Indu
Bhushan Dwivedi Vs. State of Jharkhand & ANR. [2010] INSC 432 (5 July 2010)
Judgment
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4888 OF
2010 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 23781 of 2007) Indu Bhushan Dwivedi
.......Appellant Versus State of Jharkhand and another .......Respondents
G.S.
Singhvi, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
This is an appeal for setting aside order dated 29.3.2007 passed
by the Division Bench of Jharkhand High Court in Writ Petition No.2671 of 2006
whereby it set aside the dismissal of the appellant from service but imposed
the punishment of compulsory retirement.
3.
The appellant joined service as Munsif in 1982. He was promoted as
Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate in 1996. While he was posted as Sub-
Divisional Judicial Magistrate at Chaibasa, a news item appeared in `Dainik
Jagran' dated 2.7.2003 suggesting that the appellant had misbehaved and
manhandled an accused, named, Anup Kumar and Constable Sheo Pujan Baitha. On
the next day, i.e. 3.7.2003, the appellant made a representation to District
and Sessions Judge, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa with the request that an inquiry
be got conducted into the matter and appropriate action against the person who
got published the misleading news.
4.
The High Court of Jharkhand took cognizance of the newspaper
report adversely commenting upon the conduct of the appellant and passed an
order dated 5.7.2003 whereby he was placed under suspension and his headquarter
was fixed at Chaibasa with a direction that he shall not leave the headquarter
without obtaining prior permission from the Registrar General of the High
Court.
5.
In the meanwhile, the appellant appears to have submitted an
application to the District Judge on 4.7.2003 for permission to go to Ranchi
for his treatment and also avail holiday on 6.7.2003. After receiving the order
of suspension, the appellant submitted an application to the Registrar 3
General of the High Court stating therein that as per the advise of the doctor,
he has to take complete rest for one month and, therefore, he is unable to
return to Chaibasa. The appellant also indicated that he would join the
headquarters after recovery from illness. This prayer of the appellant was
rejected by the High Court and he was informed through the District Judge to
comply with the direction contained in order dated 5.7.2003. The appellant responded
to this communication by sending letter dated 19.7.2003 to the District Judge
wherein he mentioned that he had to proceed on leave because he was suffering
from acute and uncontrolled loose motions and he had left the headquarters
after handing over charge and after seeking permission from the District Judge.
He then reiterated his inability to return to the headquarter and described the
direction contained in the letter of the High Court as merciless which could
not be complied with at the cost of one's life. He also claimed that being a
suspended employee, he cannot be compelled to stay at the headquarters.
6.
After five months of his suspension, a regular departmental
inquiry was initiated against the appellant on the following charges:
"Charge
No.1 You, Shri Indu Bhushan Dwivedi while functioning as SDJM, West Singhbhum
at Chaibasa was found in intoxicated 4 condition on 1st July 2002 (a holiday)
in your residential office when an accused Anup Kumar of a case no. C/7-60/2001
of the Court of Shri D. Mahapata, Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Chaibasa was
produced before you in your residential office for remand by the Head Constable
Shri Sheo Pujan Baitha in presence of Office Clerk Shri Baidyanath Ballav Kath
of the Court of Shri D. Mahapatra.
At the
time of production of the said accused Anup Kumar, you misbehaved and
manhandled the accused Anup Kumar as well as constable Shri Sheo Pujan Baitha.
The
aforesaid action on your part not only reflects on your reputation, dereliction
of duty but also shows the recklessness and misconduct in the discharge of
duties.
The
aforesaid action on your part is also unbecoming of a Judicial Officer.
Charge
No.2 You, Shri Indu Bhushan Dwivedi, SDJM, Chaibasa was placed under suspension
by Hon'ble High Court's order contained in letter No. 05/Apptt. dt. 5.7.2003
fixing your headquarter at Chaibasa. It was served on you on 5th July, 2003 by
the District & Sessions Judge, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa.
On 4th
July, 2003, you submitted representation applications before the District &
Sessions Judge, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa to leave the headquarter on
following Sunday i.e. 6th of July, 2003 (for one day) to proceed to Ranchi
which was allowed by the District & Sessions Judge, West Singhbhum,
Chaibasa.
