Dalco
Engineering Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Satish Prabhakar Padhye & Ors [2010] INSC 238 (31
March 2010)
Judgment
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1886 OF
2007 Dalco Engineering Private Ltd. ... Appellant Shree Satish Prabhakar Padhye
& Ors. ... Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1858 OF 2007 Fancy
Rehabilitation Trust & Anr. ... Appellants Union of India & Ors. ...
Respondents
R. V.
RAVEENDRAN, J.
Facts in
CA No.1886/2007 :
1.
The appellant is a private limited company incorporated under the
provisions of the Companies
Act, 1956. The respondent - S.P. Padhye - (also
referred to as `the employee') was employed as a Telephone Operator by the
appellant for more than two decades. The respondent's service was 2 terminated
by the appellant with effect from 31.12.2000 on the ground that he had become
deaf (85% reduction in ability to hear). The respondent complained to the
Disability Commissioner, Pune, in regard to such termination, alleging that he
was fit, able and normal when he joined service of the appellant and as he
acquired the hearing impairment during the period of service, he should have
been continued in employment in some suitable post. The Disability Commissioner
made an order dated 12.10.2001 suggesting to the employer to undertake a social
responsibility, by re- employing the respondent to discharge any other work.
The suggestion was not accepted by the employer.
2.
According to the respondent, the Commissioner, instead of making a
mere suggestion, ought to have issued a direction to the employer, in exercise
of jurisdiction under section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (`the
Act', for short). He therefore filed a writ petition seeking the following
reliefs (i) quashing of the order dated 12.10.2001; and (ii) a direction to
implement the provisions of the Disabilities Act by directing the employer to
reinstate him in service in a suitable post, with retrospective effect from
1.1.2001, in the same pay-scale and service benefits. The High Court 3 allowed
the said writ petition by judgment dated 23.12.2005, and directed the employer
to reinstate the respondent and shift him to a suitable post with the same
pay-scale and service benefits and with full back-wages. The High Court held
that the respondent, though a private limited company, was an
"establishment" as defined under section 2(k) of the Act and
consequently section 47 of the Act enjoined it not to dispense with the
services of its employee who acquired a disability.
Facts in
CA No.1858/2007 :
3.
The first Appellant is a Public Trust (for short the `Trust')
working for the benefit of the physically and mentally challenged persons, took
up a house-keeping contract from the third respondent Company on 24.7.2000.
The
appellant employed several physically handicapped persons for executing the
said contract. The third respondent terminated the appellant's contract on
18.7.2006. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed a complaint dated 22.7.2006
with the Disability Commissioner, Pune followed by a writ petition in the High
Court for quashing the notice terminating the contract.
The
appellant also sought a direction for rehabilitation of the persons with
disabilities who were employed by it for executing the said house-keeping contract,
under the provisions of the Act. A Division Bench of the Bombay 4 High Court by
judgment dated 19.9.2006 dismissed the writ petition holding that the third
respondent was not an "establishment" within the meaning of section
2(k) of the Act and, consequently, the provisions of the Act did not apply and
that the Disability Commissioner had no jurisdiction to issue any direction to
the third respondent. It also held that the earlier decision in S.P. Padhye
(which is the subject matter of the first case) was per incuriam as it ignored
two binding decisions of this court - the Constitution Bench decision in
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975 (1) SCC 421] and the
decision in S.S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi [1981 (3) SCC 431].
Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal.
Questions
for decision
4.
The employee relies on section 47 which provides that no
establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires
a disability during his service. Section 47 of the Act is extracted below :-
"47. Non-discrimination in Government employment.--(1) No establishment
shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability
during his service:
Provided
that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post
he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and
service benefits:
5
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any
post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available
or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.
(2) No
promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability:
Provided
that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried
on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if
any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from
the provisions of this section."
The term
"establishment" employed in section 47 is defined in section 2(k) of
the Act as follows :
"2.
Definitions.--In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -- xxxxx (k)
"establishment" means a corporation established by or under a
Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled
or aided by the Government or a local authority or a Government company as
defined in section 617 of the Companies Act 1956 (1 of 1956) and includes
Departments of a Government;"
5.
