K.
Ramachandran Vs. V.N. Rajan & ANR. [2009] INSC 1164 (7 July 2009)
Judgment
"REPORTABLE"
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 485
OF 2004 K. Ramachandran ....Appellant Versus V.N. Rajan & Anr.
....Respondents
V.S.
SIRPURKAR, J.
1.
By this appeal the appellant-appellant challenges the revisional
judgment of the High Court whereby the High court has upset the Trial Court's
judgment acquitting the appellant-appellant and has directed reconsideration of
the matter by the Trial Court. The High Court has further directed that such
reconsideration would be only on the basis of evidence already recorded.
2.
The appellant-appellant K. Ramachandran was tried for the offence
under Section 302 as also under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code on 2 the
allegation that he, on 18.02.1995, committed murder of his wife Nalini @ Latha
by hitting her with a wooden log on her head. The prosecution's case was that
the marriage of the appellant-accused and the said Nalini took place in 1992
and right from the beginning their marital life was not smooth as the
appellant-accused suspected her fidelity. After their marriage,
appellant-accused used to live with his wife in a rented house at Avadi. It was
the prosecution's story that neighbours used to hear wailing sounds of Nalini
and she had also told PW-5, Belamurthy that her fidelity was suspected by the
appellant-accused and on that account, the appellant-accused was not treating
her properly. During the pregnancy, the appellant-accused refused to send
Nalini to her parent's house though he was pressurised by PW-5 to send her to
the house of her father, PW-1.
The
appellant-accused went on to suggest that he was not the father of the child
which Nalini was bearing and hence she was brought back by PW-1 to his house.
Later the appellant-accused and his brother, Pandurangan took Nalini back to
the appellant-accused's house. When Nalini was at the advanced stage of
pregnancy, PW-1 wanted to take her to his house but the appellant-accused did
not permit that and said that he will take care of the confinement and wanted
the child to be born in his house. However, ultimately, the appellant-accused
relented on account of intervention of Belamurthy, PW-5.
3.
Ultimately, a child was born in the house of her father. But the
appellant-accused did not go to see the child. It was only when the child was
seven months old that the appellant-accused and brother Pandurangam took Nalini
and the child to their house. In the month of May in the year 1994 it is
reported that the appellant-accused cut the Thali chain (ornament worn by a
married lady) and threw her out of the house.
One
Krishnaveni, PW-4 had also seen the ill-treatment by the appellant- accused, of
his wife. One Girija who was the household servant of the appellant-accused had
also seen that. On 02.05.1994, Nalini was brought back by PWs 1 and 2 to their
house and after about two months, the appellant-accused and his brother again
came and took back her and they continued to live with each other for about 4-5
months. On 17.02.1995, when PWs 1 and 2 had gone to the house of
appellant-accused on being called by Nalini on phone. Nalini told them that she
was going to Vikravandi. On the next day, which was a Saturday, PWs 1 and 2
received the news of Nalini's death at 12:30 p.m. and went to Vikravandi. They
saw the dead body of Nalini and the injury on her head, on back and all over
the body. The matter was reported to the police. It was revealed during the
investigation that on the night of 17.02.1995, when PW-7 was sleeping in the
tea shop, the appellant-accused came to him and asked for the cot.
He was
then accompanied by Nalini and her daughter. However, on the next day in the
morning at 7 a.m., PW-7 heard the news of death of Nalini 4 while lighting
stove. Strangely enough, the matter was reported by the appellant-accused
himself who claimed in the FIR that Nalini went missing and ultimately died. On
that, the policy registered Crime No. 75/1995 under Section 174, Criminal
Procedure Code. The police found out the body in the well which was brought out
and post-mortem was conducted in Government hospital by Assistant Surgeon, Dr.
Bhoomadhu, PW-19. As many as eight injuries were found on the dead body and it
was found that Nalini had suffered a scull fracture.
4.
After the necessary investigation, the charge-sheet came to be
filed against appellant-accused. During investigation, the appellant-accused
had agreed to discover the log with which he had hit Nalini. The charges were
framed for offence under Section 302 and 201, IPC. During the trial, number of
witnesses came to be examined. The Sessions Judge, however, did not accept the
evidence of doctor and acquitted the appellant-accused of all the offences. The
Sessions Judge held specifically that it was not proved that the
appellant-accused had hit Nalini with a log.