Though
during the period of suspension you are not supposed to attend duty or sign any
Attendance Register but you are supposed to remain in the Headquarters and
cannot leave the Headquarters without any permission of the competent
authority, but you remained absent from headquarter from 6.7.2003 after making
over charge to SDJM, Porahat on 5 5.7.2003 and you remained out of headquarter
without any information till 10.9.2003.
The
aforesaid action on your part and violation of Court's order amounts
insubordination and misconduct.
Charge
No.3.
You, Shri
Indu Bhushan Dwivedi, SDJM, Chaibasa (under suspension) when asked by the
District & Sessions Judge, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa as to why you have
not returned to headquarter by letter No.2501/G dated 10th of July, 2003 and to
report you submitted reply and used derogatory words against the Court by your
letter No. 5(P) of 2003 dt. 19th July, 2003 using expression "Merciless
Direction of the Hon'ble Court".
The
aforesaid remarks by you reflects on your conduct amounting to insubordination,
indiscipline and unbecoming a Judicial Officer.
Shri
Dwivedi has been charged of misconduct recklessness in discharge of his duties
along with insubordination and for committing the acts most unbecoming of a
responsible Judicial Officer, on the basis of the above mentioned
allegation."
7.
The appellant submitted reply and denied all the charges. After
considering the reply, the High Court appointed District & Sessions Judge,
East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur to conduct regular inquiry. The presenting officer
examined 5 witnesses and produced 11 documents to substantiate the charges
leveled against the appellant, who examined 2 witnesses and produced 17
documents.
8.
For the sake of his convenience, the Inquiry Officer formulated
the following points:
(i)
Whether Shri Dwivedi was in an intoxicated condition on 1st July, 2003 in the
residential Office when accused Anup Kumar was produced before him for remand?
(ii) Whether Shri Dwivedi had misbehaved as also manhandled the accused Anup
Kumar and Constable Sheo Pujan Baitha? (iii) Whether Shri Dwivedi had left his
headquarter without prior permission from the competent authority and without
any sufficient cause? (iv) Whether Shri Dwivedi had used derogatory
language/word against the Hon'ble Court by his Letter No.5(p) 2003 dated
19.7.2003? and (v) Whether Shri Dwivedi had acted in a way which shows
recklessness and misconduct in discharge of his duties along with
insubordination and indiscipline which is unbecoming of a responsible Judicial
Officer? After analyzing the evidence produced before him, the Inquiry Officer
submitted report dated 4.6.2005 with the conclusion that charges No.2 and 3
have been proved against the appellant but charge No.1 has not been proved.
While dealing with point Nos.1 and 2 which related to charge No.1, the Inquiry
Officer referred to the statements of Pravakar Singh (A.W.1), the Registrar,
Civil Courts, Chaibasa, Baidyanath Ballav Kant 7 (A.W.2), Havildar Sheo Pujan
Baitha (A.W.3), the accused Anup Kumar (A.W.5) and recorded the following
conclusions:
"11.
From perusal of the record, it appears that there is some force in the
contention of the delinquent because A.W.2 Baidyanath Ballav Kant has
specifically stated that on the date of occurrence, the delinquent had
performed `Puja' and several persons were present there and after `Puja' Prasad
was also given to him and two other persons and this fact has been supported by
A.W.1 Prabhakar Singh. A.W.2 has further stated that the delinquent was not in
an intoxicated condition when the accused was produced for remand. The said
Havildar, A.W.3, has also nowhere stated in his evidence that the delinquent
was in an intoxicated state.
12. On
careful examination of the evidence oral and documentary, adduced by the
parties and in view of the aforesaid discussions, I am of the view that the
Charge No.1 that the delinquent was in an intoxicated condition when the
accused was produced before him for remand, could not be proved by cogent
evidence and similarly, this has also not been proved that the delinquent had
assaulted the accused Anup Kumar and the Havildar Sheo Pujan Baitha. So, the
Point No.4(i) and (ii) are decided in favour of the delinquent."
9.
The Inquiry Officer then dealt with other three points and held
that the delinquent (appellant herein) appears to have managed the medical
prescription from the doctors to justify non-compliance of the direction given
by the High Court not to leave the headquarter without obtaining permission
from the Registrar General and concluded that his action amounted to
insubordination and indisciplined behaviour unbecoming of a responsible
judicial officer.
10.
The High Court accepted the inquiry report and directed that show
cause notice be issued to the appellant for imposition of a major penalty.
