The Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India Vs Vimal Kumar Surana
J U D G M E N T
G.S. Singhvi, J.
1.
Leave
granted.
2.
The
question which arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the
provisions contained in Sections 24, 24A and 26 of the Chartered Accountants
Act, 1949 (for short, `the Act') operate as a bar against the prosecution of a
person who is charged with the allegations which constitute an offence or
offences under other laws including the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
3.
Respondent,
Vimal Kumar Surana, who is a graduate in Commerce and has passed the
examination of Chartered Accountant but is not a member of the
appellant-Institute is alleged to have represented himself before the Income
Tax Department and the authorities constituted under the Madhya Pradesh Trade
Tax Act on the basis of power of attorney or as legal preventative and
submitted documents such as audit reports and certificates required to be
issued by the Chartered Accountants by preparing forged seals. He is also said
to have impersonated himself as Chartered Accountant and prepared audit reports
for monetary consideration.
4.
Shri
Brij Kishor Saxena, who was authorised by the appellant-Institute to do so,
submitted complaint dated 18.3.2001 to the Station House Officer, Police
Station, Betul with following allegations: "
a. That the said Shri Vimal
Kumar Surana is not registered with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India as Chartered Accountants, but he being not a Chartered Accountant
impersonated in the public as such, and performed such functions which are
being performed by a Chartered Accountant. Whereas without being registered as
Chartered Accountant, he is not legally authorized to perform the said functions
before the Income Tax Department, under the provisions of Income Tax Act, 1961,
he represented himself as legal representative. Similarly under Section 31 of
the M.P. Trade Tax Act, 1995 he worked on the basis of Power of Attorney or as
legal representative. In this manner he has worked contrary to the provision of
Section 24 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, which is punishable offence
under section 24 of the Act.
b. That in the manner
above mentioned, the said Shri Vimal Kumar Surana not being a Chartered
Accountant, personated to the public as Chartered Accountant and in the same
manner unauthorisedly worked, which is an offence under Section 419 of the
Indian Penal Code
c. That the said Shri
Vimal Kumar Surana impersonated himself as the Chartered Accountant, prepared
the audit reports; which are required to be issued under different provisions
of law and obtained monitory consideration which is an offence under Section
420 of the Indian Penal Code.
d. That the said Shri
Vimal Kumar Surana with the intention of cheating with a view to extract money
by playing fraud upon the general public, prepared valuable documents such as
audit reports, certificates required to be issued by Chartered Accountants for
being used, which is punishable offence under Section 468 of the Indian Penal
Code.
e. The said Shri Vimal
Kumar Surana with a view to perform aforesaid acts prepared forged seals and
used the same, which is an offence punishable under Section 472 of the Indian Penal
Code. He is in possession of the seal which he uses as Chartered Accountant.
Therefore, this act is punishable offence under Section 473 of the Indian Penal
code."
5.
After
conducting investigation, the police filed challan in the Court of Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Betul (hereinafter referred to as `the trial Court'),who
passed order dated 10.3.2003 for framing charges against the respondent under
Sections 419, 468, 471 and 472 IPC. The respondent challenged that order by
filing revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.).
1st Additional Sessions Judge, Betul allowed the revision, set aside order
dated 10.3.2003 and remitted the case to the trial Court with the direction to
decide whether there are sufficient grounds for framing charges under Sections
419, 420, 465, 467 and 473 IPC read with Sections 24 and 26 of the Act. After
remand, the trial Court passed order dated 8.12.2003 and held that there was no
basis for framing any charge against respondent under the IPC. It further held
that cognizance of offences under Sections 24 and 26 of the Act cannot be taken
because no complaint had been filed by or under the order of the Council before
the Magistrate.
6.
The
appellant questioned the correctness of orders dated 29.10.2003and 8.12.2003
passed by 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Betul and the trial Court respectively
by filing two separate revisions. The learned Single Judge of the High Court
dismissed both the revisions. He held that even though prima facie case was
made out against the respondent under Sections24, 24A and 26 of the Act, the
Magistrate could not have taken cognizance because no complaint was filed under
Section 28 and the report submitted by the police could not be made basis for
punishing him on the allegation of contravention of any of those provisions.
The learned Single Judge also referred to Sections 2(d), 4, 5 and Section
195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. and held that in the absence of a complaint filed by the
concerned Court, the Magistrate was not competent to frame charges against the
respondent. The learned Single Judge also held that in view of the special
mechanism contained in the Act for prosecution of a person violating Sections
24, 24A and 26 of the Act, he cannot be prosecuted under the IPC.
7.
Shri
U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant argued that even
though the provisions contained in Chapter VII of the Act specify penalties for
certain acts committed by a member of the Institute or anon member or a
company, there is no bar against prosecution of such member, non member or
company if he/it commits an offence under the IPC. Learned senior counsel
invited our attention to the expression `without prejudice to any other
proceedings, which may be taken against him' used in sub-section (2) of
Sections 24A, 25 and 26 of the Act and argued that any person who contravenes
these provisions can be punished by levy of fine and/or imprisonment and also
prosecuted for offence(s) under the IPC. Learned senior counsel emphasized that
while enacting Chapter VII of the Act, the legislature has designedly not
excluded the applicability of the provisions contained in the IPC and argued
that the learned Single Judge committed serious error by approving the orders
of the trial Court and 1 st Additional Sessions Judge, Betul.
8.
