' preferences. The
Court must not embarrass the administrative authorities and must realize that
administrative authorities have expertise in the field of administration while
the Court does not. In the words of Chief Justice Neely, former Chief Justice
of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals : "I have very few illusions
about my own limitations as a Judge. I am not an accountant, electrical
engineer, financer, banker, stockbroker or system management analyst. It is
the height of folly to expect Judges intelligently to review a 5000 page record
addressing the intricacies of a public utility operation. It is not the
function of a Judge to act as a super board, or with the zeal of a pedantic
school master substituting its judgment for that of the administrator."
administrative matters the Court should, therefore, ordinarily defer to the
judgment of the administrators unless the decision is clearly violative of some
statute or is shockingly arbitrary. In this connection, Justice Frankfurter
while Professor of Law at Harvard University wrote in `The Public and its
Government' - "With the great men of the Supreme Court constitutional
adjudication has always been statecraft. As a mere Judge, Marshall had his superiors
among his colleagues. His supremacy lay in his recognition of the practical
needs of government. The great judges are those to whom 26 the Constitution
is not primarily a text for interpretation but the means of ordering the life
of a progressive people."
the same book Justice Frankfurter also wrote - "In simple truth, the
difficulties that government encounters from law do not in here in the
Constitution. They are due to the judges who interpret it. That document has
ample resources for imaginative statesmanship, if judges have imagination for
legal scholarship, Roscoe Pound challenged the rigid formalism of Justice Field.
Pound strongly argued against a jurisprudence founded upon immutable first
principles and sought in the social sciences and related fields a means for
making the law responsive to a changing world.
observed by Justice Frankfurter : "It would be comfortable to discover a Procrustean
formula........ If such were the process of Constitutional adjudications in
this most sensitive field, it would furnish an almost automatic task of applying
mechanical formula and would hardly call for the labors of Marshall or Taney,
of Holmes or Cardozo. To look for such talismanic formula is to assume that the
broad guarantees of the Constitution can fulfill their purpose without the nourishment
Keshavanand Bharti vs. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC1461 (vide paragraph 1547)
Khanna,J. observed : "In exercising the power of judicial review, the Courts
cannot be oblivious of the practical needs of the government. The door has to
be left open for trial and error."
the present case there was a reasonable basis for the classification, and hence
there is no violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 57. For the reasons given
above there is no merit in this appeal and hence it is dismissed.
..................................J. [Gyan Sudha Misra]