Chandrashekhar
& Ors. Vs. Addl. Special Land Acquisition Officer [2009] INSC 1180 (8 July
2009)
Judgment
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL
NOS.4163-4165 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP ) Nos. 4997- 4999 of 2005)
Chandrashekhar & Ors. .. Appellant(s) versus Additional Special Land
Acquisition Officer .... Respondent(s) (With C.A.Nos.4166-4176/09 @ SLP ) No.
7636-7646/2005, C.A.No.4177 /2009 @ SLP ) No.7711/2009 and and C.A.No.4178/2009
@ SLP ) No.15151/2009 CC. No. 1416/2007) JUDGM ENT TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
These appeals by special leave arise from the related judgments of
the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore viz., judgment
dated 14th of August, 2003 in MFA No. 1409/2003 and batch, judgment dated 27th
of August, 2003 in MFA No. 1341/2003 and batch, judgment dated 10th of
November, 2003 in MFA No. 5664/2003 and batch, and judgment dated 16th of June,
2006 in MFA No. 5309/2004. On 14th of August, 2003 the High Court, dismissing
MFA No. 1409/2003 and batch, had fixed the market value of the |Page 2 lands
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter referred to as `the
Act') at Rs.23/- per square feet which was contested by both the respondents as
well as the appellants. This decision was relied upon in all the other
decisions mentioned above that have come up for appeals in the present special
leave petitions.
3.
Since the decision dated 14th of August, 2003 was relied upon in
all other judgments appealed against and the issues are based on the same
material facts, the facts in appeal arising out of S.L.P. No.(s) 4997-4999/2005
are sufficient to decide the questions of law that have arisen in all these
appeals.
4.
On 5th of March, 1998, the lands of the appellant were notified
for acquisition under Section 4 (1) of the Act, for establishment of
rehabilitation centre for the ousters of Kanabur and Jainapur Village submerged
due to construction of Upper Krishna Project. On 15th of August, 1998,
Notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act was issued.
On 1st of
March, 1999, the Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to `LAO')
passed an award determining the compensation @ Rs. 54, 500/- per acre and
possession of the land was taken by the respondent on 31st of March, 1999.
Consequent to Reference |Page 3 Application by the appellants, the LAO referred
the matter to the Civil Court for determination and adjudication of correct
market value payable for the acquired lands. The II Addl. Civil Judge, Bijapur,
allowed the petitions and came to the conclusion that the acquired lands were
similar in nature to comparable lands acquired by LAO @ Rs.23/- per Sq. Ft. for
the purpose of ring road, and so the lands in question must be valued on the
same terms. However, the Civil Court resorted to further deductions and held
the market value of the said lands to be only Rs.17/- per Sq. Ft. on 4th of
November and 6th of November, 2002 respectively. The final amount worked out to
Rs.7, 40,500/- per Acre. It was submitted that as per the Valuation Report
dated 5th of August, 2002, submitted by PW2, Retired Superintending Engineer
(PWD), Consulting Engineer and Registered Approved Valuer in respect of the
acquired lands, the market value of the lands in question had worked out to
Rs.73.50/- per Sq. Ft.
5.
On 21st of March, 2003, the Respondent LAO filed Misc. First
Appeal before the High Court of Karnataka for reduction of compensation awarded
by the Civil Court and the present appellants appealed for enhancement of
compensation. On 14th of August, 2003, the High Court held that the market
value of the lands would be more than Rs.32.20/- per Sq. Ft., yet it restricted
the amount to Rs.23/- only, in |Page 4 view of the deficit in the Court Fee
paid by the appellants in their Cross-Objections, without affording the
appellants to pay the balance Court Fee. This decision of the High Court was
relied upon in all the other judgments already mentioned as far as the question
of compensation amount is concerned, that have been appealed against and the
decision here shall have a common effect on all the said judgments.
6.