Shri
R.P. Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent argued that the
Act is a special legislation and as specific penalties have been provided for
contravention of Section 24 and sub-section (1) of Sections 24A, 25 and 26, the
provisions contained in the IPC and Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked for prosecuting
and punishing such person. Learned senior counsel further argued that the
respondent could not have been prosecuted for the alleged contravention of
sub-section (1) of Sections 24Aand 26 of the Act because no complaint was filed
against him under Section 28 of the Act. In support of this argument, the
learned senior counsel relied upon the judgments of this Court in Jeewan Kumar
Raut v. CBI (2009) 7SCC 526 and Jamiruddin Ansari v. CBI (2009) 6 SCC 316.
Learned counsel then submitted that this Court may not interfere with the
impugned order because the allegations levelled against the respondent do not constitute
any offence under the IPC.
9.
Ms.
Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh relied
upon the judgment of this Court in Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay
(1953) 4 SCR 730 and T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari (1969) 3 SCR 65 and argued
that the offences specified in Sections 24 to 26are distinct from the offences
defined under Sections 419, 420, 465, 467,468, 472 and 473 IPC and even if the
complaint submitted by Brij Kishor Saxena cannot be treated as a complaint
filed under Section 28 of the Act, his prosecution for offences defined under
the IPC cannot be treated asbarred.
10.
The
Chartered Accountants Act was enacted by Parliament to make provision for
regulation of the profession of Chartered Accountants. Chapter I of the Act
contains definitions of various terms. Chapter II contains provisions relating
to incorporation of the Institute, entry of names in the Register,
categorisation of the members of the Institute and certificate of practice.
Section 7 which also finds place in this Chapter declares that every member of
the Institute in practice shall, and any other member may, use the designation
of a chartered accountant and no member using such designation shall use any
other description, whether in addition thereto or in substitution there for. Section
8 enumerates the disabilities which disentitles a person to have his name
entered in the Register. Section 9(1) which finds place in Chapter III
postulates that there shall be a Council of the Institute for the management of
the affairs of the Institute and for discharging the functions assigned to it.
The other provisions contained in Chapter III regulate constitution of the
Council of the Institute, establishment of Tribunal and their functions, etc.
The provisions contained in Chapter IV mandates the Council to maintain a
Register of the members of the Institute, inclusion of the particulars of the
members and removal of the name of any member of the Institute from the
Register. Chapter V consists of thirteen sections i.e. Sections 21 to 22G.
Section 21(1) postulates establishment of a Disciplinary Directorate by the
Council headed by an officer of the Institute designated as Director
(Discipline). The main function of the Director (Discipline) is to scrutinize
any information or complaint received against any member and place the same
before the Disciplinary Committee. Sections 21A, 21B and 22A provide for constitution
of a Board of Discipline, a Disciplinary Committee and an Appellate Authority.
The main function of these bodies is to ensure that expeditious action is taken
against the members against whom allegations of misconduct are levelled and he
gets fair opportunity to contest those allegations. An order passed by the
Disciplinary Committee can be appealed against under Section 22G. Section 23
which finds place in Chapter VI provides for constitution and functions of
Regional Councils. Chapter VII specifies the penalties, which can be imposed on
a member, a non member and a company. Chapter VIIA contains provisions for
establishment of Quality Review Board, functions of the Board, etc. and Chapter
VIII contains miscellaneous provisions. Schedules I and II appended to the Acts
pecify various acts of misconduct of a chartered accountant in practice. These
Schedules obviously do not enumerate the wrong doings of a person who is not a
member of the Institute.
11.
Sections
2(1) (b), 24, 24A, 25, 26 and 28 of the Act, which have bearing on this case,
read as under: "2. Interpretation (1) In this Act, unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context,- (b) "chartered
accountant" means a person who is a member of the Institute. 24. Penalty
for falsely claiming to be a member, etc. Any person who –
i.
not
being a member of the Institute -
a. represents that he is
a member of the Institute; or
b. uses the designation
Chartered Accountant; or
i.
ii.
being
a member of the Institute, but not having a certificate of practice, represents
that he is in practice or practices as a chartered accountant, shall be
punishable on first conviction with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees, and on any subsequent conviction with imprisonment which may extend to
six months or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with
both.24A. Penalty for using name of the Council, awarding degree of chartered
accountancy, etc.(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no person shall-
(i) use a name or the
common seal which is identical with the name or the common seal of the
Institute or so nearly resembles it as to deceive or as is likely to deceive the
public;
(ii) award any
degree, diploma or certificate or bestow any designation which indicates or
purports to indicate the position or attainment of any qualification or competence
similar to that of a member of the Institute; or (iii) seek to regulate in any
manner whatsoever the profession of chartered accountants.(2) Any person
contravening the provisions of subsection (1)shall, without prejudice to any
other proceedings which may be taken against him, be punishable with fine which
may extend on first conviction to one thousand rupees, and on any subsequent
conviction with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which
may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.25. Companies not to engage in
accountancy (1) No company, whether incorporated in India or elsewhere, shall
practise as chartered accountants. (2) If any company contravenes the provisions
of sub-section (i), then, without prejudice to any other proceedings which may be
taken against the company, every director, manager, secretary and any other
officer thereof who is knowingly a party to such contravention shall be
punishable with fine which may extend on first conviction to one thousand
rupees, and on any subsequent conviction to five thousand rupees. 26. Unqualified
persons not to sign documents (1) No person other than a member of the
Institute shall sign any document on behalf of a chartered accountant in
practice or a firm of such chartered accountants in his or its professional capacity.
(2) Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub- section (1) shall,
without prejudice to any other proceedings, which may be taken against him, be
punishable on first conviction with a fine not less than five thousand rupees
but which may extend to one lakh rupees, and in the event of a second or
subsequent conviction with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year
or with fine not less ten thousand rupees but which may extend to two lakh
rupees or with both. 28. Sanction to prosecute No person shall be prosecuted
under this Act except on a complaint made by or under the order of the Council
or of the Central Government." Sections 2(d), 4, 5 and 195 Cr.P.C. on
which reliance has been placed by learned senior counsel for the respondent
read as under: "2(d). "complaint" means any allegation made
orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this
Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but
does not include a police report. 11Explanation. - A report made by a police
officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a
non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police
officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant;4.
Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws. - (1) All
offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of1860) shall be investigated,
inquired into tried, and other wise dealt with according to the provision
hereinafter contained.(2) All offences under any other law shall be
investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same
provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating
the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise
dealing with such offences. 5. Saving. - Nothing contained in this Code shall
in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or
local law any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of
procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.195.
Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences
against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in
evidence.-(1) No Court shall take cognizance-(a) (i) of any offence punishable
under sections 172 to 188(both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860), or(ii) of any abetment of, attempt to commit, such offence, or(iii) of
any criminal conspiracy to commit, such offence, except on the complaint in
writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom
he is administratively subordinate;(b) (i) of any offence punishable under any
of the following section of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, sections
193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211(both inclusive) and 228, when
such offence is alleged to 12have been committed in, or in relation to, any
proceeding in any Court, or(ii) of any offence described in section 463, or
punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code,
when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document
produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or(iii) of any
criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any
offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii),except on the complaint
in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may
authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court
is subordinate.(2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under
clause (a) of subsection (1) any authority to which he is administratively
subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such
order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall
be taken on the complaint: Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if
the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded.(3) In clause (b)
of sub-section (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or
Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central,
provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes
of this section.(4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a Court
shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie
from appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a
civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal
Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local
jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate: Provided that- 13 (a) where appeals
lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall
be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; (b) where
appeals lie to a civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed
to be subordinate to the civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the
case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been
committed."
12.
An
analysis of Section 24 shows that if a person who is not a member of the
Institute represents himself as a member of the Institute or uses the designation
of chartered accountant then he is liable to be punished on first conviction
with fine which may extend to Rs.1,000/-. On any sub sequent conviction, he can
be punished with imprisonment up to 6 months or fine which may extend to
Rs.5,000/- or with both. Similar punishment can be imposed on a member of the
Institute who does not have a certificate of practice but represents that he is
in practice or practises as a chartered accountant. Sub-section (2) of Sections
24A, 25 and 26 provide for imposition of different kinds of punishment for
violation of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of those sections. The
punishment prescribed under Section 24A can be imposed if a person uses a name
or the common seal which is identical with the name or the common seal of the
Institute or is almost similar to such seal and the use of such seal has the
effect of deceiving or is likely to deceive the public. A person can also be
punished if he awards any degree, diploma or certificate or bestow any
designation which indicates or purports to indicate position or attainment of
any qualification or competence at par with a member of the Institute or if he seeks
to regulate the profession of chartered accountants. Section 26provides for imposition
of punishment if a person other than a member of the Institute signs any
document on behalf of a chartered accountant in practice or a firm of such
chartered accountants in his or its professional capacity. Section 28 which is
couched in negative form declares that no person shall be prosecuted under the
Act except on a complaint made by or under the order of the Council or of the
Central Government.
13.
What
is most significant to note is that prohibition contained in Section 28 against
prosecution of a person except on a complaint made by or under the order of the
Council or of the Central Government is attracted only when such person is
sought to be prosecuted for contravention of the provisions contained in
Section 24 or sub-section (1) of Sections 24A, 25 or26 and not for any act or
omission which constitutes an offence under the IPC. The use of expression
`without prejudice to any other proceedings which may be taken against him' in
sub-section (2) of Sections 24A and 26and somewhat similar expression in
sub-section (2) of Section 25 show that contravention of the provisions
contained in sub-section (1) of those sections can lead to filing of complaint
under Section 28 of the Act and if the particular act also amounts an offence
under the IPC or any other law, then a complaint can also be filed under
Section 200 Cr.P.C. or a first information report lodged with the police under
Section 156 Cr.P.C. The said expression cannot be given a restricted meaning in
the context of professional and other misconducts which may be committed by a
member of the Institute and for which he may be punished under Section 21B(3)
because the violation of Sections 24 to 26 can be committed by a person who may
or may not be a chartered accountant as defined in Section 2(b). In other
words, if the particular act of a member of the Institute or a non member or a
company results in contravention of the provisions contained in Section 24 or
sub-section (1) of Sections 24A, 25 or 26 and such act also amounts criminal mis
conduct which is defined as an offence under the IPC, then a complaint can be
filed by or under the order of the Council or of the Central Government under
Section 28, which may ultimately result in imposition of the punishment
prescribed under Section 24 or sub-section (2) of Sections24A, 25 or 26 and
such member or non member or company can also be prosecuted for any identified
offence under the IPC. The object underlying the prohibition contained in
Section 28 is to protect the persons engaged in profession of chartered
accountants against false and untenable complaints from dissatisfied litigants
and others. However, there is nothing in the language of the provisions
contained in Chapter VII from which it can be inferred that Parliament wanted
to confer immunity upon the members and non members from prosecution and
punishment if the action of such member or non member amounts to an offence
under the IPC or any other law.
14.
