M/S
Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. Vs. M/S Jasbir Singh Chadha (HUF) & ANR.
[2010] INSC 371 (7 May 2010)
Judgment
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4344 OF
2010 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.2689 of 2009) M/s Jeevan Diesels &
Electricals Ltd. ..Appellant(s) Versus M/s Jasbir Singh Chadha (Huf) & Anr.
..Respondent(s)
GANGULY,
J.
1. Leave
granted.
2. This
appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28.11.2008 passed by
the High Court of Delhi in Regular First Appeal No.465 of 2008. In the impugned
judgment upon admission the High Court came to a finding that a case of
ejectment was made out against the appellant on the basis of admission of the
case of the plaintiff-landlord in the written statement filed by appellant. In
passing the said 1 judgment the High Court affirmed the judgment and decree of
dispossession passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi on 23.09.2008
against the appellant.
3. The
material facts of the case are that the respondents-plaintiffs, claiming to be
the landlords/owners of the premises bearing Flat No.205, (2nd Floor),
Arunachal Building, 19, Barakhambha Road, New Delhi-110001 having area of 581
sq. ft., (super area) (hereinafter, `the suit premises') filed a suit against
the appellant for recovery of possession and mesne profit. The case of the
plaintiff-landlord in the plaint is that the appellant was inducted as a tenant
vide lease deed dated 07.07.2003 at a monthly rent of Rs.23,200/- for a period
of three years with effect from 07.07.2003. According to the
respondents-plaintiffs the said lease dated 07.07.2003 was initially for a period
of three years and which was to be renewed for a further period of three years
as per the mutual consent of both the parties with 20% increase in the monthly
rent. The main case of the plaintiff- landlord is that the said lease deed had
expired by efflux of time and notice to that effect was sent to 2 appellant
which was enclosed with the plaint. In paragraph 6 of the plaint further
averment is that the appellant, despite determination of its tenancy of the
suit property, has failed to vacate the suit property, and handover the
possession thereof to the respondents-plaintiffs.
4. The
stand of the respondents-plaintiffs before the Civil Court and also the High
Court and before this Court also was that the case of termination of tenancy
has been admitted by the appellant in its written statement.
5. In
order to appreciate this controversy it will be proper to set out the relevant
averments in the plaint and written statement of the parties.
6.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint on which the respondents-plaintiffs rely are
as follows:- "5. That the tenancy has expired by efflux of time but for
the precautionary measure, the Plaintiffs vide notice dated July 15, 2006
terminated the tenancy of the Defendant, which was sent via Regd. Ad. &
UPC. The aforesaid notice dated July 15, 2006 was duly served upon the
defendant. The copy of said notice is annexed herewith as Annexure A-3. The
registration receipt, UPC and acknowledgement 3 card are annexed herewith as
Annexure A-4 to A-6 respectively.
6. That
the defendant, despite, the determination of its tenancy of the said suit
property has failed to vacate the suit property and handover the possession
thereof to the Plaintiffs".
7. In the
written statement, which was filed by the appellant, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
plaint have been dealt with in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the written statement
respectively. Those two paragraphs are set out below:- "5. That the
contents of para 5 of the plaint are a matter of record. It is submitted that
tenancy has neither expired by efflux of time nor it has been terminated.
6. That
in reply to the contents of para 6 of the plaint, it is submitted that
defendant is in possession of the premises. There has been no determination of
tenancy.
8. It is
clear from a perusal of the aforesaid averments in the written statement that
the appellant has disputed (a) the fact of expiry of tenancy by efflux of time;
(b) the appellant has also disputed that there has been a determination of
tenancy. So far as receipt of notice referred to in 4 paragraph 5 of the plaint
is concerned, there has been no denial by the appellant.
9.
Learned counsel for the appellant also argued before us that the lease deed
cannot be terminated in view of certain clauses contained in the lease. The
said argument was opposed by the learned counsel for the
respondents-plaintiffs. But in the facts of this case and in view of the nature
of the judgment we propose to pass we need not decide those contentions at all.
10. It
may be noted herein that to the written statement filed by the appellant, the
respondents-plaintiffs did not file any rejoinder. They filed an application
under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure for passing a judgment on
admission.
In the
said petition in paragraph 4, the respondents-plaintiffs also averred as
follows:- "4. That in view of the admission (i) On existence of
relationship of landlord and tenant and there after (ii) service of the
termination notice, the only question left for adjudication for the purpose of
possession is "whether the termination of the tenancy has been validly
terminated?"
5 11. To
that application the appellant had given a reply.
In
paragraph 2 of the reply it was again denied by the appellant that there was
any admission by them about termination or determination of tenancy. In the
said reply it has been stated that in the suit issues are still to be framed
and the case be tried in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code as there is
no admission by the appellant and the respondents-plaintiffs have to prove its case
with legally admissible evidence.
As such
prayer was made to dismiss the application of the respondents-plaintiffs under
Order 12 Rule 6.
12.
Learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs relied on a judgment of this
Court in Karam Kapahi &
Others
vs. M/s. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust & Another reported in 2010 (3)
SCALE 569 and contended that in view of the principles laid down in that case,
this Court may affirm the judgment of the High Court in the instant case. This
Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention. In Karam Kapahi (supra) a
Bench of this Court analyzed the principles of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code and
held that in the facts of that case there was clear admission on the part of
the lessee about non- 6 payment of lease rent. The said admission was made by
the lessee in several proceedings apart from its pleading in the suit. In view
of such clear admission, the Court applied the principles of Order 12 Rule 6 in
the case of Karam Kapahi (supra). The principles of law laid down in Karam
Kapahi (supra) can be followed in this case only if there is a clear and
unequivocal admission of the case of the plaintiff by the appellant.
13.
Whether or not there is a clear, unambiguous admission by one party of the case
of the other party is essentially a question of fact and the decision of this
question depends on the facts of the case. This question, namely, whether there
is a clear admission or not cannot be decided on the basis of a judicial
precedent. Therefore, even though the principles in Karam Kapahi (supra) may be
unexceptionable they cannot be applied in the instant case in view of totally
different fact situation.
India and
others reported in (2000) 7 SCC 120 the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 came up
for 7 consideration before this Court. This Court on a detailed consideration
of the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 made it clear "wherever there is a
clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party
making such admission to succeed" the principle will apply. In the instant
case it cannot be said that there is a clear admission of the case of the
respondents-plaintiffs about termination of tenancy by the appellant in its
written statement or in its reply to the petition of the respondents-plaintiffs
under Order 12 Rule 6.
15. It
may be noted here that in this case parties have confined their case of
admission to their pleading only. The learned counsel for the respondents-
plaintiffs fairly stated before this Court that he is not invoking the case of
admission `otherwise than on pleading'. That being the position this Court
finds that in the pleadings of the appellant there is no clear admission of the
case of respondents-plaintiffs.
16. In
this connection reference may be made to an old decision of the Court of Appeal
between Gilbert vs.
Smith
reported in 1875-76 (2) Chancery Division 686.
8 Dealing
with the principles of Order XL, Rule 11, which was a similar provision in
English Law, Lord Justice James held, "if there was anything clearly
admitted upon which something ought to be done, the plaintiff might come to the
Court at once to have that thing done, without any further delay or
expense" (see page 687). Lord Justice Mellish expressing the same opinion
made the position further clear by saying, "it must, however, be such an
admission of facts as would shew that the plaintiff is clearly entitled to the
order asked for". The learned Judge made it further clear by holding,
"the rule was not meant to apply when there is any serious question of law
to be argued. But if there is an admission on the pleading which clearly
entitles the plaintiff to an order, then the intention was that he should not
have to wait but might at once obtain any order" (see page 689).
17. In
another old decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hughes vs. London,
Edinburgh, and Glasgow Assurance Company (Limited) reported in The Times Law
Reports 1891-92 Volume 8 at page 81, similar principles were laid down by Lord
Justice Lopes, wherein His Lordship held "judgment ought not 9 to be signed
upon admissions in a pleading or an affidavit, unless the admissions were clear
and unequivocal". Both Lord Justice Esher and Lord Justice Fry concurred
with the opinion of Lord Justice Lopes.
18. In
yet another decision of the Court of Appeal in Landergan vs. Feast reported in
The Law Times Reports 1886-87 Volume 85 at page 42, in an appeal from Chancery
Division, Lord Justice Lindley and Lord Justice Lopes held that party is not
entitled to apply under the aforesaid rule unless there is a clear admission that
the money is due and recoverable in the action in which the admission is made.
19. The
decision in Landergan (supra) was followed by the Division Bench of Calcutta
High Court in Koramall Ramballav vs. Mongilal Dalimchand reported in 23
Calcutta Weekly Notes (1918-19) 1017. Chief Justice Sanderson, speaking for the
Bench, accepted the formulation of Lord Justice Lopes and held that admission
in Order 12, Rule 6 must be a "clear admission".
20. In
the case of J.C. Galstaun vs. E.D. Sassoon & Co., Ltd., reported in 27
Calcutta Weekly Notes (1922-23) 783, a Bench of Calcutta High Court presided
over by Hon'ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee sitting with Justice Rankin while
construing the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code followed the aforesaid
decision in Hughes (supra) and also the view of Lord Justice Lopes in Landergan
(supra) and held that these provisions are attracted "where the other
party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed. This rule
applies where there is a clear admission of the facts on the face of which it
is impossible for the party making it to succeed". In saying so His
Lordship quoted the observation of Justice Sargent in Ellis vs. Allen [(1914) 1
Ch. D. 904] {See page 787}.
21.
Similar view has been expressed by Chief Justice Broadway in the case of Abdul
Rahman and brothers vs. Parbati Devi reported in AIR 1933 Lahore 403.
The
learned Chief Justice held that before a Court can act under order 12, Rule 6,
the admission must be clear and unambiguous.
22. For
the reasons discussed above and in view of the facts of this case this Court
cannot uphold the 11 judgment of the High Court as well as of the Additional
District Judge. Both the judgments of the High Court and of the Additional
District Judge are set aside.
23. The
matter is remanded to the trial Court for expeditious disposal of the suit as
early as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of
service of this order on the learned trial Court. It is made clear that this
Court has not made any observation on the merits of the case.
24. The
appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
.....................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)
.....................J.
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