5.
This judgment of the Sessions Judge was not appealed against by
the State. Instead, father of Nalini filed a criminal revision. This revision
seems to have been filed and was admitted by the High Court. It was pending
when the State Government filed an appeal against the acquittal 5 of the
appellant-accused which was delayed by 801 days. Strangely enough, that
condonation of delay application came to be considered by the Division Bench of
the High Court and the High Court, by its order dated 05.03.2003, dismissed the
condonation application. Thereby the appeal against acquittal could not
proceed. Very strangely, at the time when the condontion of delay application
in filing the appeal was considered by the High Court, it was not pointed out
by the Government advocate on criminal, side who appeared for the State, that a
revision had already been and was pending against the acquittal, at the
instance of father of Nalini.
Now, in
fact the State Government was very much a party in that revision and was also
served. After all, the said revision was admitted by the High Court. However,
since the Division Bench was totally unmindful of the pendency of the said
revision it merely dismissed the condonation of delay application. We have seen
that order. That is an order merely refusing to condone the delay and there is
nothing in the order to suggest that the High Court ever considered the merits
of the order of the Trial Court.
6.
Ultimately, the revision came up before the Single Judge of the
High Court, who allowed the revision and directed reconsideration of the matter
on the basis of evidence already on record. In the impugned order, the learned
Judge does not seem to have given any further opportunity to the 6 parties for
leading any further evidence and that is how this judgment of the learned
Single Judge is in challenge before us.
7.
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused,
firstly contended that the effect of dismissal of the condonation of delay
application was the dismissal of appeal. It was pointed out that the Division
Bench which considered the matter had made an observation in the order to the
effect that the appellant-accused was already acquitted in the year 1999 and,
therefore, to condone the delay and to admit the appeal would cause prejudice
him. The counsel, therefore, urged that this revision should have been
dismissed.
8.
Learned counsel for the complainant, however, argues that the
revision was filed prior in time as compared to the appeal filed against
acquittal and the said revision was also admitted by the High Court.
Further,
the High court had no occasion to consider the merits of the matter as it
proceeded to dismiss the application for condonation of delay.
If that
was so, there was nothing wrong in learned Judge considering the revision on
its merits. Learned counsel further pointed out that the question of
un-tenability of the revision was never pointed out to the learned Single Judge
by showing that the appeal against the decision could not proceed on account of
delay not being condoned by the High Court. Learned counsel urged that the
complainant had not done any 7 wrong in filing the revision which was also admitted
by the High Court and, therefore, the revision could not be wiped out merely
because the High court, without considering the merits of the matter, chose to
refuse the delay in filing the appeal by the State.
9.
We cannot find fault with the learned Single Judge in proceeding
ahead with the revision as it was never brought to the notice of the learned
Single Judge that the appeal against the same judgment which was impugned in
the revision had already been filed. It was for the appellant- accused to point
out that on the date when the revision was heard the fate of the criminal
appeal filed impugning the same judgment was sealed because of the refusal on
the part of the Division Bench to condone the delay. In fact, it was up to the
Government pleader who was a common party in both the revision and the appeal
to point out to the learned Single Judge about the dismissal of the condonation
of delay application. Very strangely, the Government pleader did not do that.
Again we are at a loss to understand as to how the criminal revision was left
out and was not mentioned before the Division Bench deciding the question of
condonation of delay in appeal, which was filed against the same judgment. In
this appeal, however, the first question which has been raised is about the
dismissal of the statutory appeal preferred by the State and its effect on the
pending revision. The appellant-appellant-accused, however, has 8 conveniently
avoided to state in the special leave petition as to when he came to know about
the dismissal of the condonation of delay application in filing the appeal and
how. We cannot, therefore, find fault with the learned Single Judge's judgment
who was never appraised of the dismissal of the condonation of delay
application. Similarly, since the order refusing to condone the delay is not
challenged before us, it will not be possible for us to go into that aspect
also. But we must observe that it was the duty of the State counsel to point
out that a revision was already pending against the same judgment which was
challenged in appeal but which appeal was delayed by more than 800 days at the
time when the application for condonation for delay was considered by the
Division Bench. Since the appellant-accused had not raised the question about
the continueability of the revision before the High Court, we would not
ordinarily allow the counsel for appellant-accused to raise that question
before us. Though, we must say that an awkward situation has arisen wherein an
appeal against the judgment had failed, though only on the question of
limitation, yet, a revision against the same judgment, however, continued and
was allowed also and all this happened because of the casual attitude on the
part of the State Government as also the appellant- accused in not pointing out
the proper facts to the Courts, both to the Division Bench as well as the
learned Single Judge.