The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that decision
of the High Court not to grant enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs.32.10/- per
Sq. Ft. on the mere technical ground that the appellants had restricted their
claim to Rs.23/- per Sq. Ft. due to their inability to pay Court Fee was
fallacious. In this regard the learned counsel for the appellants has drawn our
attention to the judgment in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh
[(1985) 3 SCC 737] wherein it has been laid down that a rightful claim of the
claimant cannot be defeated on technical ground of want of requisite Court Fee.
The relevant portion of the said order and judgment of the High Court may be
referred to for proper decision of these appeals. This Court observed in the
aforesaid decision as follows :
"3.
We are of the view that when the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
took the view that the claimants |Page 5 whose land was acquired by the State
of Punjab under the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act,
were entitled to enhanced compensation and the case of the appellants stood on
the same footing, the appellants should have been given an opportunity of
paying up the deficit court fee so that, like other claimants, they could also
get enhanced compensation at the same rate as the others. The learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench should not have, in our opinion, adopted a
technical approach and denied the benefit of enhanced compensation to the
appellants merely because they had not initially paid the proper amount of
court fee. It must be remembered that this was not a dispute between two
private citizens where it would be quite just and legitimate to confine the
claimant to the claim made by him and not to award him any higher amount than
that claimed though even in such a case there may be situations where an amount
higher than that claimed can be awarded to the claimant as for instance where
an amount is claimed as due at the foot of an account. Here was a claim made by
the appellants against the State Government for compensation for acquisition of
their land and under the law, the State was bound to pay to the appellants
compensation on the basis of the market value of the land acquired and if
according to the judgments of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench,
the market value of the land acquired was higher than that awarded by the Land
Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge, there is no reason why
the appellants should have been denied the benefit of payment of the market
value so determined. To deny this benefit to the appellants would tantamount to
permitting the State Government to acquire the land of the appellants on
payment of less than the true market value. There may be cases where, as for
instance, under agrarian reform legislation, the holder of land may,
legitimately, as a matter of social justice with a view to eliminating
concentration of land in the hands of a few and bringing about its equitable
distribution, be deprived of land which is not being personally cultivated by
him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with payment of little
compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is acquired under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the holder
of his land without payment of the true market value when the law, in so many
terms, declares that he shall be paid such market value. The |Page 6 State
Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far
as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is received or recovered
without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably
be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim
of the citizen We are, therefore, of the view that, in the present case, the
Division Bench as well as the learned single Judge should have allowed the
appellants to pay up the deficit court fee and awarded to them compensation at
the higher rate or rates determined by them."
We are in
respectful agreement with the views expressed by this court, as noted herein
above, in the above judgment. A perusal of the decision of the High Court in
the present case gives a similar impression as was observed in the above
judgment, viz. once the court has taken the view that the claimants (appellants
in the present case) were entitled to enhance compensation they should not be
denied the same on the mere technical ground of nonpayment of the court fees
and an opportunity must be given for payment of the same.
7.
After examining the decision of the High Court, we are of the view
that the court has recognised the high value of the lands of the appellants and
have accordingly justified the same. The High Court has observed that the locus
and potentiality of the acquired land with reference to evidence laid before
the Civil court and that evidence was held to be a clear and clinching proof of
the high potential of the acquired land. The High Court further observed that
allowing escalation at the rate of 10% p.a. for four years, the actual market
|Page 7 value of the acquired land would have been Rs.32.10/- per Sq. Ft.
The High
Court also took into consideration the awards passed by the Civil Court in LAC
No.180/1998 and LAC No.23/1998 and observed that the entitlement of the
appellants in the present case would be far more than the rate of Rs. 32.10/-
per Sq. Ft. However the High Court then relied on the fact that the appellants
had failed to mobilize money towards court fee and so the claim was restricted
to Rs.23/- per Sq. Ft. Nevertheless, the High Court was of the opinion that
State should be fair and reasonable in compensating the uprooted agriculturists
and it should not be permitted to make unlawful gain while exercising eminent
domain power under the Act or any other statute.
8.