The question is, having regard to the definition of the word
`establishment' of section 2(k) of the Act, whether the requirement relating to
non-discrimination of employees acquiring a disability during the course of
service, embodied in Section 47, is to be complied with only by authorities falling
within the definition of State (as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution),
or even by private employers. This leads us to the following two questions:- 6
(i) Whether a company incorporated under the Companies Act (other than a
Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956) is an "establishment" as defined in section 2(k)
of the Act ? (ii) Whether the respondent in the first case and the appellant in
the second case are entitled to claim any relief with reference to section 47
of the Act ? Re: Question (i)
6.
Let us examine the meaning of the crucial word `establishment'
used in sub-section (1) of section 47 of the Act. The definition of the word
`establishment' in section 2(k), when analyzed, shows that it is an exhaustive
definition, and covers the following categories of employers:
(i) a
corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial, or State Act;
(ii) an
authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government;
(iii) a
local authority;
(iv) a
Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956; and
(v) Departments of a Government.
7 It is
not in dispute that the employers in these two cases are companies incorporated
under the Companies
Act, 1956 which do not fall under categories (ii) to
(v) specified in Section 2(k) of the Act.
7.
The employee contends that a company incorporated under the Companies Act is a Corporation falling under the first category
enumerated in section 2(k), that is `Corporation established by or under a
Central, Provincial or State Act', on the following reasoning : that a
corporation refers to a company; that Companies Act is a Central Act;
and that therefore a company incorporated and registered under the Companies
Act is a Corporation established under a Central Act. He contends that the use
of the words "by or under" is crucial. According to him, `a
corporation established by an Act' would refer to a corporation brought into
existence by an Act;
and a `corporation
established under an Act' would refer to a company incorporated under the Companies
Act. On the other hand, the employer contends that the term `Corporation
established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act' refers to a
statutory Corporation which is brought into existence by a statute, or under a
statute and does not include a company which is registered under the Companies
Act. It is submitted that Companies Act merely facilitates and lays down the
procedure for 8 incorporation of a company which, when incorporated, will be
governed by the provisions of the said Act and therefore, a company registered
under the Companies Act, is not a corporation established under an Act.
8.
The words "a Corporation established by or under a Central,
Provincial or State Act" is a standard term used in several enactments to
denote a statutory corporation established or brought into existence by or
under statute. For example, it is used in sub-clause (b) of Clause Twelfth of
Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (`IPC' for short) and Section 2(c)(iii) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (`PC Act' for short). Both these
statutes provide that a person in the service of a `Corporation established by
or under a Central, Provincial or State Act' is a public servant. The
Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 defines `public property' as
meaning any property owned by, or in the possession of, or under the control of
(i) the Central Government (ii) any state government; or (iii) any local
authority; or (iv) any corporation established by, or under, a Central,
Provincial or State Act; or (v) any company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956; or (vi) any institution, concern or undertaking which the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in
that behalf provided that the Central Government 9 shall not specify any
institution, concern or undertaking under that sub- clause unless such
institution, concern or undertaking is financed wholly or substantially by
funds provided directly or indirectly by the Central Government or by one or
more State Governments, or partly by the Central Government and partly by one
or more State Governments. Thus the term is always used to denote certain
categories of authorities which are `State' as contrasted from non-statutory
companies which do not fall under the ambit of `State'.
9.
The meaning of the term came up for consideration in S. S. Dhanoa
vs. Municipal Corporation, Delhi and Ors. - 1981 (3) SCC 431 with reference to
section 21 of IPC. This Court held:
"Clause
Twelfth does not use the words "body corporate", and the question is
whether the expression "corporation" contained therein, taken in
collocation of the words "established by or under a Central, Provincial or
State Act" would bring within its sweep a cooperative society.
Indubitably,
the Cooperative Store Limited is not a corporation established by a Central or
State Act. The crux of the matter is whether the word 'under' occurring in
Clause Twelfth of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code makes a difference. Does
the mere act of incorporation of a body or society under a Central or a State
Act make it a corporation within the meaning of Clause Twelfth of Section 21.
In our opinion, the expression 'corporation' must, in the context, mean a
corporation created by the Legislature and not a body or society brought into
existence by an act of a group of individuals. A cooperative society is,
therefore, not a corporation established by or under an Act of the Central or
State Legislature.
A
corporation is an artificial being created by law having a legal entity
entirely separate and distinct from the individuals who compose it with the 10
capacity of continuous existence and succession, notwithstanding changes in its
membership. ........ The term 'corporation' is, therefore, wide enough to
include private corporations. But, in the context of Clause Twelfth of Section
21 of the Indian Penal Code, the expression 'corporation' must be given a
narrow legal connotation.