The
issue deserves to be considered from another angle. If a person cheats by
pretending to be some other person, or by knowingly substituting one person for
another, or representing that he or any other person is a person other than he
or such other person really is (Section 416 IPC), then he can be charged with
the allegation of cheating by personating and punished under Section 419 for a
term which may extend to 3 years or with fine or both. If a person makes any
false document with the intent to caused a mage or injury to the public or to
any person, or to support any claim or title, then he can be prosecuted for an
offence of forgery (Section 463) and can be punished under Section 465 with
imprisonment which may extend to2 years or with fine or with both. If a person
commits forgery for the purpose of intending that the document forged by him
shall be used for the purpose of cheating then he can be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years and fine (Section 468). If
a person makes or counterfeits any seal, plate or other instrument for making
an impression, intending that the same shall be used for committing any forgery
which would be punishable under Section 467 or with such intent, in his
possession any such seal, plate or other instrument, knowing the same to be
counterfeit then he is liable to be punished with imprisonment for life or with
imprisonment which may extend to 7 years. He shall also be liable to fine. The
provisions contained in Chapter VII of the Act neither define cheating by personating
or forgery or counterfeiting of seal, etc. nor provide for punishment for such
offences. If it is held that a person acting in violation of Section 24 or
contravening sub-section (1) of Sections 24A and 26 of the Act can be punished
only under the Act even though his act also amounts to one or more offence(s)
defined under the IPC and that too on a complaint made in accordance with
Section 28, then the provisions of Chapter VII will become discriminatory and
may have to be struck down on the ground of violation of Article 14. Such an
unintended consequence can be and deserves to be avoided in interpreting
Sections 24A, 25 and 26 keeping in view the settled law that if there are two
possible constructions of a statute, then the one which leads to anomaly or
absurdity and makes the statute vulnerable to the attack of unconstitutionality
should be avoided in preference to the other which makes it rational and immune
from the charge of unconstitutionality. That apart, the Court cannot interpret
the provisions of the Act in a manner which will deprive the victim of the offences
defined in Sections 416, 463, 464, 468 and 471 of his right to prosecute the
wrongdoer by filing the first information report or complaint under the
relevant provisions of Cr.P.C.
15.
We
may add that the respondent could have been simultaneously prosecuted for
contravention of Sections 24, 24A and 26 of the Act and for the offences
defined under the IPC but in view of the bar contained in Article 20(2) of the
Constitution read with Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section
300 Cr.P.C., he could not have been punished twice for the same offence. In
Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay(supra), the Court considered the
question whether the appellant who had brought gold from Jeddah in
contravention of notification dated 25.8.1948could have been prosecuted under
Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 after the gold had been
confiscated by the authorities of the Customs Department under Section 167(8)
of the Sea Customs Act,1878. The appellant challenged his prosecution by contending
that this amounted to infringement of his fundamental right under Article 20(2)
of the Constitution. The Bombay High Court negatived his challenge. This Court upheld
the order of the High Court and observed: "There is no doubt that the act
which constitutes an offence under the Sea Customs Act as also an offence under
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was one and the same viz. importing the
gold in contravention of the notification of the Government of India dated 25th
August, 1948. The appellant could be proceeded against under Section 167(8) of
the Sea Customs Act as also under Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act in respect of the said act. The fundamental right which is guaranteed in
Article 20(2) enunciates the principle of "autrefois convict" or
"double jeopardy". The roots of that principle are to be found in the
well established rule of the common law of England "that where a person
has been convicted of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction the
conviction is a bar to all further criminal proceedings for the same
offence". (Per Charles, J. in Reg v. Miles). To the same effect is the
ancient maxim "Nemobis debet puniri pro uno delicto", that is to say
that no one ought to be twice punished for one offence or as it is sometimes written
"pro eadem causa", that is, for the same cause. This is the principle
on which the party pursued has available to him the plea of "autrefois
convict" or "autrefois acquit". "The plea of `autrefois
convict' or `autrefois acquit' avers that the defendant has been previously
convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of
which he is arraigned.... The question for the jury on the issue is whether the
defendant has previously been in jeopardy in respect of the charge on which he
is arraigned, for the rule of law is that a person must not be put in peril
twice for the same offence. The test is whether the former offence and the
offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts
constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other, not that
the facts relied on by the Crown are the same in the two trials. A plea of
`autrefois acquit' is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of
acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the
latter." (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. 9, pp.
152and 153, para 212).This principle found recognition in Section 26 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897,-- `Where an act or omission constitutes an offence
under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted
and punished under either or any of those enactments but shall not be liable to
be punished twice for the same offence, 'and also in Section 403(1) of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898,-- `A person who has been tried by a court of
competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence
shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be
tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence
for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made
under Section 236, or for which he might have been convicted under Section
237'."The Court then referred to the provisions of the Sea Customs Act,
1878 and held: "We are of the opinion that the Sea Customs authorities are
not a judicial tribunal and the adjudging of confiscation, increased rate of
duty or penalty under the provisions of the Sea Customs Act do not constitute a
judgment or order of a court or judicial tribunal necessary for the purpose of
supporting a plea of double jeopardy. It therefore follows that when the
Customs authorities confiscated the gold in question neither the proceedings
taken before the Sea Customs authorities constituted a prosecution of the
appellant nor did the order of confiscation constitute a punishment inflicted
by a court or judicial tribunal on the appellant. The appellant could not be
said by reason of these proceedings before the Sea Customs authorities to have
been "prosecuted and punished" for the same offence with which he was
charged before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, in the complaint which
was filed against him under Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act."
16.
In
T.S. Baliah's case, the Court considered the question whether the appellant
could be simultaneously prosecuted under Section 177 IPC and for violation of
Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. After noticing Section26 of the General
Clauses Act, the Court held: "A plain reading of the section shows that
there is no bar to the trial or conviction of the offender under both
enactments but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the
same offence. In other words, the section provides that where an act or
omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be
prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be
liable to be 21 punished twice for the same offence. We accordingly reject the argument
of the appellant on this aspect of the case."
17.
