Ramanuj Pandey Vs.
State of M.P. & Ors. [2009] INSC 1004 (8 May 2009)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.3406 OF 2009 (Arising out
of SLP(C) No. 1019 of 2008) Ramanuj Pandey ..........Appellant Versus The State
of M.P. & ors. ........Respondent
H.L. Dattu,J.
Leave granted.
1.
This
appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Jabalpur in Writ Appeal No. 693 of 2006 dated 22.11.2006. By the
impugned judgment, the Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal, stating that
the punishment of removal from service of the appellant cannot on the facts and
circumstances of the case shocks the conscience of the Court.
2.
The
facts leading to this Special Leave Petition are: the appellant was appointed
as a Constable in the service of M.P. Police on 1.11.1967 and was subsequently
promoted to the post of Head Constable. On the relevant date i.e. 25.9.1991
while discharging his duties as Incharge, Outpost, Kolar Dam, Birpur appellant
apprehended one Laxmi Narain, Dozer Operator of Kolar Dam and registered a
complaint against him under Section 13 of the Lunacy Act. In the complaint
filed, appellant had stated that Laxmi Narain in an insane state of mind
assaulted him and caused injuries. On the other hand, son of Laxmi Narain filed
a complaint and requested the authorities to conduct inquiry against the
appellant.
Inquiry was conducted
and consequent thereto, a charge sheet was issued to the appellant and he was
kept under suspension pending domestic enquiry proceedings. The appellant in
his reply had denied all the charges. In the Departmental Inquiry conducted by
Superintendent of Police, Sehore on 7.5.1992, he has held the appellant guilty
of the said charges and was removed from government services affirming that the
appellant had done a very heinous act by detaining a public servant in police
post without any reason, violating his fundamental rights.
Appellant went before
the High Court contending that no departmental inquiry was warranted in such
matter and the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate. The High
Court dismissed the petition confirming the decision of the disciplinary
authority. The appellant then went in appeal before the Division Bench. The
Division Bench held that appellant being a Head Constable has apprehended Laxmi
Narain and registered him under the Lunacy Act, although he was not a Lunatic,
therefore, the punishment of removal from service of the appellant cannot on
these facts be held to be one which shocks the conscience of the Court.
1.
2.
3.
We
have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
4.
Learned
Counsel for the appellant would contend that the appellant could not be held to
have misused his position as Head Constable and not acted in good faith. He
would also contend that the punishment awarded to the appellant is shockingly
disproportionate and excessive. Learned Counsel would draw our attention to the
case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 484, wherein this court
held that:
"A review of the
above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on
appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive
power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are
invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the
magnitude or gravity of the misconduct.
The High
Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally
substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks
the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the
relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the
penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional
and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support
thereof."
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
In
the case of Commr of Police v. Syed Hussain, (2006) 3 SCC 173, this Court
observed that, it is one thing to say that order passed by the statutory
authority is wholly arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution and thus liable to be set aside, but it is another thing to say
that the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by such authority should not
ordinarily be interfered with by a superior court while exercising its power of
judicial review unless one or the other ground upon which and on the basis
whereof the power of judicial review can be exercised, exists. It is,
therefore, beyond any doubt or dispute that the doctrine of proportionality has
to be applied in appropriate case as the depth of judicial review will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Admittedly,
it is for the disciplinary authority or the administrative authority to decide
the quantum of punishment in a case of misconduct and the role of the Court is
only secondary. But in view of the gravity of the misconduct, namely, the
appellant having apprehended Laxmi Narain and registering him under section 13
of the Lunacy Act, where the disciplinary authority held appellant guilty for
detaining a public servant in police post without any reason and removed him
from government services, the interference with the imposition of punishment is
necessary.
7.
In
the present matter the appellant, while discharging his duties apprehended
Laxmi Narain and registered him under Lunacy Act without any sufficient
reasons. This act of his had indisputably caused harassment to Laxmi Narain and
was detrimental to the image of police department, but the same was also not grave
enough to punish him with removal from services. The appellant as a head
constable was bestowed with official duties and while discharging them he went
outside its purview, which definitely warrants that his services must be
terminated, but as a warning to others and not as a vengeance.
8.
While
considering the power to interfere with the order of punishment, this Court in
the case of Rangaswami v. State of T.N., AIR 1989 SC 1137, held that this
Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution,
is empowered to alter or interfere with the penalty.
9.
Accordingly,
the punishment of appellant of dismissal from services as imposed by the
disciplinary authority is substituted to one of compulsory retirement from the
date of his dismissal from services i.e. 7.5.1992.
10.
In
view of the above discussion, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned order
passed by the High Court is partly set aside. No order as to costs.
.......................................J.
[TARUN CHATTERJEE]
.......................................J.
[ H.L. DATTU ]
New
Delhi,
May
08, 2009.
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