Thus, we are of the clear opinion that the High Court seems to be
at fault in view of the established law emanating from the decision in Bhag
Singh (supra) as far as the restriction of the compensation amount to Rs.23/-
on the mere technical ground of non- payment of the court fees is concerned.
However, the learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the
decision in Buta Singh v. Union of India [(1995) 5 SCC 283], wherein a
Constitution Bench of this Court had affirmed and approved the law laid down in
Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India [(1991) 1
|Page 8 SCC 174]. The Constitution Bench held the opinion that the decision in
Chand Kaur v. Union of India [(1994) 4 SCC 663] was per incuriam the decision
of this court in Scheduled Caste Coop.
(supra).
The court in Chand Kaur (supra) had relied on the law laid down by Bhag Singh
(supra) while granting two months time to the appellants in that case to make
up the deficiency in the court fee in the LPAs which had been filed by them.
Thus, in Buta Singh (supra), the Constitution Bench of this court pointed out
that the decision in Chand Kaur (supra) had failed to take into account the law
laid down in Scheduled Caste Coop. (supra) which was a subsequent decision to
that of Bhag Singh (supra) and thus, the law as laid down by Scheduled Caste
Coop. (supra) was held to be the correct one.
9.
Since we have already perused the judgment in Bhag Singh (supra),
now we need to examine the judgment in Scheduled Caste Coop.
(supra)
and find out whether, in fact, the Constitution Bench judgment of Buta Singh
(supra) had rendered the law laid down in Bhag Singh (supra) null and void. A
perusal of the decision in Scheduled Caste Coop. (supra) gives us the
impression that the court had in fact agreed to the views expressed by this
Court in Bhag Singh |Page 9 (supra), as can be observed in the following lines
on Bhag Singh (supra):
"...the
appellants had restricted their claim in the first appeal to the High Court by
paying lesser court fee. After the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the
appellants realised that they were entitled to the benefit of enhanced compensation
which was denied to them as they had restricted their claim by paying a lesser
court fee. They kept the matter alive by filing a Letters Patent Appeal along
with several others who too were dissatisfied with the amount awarded by the
learned Single Judge. The Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the
judgment of the learned Single Judge in regard to the rate of compensation for
the land comprising the belt having proximity to the road, but with regard to
the land situate in the owner belt, it enhanced the compensation to Rs.38.720/-
per acre as stated earlier.
Since the
Division Bench also restricted the benefit of the enhanced compensation to
claimants who had paid the proper court fee, the appeal preferred by the
appellants was dismissed. The appellants did not rest there but carried the
matter to this Court by way of special leave. It will be clear from the above
facts that unlike the present petitioner- society the appellants in that case
kept the matter alive...
This
Court pointed out that since the case was not between two private parties and
the claim was directed against the Government for payment of compensation for
expropriated land the State Government was bound to pay compensation on the
basis of the marked value of the acquired land and if according to the
judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench the market value
was higher than that awarded by the Collector or the reference court there was
no reason to deny to the appellants the benefit of payment of that market value
because to deny the same would tantamount to permitting the State Government to
acquire land at a rate below the market value. On this line of reasoning this
Court allowed the appellants to pay the deficit court fee and receive
compensation at the higher rate."
10.
The court clearly distinguished the factual position in that case
from the material facts in Bhag Singh (supra), as can be seen in the following
lines:
"...In
the present case however, the petitioner-society while preferring the appeal
stated in paragraph 11 of the Memo of Appeal that their claim for enhanced
compensation was restricted to Rs.4,00,000/- over and above the amount awarded
by the reference court. It is further stated in that paragraph that according
to the appellants the market value of the land is not less than 80,000/- per
acre but as the appellants are not in a position to pay the huge court fee,
they arc restricting their claim to Rs.4,00,000/-. This was a conscious
decision on the part of the present appellant. The averment in that paragraph
about their incapacity to pay the court fee is doubtful having regard to the
fact, that the appellants had received a substantial amount by way of
compensation under the award made by the Collector as well as the reference
court. Be that as it may, the fact remains that though the appellants were
aware that the market value was higher, they deliberately restricted their
claim to Rs.4,00,000/- and after the appeal was disposed of by the learned
Single Judge on November 10, 1981 they allowed the matter to rest and did not
carry the same by way of an appeal to the Division Bench. It was long after the
decision rendered by this Court in Bhag Singh's case that the appellants filed
an application in 1987 to permit them to pay the deficit court fee and claim
the benefit of the difference in higher rate of compensation awarded by the
learned Single Judge. Possibly they were inspired by the afore- quoted
observations of this Court in Bhag Sing's case.