In
State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte (1961) 3 SCR 107, the question that fell for
consideration was whether in view of an earlier conviction and sentence under
Section 409 IPC, a subsequent prosecution for an offence under Section 105 of
Insurance Act, 1935, was barred by Section26 of the General Clauses Act and
Article 20(2) of the Constitution. This Court answered the question in
following words: "To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequential
punishment there under, must be for `the same offence'. The crucial requirement
therefore for attracting the article is that the offences are the same, i.e.,
they should be identical. If, however, the two offences are distinct, then notwithstanding
that the allegations of facts in the two complaints might be substantially
similar, the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked. It is, therefore, necessary
to analyse and compare not the allegations in the two complaints but the
ingredients of the two offences and see whether their identity is made out. . .
. ... Though Section 26 in its opening words refers to `the act or omission
constituting an offence under two or more enactments', the emphasis is not on
the facts alleged in the two complaints but rather on the ingredients which
constitute the two offences with which a person is charged. This is made clear
by the concluding portion of the section which refers to `shall not be liable
to be punished twice for the same offence'. If the offences are not the same
but are distinct, the ban imposed by this provision also cannot be invoked."
18.
In
V.K. Agarwal v. Vasantraj B. Bhatia (1988) 3 SCC 467, this Court considered the
question whether the acquittal of an accused charged with having committed an
offence punishable under Section 111read with Section 135 of the Customs Act,
1962 create a legal bar to the subsequent prosecution of the said accused under
Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. The Gujarat High Court answered the
question in affirmative. This Court reversed the order of the High Court and observed:
"It is therefore evident that the ingredients required to be established
in respect of the offence under the Customs Act are altogether different from
the ones required to be established for an offence under the Gold (Control)
Act. In respect of the former, the prosecution has to establish that there was
a prohibition against the import into Indian sea waters of goods which were
found to be in the possession of the offender. On the other hand in respect of
the offence under the Gold (Control) Act, it is required to be established that
the offender was in possession of primary gold meaning thereby gold of a purity
of not less than 9 carats in any unfinished or semi-finished form. In regard to
the latter offence it is not necessary to establish that there is any prohibition
against the import of gold into Indian sea waters. Mere possession of gold of
purity not less than carats in any unfinished or semi-finished form would be an
offence under the Gold Control Act. It is therefore stating the obvious to say
that the ingredients of the two offences are altogether different. Such being
the case the question arises whether the acquittal for the offences under the
Customs Act which requires the prosecution to establish altogether different
ingredients operates as a bar to the prosecution of the same person in
connection with the charge of having committed the offence under the Gold
(Control) Act. .........In the present case the concerned Respondents could be
found guilty of both the offences in the context of the possession of gold. If
it was established that there was a prohibition against the import of gold and
that he was found in possession of gold which he knew or had reason to believe
was liable to confiscation he would be guilty of that offence. He would also be
guilty of an offence under the Gold (Control) Act provided the gold is of a
purity of at least 9 carats. He would have violated the provisions of
"both" the Customs Act and the Gold (Control) Act if the aforesaid ingredients
were established. It is not as if in case he was found guilty of an offence
under the Customs Act, he could not have been found guilty under the Gold
(Control) Act or vice versa. Upon being found guilty of both the offences the court
may perhaps impose a concurrent sentence in respect of both the offences but
the court has also the power to direct that the sentence shall run
consecutively. There is therefore no question of framing of an alternative
charge one, under the Customs Act, and the other, under the Gold (Control) Act.
If the ingredients of both the offences are satisfied the same act of
possession of the gold would constitute an offence both under the Customs Act
as also under the Gold (Control) Act. Such being the position it cannot be said
that they could have been tried on the same facts for an alternative charge in
the context of Section 236 Cr.P.C. at the time of the former proceedings. The
submission urged in the context of Section 403(1) cannot therefore succeed for
it cannot be said that the persons who are sought to be tried in the subsequent
proceedings could have been tried on the same facts at the former trial under
Section 236."
19.
19.
In State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan (1988) 4 SCC 655, the question considered
by the Court was whether the complaint lodged by the competent officer alleging
commission of offence under Section 9(1)read with Section 51 for killing
elephants and removing its husk was maintainable notwithstanding the pendency
of police investigation for an offence under Sections 447, 429 and 479 read
with Sections 54 and 39 of the Act. After adverting to the relevant provisions,
this Court held: "What emerges from a perusal of these provisions is that cognizance
of an offence under the "Act" can be taken by a court only on the
complaint of the officer mentioned in Section 55. The person who lodged
complaint dated June 23,1986 claimed to be such an officer. In these
circumstance seven if the jurisdictional police purported to register a case for
an alleged offence against the Act, Section 210(1) would not be attracted
having regard to the position that cognizance of such an offence can only be
taken on the complaint of the officer mentioned in that section. Even where a
Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence instituted otherwise than on a police
report and an investigation by the police is in progress in relation to same
offence, the two cases do not lose their separate identity. The section seeks
to obviate the anomalies that might arise from taking cognizance of the same
offence more than once. But, where, as here, cognizance can be taken only in
one way and that on the complaint of a particular statutory functionary, there
is no scope or occasion for taking cognizance more than once and, accordingly, Section
210 has no role to play. The view taken by the High Court on the footing of
Section 210 is unsupportable. We are unable to accept the contention of Shri
R.F. Nariman that the specific allegation in the present case concerns the
specific act of killing of an elephant, and that such an offence, at all
events, falls within the overl aping areas between of Section 429 IPC on the
one hand and Section 9(1) read with Section 50(1) of the Act on the other and
therefore constitutes the same offence. Apart from the fact that this argument
does not serve to support the order of the High Court in the present case, this
argument is, even on its theoretical possibilities, more attractive than sound.