Accordingly,
the Registrar General of the High Court issued Memo dated 30.6.2005 to the
appellant enclosing therewith a copy of the inquiry report and called upon him
to show cause as to why a major penalty such as dismissal from service may not
be inflicted upon him. In his reply dated 22.7.2005, the appellant challenged
the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer in respect of charges No.2 and 3
by contending that the same were based on erroneous appreciation of evidence
and that there was no valid ground to discard the testimony of the doctor and
prescriptions given by him. The appellant then pleaded that he neither had the
intention nor he could have dared to disobey the direction given by the High
Court. He submitted that non-compliance of the direction given by the High
Court to stay at the headquarters during the period of suspension was due to
his illness and pleaded that he may be pardoned for using the expression
`merciless direction' for the communication sent by the High Court. He again
tendered an unqualified apology for what he termed as wrong choice of the
words. Simultaneously, he claimed that there was no adverse report regarding
his integrity, honesty and sincerity and he was never found guilty of any act
of insubordination or indiscipline and pointed out that in the latest 9 report,
the District Judge had commended his work. This is evinced from para 17 of the
appellant's representation, which reads thus:
"17.
Sir, most humbly and respectfully I submit that in the entire period of my service
there is no report against my integrity honesty and sincerity. I was never
found guilty of any act of insubordination or indiscipline ever before in this
entire period of service also that recently proceeding this suspension my
District Judges in their annual report have commended my work."
11.
After considering the reply of the appellant, the High Court
recommended his dismissal from service. The State Government accepted the
recommendation of the High Court and passed order dated 22.2.2006 whereby the
appellant was dismissed from service.
12.
The appellant challenged the aforementioned order by contending
that the same is vitiated due to violation of the rules of natural justice
because while recommending his dismissal from service, the High Court had
considered un-communicated adverse remarks recorded in the Annual Confidential
Report without informing him that the same were being relied upon for deciding
the quantum of punishment. Another ground taken by the appellant was that the
punishment of dismissal from service was totally disproportionate to the
charges found proved against him.
13.
The Division Bench of the High Court first considered the question
whether the past adverse record could be considered for imposing the punishment
of dismissal, referred to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in State of
Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda AIR 1964 SC 506 as also the judgment in State of U.P.
v. Harish Chandra Singh AIR 1969 SC 1020 and held that when the High Court
proposed the punishment of dismissal from service and the appellant himself
made a request in paragraph 17 of his reply that his past record may be
considered, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to him on account of
consideration of the adverse reports.
Paragraphs
21 and 22 of the impugned order which contain the reasoning of the High Court
on this issue are extracted below:
"21.
Thus, the ratio decided in the above case is where the past records is
considered for awarding lesser punishment, no notice about the proposal that
the past records will be considered is necessary. In this case, the stand taken
by the 2nd respondent, namely, the High Court, the past records were taken into
consideration in addition to the charges proved only to consider if any lesser
punishment than the dismissal could be inflicted, as desired by the petitioner.
In case, the past records were not considered by the disciplinary authority,
then the then the petitioner may raise a grievance non-consideration of his
past records white awarding punishment in spite of his request.
Under
those circumstances, the past records as admitted in the counter affidavit
filed by the respondent No. 2 have been considered.
22. As
indicated above, when specially the petitioner has made a request in his reply
to consider his past records, while 11 awarding punishment as his past records
are good, the disciplinary authority was constrained to go into the past
record. But, according to the counter by the respondent No.2, the past records
did not support the claim of the petitioner that his past records were good. On
the contrary, his past records contained various details about his bad records
in so many words as mentioned in the counter. There is no question of
consideration of past records for giving higher punishment than the
disciplinary authority felt while issuing 2nd show cause notice that the
maximum punishment alone, would commensurate the proved charges. In the
aforesaid circumstance, there is no requirement to mention in the show cause
notice regarding to mention in the show cause notice regarding his past
records. As stated by the counsel for the respondent No.2, the past records
were considered at the instance of the petitioner and also with a view to
consider if any lesser punishment than the dismissal could be inflicted upon
the petitioner. As such the first contention would fail."
14.