As stated
earlier, Bhag Singh & Others had kept their matters alive by preferring
Letters Patent Appeals and thereafter approaching this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution. On the other hand the present petitioners rested content
with the amount claimed and received by them in paragraph 11 of their Memo
appeal even after the decision of the learned Single Judge."
11.
This court, in the case of Scheduled Caste Coop. (supra), had one
apprehension in mind, a justified one, that entertainment of such a claim at
such a belated stage would have opened up flood gates for similar applications
in innumerable cases which might have become final. This was justified in view
of the fact that the appellants in that case had not kept their matter alive
unlike in the present case or in the case of Bhag Singh (supra). The same is
reflected in the following words of the court:
"...The
petitioners herein were satisfied with the amount of Rs.4,00,000/-and did not
apply to pay the deficit court fee soon after the judgment of the learned Single
Judge was rendered in 1981 but did so after a lapse of almost six years in
1987. The Full Bench of the High Court, therefore, rightly held that to permit
payment of deficit court fee for recovering enhanced compensation after a lapse
of almost six years under its inherent jurisdiction would encourage the
practice of not paying the court fee in the hope that as and when the valuation
is determined in appeal the jurisdiction of the court can be invoked under
Section 151 of the Code and the benefit of enhanced compensation can be reaped
by making good the deficit court fee."
12.
In view of the difference in material backgrounds of the present
case or Bhag Singh and Scheduled Caste Coop. (supra), we are of the opinion
that the apprehension mentioned above can not be an issue in the present case.
13.
From the observations as quoted herein earlier, we conclude that
the decision of the Constitution Bench in Buta Singh (supra) has not reversed
the decision in Bhag Singh (supra) and the law laid down |Page 12 in Scheduled
Caste Coop. (supra) is materially different from the law established by this
court in Bhag Singh (supra) since both the decisions dealt with different
matters and moreover the Scheduled Caste Coop. (supra) decision has in fact
recognised the validity of the law laid down in Bhag Singh (supra). Therefore,
we are of the opinion that following the judgment of Bhag Singh (supra) in the
present case shall not be in conflict with the opinion of the Constitution
Bench decision in the case of Buta Singh (supra).
Thus, in
our opinion, it is settled that the High Court should not have deprived the
appellants of their rightful claim on the technical ground of want of requisite
Court Fees and an opportunity should have been afforded to them for payment of
the deficit Court Fee. This position is also supported by the decision of this
court in a recent case viz.
Bhimasha
v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2008) 10 SCC 797] wherein it has been
held that the High Court should have, after taking note of the facts of the
case and the market value determined by it, awarded the higher compensation
subject to the payment of the balance court fee.
14.
Since we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was not
justified in denying the appellants compensation @ Rs.32.10/- pr Sq. Ft. after
having recorded its finding that the value of the required land |Page 13 would
be not less than @ Rs.32.10/- pr Sq. Ft. on a mere technical ground that the
Court Fee paid by the appellants would entitle them to compensation of only
Rs.23/- per Sq. Ft., we now proceed to consider the other submissions of the
appellants. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the High
Court had awarded compensation @ Rs.100.50/- per Sq. Ft. in MFA No. 2366/2003
(LAC) C/W MFA CR.OB. No. 52/2004 [Asst. Commissioner & the LAO, Bijapur v
Tukaram S/o. Shivaram Zinjade, arising out of LAC No. 180/1998], the appellants
should also be awarded compensation at the same rate affording an opportunity
to them to pay the deficit court fee. In this regard our attention was drawn to
the decision of this Court in Pal Singh v. UT of Chandigarh [AIR 1993 SC 225].