The expression "any act or omission which constitutes any offence under
this Act" in Section 56 of the Act, merely imports the idea that the same
act or omission might constitute an offence under another law and could be
tried under such other law or laws also. The proviso to Section 56 has also a
familiar ring and is a facet of the fundamental and salutary principles that permeate
penology and reflected in analogous provisions of Section 26 of General Clauses
Act, 1897; Section 71 IPC; Section 300 Cr PC 1973, and constitutionally
guaranteed 25under Article 20(2) of the Constitution. Section 26 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 provides: "26. Provision as to offences punishable under
two or more enactments.--Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under
two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished
under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished
twice for the same offence." Broadly speaking, a protection against a
second or multiple punishment for the same offence, technical complexities
aside, includes a protection against re-prosecution after acquittal, a
protection against re-prosecution after conviction and a protection against
double or multiple punishment for the same offence. These protections have
since received constitutional guarantee under Article 20(2). But difficulties
arise in the application of the principle in the context of what is meant by
"same offence". The principle in American law is stated thus: "The
proliferation of technically different offences encompassed in a single
instance of crime behaviour has increased the importance of defining the scope
of the offence that controls for purposes of the double jeopardy guarantee. Distinct
statutory provisions will be treated as involving separate offences for double
jeopardy purposes only if `each provision requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not' (Block burger v. United States). Where the same
evidence suffices to prove both crimes, they are the same for double jeopardy
purposes, and the clause forbids successive trials and cumulative punishments
for the two crimes. The offences must be joined in one indictment and tried
together unless the defendant requests that they be tried separately. (Jeffers
v. United States)" The expression "the same offence",
"substantially the same offence" "in effect the same
offence" or "practically the same", have not done much to lessen
the difficulty in applying the tests to identify the legal common denominators of
"same offence". Fried land in Double Jeopardy (Oxford 1969) says at
p. 108: "The trouble with this approach is that it is vague and hazy and
conceals the thought processes of the court. Such an inexact test must depend
upon the individual impressions of the judges and can give little guidance for
future decisions. A more serious consequence is the fact that a decision in one
case that two offences are `substantially the same' may compel the same result
in another case involving the same two offences where the circumstances may be
such that a second prosecution should be permissible...." In order that
the prohibition is attracted the same act must constitute an offence under more
than one Act. If there are two distinct and separate offences with different ingredients
under two different enactments, a double punishment is not barred. In Leo Roy
Frey v. Superintendent, District Jail, the question arose whether a crime and
the offence of conspiracy to commit it are different offences. This Court said:
(SCR p. 827) "The offence of conspiracy to commit a crime is a different
offence from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy because the
conspiracy precedes the commission of the crime and is complete before the crime
is attempted or completed, equally the crime attempted or completed does not
require the element of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. They are, therefore,
quite separate offences."
20.
In
State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh (2003) 2 SCC 152, the Court considered the
question whether the High Court was right in taking the view that the
respondent could have been prosecuted either under Section5 or Section 6(3) of
the Rajasthan Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 and not under both the sections. The
High Court had ruled in favour of the respondent. This Court reversed the
judgment of the High Court, referred to Article 20(2) of the Constitution, the
judgments in Maqbool Hussainv. The State of Bombay (supra), State of Bombay v.
S.L. Apte (supra)and observed: "The rule against double jeopardy is stated
in the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. It is a significant
basic rule of criminal law that no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one
and the same offence. The rule provides foundation for the pleas of autrefois
acquit and autrefois convict. The manifestation of this rule is to be found
contained in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 300 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code.
Section 26 of the General Clauses Act provides: "26. Where an act or
omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender
shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those
enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same
offence." Section 300 CrPC provides, inter alia,-- "300. (1) A person
who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and
convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or
acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same
offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge
from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of
Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub- section (2)
thereof." Both the provisions employ the expression "same
offence"." The Court then proceeded to analyze the relevant sections
of the Act and held that the offences under Sections 5 and 6(3) of the Act were
distinct and there was no bar against prosecution of the respondent
underSection 5 even though his prosecution under Section 6(3) had failed.
21.
In
view of the above discussion, the argument of the learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent that the Act is a special legislation vis-`-vis
IPC and a person who is said to have contravened the provisions of sub-section
(1) of Sections 24, 24A, 25 and 26 cannot be prosecuted for an offence defined
under the IPC, which found favour with the High Court does not commend
acceptance.
22.
The
judgments on which the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent has
placed reliance are clearly distinguishable. In Jamiruddin Ansari v. C.B.I.