The Division Bench then considered the appellant's plea that the
punishment of dismissal was unduly harsh and disproportionate to the misconduct
found proved against him, referred to the judgments in Om Kumar v. Union of
India (2001) 2 SCC 386, Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Jarawade (2005) 3
SCC 134, Hombe Gowda Educational Trust v. State of Karnataka (2006) 1 SCC 430,
and held:
"Even
at the threshold, it should be stated that, the disciplinary proceedings were
initiated and suspension order was passed mainly on the basis of the report of
an officer in the Civil Court complaining that the delinquent-petitioner, in an
intoxicated condition, assaulted the accused who was produced before him for
remand as well as the constable, who produced before the 12 delinquent. This is
truly a very serious charge. If this charge is proved, it would have been a
very serious misconduct on the part of the judicial officer, which would entail
him to maximum punishment. But, in this case, the inquiry officer has not only
observed the charge is not proved, but also indicated that the delinquent had
been falsely implicated at the instance of the police personnel of the local
police station with whom relationship of delinquent was not cordial. It is true
that merely, because the first charge had been held to be false, we cannot hold
the other charges do not need any serious consideration.
Other
charges also are serious, but it shall be remembered that they are not so
serious as that of the first charge. As indicated above, the petitioner,
himself, requested the disciplinary authority to take into consideration the
past record. There is no dispute in the fact that the past records were taken
into consideration where it was recorded as his conduct was not good in respect
of some period. But the show cause reply sent by the delinquent, dated,
22.07.2005, would indicate that he has specifically asked the authority to take
into consideration all the entire period of service. He further referred in his
show cause that his District Judge, Chaibasa has commended his work in his
annual report. Admittedly, there is no reference about this in the counter
filed by the respondent No. 2. On the other hand, the counsel for the 2nd
respondent would submit that his entire past records are not good.
In view
of this, it would be better to look into the relevant entries in his A.C.R.
This Court called for the A.C.R. and perused the same. The relevant entry in
A.C.R. in respect of 1988-89, 1989-90, 1991-92, 1996-97 would show various
adverse remarks, as referred to in the counter. However, in the counter, there
is no mention about the entries made during the year 2002-2003. As per the
entry, the District Judge, Chaibasa certified him as a good officer which is as
follows:
Year
2002-2003 Name of Judgeship Chaibasa Reporting Officer /Hon'ble Mr. B.N. Pandey
Judge 13 Knowledge Good Promptness in disposal Yes Quality of Judgment Good
Supervision of Business NA Efficiency Yes Reputation Yes Attitude towards Good
behaviour Colleagues Relation with Bar & Good behaviour Public Net Result
Good Officer There is no reason as to why the respondent No. 2 has not chosen
to refer to these entries in relation to his good behaviour. The respondent No.
2 only was particular about giving reference about the earlier years in which
some adverse remarks had been passed against him, but in the later year, as
indicated above, he got an entry from the District Judge in his A.C.R. that his
knowledge and behaviour is good and he was certified as good officer.
Thus, it
is clear while imposing punishment, this aspect has not been taken into
consideration despite the request made by the delinquent to take into
consideration the recent entry made by District Judge, Chaibasa commending his
work.
Admittedly,
the suspension order was issued on 05.07.2003.
His
suspension was not revoked during the pendency of the inquiry. The inquiry
commenced and the charges have been framed only on 16.12.2003. The inquiry
officer was appointed only on 28.05.2004. Thereafter inquiry held. The inquiry
report was submitted on 04.06.2005. Show cause notice was issued on 30.06.2005.
Show cause reply was sent on 22.07.2005.
Ultimately,
dismissal order was passed only on 26.02.2006.
Thus, he
was facing inquiry from 2003 to 2006. Admittedly, during the said period his
suspension was not revoked and he was continued to be under suspension. Thus,
he was facing inquiry for two years and seven months approximately and during
that long period, he was constrained to stay at Chaibasa 14 at Headquarters as
per the direction of this Court. So, this aspect of the long delay as well as
the good conduct certificate obtained by the delinquent in the recent past from
the District Judge would be the relevant aspect which ought to have been taken
into consideration by the disciplinary authority, while imposing punishment.
Admittedly, both these aspects have not been considered."
15.
In the end, the Division Bench concluded that the punishment of
dismissal imposed on the appellant is not sustainable but declined to set aside
the same on the ground that substantial time has lapsed since the initiation of
the inquiry and proceeded to impose punishment of compulsory retirement upon
the appellant. This is evinced from paragraphs 34 and 35 of the impugned order,
which are extracted below:
"34.