Corporation,
in its widest sense, may mean any association of individuals entitled to act as
an individual. But that certainly is not the sense in which it is used here.
Corporation established by or under an Act of Legislature can only mean a body
corporate which owes its existence, and not merely its corporate status, to the
Act. For example, a Municipality, a Zilla Parishad or a Gram Panchayat owes its
existence and status to an Act of Legislature. On the other hand, an
association of persons constituting themselves into a Company under the Companies Act or a Society under the Societies Registration Act owes its
existence not to the Act of Legislature but to acts of parties though, it may
owe its status as a body corporate to an Act of Legislature.
There is
a distinction between a corporation established by or under an Act and a body
incorporated under an Act. The distinction was brought out by this Court in
Sukhdev Singh and Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Ors - (1975)
1 SCC 421. It was observed :
A company
incorporated under the Companies
Act is not created by the Companies Act but comes
into existence in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
There is
thus a well-marked distinction between a body created by a statute and a body
which, after coming into existence, is governed in accordance with the
provisions of a statute."
(emphasis
supplied) In Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain -
1976 (2) SCC 58, this Court explained the position further:
"In
other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe
its very existence to a statute which would be the fountainhead of its powers.
The question in such case to be asked is, if there is no statute, would the
institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then
undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate
existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is
merely 11 governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a
statutory body."
[emphasis
supplied]
10.
A `company' is not `established' under the Companies Act. An
incorporated company does not `owe' its existence to the Companies Act.
An
incorporated company is formed by the act of any seven or more persons (or two
or more persons for a private company) associated for any lawful purpose subscribing their
names to a Memorandum of Association and by complying with the requirements of
the Companies Act in respect of registration. Therefore, a `company' is
incorporated and registered under the Companies Act and not established under
the Companies Act. Per contra, the Companies Act itself establishes the
National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, and
those two statutory authorities owe their existence to the Companies Act.
11.
Where the definition of `establishment' uses the term `a
corporation established by or under an Act', the emphasis should be on the word
`established' in addition to the words `by or under'. The word `established'
refers to coming into existence by virtue of an enactment. It does not refer to
a company, which, when it comes into existence, is governed in accordance 12
with the provisions of the
Companies Act. But then, what is the difference between `established by a
central Act' and `established under a central Act'? The difference is best explained
by some illustrations. A corporation is established by an Act, where the Act
itself establishes the corporation. For example, Section 3 of State Bank of
India Act, 1955 provides that a Bank to be called the State Bank of India shall
be constituted to carry on the business of banking. Section 3 of Life Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 provides that with effect from
such date as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette
appoint, there shall be established a corporation called the Life Insurance
Corporation of India. State Bank of India and Life Insurance Corporation of
India are two examples of corporations established by "a Central
Act". We may next refer to the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 which
provides for establishment of various Financial Corporations under that Act.
Section 3 of that Act relates to establishment of State Financial Corporations
and provides that the State Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette establish a Financial Corporation for the State under such name as may
be specified in the notification and such Financial Corporation shall be a body
corporate by the name notified. Thus, a State Financial Corporation is
established under a central Act. Therefore, when the words "by and under
an Act" are preceded by the words 13 "established", it is clear
that the reference is to a corporation established, that it is brought into
existence, by an Act or under an Act. In short, the term refers to a statutory
corporation as contrasted from a non-statutory corporation incorporated or
registered under the Companies Act.
12.
There
is indication in the definition of `establishment' itself, which clearly
establishes that all companies incorporated under the Companies Act are not
establishments. The enumeration of establishments in the definition of
`establishment' specifically includes "a Government Company as defined in
Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956". This shows that the legislature,
took pains to include in the definition of `establishment' only one category of
companies incorporated under the Companies Act, that is the `Government
Companies' as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act.
If, as contended by
the employee, all Companies incorporated under the Companies Act are to be
considered as `establishments' for the purposes of Section 2(k), the definition
would have simply and clearly stated that `a company incorporated or registered
under the Companies Act, 1956' which would have included a Government company
defined under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The inclusion of only a
specific category of companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956
within the 14 definition of `establishment' necessarily and impliedly excludes
all other types of companies registered under the Companies Act, 1956, from the
definition of `establishment'. It is clear that the legislative intent was to
apply section 47 of the Act only to such establishments as were specifically
defined as `establishment' under section 2(k) of the Act and not to other
establishments. The legislative intent was to define `establishment' so as to
be synonymous with the definition of `State' under Article 12 of the
Constitution of India. Private employers, whether individuals, partnerships,
proprietary concerns or companies (other than Government companies) are clearly
excluded from the `establishments' to which section 47 of the Act will apply.