(supra), this Court was called upon to consider whether an order for
investigation could be passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in a case involving
violation of the provisions contained in the Maharashtra Control of Organised
Crime Act, 1999. This Court referred to the provisions of Sections 9 and 23 of
the Maharashtra Act and held that the Special Judge cannot take cognizance of
any offence under that Act unless sanction has been given by a police officer
not below the rank of Additional Director General of Police. The Court further
held that the provisions contained in the Maharashtra Act have overriding
effect and Section 156(3) cannot be invoked for ordering special inquiry on a
private complaint. Paragraphs 65(part), 67 and 68 of the judgment, which
contain this conclusion, reads asunder: "The wording of sub-section (2) of
Section 23 leaves no room for doubt that the learned Special Judge cannot take
cognizance of any offence under MCOCA unless sanction has been previously given
by the police officer mentioned hereinabove. In such a situation, even as far
as a private complaint is concerned, sanction has to be obtained from the
police officer not below the rank of Additional Director General of Police, before
the Special Judge can take cognizance of such complaint. We are also inclined
to hold that in view of the provisions of Section 25 of MCOCA, the provisions
of the said Act would have an overriding effect over the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code and the learned Special Judge would not, therefore, be
entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 156(3) CrPC for ordering a special
inquiry on a private complaint and taking cognizance thereupon, without
traversing the route indicated in Section 23 of MCOCA. In other words, even on
a private complaint about the commission of an offence of organised crime under
MCOCA cognizance cannot be taken by the Special Judge without due compliance
with sub-section (1) of Section 23, which starts with a non obstante clause. As
indicated hereinabove, the provisions of Section 23 are the safeguards provided
against the invocation of the provisions of the Act which are extremely
stringent and far removed from the provisions of the general criminal law. If,
as submitted on behalf of some of the respondents, it is accepted that a
private complaint under Section 9(1) is not subject to the rigours of Section
23, then the very purpose of introducing such safeguards lose their very raison
d'jtre. At the same time, since the filing of a private complaint is also
contemplated under Section 9(1) of MCOCA, for it to be entertained it has also
to be subject to the rigours of Section 23. Accordingly, in view of 30 the bar
imposed under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act, the learned Special
Judge is precluded from taking cognizance on a private complaint upon a
separate inquiry under Section 156(3) CrPC. The bar of Section 23(2) continues
to remain in respect of complaints, either of a private nature or on a police report."
The question which fell for consideration in Jeewan Kumar Raut v. C.B.I.(supra)
was whether the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 (for short, `the 1994
Act') is a special law and has overriding effect qua the provisions of the IPC.
This Court referred to Sections 18, 19 and 22 of the1994 Act and observed: "TOHO
being a special statute, Section 4 of the Code, which ordinarily would be
applicable for investigation into a cognizable offence or the other provisions,
may not be applicable. Section 4 provides for investigation, inquiry, trial, etc.
according to the provisions of the Code. Sub-section (2) of Section 4, however,
specifically provides that offences under any other law shall be investigated,
inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions,
but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner
or place of investigating, inquiring into, tried or otherwise dealing with such
offences. TOHO being a special Act and the matter relating to dealing with
offences there under having been regulated by reason of the provisions thereof,
there cannot be any manner of doubt whatsoever that the same shall prevail over
the provisions of the Code. The investigation in terms of Section 13(3)(iv) of TOHO,
thus, must be conducted by an authorised officer. Nobody else could do it. For
the aforementioned reasons, the officer in charge of Gurgaon Police Station had
no other option but to hand over the investigation to the appropriate
authority. Section 22 of TOHO prohibits taking of cognizance except on a complaint
made by an appropriate authority or the person who had made a complaint earlier
to it as laid down therein. The 31 respondent, although, has all the powers of
an investigating agency, it expressly has been statutorily prohibited from
filing a police report. It could file a complaint petition only as an appropriate
authority so as to comply with the requirements contained in Section 22 of
TOHO. If by reason of the provisions of TOHO, filing of a police report by
necessary implication is necessarily forbidden, the question of its submitting
a report in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code did not and
could not arise. In other words, if no police report could be filed,
sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code was not attracted. It is a
well-settled principle of law that if a special statute lays down procedures,
the ones laid down under the general statutes shall not be followed. In a
situation of this nature, the respondent could carry out investigations in
exercise of its authorisation under Section 13(3)(iv) of TOHO. While doing so,
it could exercise such powers which are otherwise vested in it. But, as it
could not file a police report but a complaint petition only; sub-section (2)
of Section 167 of the Code may not be applicable."
23.
The
language of the provisions, which were interpreted in the above noted two
judgments was not similar to sub-section (2) of Sections 24A, 25and 26 of the
Act which, as mentioned above, contain the expression` without prejudice to any
other proceedings, which may be taken'. Therefore, the ratio of those judgments
cannot be relied upon for sustaining the impugned order.
24.
It
is also apposite to mention that except the provision contained in Section 28
against the prosecution of a person, who is alleged to have acted in
contravention of sub-section (1) of Sections 24, 24A, 25 or 26 otherwise then
on a complaint made by or under the order of the Council or the Central Government,
the Act does not specify the procedure to be followed for punishing such
person. In the absence of any such provision, the procedure prescribed in
Cr.P.C. has to be followed for inquiry, investigation and trial of the
complaint which may be filed for contravention of any of the provisions
contained in Chapter VII of the Act - Section 4 Cr.P.C.
25.
25.
The submission of Shri Gupta that the respondent cannot be prosecuted for
offences defined under the IPC because no complaint had been filed against him
by the concerned Court or authority as per the requirement of Section
195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. sounds attractive but lacks merit. The prohibition
contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C. against taking of cognizance by the Court
except on a complaint in writing made by the concerned Court before which the
document is produced or given in a proceeding is not attracted in the case like
the present one because the officers of the Income Tax Department and the
authorities constituted under the Madhya Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1995 before
whom the respondent is alleged to have acted on the basis of power of attorney
or as legal representative or produced audit report do not fall within the
ambit of the term `Court' as defined in Section 195(3) Cr.P.C. Such
officer/authorities were neither discharging the functions of a Civil, Revenue
or Criminal Court nor they could be treated as tribunal constituted by or under
the Central or State Act, which is declared to be a Court for the purpose of
Section 195.This provision was analysed and interpreted by the Constitution
Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370. The Constitution
Bench referred to other provisions of Cr.P.C. and considered earlier judgments
and observed: "The scheme of the statutory provision may now be examined.