At this stage, we may refer to the powers of this Court as indicated by the
Supreme Court for reviewing the punishment imposed upon the delinquent by the
disciplinary authority. Let us refer to the relevant portion of judgment of the
Supreme Court in (2001) 2 SCC 386 [Om Kumar versus Union of India]
14. The
court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury
principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the
administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in
extreme and rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the
disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the courts, can the court
substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment.
35. In
the light of the above rule, we are vested with the power to review the
punishment. As we are of the view that the Wednesbury principles have been
violated in this case, we are 15 constrained to review the quantum punishment.
As Supreme Court would observe, this Court would normally remit the matter to
the disciplinary authority to take a fresh decision as to the quantum of
punishment. However, this Court is no inclined to do the same, as in this case
there has been a long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings
as well as in the time taken in this Court. The proceedings were started in the
year 2003. We are in 2007. Therefore, instead of remitting the matter, we
ourselves inclined to review the punishment. In our view, instead of dismissing
the petitioner from service, it would be appropriate to impose the punishment
of compulsory retirement, which would meet the ends of justice."
16.
Shri Raja Venkatappa Naik, learned counsel for the appellant
reiterated both the grounds taken before the High Court and urged that the
impugned order as also the one passed by the State Government are liable to be
set aside because the action taken against the appellant is not only against
the basics of natural justice but is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and
unjustified. Learned counsel emphasized that none of the four Annual
Confidential Reports mentioned in paragraph 30 of the impugned order were
communicated to the appellant so as to enable him to represent against the
adverse remarks recorded therein and argued that the same could not have been
considered for the purpose of imposing the punishment of dismissal without
giving him opportunity to offer his explanation. Learned counsel submitted that
even if the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer in respect of charges No.1
and 2 are held to be correct, there was no justification to 16 impose the
punishment of dismissal ignoring that in his long service career of 24 years
the appellant was not found guilty of any other act of insubordination or
indiscipline. Learned counsel argued that when charge No.1, which was extremely
serious in nature was not found proved, the High Court could not have imposed
extreme penalty of dismissal from service by simply relying upon
un-communicated adverse remarks recorded in his Annual Confidential Reports.
Learned counsel criticized the imposition of the punishment of compulsory
retirement by the Division Bench of the High Court by arguing that once the
Division Bench came to the conclusion that punishment of dismissal is vitiated
due to non consideration of the relevant material i.e., the latest Annual
Confidential Report in which the immediate superior of the appellant had
commended his work and conduct, then it should have set aside the order which
was subject matter of challenge in the writ petition and directed the
respondents to pass fresh orders after communicating adverse remarks to the
appellant and giving him an opportunity to explain his position.
17.
We shall first deal with the question whether consideration of the
past adverse record of the appellant by the High Court had the effect of
vitiating the ultimate order passed by the State Government. An exactly similar
17 question was considered and answered in affirmative by the Constitution
Bench in State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda (supra). The facts of that case
were that while the respondent was holding the post of an Assistant to the
Additional Development Commissioner, Planning, Bangalore, the Government of
Mysore appointed Shri G.V.K. Rao (Additional Development Commissioner) to
conduct a departmental enquiry against him in respect of the false claims for
allowances and fabrication of vouchers.
The
Enquiry Officer framed four charges against the respondent. After holding an
enquiry in accordance with relevant rules, the Enquiry Officer submitted report
with the recommendation that the respondent might be reduced in rank. However,
the government issued a notice to the respondent requiring him to show cause as
to why he may not be dismissed from service. After considering his reply, the
Government dismissed the respondent from service. The respondent challenged his
dismissal by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. The High Court quashed the order of dismissal on several grounds
including the one that the respondent had not been foretold about the proposed
consideration of his past adverse record. This Court approved the view taken by
the High Court and observed:
"Under
Art.311(2) of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court, a Government
servant must have a reasonable 18 opportunity not only to prove that he is not
guilty of the charges leveled against him, but also to establish that the
punishment proposed to be imposed is either not called for or excessive.
The said
opportunity is to be a reasonable opportunity and, therefore, it is necessary that
the Government servant must be told of the grounds on which it is proposed to
take such action: see the decision of this Court in State of Assam v. Bimal
Kumar Pandit, Civil Appeal No.832 of 1962 D/- 12-2-1963 : (AIR 1963 SC 1612).