10.
The question is undoubtedly important, and hence, though raised
for the first time before us, we propose to decide the same. An incongruous situation
has arisen where, though the appeal against the acquittal has been dismissed by
not allowing the condonation of delay in filing the same, yet, the revision
filed against the said judgment by the private complainant has not only
survived but such revision has also been allowed. We must observe that the
Division Bench in not allowing the condonation of delay has effectively
dismissed the appeal in the sense that it has not allowed the State Government
to proceed with the appeal for which there was a provision. This was a
prosecution not based on private complaint but on the police report. Therefore,
the State Government had a right under Section 378 (2) Cr. P.C. to file appeal
and very conspicuously the private party did not have that right. The private
complainant, therefore, could only excite the general powers of revision by the
High Court. Firstly, we must clarify that when the Division Bench considered
the question of condonation of delay in filing the appeal against acquittal,
though technically, it was deciding the application under Section 378 (3),
Cr.P.C.
It was
actually the whole appeal itself which was before it. In this behalf it will
have to be seen that the limitation for filing such appeal at the instance of
the State Government against acquittal is provided by Article 114 of the 10
Limitation Act. It is undoubtedly true that sub-Section (3) specifically
provides that the appeal under sub-Sections (1) and (2) cannot be entertained
except with the leave of the High Court and, therefore, an application for
leave in such appeal filed by the State Government is a must. The limitation
for filing the appeal is 90 days from the date of the order while the same
Article provides for 30 days of limitation from the date of grant of special
leave. Therefore, what was before the High Court was the appeal itself and the
petitioner prayed the condonation of delay of 801 days in filing appeal against
acquittal. When the High Court declined to grant that permission, it, in effect
refused to entertain the appeal against the order of the Trial Court, thus,
making it final. Now, obviously, if the judgment was rendered final by the
Division Bench of the High Court then there could not be any subsequent order
to the contrary by the Single Judge even if the effect of the pendency of the
revision was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. There is no
review power under the Criminal Procedure Code to the Criminal Court including
the High Court.
Such a
review power exists only in this Court. As such, once the High Court had passed
the order refusing the condonation of delay of appeal and thereby awarding the
finality to the Trial Court's judgment, that order could be considered and
upset only by this Court on a proper appeal having been filed in this Court by the
State Government. As against the State Government, the order of the Trial Court
acquitting the appellant- 11 accused had become final. Therefore, the only
course left open then in law was to challenge that order refusing to condone
the delay in filing appeal against acquittal. It is an admitted fact that such
appeal challenging the order passed by the Division Bench was never filed and
the order of the Division Bench became final and has remained final till today.
Under such circumstances, in our considered opinion, the revision against the
same order could not have been entertained, much less allowed upsetting the
finality of the Trial Court's judgment, which finality was confirmed by the
order of the High court by refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal
against the same Trial Court judgment. That would be the true import of the
appellate powers of the High Court.
An
attractive argument is pressed in service by the learned counsel for the
complainant that this is a case where the complainant's side was not considered
at all.
We must
express here that considering the history of appeal against acquittal and the
revisional powers of the High court, the appeal against acquittal originally
was not there. That was a general rule in England. In Canada, such right was
recognised by Section 584 of the Canadian Criminal Code only on the point of
law to the Court of appeal for an indictable offence. In New Zealand also vide
Sections 380-382 of the Crimes Act, 1861, there were similar provisions. In
comparison to these 12 strict provisions, in India, however, unlimited and
general right was given in respect of appeal against acquittals in favour of
the State Government. In its 48th Report, the Law Commission cautioned against
the unlimited nature of the right and prescribed that it was desirable to put
some limitation as to the nature of cases where the right would be available. It
was also further provided that regard must be had to the need of putting
reasonable limitations on the period for which anxiety and tension of a
criminal prosecution could be allowed to torment the mind of the appellant-
accused. It was provided that there is a qualitative distinction between
conviction and acquittal and appeals against acquittals should not be allowed
in the same un-restricted manner as appeal against conviction.