Broadly, Section 195 CrPC deals with three distinct categories of offences
which have been described in clauses (a), (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and they relate to
(1) contempt of lawful authority of public servants, (2) offences against public
justice, and (3) offences relating to documents given in evidence. Clause (a)
deals with offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC which occur in
Chapter X IPC and the heading of the Chapter is -- "Of Contempt’s of the Lawful
Authority of Public Servants". These are offences which directly affect
the functioning of or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant. Clause
(b)(i) refers to offences in Chapter XI IPC which is headed as -- "Of
False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice". The offences mentioned
in this clause clearly relate to giving or fabricating false evidence or making
a false declaration in any judicial proceeding or before a court of justice or
before a public servant who is bound or authorised by law to receive such
declaration, and also to some other offences which have a direct correlation
with the proceedings in a court of justice (Sections 205 and 211 IPC). This
being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195 viz. that the
offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or
discharge of lawful duties of a public servant or has a direct correlation with
the proceedings in a court of justice, the expression "when such offence
is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in
evidence in a proceeding in any court" occurring in clause (b)(ii) should
normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually
been produced or given in evidence in the court. The situation or contingency
where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed
earlier and later on the document is produced or is given in evidence in court,
does not appear to be in tune with clauses(a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently
with the scheme of Section195 CrPC. This indicates that clause (b)(ii)
contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed
with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence
in a proceeding in any court. Section 195(1) mandates a complaint in writing to
the court for taking cognizance of the offences enumerated in clauses(b)(i) and
(b)(ii) thereof. Sections 340 and 341 CrPC which occur in Chapter XXVI give the
procedure for filing of the complaint and other matters connected therewith.
The heading of this Chapter is -- "Provisions as to Offences Affecting the
Administration of Justice". Though, as a general rule, the language
employed in a heading cannot be used to give a different effect to clear words
of the section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning,
but they are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes or were
introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments.
They constitute an important part of the Act itself, and may be read not only
as explaining the sections which immediately follow them, as a preamble to a
statute may be looked to explain its enactments, but as affording a better key
to the constructions of the sections which follow them than might be afforded
by a mere preamble. (See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn.,pp.207, 209.) The fact
that the procedure for filing a complaint by court has been provided in Chapter
XXVI dealing with offences affecting administration of justice, is a clear
pointer to the legislative intent that the offence committed should be of such
type which directly affects the administration of justice viz. which is
committed after the document is produced or given in evidence in court. Any offence
committed with respect to a document at a time prior to its production or
giving in evidence in court cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be an offence
affecting the administration of justice." The Court then referred to
Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Full Bench judgment of
the Allahabad High Court inEmperor v. Kushal Pal Singh AIR 1931 Allahabad 443
and observed: "The Court clearly rejected any construction being placed on
the provision by which a document forged before the commencement of the
proceeding in which it may happen to be used in evidence later on, to come
within the purview of Section 195, as that would unreasonably restrict the
right to initiate prosecution possessed by a person and recognised by Section
190 CrPC. The aforesaid decision was considered in Raghunath v. State of U.P.
Here, the accused had obtained sale deed of the property of a widow by setting
up of an impostor and thereafter filed a mutation application before the
Tahsildar. The widow contested the mutation application on the ground that she
had never executed the sale deed and thereafter filed a criminal complaint under
Sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC in which the accused were convicted. In appeal,
it was contended that the private complaint was barred by virtue of Section
195(1)(c) CrPC and the Revenue Court alone could have filed the complaint. The Court
repelled the aforesaid contention after relying upon the ratio of Patel
Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat and the private complaint was held to be
maintainable. In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan the above noted two decisions
were relied upon for holding that provisions of Section 195(1)(c) (old Code)
would not be applicable where mutation proceedings were commenced after a Will
had been forged. In Legal Remembrancer, Govt. of W.B. v. Haridas Mundra,
Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was), speaking for a three-Judge Bench
observed that earlier there was divergence of opinion in various High Courts,
but the same was set at rest by this Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai and
approved the view taken therein that the words of Section 195(1)(c) clearly
meant the offence alleged to have been committed by a party to the proceeding
in his character as such party i.e. after having become a party to the
proceeding, and Sections 195(1)(c), 476 and 476-A (of the old Code) read together
indicated beyond doubt that the legislature could not have intended to extend
the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) to the offences mentioned in the
said section when 36 committed by a party to a proceeding prior to his becoming
such party. Similar view has been taken in Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan v. State of
Maharashtra where the contention that the absence of a complaint by the Revenue
Court was a bar to taking cognizance by the criminal court in respect of
offences under Sections 446, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B IPC which were
committed even before the start of the proceedings before the Revenue Court,
was not accepted. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby
the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission
of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable
of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh after preparing a forged
document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding
instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or
through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said
proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance
of a private party or the police until the court, where the document has been filed,
itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due
to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an
interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at
large."The attention of the High Court does not appear to have been
invited to the aforesaid judgment of the Constitution Bench and this is the
reason that the High Court declared that the complaint filed by Brij Kishor
Saxena was not maintainable because the same was not filed in accordance with
Section195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C.
26.
Although,
Shri Gupta argued that the allegations levelled against the respondent do not
constitute any offence under Sections 419, 420, 465, 467,468, 472 and 473 IPC,
we do not consider it necessary to deal with this point because the High Court
did not sustain the orders challenged before it on that ground.27. In the
result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the matter
is remitted to the trial Court for considering whether the allegations
contained in the complaint lodged by Brij Kishor Saxena constitute any offence
under the IPC. If the trial Court comes to the conclusion that the allegations
do constitute one or more offence(s), then its hall proceed against the
respondent in accordance with law. However, it is made clear that in the
absence of a complaint having been filed under Section 28, no charges be framed
against the respondent for the alleged contravention of Sections 24, 24A or 26
of the Act.
.................................J.
[G.S. Singhvi]
.................................J.
[Asok Kumar Ganguly]
New
Delhi
December
01, 2010.
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