If the grounds are not given in the notice, it would be well nigh impossible
for him to predicate what is operating on the mind of the authority concerned
in proposing a particular punishment: he would not be in a position to explain
why he does not deserve any punishment at all or that the punishment proposed
is excessive. If the proposed punishment was mainly based upon the previous
record of a government servant and that was not disclosed in the notice, it
would mean that the main reason for the proposed punishment was withheld from
the knowledge of the government servant. It would be no answer to suggest that
every government servant must have had knowledge of the fact that his past
record would necessarily be taken into consideration by the Government in
inflicting punishment on him; nor would it be an adequate answer to say that he
knew as a matter of fact that the earlier punishments were imposed on him or
that he knew of his past record. This contention misses the real point, namely,
that what the government servant is entitled to is not the knowledge of certain
facts but the fact that those facts will be taken into consideration by the
Government in inflicting punishment on him. It is not possible for him to know
what period of his past record or what acts or omissions of his in a particular
period would be considered. If that fact was brought to his notice, he might
explain that he had no knowledge of the remarks of his superior officers, that
he had adequate explanation to offer for the alleged remarks or that his conduct
subsequent to the remarks had been exemplary or at any rate approved by the
superior officers. Even if the authority concerned took into consideration only
the facts for which he was punished, it would be open to him to put forward
before the said authority many mitigating circumstances or some other
explanation why those punishments were given to him or that subsequent to the
19 punishments he had served to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned
till the time of the present enquiry. He may have many other explanations. The
point is not whether his explanation would be acceptable, but whether he has
been given an opportunity to give his explanation. We cannot accept the
doctrine of "presumptive knowledge" or that of "purposeless enquiry",
as their acceptance will be subversive of the principle of "reasonable
opportunity". We, therefore, hold that it is incumbent upon the authority
to give the government servant at the second stage reasonable opportunity to
show- cause against the proposed punishment and if the proposed punishment is
also based on his previous punishments or his previous bad record, this should
be included in the second notice so that he may be able to give an
explanation."
(emphasis
supplied)
18.
The proposition laid down in the above noted judgment represents
one of the basic canons of justice that no one can be condemned unheard and no
order prejudicially affecting any person can be passed by a public authority
without affording him reasonable opportunity to defend himself or represent his
cause. As a general rule, an authority entrusted with the task of deciding lis
between the parties or empowered to make an order which prejudicially affects
the rights of any individual or visits him with civil consequences is duty
bound to act in consonance with the basic rules of natural justice including
the one that material sought to be used against the concerned person must be
disclosed to him and he should be given an opportunity to explain his position.
This unwritten right of hearing is fundamental to a just decision, which forms
an integral part of the concept of rule of law. This 20 right has its roots in
the notion of fair procedure. It draws the attention of the authority concerned
to the imperative necessity of not overlooking the cause which may be shown by
the other side before coming to its decision.
When it
comes to taking of disciplinary action against a delinquent employee, the
employer is not only required to make the employee aware of the specific
imputations of misconduct but also disclose the material sought to be used
against him and give him a reasonable opportunity of explaining his position or
defending himself. If the employer uses some material adverse to the employee
about which the latter is not given notice, the final decision gets vitiated on
the ground of the violation of the rule of audi alteram partem. Even if there
are no statutory rules which regulate holding of disciplinary enquiry against a
delinquent employee, the employer is duty bound to act in consonance with the
rules of natural justice - Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing
Corporation and another v. Vijay Narayan Bajpayee (1980) 3 SCC 459. However,
every violation of the rules of natural justice may not be sufficient for
invalidating the action taken by the competent authority/employer and the Court
may refuse to interfere if it is convinced that such violation has not caused
prejudice to the affected person/employee.
19.
In Harish Chandra Singh's case (supra), a three-Judge Bench of
this Court considered a somewhat similar question in the backdrop of the fact
that even though in the show cause notice, the competent authority had proposed
dismissal of the respondent, after considering his reply, a lesser punishment
i.e. removal from service was imposed upon him. The respondent in that case had
joined Police Department in 1947. He was dismissed from service on 21.6.1951
but was reinstated in January, 1952.
