& Ors. Vs. G.Narasimha Reddy & Ors.  INSC 637 (16 August 2010)
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 6656-6657
of 2010 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14447-14448 of 2007) Meghmala & Ors.
..Appellants Versus G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors. ..Respondents
Judicial pronouncements unlike sand dunes are known for their
stability/finality. However, in this case, in spite of the completion of
several rounds of litigation upto the High Court, and one round of litigation
before this Court, the respondents claim a right to abuse the process of the
Court with the perception that whatever may be the orders of the High Court or
this Court, inter-se parties the dispute shall be protracted and will never
come to an end.
These appeals have been preferred against the Judgment and Order
dated 26.04.2007 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad, passed in
Writ Petition Nos. 19962-19963 of 2006, by which the High Court has allowed the
said petitions against the Judgment and order of the Special Court under the
Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter called,
"Act 1982"), dismissing the review application No. 397/2005 in LGC
No. 76/1996 and in LGCSR 357/2005.
Facts and circumstances giving rise to the present cases are as
under :- (A) V. Ram Chandra Reddy and his brother (vendors) had a huge chunk of
land and a part of it could have been the subject matter of the provisions of Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the Act 1976). The
said vendors entered into an agreement to sell dated 23.01.1976 for selling a
part of the land (hereinafter called `suit land') to a cooperative society
namely, Gruha Lakshmi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. (hereinafter called,
"the Society"). The vendors, V. Ram Chandra Reddy and his brother
executed a sale deed in favour of A. Sambashiva Rao (hereinafter called the
appellant/applicant) which was registered on 21.05.1980 vide document No.
4758/80 and the appellants were put in possession of the suit land.
2 (B) The
appellant/applicant- vendee filed LGC No. 76/1996 against the respondents under
the provisions of the Act, 1982 alleging that he had been working in Andhra
Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and was mostly out of station, and the
respondents had forcibly grabbed his land and raised construction thereon.
Thus, he sought the relief of their dispossession and action against them under
the provisions of the Act, 1982.
complying with the requirements of the statutory provisions i.e. taking the
sanction etc., the respondents were issued a show cause notice.
respondents filed their reply submitting that in respect of the suit land,
there was an agreement to sell, dated 23.01.1976, in favour of the society and
once such an agreement to sell had been executed, vendors had no right to
transfer the land in favour of the appellant/applicant. The society had
allotted the suit land in their favour, therefore, the application was liable
to be rejected.
Special Court after appreciating the evidence, vide Judgment and order dated
4.11.1997 came to the conclusion that the appellant/applicant was the owner of
the suit land and that the respondents had no right, title or claim over the
suit land. They had forcibly occupied the land and they were land grabbers,
thus, they were liable to be evicted and orders for that purpose were passed.
aggrieved by the order of the Special Court dated 4.11.1997, the respondents
preferred writ petition No. 33572/1997 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh,
which was dismissed vide Judgment and Order dated 3.07.2001.
aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the respondents preferred Special
Leave Petition (c) No. 18218/2001 before this Court, which was dismissed as
withdrawn vide order dated 2.11.2001 giving liberty to the respondents to file
review petition before the High Court.
respondents filed review petition No. 31506/2002 before the High Court.
However, the said review petition was dismissed by the High Court vide order
the intervening period, when the review petition was pending before the High
Court, the appellant/applicant filed execution proceedings by moving IA No.
518/2002. The Respondents also moved an application to summon the record of the
Revenue Divisional Officer, Secundrabad, pertaining to the survey of the suit
land along with an application for the stay of Execution proceedings. The
Special Court vide order dated 7.11.2002 allowed the Execution Application
filed by the appellant/applicant but dismissed the application filed by
respondents directing the Revenue Divisional Officer to implement the order
respondents being aggrieved by the common order dated 7.11.2002, filed writ
petition nos. 22953 and 23105 of 2002, which were, dismissed by the High Court
vide order dated 17.12.2002.
pursuance of the order in Execution Proceedings dated 7.11.2002, the appellants
were put into possession of the suit land on 16.12.2002.
respondents being aggrieved by the order of the High Court dated 17.12.2002,
preferred review petitions before the High Court, which were dismissed by the
Court vide order dated 17.11.2003.
respondents filed Review Application no. 397/2005 in LGC No. 76 after an
inordinate delay, seeking review of the order dated 4.11.1997.