Before
that in its 41st Report, the Law Commission had observed that the appeals
against acquittals should be heard by the High Court to avoid miscarriage of
justice and to secure a uniform standard in dealing with such appeals. It was
further provided that the right of appeal should be confined only to the State
and the complainant and cannot be given to other interested persons. Thirdly,
it was provided that there no need for an express provision to the effect that
when an appeal by State has been dismissed no application for special leave by
complainant should be competent since this is a necessary consequence of the
dismissal of appeal. (Emphasis supplied). Forthly, it was provided that an
appeal from a Single Judge to the Bench will not serve any useful purpose, and
lastly it 13 was provided there was no justification for extending the time for
appeals by the State.
In the
Report of Joint Select Committee also it was recommended that such appeals
shall be entertained by the High Court only if it grants leave to the State
Government in this behalf. This is necessary to check any arbitrary exercise of
executive power. Section 378, Cr.P.C., as it stood then was further amended
w.e.f 23.06.2006 by Act No.25 of 2005 vide Section 32 while for the first time
the appeals against acquittals recorded by a Magistrate in respect of cognizable
and bailable offences could be tried by the Court of Sessions also. But we are
not concerned with that Amendment.
All this
would clearly suggest that once the appeal at the instance of the State has
been dismissed, the complainant or the state could not ask for the revision of
the judgment. In this particular case, we are of the clear cut opinion, that
since the Trial Court's judgment was given the effect of finality by the
Division Bench of the High Court then learned Single Judge of that Court could
not have reversed that effect and upset that position .
In this
behalf, even sub-Section (6) would, though not directly, support this view.
Sub-Section (6) provides as under:
"(6)
If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special
leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, 14 no appeal from that
order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section
(2)."
This
would mean that if a case is instituted by the complainant and such leave is
refused even the State Government would be unable to pursue any appeal under
sub-Sections (1) or (2) against the impugned judgment of acquittal. In effect
by sub-Section (6), the finality attained by the dismissal of an application
for special leave is confirmed by the Court then that verdict would operate
against the said judgment of acquittal being challenged even at the instance of
the State Government. If this is the effect of the finality attained by the
judgment, even in case of an offence which was tried on the basis of a private
complaint, then there would be no reason not to give the same effect to the
finality attained by the judgment of acquittal by reason of the order passed in
appeal, filed by the State Government.
Again, as
we have already pointed out the finality confirmed by the Division Bench should
not be upset by the judgment of the Single Bench of the same Court. Such
incongruous results would follow if we allow the revision to be entertained and
decided. In this case, undoubtedly, the revision was not only entertained but
also admitted by the High Court. We have only to express that the attitude on
the part of the State Government counsel as also the appellant-accused was
extremely casual. We also do not understand as to why, when appeal was filed
along with the application 15 for condonation of delay against the judgment of
acquittal, the revision pending against the same judgment of acquittal was not
joined with the appeal. Ordinarily, that should have been done. It is all the
result of colossal casualness even on the part of the Registry of the High
Court which has resulted in such incongruous situation. We, however, cannot
blame the learned Single Judge for proceeding with the revision as he was never
apprised of the dismissal of the appeal.
The
limitation aspect cannot be such as to be apart or distinct from the merits of
the impugned judgment. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appeal was only
disposed of on the question of limitation. The result would, after all, be the
same i.e. impugned judgment gaining finality.
11.
However, we find that the revision could not have proceeded and
the appellant-accused must succeed on this plea alone. We have also considered
the judgment of the learned Single Judge on merits of the matter. In a revision
against acquittal preferred by a private party, there is a very little scope to
interfere. Here was a case where the learned Single Judge dis-approved of the
appreciation of the evidence by the Trial Court.
It is not
as if the Trial Court had ignored any important piece of evidence or it had
chosen not to appreciate the same. It is again not as if there was any piece of
evidence which was illegally not permitted to come on record.
Again, it
is also not a case where there was some serious defect in the trial 16
affecting the merits of the matter. Further, the Court trying the appellant-
accused did not lack the jurisdiction also to try and convict or acquit the
appellant-accused. All that the High Court has observed is that the
appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court was not correct and the Trial Court
should not have taken the view that it has taken of the evidence.