He was
finally removed from service in 1956. In the year 1951 itself, punishment of
reduction to the lowest scale of the post for a period of three years was
imposed on the respondent. In 1955, his pay was reduced for a period of two
years. In the course of service, the respondent had earned fifteen rewards and
commendations. In the departmental inquiry which led to his removal from
service in 1956, the respondent was found guilty of three charges of gross
negligence in the performance of his duty of investigating the cases registered
under various sections of the Indian Penal Code. The trial Court dismissed the
suit filed by the respondent. On appeal, Additional District Judge, Varanasi
decreed the same. The High Court confirmed the appellate judgment and dismissed
the second appeal preferred by the State by observing that the respondent had not
been given opportunity to explain the past punishments which were considered by
the Deputy 22 Inspector General of Police in arriving at his decision to remove
the respondent from service. While considering the question whether it was
necessary for the concerned authority to give notice to the respondent as a
condition precedent for consideration of his past punishments, this Court
referred to the factual matrix of the case and held that when the final
punishment was lesser than the proposed punishment, consideration of the past
adverse record was inconsequential. The Court referred to the arguments urged
on behalf of the State and observed:
"The
learned counsel for the State contends that on the facts of this case it is
clear that the plaintiff had notice that his record would be taken into
consideration because the Superintendent of Police had mentioned it towards the
end of his order, a copy of which was supplied to the plaintiff. In the
alternative he contends that if the record is taken into consideration for the
purpose of imposing a lesser punishment and not for the purpose of increasing
the quantum or nature of punishment, then it is not necessary that it should be
stated in the show- cause notice that his past record would be taken into
consideration.
It seems
to us that the learned counsel is right on both the points. The concluding para
of the report of the Superintendent of Police, which we have set out above,
clearly gave an indication to the plaintiff that his record would be considered
by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and we are unable to appreciate what
more notice was required. There is also force in the second point urged by the
learned counsel. In State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda (1964) 4 SCR 540 the
facts were that the Government servant was misled by the show-cause notice
issued by the Government, and but for the previous record of the Government
servant the Government might not have imposed the penalty of dismissal on him.
This is borne 23 out by the following observations of Subba Rao, J., as he then
was:
"In
the present case the second show cause notice does not mention that the
Government intended to take his previous punishments into consideration in
proposing to dismiss him from service. On the contrary, the said notice put him
on the wrong scent, for it told him that it was proposed to dismiss him from
service as the charges proved against him were grave. But, a comparison of
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the order of dismissal shows that but for the previous
record of the Government servant, the Government might not have imposed the
penalty of dismissal on him and might have accepted the recommendations of the
Enquiry Officer and the Public Service Commission. This order, therefore,
indicates that the show cause notice did not give the only reason which
influenced the Government to dismiss the respondent from service."
20.
An analysis of the two judgments shows that while recommending or
imposing punishment on an employee, who is found guilty of misconduct, the
disciplinary/competent authority cannot consider his past adverse record or
punishment without giving him an opportunity to explain his position and
considering his explanation. However, such an opportunity is not required to be
given if the final punishment is lesser than the proposed punishment.
21.
In the light of the above, we shall now consider whether the High
Court could have while recommending the appellant's dismissal from 24 service
taken into consideration un-communicated adverse Annual Confidential Reports
and whether the Division Bench of the High Court was right in distinguishing
the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Manche Gowda's case on the ground
that appellant had himself made a request for consideration of the past record.
22.
It is not in dispute that adverse remarks recorded in the Annual
Confidential Reports of the appellant for the years 1988-1989, 1989-1990,
1990-1991 and 1996-1997 were not communicated to him. It can reasonably be
presumed that if the adverse remarks were communicated to him, the appellant
would have made representation for expunging the same.
However,
as the adverse remarks were not communicated to him, the appellant could not
avail that opportunity. He did not even know what were the adverse remarks and
who had recorded the same. This Court cannot speculate about the appellant's
fate if the High Court had informed him that there were adverse remarks in his
Annual Confidential Reports which were being relied upon for the purpose of
determining the quantum of punishment and that he can submit his representation
against the same. If the appellant was made aware that the adverse remarks
relate to his work, conduct or behaviour, he may have represented and
successfully demonstrated that the 25 remarks were recorded by the concerned
officer without looking into the quality and quantity of the work done by him
and that there was no complaint from any quarter regarding his conduct and
behaviour. He could have also shown that in the past no such adverse remark had
been entered in his Annual Confidential Report. If the remarks contained
adverse reflection on his integrity, the appellant could have represented that
the same were unfounded or were made due to bias or prejudice. He may have
shown that his integrity was beyond doubt and he had discharged his duties
sincerely and to the satisfaction of his superiors. However, the fact of the
matter is that the adverse remarks were not communicated to him and on that
account he could not represent against the same.