respondents subsequently filed an application in LGCSR No. 357/2005 before the
Special Court for fresh declaration that they were the owners and that the
appellants, who had succeeded throughout the litigation, were the land
grabbers. The respondents in the said application impleaded persons other than
the appellant/applicant also, i.e. the vendors of the appellant/applicant and
govt. officials etc., who are the other appellants in these cases. The Special
Court dismissed the said applications vide orders dated 6.7.2006 and 11.7.2006.
respondents, being aggrieved by both the orders, filed Writ Petition Nos. 19962
and 19963 of 2006, which have been allowed by the 5 High Court vide impugned
Judgment and order dated 26.04.2007, directing the Special Court to decide both
the applications afresh on merit, as in the opinion of the High Court, the
applications required certain inquiry on factual matters and the claim of the
respondents could not have been rejected merely on the determination and
attaining finality of orders in earlier proceedings. Hence, these appeals.
Sh. P. Vishwanatha Shetty, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellants, has submitted that even if there was an agreement to sell by
the vendor of the appellants in favour of the society, such an agreement did
not confer any title in the suit land in their favour. The respondents had not
been the members of the said Society, nor had any allotment ever been made by
the Society in their favour. The earlier proceedings came to an end after
having several rounds of litigation upto the High Court and one round upto this
Court. The orders passed therein attained finality and in pursuance of the
same, the appellant/applicant came into possession of the suit land.
fraud and identification of land had been in issue in some of the earlier
proceedings. Once the respondents had approached this Court, the question of
entertaining the review petition after an inordinate delay of 7-8 years does
not arise. The respondents have no locus standi to ask the Special Court to
determine under what circumstances the 6 appellant/applicant had obtained the
suit land. An application to call for certain records in respect of the suit
land from 1972 to 2002, the survey reports etc. cannot be made by them. The
High Court has gravely erred in interfering with the orders of the Special
Court rejecting both the applications. Thus, the appeals deserve to be allowed.
Per contra, Sh. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel appearing for
the respondents submitted that the transfer of land in favour of the
appellant/applicant vide registered sale deed dated 21.05.1980 was itself a
fraudulent transaction and material in this regard was suppressed from the
Special Court while obtaining the orders in their favour. Fraud vitiates
everything. The respondents have raised the issue of the identification of the
suit land. Thus, the applications filed by the respondents were maintainable
and the High Court has rightly reversed the orders passed by the Special Court.
The appeals lack merit and no interference is warranted by this Court.
We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned
counsel for the parties and perused the record.
there is a registered sale deed in favour of the appellant/applicant dated
21.05.1980 and there may be an agreement to sell in favour of the society dated
23.01.1976. It is settled legal proposition that 7 an agreement to sell does
not create any right, or title in favour of the intending buyer. The Society
did not file suit for specific performance against the vendors prior to the
execution of sale deed in favour of the appellant/applicant on 21.05.1980. The
Special Court, after appreciating the entire evidence on record, came to the
conclusion that the appellant/applicant was the owner and was in actual
physical possession of the land and that the respondents had grabbed the said
land. The Special Court has observed as under :- "In the
cross-examination, RW1 (respondent No.1 herein) had to admit that they have not
filed any document to show that the said plot was allotted in their favour by
the society and that they have not filed any document to show that they are the
members of the said society. He also admitted that without any municipal sanction
or permission, they raised the construction in the scheduled land."
Special Court further held that the respondents were land grabbers within the
meaning of the Act, 1982 and thus, they were directed to restore the premises
to the appellant/applicant. These findings of fact had been affirmed upto the
The record of the case reveals that respondents have filed review
petitions before the Special Court as well as before the High Court.
all the applications had been dismissed by the Courts concerned.
respondents again filed an application seeking review of the order dated
4.11.1997. Section 17-A of the Act, 1982 provides that in order to prevent the
miscarriage of justice, a review application can be entertained on the grounds
that the order has been passed under a mistake of fact, ignorance of any
material fact or an error apparent on the face of law. Limitation for filing
the review application before the Special Court has been prescribed under Rule
18 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, 1988, as 30 days
from the date of the order of which the review is sought.
respondents had earlier challenged the said order dated 4.11.1997 before the
High Court, as well as before this Court. Review petitions had been filed
before the Special Court, as well as before the High Court. Thus, question does
arise as to whether it is permissible for a litigant to file a review
application after approaching the superior forum/court.
