Chairman, D. A. Rani
Lakshmi Bai K. G. Bank Vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney And Ors.  INSC 625 (26
SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)
No(s).10483/2007 (From the judgement and order dated 13/03/2007 in CMWP No.
2868/2004 of The HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD) CHAIRMAN, D.A.,RANI
LAKSHMI BAI K.G.BANK Petitioner(s) VERSUS JAGDISH SHARAN VARSHNEY AND ORS.
Respondent(s) (With appln(s) for directions and prayer for interim relief ))
(for final disposal) Date: 26/03/2009 This Petition was called on for hearing
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE
MARKANDEY KATJU HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B. SUDERSHAN REDDY For Petitioner(s) Mr.
Dhruv Mehta, Adv.
Adv.for M/S K.L. Mehta & Co.
For Respondent(s) Mr.
Ajay Veer Singh, Adv.for Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta,Adv.
UPON hearing counsel
the Court made the following ORDER Leave granted.
The Appeal is partly
allowed in terms of the signed order. No order as to costs.
(Parveen Kr. Chawla)
(Indu Satija) Court Master Court Master [Signed Order is placed on the File]
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL
APPEAL NO.1921 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No.10483 of 2007) Chairman,
Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank ..Appellant
versus Jagdish Sharan Varshney & Others ..Respondents ORDER Heard learned
counsel for the parties.
This Appeal has been
filed against the judgment and order dated 13.3.2007 passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.2868 of 2004,
whereby and whereunder the High Court has allowed the writ petition and quashed
the order dated 23.4.2003 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the
resolution of the Board of Directors dated 4.9.2003 as communicated by Board's
letter dated 3.10.2003.
It appears that there
was some allegation against respondent No.1 on the basis of which he was
charge-sheeted; an enquiry was held and he was found guilty and he was given
the punishment of fixing his pay scale at Rs.7780/- by reducing the increment
of time scale by 15 under regulation -2- 38(1) (Kha-II) of Chapter IV of the
Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank Officers and Employees Service Rules, 2000
(for short 'the Rules').
dissatisfied by the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 23.4.2003,
respondent No.1 filed an appeal before the appellate authority (Board of
Directors) on 13.6.2003 which was dismissed by the appellate authority on
4.9.2003 without giving any reasons whatsoever.
Aggrieved against the
order of the appellate authority dated 4.9.2003, respondent No.1 filed a writ
petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.
The High Court by the
impugned order has allowed the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 and set
aside the orders of the appellate authority and disciplinary authority on the
ground that the order of the appellate authority dated 4.9.2003 did not contain
Shri Dhruv Mehta,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied on a decision of this Court
in the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Haipur & Others vs. Prabhu Dayal
Grover reported in (1995) 6 SCC 279 and contended that an order of affirmation
does not require any reasons.
In our opinion, an
order of affirmation need not contain as elaborate reasons as an order of
reversal, but that does not mean that the order of affirmation need not -3-
contain any reasons whatsoever. In fact, the said decision in Prabhu Dayal
Grover's case(supra) has itself stated that the appellate order should disclose
application of mind. Whether there was an application of mind or not can only
be disclosed by some reasons, at least in brief, mentioned in the order of the
Hence, we cannot
accept the proposition that an order of affirmation need not contain any
reasons at all. That order must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so
that one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while
affirming the order of the disciplinary authority. The view we are taking was
also taken by this Court in Divisional Forest Officer vs. Madhusudan Rao, JT
2008 (2) SC 253 (vide para 19), and in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. vs. Union
of India, AIR 1966 SC 671, siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs.
Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 (vide para 6), etc.
In the present case,
since the appellate authority's order does not contain any reaons, it does not
show any application of mind.
The purpose of
disclosure of reasons, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of S.N.Mukherjee vs. Union of India reported in (1990) 4 SCC 594, is that
people must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities.
Unless reasons are
disclosed, -4- how can a person know whether the authority has applied its mind
or not? Also, giving of reasons minimizes chances of arbitrariness. Hence, it
is an essential requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in
brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even if it is
an order of affirmation.
No doubt, in
S.N.Mukherjee's case (supra), it has been observed (vide para 36) that:
appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give
separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the
reasons contained in the order under challenge."
observation, in our opinion, really means that the order of affirmance need not
contain an elaborate reasoning as contained in the order of the original
authority, but it cannot be understood to mean that even brief reasons need not
be given in an order of affirmance. To take a contrary view would mean that appellate
authorities can simply dismiss appeals by one line orders stating that they
agree with the view of the lower authority.
For the same reason,
the decision of this Court in State of Madras vs. Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827
(vide para 15) has also to be understood as explained by us above.
-5- Hence, we agree
with the High Court that reasons should have been contained in the appellate
authority's order, but we cannot understand why the High Court has set aside
the order of the disciplinary authority, in addition to setting aside the
Hence, this appeal is
partly allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court to the extent that
it has set aside the order of the disciplinary authority is set aside, and the
matter is remanded to the appellate authority to decide the appeal filed by
respondent No.1 afresh in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of
being heard to respondent No.1 and also by passing a speaking order. The said
appeal shall be decided very expeditiously. No order as to costs.
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