13.
There is yet another indication in section 47, that private
employers are excluded. The caption/ marginal note of section 47 describes the
purport of the section as non-discrimination in Government employment. The word
`government' is used in the caption, broadly to refer to `State' as defined in
Article 12 of the Constitution. If the intention of the legislature was to
prevent discrimination of persons with disabilities in any kind of employment,
the marginal note would have simply described the provision as
`non-discrimination in employment' and sub-section (1) of section 47 15 would
have simply used the word `any employer' instead of using the word
`establishment' and then taking care to define the word `establishment'. The
non-use of the words `any employer', and `any employment' and specific use of the
words `Government employment' and `establishment' (as defined), demonstrates
the clear legislative intent to apply the provisions of Section 47 only to
employment under the State and not to employment under others. While the
marginal note may not control the meaning of the body of the section, it
usually gives a safe indication of the purport of the section to the extent
possible. Be that as it may.
14.
The learned counsel for the employee submitted that the decision
in Dhanoa was rendered with reference to a penal statute; and that words or
terms in such statutes are used in a restrictive and strict sense. He contended
that definition of words and terms in a penal statute will not provide a safe
guide to interpret the same words employed in socio-economic legislations.
He
further contended that the terms used in a socio-economic statute like
Disabilities Act, providing for full participation and equality, for people
with disabilities and to remove any discrimination against them vis-`-vis non-
disabled persons, should be interpreted liberally. He submitted that any
interpretation of the term `a corporation established by or under a central, 16
provincial or state Act' with reference to the Penal Code should not therefore
be imported for understanding the meaning of that term when used in the Act. He
referred to and relied upon the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act
which states that India as a signatory to the Proclamation on the Full
Participation and Equality of the People with Disabilities in the Asian and
Pacific Region, enacted the Statute to provide for the following :
(i) to
spell out the responsibility of the State towards the prevention of
disabilities, protection of rights, provision of medical care, education,
training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities;
(ii) to
create barrier free environment for persons with disabilities;
(iii) to
remove any discrimination against persons with disabilities in the sharing of
development benefits, vis-`-vis non-disabled persons;
(iv) to
counteract any situation of the abuse and the exploitation of persons with
disabilities;
(v) to
lay down a strategy for comprehensive development of programmes and services
and equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities; and (vi) to
make special provision of the integration of persons with disabilities into the
social mainstream."
He
submitted that keeping the said objects in view, the term `establishment'
should be extended to all corporations incorporated under the Companies Act
1956, irrespective of whether they are in the public sector or private sector.
17 14.1)
He also relied upon the following principle of contextual interpretation
enunciated by this Court in Reserve Bank of India vs.
Peerless
General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., - 1987 (1) SCC 424:
"Interpretation
must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation.
One may well say is the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour.
Neither can be ignored. Both are important. The interpretation is best which
makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted
when we know why it was enacted.
With this
knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by
section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word.
If a
statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the
statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses,
phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is
looked at without the glasses provided by the context.
With
these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each
section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as
to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a
statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that
every word has a place and everything is in its place."
14.2) He
next relied upon the principle that words in a social welfare legislation
should receive liberal and broad interpretation, stated by this Court in
Workman of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of
American Express International Banking Corporation - 1985 (4) SCC 71 :
"The
principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in
statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights
legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian
dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal
construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be
recognized and reduced. Judges ought to be more 18 concerned with the `colour',
the `content' and the `context' of such statutes (we have borrowed the words
from Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds - 1971 (3) All ER 237). In
the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind
in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language,
unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be
interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of the cases
cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (1981) 1 SCR 789, we had occasion to say, Semantic
luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of "bread and butter"
statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation.
Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief,
the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions."
14.3) He
next relied upon the following observations in Kunal Singh v.
Union of
India - 2003 (4) SCC 524, where this Court, referring to the very section under
consideration, observed thus :
"Section
47 contains a clear directive that the employer shall not dispense with or
reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during the service. In
construing a provision of a social beneficial enactment that too dealing with
disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities, protection of
rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and
serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and
paralyses the purpose of the Act. Language of section 47 is plain and certain
casting statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee acquiring
disability during service."