15.
In the case of Pal Singh (supra), this court had examined the
question whether a judgment of a court in a land acquisition case determining
the market value of a land in the vicinity of acquired lands, even though not
inter-parties, was admissible in evidence in a subsequent case, either as an
instance or one from which the market value of the acquired land could be
deduced or inferred. The court had analyzed the same and expressed the
following opinion:
"5.
No doubt, a judgment of a court in a land acquisition case determining the
market value of a land in the vicinity of the acquired lands, even though not
inter Partes, could be admitted in evidence either as an instance or one from
which the market value of the acquired land could be deduced or inferred as has
been held by the Calcutta High Court in H.K. Mallick's case [H.K. Mallick v.
State of West Bengal (79 Calcutta Weekly Notes 378)] based on the authority of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Indian
General Steam Navigation and Railway Co. 1909 I.LR. 36 Cal. 967, where the
Judicial Committee did refuse to interfere with High Court judgment in a land
acquisition case based on previous awards, holding that no question of
principle was involved in it."
So it
seems that the court in principle recognised the admissibility of such previous
decisions in a subsequent case as far as the market value of the acquired land
was concerned. However, the court further held that:
"...But
what cannot be overlooked is, that for a judgment relating to value of land to
be admitted in evidence either as an instance or as one from which the market
value of the acquired land could be inferred or deduced, must have been a
previous judgment of Court and as an instance, it must have been proved by the
person relying upon such judgment by adducing evidence aliunde that due regard
being given to all attendant facts and circumstances, it could furnish the
basis for determining the market value of the acquired land..."
16.
Thus, for a judgment relating to value of land to be admitted in
evidence either as an instance or as one from which the market value |Page 15 of
the acquired land could be inferred or deduced, must have been a previous
judgment of that same court and this requirement is fulfilled in the present
case. However, the requirement was that it must have been proved by the person
relying upon such judgment by adducing evidence aliunde and that due regard
being given to all other attendant facts and circumstances it could furnish the
basis for determining the market value of the acquired land, is in our opinion
the more important test for admission of such previous decision of the High
Court for determination of the market value of the land acquired in the present
case. On a perusal of the materials submitted before us by the appellants, we
must conclude that the appellants had failed to satisfactorily furnish the
basis for determining the market value of the acquired land according to the
decision of the same High Court in Assistant Commissioner & the LAO (supra)
at Rs.100.50/-. Per sq. ft.
Thus, we
conclude that this plea of the appellants is not acceptable in the present
case.
17.
In view of our discussions made herein above and in view of the
decisions cited herein earlier, we are of the view that the decisions of the
High Court impugned in these appeals on the termination of the market value of
the lands of the appellants are set aside. We fix the market value of the
acquired lands of the appellants at Rs.32.10/- per |Page 16 sq. ft. However the
rest of the decision of the High Court is affirmed.
In other
words the appellants are entitled to 30% solatium on the enhanced compensation
and interest accrued on it. The appellants are also entitled to 12% additional
market value on the enhanced compensation from the date of issuance of the
notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, till the date of dispossession or
till the date of award, whichever is earlier. Moreover they are also entitled
to interest @ 9% on the enhanced compensation amount from the date of taking
possession or award for a period of one year and thereafter @ 15% till the
amount is deposited. The compensation already paid by the LAO shall be
deducted. It is made clear that the enhanced compensation which has now been
directed to be paid to the appellants shall be paid if the appellants shall
deposit the requisite court fees on the aforesaid enhanced amount within four
months from the date of supply of a copy of this order to the courts below.
18.
These appeals are thus allowed to the extent indicated above.
There will be no order as to the costs.
...........................J. [Tarun Chatterjee]
..........................J.
New Delhi;
Back
Pages: 1 2 3