23.
The ratio of Manche Gowda's case is that the past adverse record
of the delinquent employee cannot be considered at the stage of imposing
punishment unless he is put to notice and given an opportunity to explain his
position. In the show cause notice issued to the appellant, it was not
disclosed that the High Court had considered the un-communicated adverse
remarks recorded in his Annual Confidential Reports for the purpose of forming
an opinion that he should be dismissed from service. If the appellant had been
told about this and given an opportunity to have his say 26 against the
un-communicated adverse remarks, he could have offered appropriate explanation
and tried to convince the concerned authority that the remarks were either
unfounded or were totally unjustified. He would have surely pleaded that after
1996-1997 no adverse comments were made about his work, conduct, behaviour and
integrity and he had earned good reports (even the Division Bench of the High
Court had noted that his confidential report for the year 2002-2003 was good on
all counts). It is thus clear that the appellant was seriously prejudiced on
account of non- disclosure of the fact that while recommending his dismissal
from service, the High Court had taken into consideration un-communicated
adverse remarks recorded in his four Annual Confidential Reports.
24.
The inquiry was held against the appellant on three charges, the
most serious of which was that after having consumed liquor, he had misbehaved
and manhandled an accused and a constable. That charge was not found proved.
The other two charges were that he had left headquarter without seeking
permission from the Registrar General of the High Court in violation of the
direction contained in order dated 5.7.2003 and that he had used derogatory
words (merciless direction) qua the communication sent by the High Court. There
cannot be two views that being a member of the 27 subordinate judiciary, the
appellant was bound to comply with the direction given by the High Court to
stay at the headquarters but singular violation of such directive or use of
intemperate language in representation dated 19.7.2003 were not that serious
which warranted imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. In
our view, the adverse remarks recorded in the Annual Confidential Reports of
the appellant seems to have weighed heavily with the High Court while
recommending his dismissal from service.
25.
Since the un-communicated adverse remarks contained in the Annual
Confidential Reports of the appellant became foundation of the decision taken
by the High Court to recommend his dismissal from service and he was not
noticed about the proposed consideration of those remarks, it must be held that
the appellant was seriously prejudiced. We have mentioned all this only to reinforce
the ratio of the judgment in Manche Gowda's case that consideration of the past
adverse record without giving an opportunity to the delinquent to explain the
same can cause serious prejudice to him.
26.
The Division Bench of the High Court clearly misread the
representation made by the appellant and distinguished the judgment of the
Constitution Bench in Manche Gowda's case without any tangible reason.
28 A
reading of paragraph 17 of the representation made by the appellant makes it
clear that he had only mentioned that there was no report against his integrity
and honesty and he was never found guilty of any act of insubordination or
indiscipline in his service career. This assertion, cannot by any stretch of
imagination be construed as a request by the appellant for consideration of his
past record. Thus, the finding recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court
that the appellant's cause was not prejudiced on account of consideration of
the past adverse record is clearly erroneous and unsustainable.
27.
The judgment in Harish Chandra Singh's case is clearly
distinguishable. At the cost of repetition, we consider it necessary to observe
that the three-Judge Bench had not applied the ratio of Manche Gowda's case
because on facts it was found that the past record had been considered by the
disciplinary authority only for the purpose of imposing a lesser punishment on
the respondent.
28.
For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned
order of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. The High Court of
Jharkhand shall now consider the issue of quantum of punishment afresh and make
fresh recommendation to the State Government within a period of 29 four months
from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. If the High Court
still feels that the adverse remarks in the Annual Confidential Reports of the
appellant for the year 1988-1989, 1989-1990, 1990-1991 and 1996-1997 should be
considered, then such report(s) shall be communicated to him and he should be
given an opportunity to make appropriate representation. While making fresh
recommendation for imposing the particular punishment, the High Court is
expected to take into consideration the good as well as adverse record of the
appellant. The State Government shall pass appropriate order within three
months from the date of receipt of fresh recommendation from the High Court.
The parties are left to bear their own cost.
................................J. [G.S. Singhvi]
...............................J. [C.K. Prasad]
New Delhi
July 5, 2010.
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