This
question has been considered in the celebrated judgment of Akalu Ahir &
Ors. v. Ramdeo Ram [(1973) 2 SCC 583], where, after considering the judgments
of D. Stephens v. Nosibolla [1951 SCR 284], Logendranath Jha v. Polailal [1951
SCR 676], K.C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(1963) 3 SCR 412] and Mahendra
Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh [(1968) 2 SCR 287] this Court came out with
categories of case which would justify the High Court in interfering with the
finding of acquittal in revision:
"(i)
Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still
acquitted the appellant- accused;
(ii)
Where the Trail Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution
wished to produce;
(iii)
Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by
the Trial Court to be inadmissible;
(iv)
Where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the Trial
Court or by the appellate Court; and 17 (v) Where the acquittal is based on the
compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law."
Of
course, these categories were declared by this Court to be illustrative and
this Court observed that other cases of similar nature could also be properly
held to be exceptional in nature where the High Court could justifiably
interfere with the order of acquittal. In this very judgment though in
paragraph 10, this Court did not generally approve of the appreciation of
evidence by the Trial Court Judge and held it to be not perfect or free from
flaw and further observed "the Court of appeal may be justified in
disagreeing with the conclusion, but it does not follow that on revision by a
private complainant, the High Court is not entitled to re- appreciate the
evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a
re-trial." The situation, as we will show further, is identical in the
present case.
12.
In the impugned judgment, learned Single Judge has pointed out the
prosecution case that the Court noticed that though the appellant-accused was
supposed to reach Vikravandi in the day time on 18.02.1995, he preferred to
reach on 17.02.1995 at about 2 a.m. and then the appellant- accused took shelter
in the tea shop of PW-7. Learned Judge further noted that at about 5 a.m. in
the morning the deceased wanted to answer the call of nature and, hence,
leaving the child in the tea shop itself, the 18 appellant-accused took the
deceased to his lands where there is a well and after the deceased answered the
nature's call when she went to wash herself in the nearby well she slipped and
fell into the well and was drowned. The learned Judge also noted that the
appellant-accused himself reported that at about 11:20 a.m. in the Vikravandi
police station.
Thereafter,
some villagers and the police came to the spot of occurrence and the further
investigation started. The learned Single Judge further noted that the
prosecution examined 20 witnesses including the relations of the deceased as
also PWs 1 and 2, who were the parents of the deceased, PW-3, son-in-law and
PW-4 who was the servant maid in the house of the appellant-accused. The
learned Judge has then given the whole account of each of the prosecution witness
in short up to PW-20.
13.
While considering the evidence of PW-19, the doctor who conducted
the post-mortem, following observation was made by the learned Judge:
"In
cross examination a specific question was put that if a person falls down from
a high place into a well where there was water, would such injury be caused.
The doctor has negatived the suggestion and he was of the opinion that the said
injury could have been caused only when she had been hit with some weapon and
MO No.1 would be such a weapon that could have caused the injury."
14.
When we see the evidence of Dr. Bhoomadhu, who was examined as
PW-19, we clearly see the following assertions in paragraph 9 of his
deposition:
19
"I opined that the death should have occurred 28 to 30 hours earlier. I
opeined the death could have been caused because of loss of blood due to
injuries and shock. Ex.35 is the requisition. Ex.36 is the report I had sent.
The Inspector showed the MO No. 1 the log and enquired me with No.1 the
injuries over the body 1 to 5 cold have been possible."
15.
In the cross-examination this witness asserted that "8th
injury is inside and there was no outward injury to that"(sic).
16.
He admitted in the cross-examination that the injury was very
minor one and there was no need to cut that. The depth of injuries 1, 2 and 4
was 1/4th cms. and they were ordinary external injuries and there was no need
to open them and, therefore, he did not open them. He further admitted that the
Inspector enquired him on 12.06.1997 and he did not remember whether the
Inspector examined him showing the log, MO No. 1. He also could not say whether
the blood was beneath would 2, 4 and 5.
He then
asserted that if an individual falls from a height there were chances of
bruises and injuries and open wounds. When falling from a height if head dashes
against a hard substance, injury No. 8 can be caused. He also admitted that if
a blow was given by MO NO.1 on the head, external injury can be there. He
further tried to explain that if the hitting was light there would be no
external injury.
17.
We have examined the evidence of the doctor almost line by line
but we do not see any assertion on the part of the doctor which has been quoted
by the learned Judge in paragraph 10 of his judgment which we have quoted
above. Therefore, it is obvious that the High Court has mis- read the evidence
of the doctor. It will be worthwhile to see that the doctor has specifically
said that "there was no corresponding outward injury to the 8th injury
suffered by the deceased"(sic) . If this is so, it is not possible to hold
that the 8th injury which was only an internal injury would be caused by MO No.1,
a log. The doctor, on his external examination found an internal fracture.
Injury No.8 was only a Haemorrhage or a blood clot.
18.
After reading the evidence carefully, we are of the opinion that
the evidence of the doctor has been completely mis-read by the high Court. In
paragraph 13 of the judgment, the learned Judge has referred to the finding by
the Trial Court that the appellant-accused had been ill-treating his wife. In
paragraph 17, learned Judge has commented upon the conduct of the
appellant-accused and has observed that that appellant- accused had not come
forward with any specific case as to why he took his wife on the night of
17.2.1995 to Vikravandi and as to why at 2 a.m.
when
appellant-accused could have gone to his own house, he preferred to stay in a
tea shop. It is then commented that the story, that he accompanied the deceased
to the field when she wanted to answer the 21 nature's call, was difficult to
digest. It has also come later on in the judgment that it was strange that the
lady should have gone to the well instead of a nearby pond to wash herself. In
our opinion, these observations are speculative. If the lady had gone to the
well in the dark at 5 O'clock then one wonders how she could have seen the
nearby pond.
Again, it
has not been proved that the field belonged to the appellant- accused. There
appears to be a lot of confusion on that issue. The field has been described in
the R.D.O. report in the Magazar as survey No. 167/5. It is then further
mentioned in paragraph that the said well in the Punja survey No. 167/5 in
Patta No. 354 to be in the name of Panduramng s/o Kasilingam. We, therefore,
fail to understand as to how it was mentioned that the field belonged to the
appellant-accused.
19.
Lastly, it is expressed by the High Court in paragraph 19:
"What
is more surprising is that there were as many as 8 injuries in the body. The
injury on the head makes it abundantly clear that she has been assaulted by a
weapon. It is not the case of the accused that there was any stone or any protruding
material in the well which could have hit on the head. It is nobody's case.
Therefore,
it is for the accused to explain as to how all these things happened."
20.
We do not think that this was a correct approach as the above
observation is not factually correct. In the whole judgment, it is nowhere
pointed out as to how and where the Trial Court had gone wrong. When 22 we see
the judgment of the Trial Court, it is seen that the Trial Court has awarded
the acquittal as according to it in a case based on circumstantial evidence,
the chain of circumstances has to be complete and in this case it was not. The
only two circumstances which were held proved according to the Trial Court were
that the deceased was last seen accompanying the appellant-accused herein and
that her dead body was found near the residential plot of the
appellant-accused. To the Trial court these two circumstances were not enough
to book him much less for an offence under Section 302, IPC. The learned
Sessions Judge also explained the 8 injuries noted by the doctor and has
appreciated the evidence of PW-19 and observed that barring injury No.8, which
was an internal injury there were no other outward serious injuries as those
injuries were minor and might have been caused by some insect or biting by
fish. He pointed out that the doctor was not certain whether the injury Nos. 2,
4 and 5 suggested that they were ante-mortem injuries. He also said that the
post-mortem report was inconclusive. The Trial Court has, in detail, considered
the evidence and came to the finding that the verdict of conviction was not
possible in this case. We have already pointed out that the approach of the
learned revisional Court was not correct, after all this was a revision against
acquittal, at the instance of private party.
21.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court has directed not even
re-trial but re-appraisal of the evidence which will be clear from the last
paragraph of the impugned judgment before us. We do not think that this could
be the course adopted in the matter. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set
aside the judgment of the revisional Court and restore that of the Trial Court.
...........................J. [V.S. SIRPURKAR]
...........................J. [R.M. LODHA]
NEW DELHI
JULY 7, 2009 24
Digital
Performa Case No. : Criminal Appeal No. 485 of 2004 Date of Decision :
07.07.2009 Cause Title : K. Ramachandran Versus V.N. Rajan & Anr.
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