15.
We agree that the socio-economic legislations should be
interpreted liberally. It is also true that Courts should adopt different
yardsticks and measures for interpreting socio-economic statutes, as compared
to penal 19 statutes, and taxing statutes. But a caveat. The courts cannot
obviously expand the application of a provision in a socio-economic legislation
by judicial interpretation, to levels unintended by the legislature, or in a
manner which militates against the provisions of the statute itself or against
any constitutional limitations. In this case, there is a clear indication in
the statute, that the benefit is intended to be restricted to a particular
class of employees, that is employees of enumerated establishments (which fall
within the scope of `state' under Article 12). Express limitations placed by
the socio-economic statute cannot be ignored, so as to include in its
application, those who are clearly excluded by such statute itself. We should
not lose sight of the fact that the words "corporation established by or
under a Central, Provincial or State Act" is a term used in several
enactments, intended to convey a standard meaning. It is not a term which has
any special significance or meaning in the context of the Disabilities Act or
any other socio-economic legislations. It is a term used in various enactments,
to refer to statutory corporations as contrasted from non-statutory companies.
Any
interpretation of the said term, to include private sector, will not only
amount to overruling the clear enunciation in Dhanoa which has held the field
for nearly three decades, but more importantly lead to the erasure of the
distinction maintained in the Constitution between statutory corporations 20
which are `state' and non-statutory bodies and corporations, for purposes of
enforcement of fundamental rights. The interpretation put forth by the employee
would make employees of all companies, public servants, amenable to punishment
under the provisions of Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act; and
would also result in all non-statutory companies and private sector companies
being included in the definition of `State' thereby requiring them to comply
with the requirements of non- discrimination, equality in employment,
reservations etc.
16.
The appellant next contended that the scheme of the Act, does not
confine its applicability to government or statutory corporations. Reference is
invited to some provisions of the Act to contend that obligations/duties/
responsibilities are fixed with reference to persons with disabilities, on
establishments other than those falling under section 2(k) of the Act. It was
submitted that section 39 casts an obligation on all educational institutions,
to reserve not less than three percent of the seats for persons with
disabilities. In fact, it is not so. Though, the marginal note of section 29
uses the words `all educational institutions' with reference to reservation of
seats for persons with disabilities, the section makes it clear that only
government educational institutions and educational institutions receiving aid
from the 21 government shall reserve not less than three percent seats for
persons with disabilities. It is well recognized that an aided private school
would be included within the definition of `State' in regard to its acts and
functions as an instrumentality of the State. Therefore, care is taken to apply
the provisions of the Act to only educational institutions belonging to the
government or receiving aid from the government and not to unaided private
educational institutions. Further, section 39 of the Act, does not use the word
`establishment'. Reference is next made to the section 44 which requires
non-discrimination in transport. This section requires establishments in the
transport sector to take special measures (within the limits of their economic
capacity) to permit easy access to persons with disabilities. The employee
contends that this would mean that all establishments whether statutory
corporations falling under the definition of section 2(k) of the Act or non-
statuary corporations, or even individuals operating in the transport sector
should comply with section 44 of the Act. We do not propose to consider whether
Section 44 applies to non-statutory corporations in the transport sector, as
that issue does not arise in this case. Further the use of the words
"within the limits of their economic capacity" makes it virtually
directory.
Be that
as it may.
22 Re :
Question (ii)
17.
As the appellant in CA No. 1886/2007 and the third respondent in
CA No. 1858/2007, are not establishments, within the meaning of that expression
in Section 2(k) of the Act, section 47 of the Act will not apply. In so far the
CA No. 1858 of 2007, there is an additional factor. Third respondent therein
was not the employer of any persons with disability.
Therefore,
in that case, the entire question is academic. In neither of the cases, any
relief can be granted under section 47 of the Act.
18.
Therefore CA No. 1886 of 2007 is allowed and CA No. 1858 of 2007
is dismissed resulting in the dismissal of the respective writ petitions. This
will not come in the way of employee of any private company, who has been
terminated on the ground of disability, seeking or enforcing any right
available under any other statute, in accordance with the law.
_____________________J. (R.V. RAVEENDRAN)
_____________________J.(R. M. LODHA)
_____________________J.
New Delhi.
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