After approaching the Higher Forum:- 742, this Court had taken a view that the
court cannot entertain an application for review if before making the review
application, the superior court had been moved for getting the self-same
relief, for the reason that for 9 the self-same relief two parallel proceedings
before the two forums cannot be taken.
3069, this Court held that when a special leave petition from the order of the
Tribunal was dismissed by a non-speaking order, the main order was confirmed by
the Court. Thereafter, the power of review cannot be exercised by the Tribunal
as it would be "deleterious to the judicial discipline".
view has been reiterated by this Court in Raj Kumar Sharma SC 1872.
& Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1486, a three Judge Bench of this Court considered the
issue afresh and held that filing of the review petition after dismissal of the
special leave petition by it against the self-same order amounted to an abuse
of process of the court and the entertainment of such a 1 review application
was in affront to its order and it was subversive of judicial discipline.
three Judge Bench of this Court reconsidered the issue and all above referred
judgments and came to the conclusion that dismissal of special leave petition
in limine by a non-speaking order may not be a bar for entertaining a review
petition by the court below for the reason that this Court may not be inclined
to exercise its discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution. The
declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 where the matter has been
decided on merit by a speaking judgment. In that case doctrine of merger would
come into place and lay down the following principles:- (i) Where an appeal or
revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other
authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or
affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate
forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which
subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.
jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two
stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to
file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is 1
granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal.
Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It
will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and
the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall
be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction
should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue
before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse,
modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising
its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary
jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of
merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter.
order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a
speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An
order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of
the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined
to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.
the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for
refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the
statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme
Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other
than the 1 declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings
recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the
court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of
judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country.
But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or
authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting
the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only
order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.
Court came to the conclusion that where the matter has been decided by a
non-speaking order in limine the party may approach the High Court by filing a
view has been reiterated in National Housing Coop. Society Court considered the
ratio of the judgment in Kunhayammed (supra); and Abbai Maligai Partnership
Firm (supra) and held that if a review application has been filed before the
High Court prior to filing the special leave petition before this Court and
review petition is decided/rejected, special leave petition against that order
of review would be maintainable. In case the review application has been filed
subsequent to dismissal of the 1 special leave petition it would amount to
abuse of process of the court and shall be governed by the ratio of the
judgment in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm (supra). The said judgment has been
approved and Collector, Golaghat, Assam & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 1738.
Court held as under :- "As a matter of fact at the earlier stage this
Court did not consider the question whether one of the appeals against the order
dismissing the Review Petition on merits was maintainable. At best the order of
remand and the decision in Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr.
(2000) 6 SCC 359 would enable the petitioner to get over the ratio of the three
Judge Bench decision in Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. v. K.
Santhakumaran & Ors. (1998) 7 SCC 386 that the seeking of a review after
the petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed without reserving any
liberty in the petitioner was an abuse of process."
the law on the issue stands crystallized to the effect that in case a litigant
files a review petition before filing the Special Leave Petition before this
Court and it remains pending till the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed,
the review petition deserves to be considered. In case it is filed subsequent
to dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, the process of filing review
application amounts to abuse of process of the court.
view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that filing of such a
review application by the respondents at a belated stage amounts to abuse of
process of the Court and such an application is not maintainable.
High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition against the order of
dismissal of the review application by the Special Court and the order of the
High Court to that extent is liable to be set aside.
far as the other application filed by the respondents before the Special Court
is concerned, it is based on the grounds that earlier judgment and order had
been obtained by the appellant/applicant suppressing material facts and the
suit land had not been identified properly, and therefore, the judgment of the
Special Court duly affirmed by the High Court stood vitiated.
20. It is
settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office by
making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent Authority, such
order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.
avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P. 1 E.R.
349), the Court observed without equivocation that "no judgment of a
Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained
by fraud, for fraud unravels everything."
Mills & Anr. AIR 1994 SC 2151; and State of Maharashtra & while
exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent
perpetration of a legal fraud as the courts are obliged to do justice by
promotion of good faith. "Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from
the crafty evasions and sub-letties invented to evade law."
has been held as under:- "Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn
proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept
descriptive of human conduct."
SC 1165, this Court observed that "Fraud and justice never dwell
together" (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim
which has never lost its temper over all these centuries.
ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be
permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made
misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the
fraud. (See District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare
Residential School Society, Vizianagaram SCC 325; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi
Prakash Babulalsing Parmar Refining Company AIR 2007 SC 2798; and Mohammed
Ibrahim & Ors.
is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate
the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate
deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The
expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the
person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage.
& Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170).
act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy
with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would
render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.
Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema
to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be
perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res
judicata. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been
made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly,
careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a material document would
also amount to a fraud on the court. (Vide S.P. Shankar Family Trust & Ors.
AIR 1996 SC 2202; Ram Chandra Singh State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. AIR 2004 SC
constructive fraud is not, at all events after long delay, sufficient but such
a judgment will not be set aside upon mere proof that the judgment was obtained
detection/discovery of constructive fraud at a much belated stage may not be
sufficient to set aside the judgment procured by perjury.
the above, it is evident that even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is
proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be taken away.
an eventuality the questions of non-executing of the statutory remedies or
statutory bars like doctrine of res judicata are not attracted.
of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the court.
court has an inherent power to recall its own order obtained by fraud as the
order so obtained is non est.
instant case required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled
of the respondents has been that transfer by the vendor in favour of the
appellant was not genuine. Material information had been suppressed from the
Special Court. More so, there was no proper identification of the suit land in
the earlier litigation. The reports submitted in this regard were not correct.
Respondents have never been able to show as under what circumstances they are
interested in the suit land because before the Special Court in the first round
they failed to show any document that land had ever been transferred by the
tenure holders/owners in favour of the Society or the Society had made any
allotment in their favour or they were member of the said Society or they
obtained any sanction from statutory authority to raise the construction.
Durga Prasad, Ld. Counsel appearing for the said respondents was repeatedly
asked by us to show any document on record linking the said respondents with
the suit land. Though, he argued for a long time, raised large number of issues
but could not point out a single document which may reflect that respondents
could have any claim on the suit land.
we are of the considered opinion that the application at their behest was not
issue of mis-representation/fraud, suppression of material fact and
identification of land had been in issue in earlier review petitions before the
Special Court and in the Writ Petitions before the High Court. In this regard,
the Special Court in execution proceedings was fully satisfied regarding the
identity of land on the basis of revenue record and came to the conclusion that
there was no mis-representation or fraud on the part of the 2
appellant/applicant. The order of the Special Court dated 11th July, 2006 made
it clear that all these issues had been agitated in earlier proceedings.
Special Court has held as under:
applicants herein as contended in this L.G.C. have filed IA No.869/2002 for
stay of proceedings and IA No. 861/2002 for summoning the record in File
No.B/9815/97 from the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer on the ground of
alleged fraud played by the Mandal Revenue Officer and the Mandal Surveyor.
Those petitions were heard at length and were dismissed holding that the
alleged fraud as contended by the applicants herein was not made out and the
property which is the subject matter of L.G.C. No.76/96 should be delivered to
the respondents herein by evicting the applicants. As mentioned already, in
execution of the said order, applicants herein were evicted and possession was
delivered to the respondents.
the common order passed in IA Nos. 518/2002, 861/2002 and 869/2002, by this
Court was questioned by the applicants herein by filing Writ Petitions before
the Hon'ble High Court of A.P. and the same was also dismissed holding that the
applicants herein are trying to protract the litigation and to delay the
delivery of possession of the property in question to the
another case decided by the Special Court vide order dated 6th July, 2006 the
Court had taken note of the pleadings in respect of identification of land and
mis-representation/fraud/collusion in the earlier proceedings and the
observations made by the Writ Court in its order dated 17th December, 2002 that
the said respondents were interested in protracting the litigation and
obstructing the implementation of the order of the Special Court dated 2
4.11.1997. The said order had been passed in Application No. 51 of 2002 where
one of the main grounds had been that the appellant/applicant had played fraud
in obtaining the said order as is taken note of in paragraph 13 of the said
order by the Special Court. The Special Court also took note of earlier
direction to the Revenue Divisional Officer to identify the land and possession
of the same was delivered to the decree holder. The said order was under challenge
before the High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 22953/2002 and 23105/2002 wherein
pleading of the alleged fraud and mis-identification of suit land were taken.
The Special Court came to the conclusion that there was no suppression of any
fact by the revenue authorities or the court was misled at the time of
obtaining such orders.
is a registered sale deed dated 21.5.1980 in favour of the appellant/applicant.
Nobody has ever filed any application before the competent court to declare
said sale deed as null and void. Respondents have no right or interest in the
suit property. The Society claimed to have an agreement to sell in its favour
which did not confer any title in favour of the Society. A finding of fact had
been recorded in earlier proceedings that the appellant/applicant was in actual
physical possession of the land and he was illegally/forcibly dispossessed by
a trespasser cannot be evicted forcibly. Thus, a person in illegal occupation
of the land has to be evicted following the procedure prescribed Rao AIR 1989
SC 2097) .
observed that Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 is
based on the principle that even a trespasser is entitled to protect his
possession except against the true owner and purports to protect a person in
possession from being dispossessed except in due process of law.
the State authorities cannot dispossess a person by an executive order. The
authorities cannot become the law unto themselves. It would be in violation of
the rule of law. Government can resume possession only in a manner known to or
recognised by law and not otherwise. (Vide Bishan Das 2 Vishnunarayan &
Associates (P) Ltd. & Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 134).
forcible eviction of the appellant/applicant by the respondents was unwarranted
and unlawful. Proceedings had been initiated under the Act, 1982. It is a
special Act to prevent illegal activities of land grabbing.
Legislature, in its wisdom, constituted a Special Court presided over by a
person who is or eligible to be the Judge of the High Court, and consisting of
the Members who are or eligible to become District Judge and District
Collector. Therefore, persons having enough experience and who have acquired a
higher status have been given responsibility to adjudicate upon the disputes
under the Act 1982. That Special Court has been conferred with the powers of
Civil or Criminal Courts.
the provisions of Section 10 of the Act 1982, the burden of proof is on the
accused to prove that he is not guilty. Thus, it is not like any other criminal
case where accused is presumed to be innocent unless the guilt is proved. The
presumption of innocence is a human right, however, subject to the statutory
exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of Criminal Jurisprudence. For
this purpose, the nature of offence, its seriousness and gravity thereof has to
be taken into consideration. Statutes like Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988;
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, provide for
presumption of guilt if the circumstances provided in those Statutes are found
to be fulfilled and shift the burden of proof of innocence on the accused.
Thus, the Legislature has adopted a deviating course from ordinary criminal law
shifting the burden on the accused to prove that he was not guilty. The High
Court while deciding these cases has not considered the issue of the locus
standi of the respondents to maintain the application for eviction of the
appellant/applicant. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted
to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the
court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a
weapon of harassment and persecution.
view of the above factual position, we reach the following conclusions:
has been a registered sale deed in favour of the appellant/applicant by the
vendors which was registered on 21.5.1980 and he was put in possession.
Prior to the execution of the said sale deed there has been an agreement to
sell dated 23.1.1976 in favour of the Society.
In respect of the said agreement to sell the litigation remained pending before
the Civil Court but there is nothing on record to show as to what had been its
agreement to sell did not confer any right on the Society, though the appellant
acquired the title over the suit land by execution and registration of the sale
deed dated 21.5.1980.
respondents had not been the members of the Society nor Society made any
allotment in their favour.
the Special Court, the respondents could not show as under what circumstances
they could stake their claim on the suit land and no document worth the name
could be shown which may link them to the suit land.
Respondents grabbed the suit land forcibly and raised a construction without
spite of our repeated queries, learned counsel for the respondents could not
point out a single document on record to show that they could have any right,
interest or title in the suit land.
litigation completed several rounds before the High Court and this is the
second round of litigation before this Court.
the courts proceedings reveal that after proper adjudication the declaration
had been made that suit land belonged to the appellant/applicant and
respondents were merely land grabbers.
earlier review petitions filed by the respondents before the Special Court and
further taking the matter to the High Court in Writ Petitions and Review
Applications before the High Court the issue of mis-
representation/fraud/collusion and mis-identification of the suit land had been
raised but they could not succeed.
execution proceedings, the appellant/applicant succeeded and came in possession
of the suit land in 2002.
Respondents filed frivolous application raising the issue of fraud and
mis-identification of the suit land which had earlier been adjudicated upon.
review application was filed at much belated stage.
review application was certainly not maintainable as the respondents had
approached the higher forum and it merely amounted to abuse of process of the
respondents had been interested only to protract the litigation by one way or
Fresh proceedings taken by the respondents before the Special Court in fact, is
tantamount to malicious prosecution.
High Court failed to take all aforesaid factors into consideration before
passing impugned judgment and order.
40. In view
of the above, we are of the considered opinion that judgment and order of the
High Court impugned herein, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The appeals
are allowed. The judgment of the High Court dated 26.4.2007 is set aside and
the judgments and orders dated 6.7.2006 and 11.7.2006 passed by the Special
Court are restored. No costs.
..................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM)