U.P. State Road
Transport Corporation Vs. Assistant Comnr. of Police (Traffic) Delhi [2009]
INSC 312 (12 February 2009)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 950 OF 2009 (Arising out
of SLP (C) No.2359 of 2006) U.P. State Road Transport Corporation ... Appellant
Versus Assistant Comnr. of Police (Traffic) Delhi ...
Respondent With Civil
Appeal No. 951 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.2408 of 2006)
S.B. Sinha, J.
1.
Leave
granted in both the SLPs. Both the appeals are being disposed of through this
common judgment.
2.
Interpretation
of a judgment of this Court, vis-`-vis the action taken by the first respondent
pursuant to or in furtherance thereof is in question in these appeals. In the
appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.2359 of 2006, the challenge is against a
judgment and order dated 9.9.2005 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No.1958 of 2005 whereby and whereunder a judgment
and order dated 10.8.2004 passed by a learned Single Judge of the said Court in
Civil Writ Petition No.8339 of 2002 was upheld. The appeal arising out of SLP
(C) No.2408 of 2006 is against the order and judgment dated 9.9.2005 passed by
the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in LPA No.1956 of 2005 confirming
an order dated 17.8.2004 passed by a learned Single Judge in WP (C) No.13688 of
2004.
3.
Since
the facts in both the appeals are identical and since the same legal questions
arise in both the appeals, reference is being made to the facts in the appeal
arising out of SLP (C) No.2359 of 2006. Appellant is a Corporation constituted
and registered under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1951, indisputably,
for the purpose of plying of buses on various routes falling within the State
of Uttar Pradesh and National Capital Territory of Delhi. Several agreements as
envisaged under sub-section (5) 3 of Section 88 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 (hereinafter called and referred to for the sake of brevity as `the Act')
were executed.
4.
A
Public Interest Litigation in regard to observance of the norms of safety on
the roads came up for consideration before this Court in a writ petition filed
by one Shri M.C. Mehta which was registered as Writ Petition (Civil) No.13029
of 1985. This Court in exercise of its power under Article 32 read with Article
142 of the Constitution of India issued the following directions by an order
dated 20.11.1997 :
"(a) No heavy
and medium transport vehicles, and light goods vehicles being four wheelers
would be permitted to operate on the roads of the NCR and NCTT, Delhi, unless
they are fitted with suitable speed control devices to ensure that they do not
exceed the speed limit of 40 KMPH. This will not apply to transport vehicles
operating on Inter-State permits and national goods permits. Such exempted
vehicles would, however, be confined to such routes and such timings during day
and night as the police/transport authorities may publish. It is made clear
that no vehicle would be permitted on roads other than the aforementioned
exempted roads or during the times other than aforesaid time without a speed
control device.
(b) In our view the scheme
of the Act necessarily implies an obligation to use the vehicle in a manner
which does not imperil public safety. The authorities aforesaid 4 should,
therefore, ensure that the transport vehicles are not permitted to overtake any
other four-wheel motorized vehicle.
XXX XXX XXX (e) Any
breach of the aforesaid directions by any person would, apart form entailing
other legal consequences, be dealt with as contravention of the conditions of
the permit which could entail suspension /cancellation of the permit and
impounding of the vehicle.
XXX XXX XXX The
Government is directed to notify under section 86(4) the officers of the rank
of Assistant Commissioners of Police or above so that these officers are also
utilized for constituting the flying squads.
XXX XXX XXX B. We
direct the Union of India to ensure that the contents of this Order are
suitably publicized in the print as well as the electronic media not later than
November 22, 1997 so that every body is made aware of the directions contained
in the Order.
Such publication
would be sufficient public notice to all concerned for due compliance.
C. We, direct that
this Order will be carried out notwithstanding any other order or directions by
any authority, Court or Tribunal, and that no authority shall interfere with
the functioning of the police and transport department in so far as
implementation and execution of these directions is concerned."
5.
In
the first appeal, a bus of the appellant Corporation bearing Registration No.UP
14 Q 8755, driven by one Shri Shiv Lal was found overtaking another four wheel
vehicle bearing Registration No. DL 1 LD 6452 and, thus, purported to have
violated the conditions as enshrined in the directions of this Court. A
proceeding under Sections 3/181, 66(i)/92A of the Act was initiated.
In the said
proceeding, fine of Rs.300/- was imposed.
6.
Respondent,
as a purported consequence of the penalty imposed upon the driver of the said
vehicle, initiated a proceeding under Section 86 of the Act, directing :
"NOW THEREFORE,
I.K.S. Bedi, Assistant Commissioner of Police/Traffic/East district, Delhi in
exercise of powers delegated to me u/s read with 86(4) of M.V.Act, 1988 by STA
Delhi vide its Board Resolution No.1/98, dated 25.5.1998 hereby require General
Manager s/o Shri Nil R/o UPSRTC, Lucknow, U.P. the permit holder top show cause
as to why the said permit should not be suspended for a period of one month for
the above mentioned violations. Your reply, if any, should reach the
undersigned within a period of 7 days from the date of the show cause notice,
failing which, it will be presumed that you have nothing to say and the case
will be decided ex parte on merits.
6 You are also at
liberty to appear before the undersigned within the stipulated period to make
personal submissions, if any, in this regard."
7.
By
reason of an order dated 20.12.2002, the permit was suspended, stating :
"AND WHEREAS, it
is evident from the record brought up before the undersigned and submission
that the permit holder has violated the permit conditions as enshrined in the
directions of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of M.C.Mehta vs. UOI. It
is also evident that the permit holder has ignored the safety of the public on
road and failed to exercise such supervision as was necessary on his employees
as a result of which the vehicle violated the permit conditions, provisions of
MV Act framed there under to the extent that the vehicle was being driven in
such a way which has dangerous for the public safety.
NOW THEREFORE,
keeping in view all the facts of the case, reply of the show cause notice
submitted by the permit holder on one hand and on the other hand going through
the STA Board Resolution, permit conditions mentioned in the brochure and
directions of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of M.C.Mehta vs. UOI, I,
K.S.Bedi, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Traffic, East Distt. Delhi in
exercise of powers under section 86 of M.V.Act, 1988 and delegated to me vide
STA Board Resolution No.1/98 dated 25.5.1998 do hereby suspend the permit No.
of UP-14R-7231 of the said vehicle for a period of [7] seven days from the date
of depositing the vehicle at Burari Pit (STA),Delhi within 3 days 7 positively
and receipt be submitted in this office alongwith the original permit of the
vehicle which will be kept on the file till the expiry of suspension
period."
8.
A
writ petition was filed thereagainst by the appellant. A learned Single Judge
of the Delhi High Court, by an order dated 10.8.2004, having regard to the directions
issued by this Court on 20.11.1997, refused to interfere with the said order
dated 20.12.2002, stating:
"Learned counsel
for the respondent states that in fact the petitioner has not surrendered the
bus in pursuance to the order for suspension of the licence. It is seen from
the order-sheet that there is no interim relief granted in favour of the
petitioner. If the Petitioner has failed to comply with the directions for
suspension of the permit/licence, it is open to the respondent to take appropriate
measures not only to enforce the said order but to take further action against
the petitioner for not having complied with directions passed by the
respondents."
9.
Without
preferring a Letters Patent Appeal thereagainst, a Special Leave Petition was
filed. The same was dismissed as withdrawn.
Thereafter a Letters
Patent Appeal was filed against the said order dated 10.8.2004. It is, however,
stated that another special leave petition filed in identical matter was
dismissed.
10.
By
reason of the impugned judgment, the said appeal has been dismissed by the High
Court.
11.
Mr.
Ashok Srivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant urged
that having regard to the provisions of Section 86 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
the respondent, not being the appropriate State Transport Authority, could not
have directed impounding of the bus and/or suspension of the permit.
It was urged that as
the State of U.P. has entered into a mutual agreement with the National Capital
Territory of Delhi in regard to the plying of buses in the National Capital
region, the terms and conditions laid down therein being binding on both the
parties in the event of any violation of any provisions of the Motor Vehicles
Act, the rules framed thereunder or the conditions of permit, the rules
applicable to the State of U.P. shall be attracted. Even otherwise, the learned
counsel would contend in relation to a inter-State permit, the State which had
merely countersigned could only withdraw the same but would have no
jurisdiction to cancel or suspend the permit as such.
12.
Mr.
Qadri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand
would contend :
9 1) The order dated
20.12.2000 having been passed in compliance of this Court's order, the impugned
judgment of the High Court should not be interfered with.
2) This Court, having
dismissed the special leave petition whereafter only a letters patent appeal
was filed, the present appeal is not maintainable.
13.
The
National Capital Territory of Delhi, in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 86(4) of the Act, having delegated its power to various police
authorities, the respondent had the requisite jurisdiction to pass an order
suspending the permit in terms thereof. Our attention in this behalf has been
drawn to Rule 61-A as inserted by Notification dated 19.5.1998, which reads as
under:
"`DELEGATION OF
POWERS FOR SUSPENSION OF PERMIT : The State Transport Authority may by general
or special resolution recorded in its proceedings and subject to the
restrictions, limitation and conditions that it may impose, delegate to Group
`A' and Group `B' Gazetted Officers, its powers under section 86 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 to suspend a permit or to recover from the holder thereof a
sum of money agreed upon in accordance with sub- section (5) of section 86 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Provided that the
State Transport Authority may delegate its powers as mentioned hereinabove by
specifying the designation of the officer(s) and the name of the Government
department/branch in which the said officer (s) may be serving if it is
necessary to do so."
14.
Pursuant
thereto or in furtherance therof, the State Transport Authority had delegated
its power in favour of the respondent in terms of a circular letter dated
23.9.1998 containing the resolution passed by the Authority. Respondent, even
otherwise, having regard to the provisions of Section 207 of the Act had the
requisite jurisdiction to detain the bus.
Respondent having the
requisite power to suspend the operation of permit granted by the U.P. State
Transport Authority even if a wrong provision had been maintained, it need not
be held that the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction.
15.
The
Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles.
Chapter V of the Act deals with control of transport vehicles. Section 66 of
the Act provides for the necessity of permits stating that no owner of a motor
vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle
actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the
conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State
Transport Authority or any prescribed authority 11 authorizing him the use of
the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is used. The power
to control Road Transport Corporation is vested in the State under Section 67
of the Act. Section 68 provides for constitution of Transport Authorities.
Section 71 provides for the procedure of Regional Transport Authority in the
matter of considering application for stage carriage permit. Section 72, inter
alia, provides for any or more of the conditions as stated in sub-section (2)
of Section 72 to be attached to the permit. Section 80 provides for the
procedure of filing of application for and grant of permits. Section 84
provides for general conditions attaching to all permits. Section 86 deals with
cancellation and suspension of permits, sub-section (1) whereof reads as under
:
"Section 86 -
Cancellation and suspension of permits.--(1) The transport authority which
granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it
thinks fit- (a) on the breach of any condition specified in section 84 or of
any condition contained in the permit, or (b) if the holder of the permit uses
or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the
permit, or (c) if the holder of the permit ceases to own the vehicle covered by
the permit, or (d) if the holder of the permit has obtained the permit by fraud
or misrepresentation, or 12 (e) if the holder of the goods carriage permit,
fails without reasonable cause, to use the vehicle for the purposes for which
the permit was granted, or (f) if the holder of the permit acquires the
citizenship of any foreign country:
Provided that no
permit shall be suspended or cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to
the holder of the permit to furnish his explanation."
Section 88 of the Act
provides for validation of permits for use outside the region for which it is
granted. Sub-Section (4) thereof reads as under :
"(4) The
provisions of this Chapter relating to the grant, revocation and suspension of
permits shall apply to the grant, revocation and suspension of
countersignatures of permits:
Provided that it
shall not be necessary to follow the procedure laid down in Section 80 for the
grant of countersignatures of permits, where the permits granted in any one
State are required to be countersigned by the State Transport Authority of
another State or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned as a result of
any agreement arrived at between the States after complying with the
requirements of sub-section (5)."
Sub-sections (5),
(6), (7) and (8) of Section 88 lay down the procedure or provide for entering
into the agreements between the States to fix the number of permits.
Section 89 of the Act
provides for an appeal from such an order where for the State Government is
required to constitute Transport Appellate Tribunals in such numbers as it
thinks fit.
Section 207 of the
Act authorises any police officer to seize and detain any motor vehicle in the
event he has reason to believe that it has been or was being used in
contravention of the provisions of section 3 or section 4 or section 39 or
without the permit required by sub-section (1) of section 66 or in
contravention of any condition of such permit relating to the route on which or
the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used in the
prescribed manner and for the said purpose to take or cause to be taken any
steps he may consider proper for the temporary safe custody of the vehicle.
16.
The
directions issued by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
32 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India must be held to be in
addition to the conditions contained in the permit and/or the provisions of the
Act.
17.
Regulation
of motor vehicles is vested in the State and/or statutory authorities.
Ordinarily, they should exercise their power within the four corners thereof.
Right to ply a
vehicle in terms of the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder is
a statutory right. Where a person, including a juristic person, is conferred a
right to carry on business, regulation thereof should ordinarily be governed by
the statute under which the permit has been granted. Although in view of
several decisions of this Court and, in particular, Vishaka & Ors. V. State
of Rajasthan & Ors. [(1997) 6 SCC 241], even if additional regulatory
measures are laid down, the same, in our opinion, should be construed strictly.
18.
Keeping
in mind the aforementioned legal principles, we may now consider the effect of
the directions issued by this Court.
19.
Paragraph
`A' of the directions has been issued upon the Police and all other authorities
entrusted with the administration and enforcement of the Act and generally with
the control of the traffic. The direction upon the authorities to ensure that
the transport vehicles are not permitted to overtake any four wheels motorized
vehicle was issued as in the view of this Court, the scheme of the Act
necessarily implied an obligation to use the vehicle in 15 a manner which does
not imperil public safety. Clause (e) of the order must be construed in the
light of the purpose and object for which the Act was enacted.
20.
The
direction that any breach will be considered to be in contravention of the
conditions of the permit which could entail suspension/cancellation of the
permit and impounding of the vehicle must be read in the light of the provisions
of the Act and not de hors the same.
This Court could not
and, in fact, did not while issuing the said direction confer a statutory
authority upon a person who did not have any such authority under the statute.
An order passed by an authority without jurisdiction, it is trite, would be a
nullity. It would, therefore, be preposterous to presume that this Court would
confer jurisdiction upon an authority whose order would be a nullity and, thus,
non est in the eye of law.
21.
The
aforementioned directions must be construed having regard to the reasons
assigned in support thereof. This Court analysed each of the relevant chapters
and the provision of the Act. It considered a proposal made by the Transport
Commissioner whereby maximum punishment was proposed to be raised. It, in the
aforementioned backdrop, took into consideration the realities and chaotic
state of road traffic in National Capital Region and National Capital Territory
of Delhi. Referring to 16 Section 207 of the Act which empowers any police
officer or other person authorised in this behalf, to detain vehicles used
without certificate of registration permit etc., it was opined:
"In our opinion,
the existing provisions in the Act alone are sufficient to clothe the members
of the police force and the transport authorities with ample powers to control
and regulate the traffic in an appropriate manner so that no vehicle being used
in a public place poses any danger to the public in any form. The requirement
of maintaining the motor vehicles in the manner prescribed and its use if
roadworthy in a manner which does not endanger the public, has to be ensured by
the authorities and this is the aim of these provisions enacted in the Act. As
earlier stated, we reach this conclusion even without reference to the general
powers available to the police officers under the Police Act and the Code of
Criminal Procedure."
{See M.C. Mehta v.
Union of India & Ors. [(1997) 8 SCC 770]}.
22.
What
was emphasized is that empowerment of the authority. Such empowerment must be
within the broad framework of the Act. The judge made law in an area covered by
the Parliamentary Act should not be applied in an expansive manner. Nothing
should be deduced therefrom.
23.
A
decision is an authority, it is trite, for which it decides and not what can
logically be deduced therefrom. This wholesome principle is equally 17
applicable in the matter of construction of a judgment. A judgment is not to be
construed as a statute. It must be construed upon reading the same as a whole.
For the said purpose, the attending circumstances may also be taken into
consideration. {See Ramesh Chand Daga v. Rameshwari Bai [(2005) 4 SCC 772]}.
24.
Unfortunately,
the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court did not
pose unto themselves the correct question(s). It misread the provisions of
Section 86 to hold that respondent was clothed with the jurisdiction of
suspension and/or cancellation of the permit and impounding of the vehicle in
terms of the order of the Court. This Court had merely spelt out the
consequences emanating from contravention of the directions. Such directions,
if read with the provisions of the Act, would mean that the procedure for
suspension/cancellation of the permit and impounding of the vehicle must be
followed as contained in the Act.
Jurisdiction for the
said purpose must be exercised by the authority under the statute. No statutory
authority, whether empowered by this Court or otherwise, can act de hors the
statute.
25.
The
width and breadth of Article 142 of the Constitution although is wide, any
direction issued thereunder by reason of an interpretation should not be
expanded. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court did 18 precisely
this. The Division Bench unfortunately did not consider this aspect of the
matter. It is true that in one case the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.
But it was an unreasoned order. It did not create any precedent. Thus, when a
Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable, the Division Bench could have and, in
our opinion, should have determined the question in accordance with law. We,
therefore, are of the opinion that violation of the directions of this Court
would merely entail the consequences which would mean that the respondent could
proceed to take action only in accordance with law including the provisions
contained in Section 88 of the Act.
26.
Indisputably,
the Lieutenant Governor of National Capital Territory of Delhi inserted Rule
61-A in the Rules by reason whereof the State Transport Authority had been
vested with the power to delegate its powers in favour of any other authority.
A purported resolution was passed by the State Transport Authority which is to
the following effect:
"Now that the
necessary rule has been gazetted it is proposed that the power to suspend
permits under section 86 may now be delegated in accordance with Rule 61-A of
the Delhi Motor Vehicles Rules, 1993 to officers of the category that were
empowered vide Resolution no.28/1997 dated 21-11-1997 subject to the condition
that the delegation shall be liable to be reviewed from time to time and also
subject to the limitation that the 19 power to charge compounding fees in lieu
of suspension in case of fatal accidents by stage carriage buses shall be
exerciseable by officers of the level of Deputy Director and above of the
Transport Department only in accordance with the procedure laid down vide
resolution no.3/1997 dated 2-4-1997."
27.
Vires
of the said delegation not being under challenge, we would assume the same to
be valid. The question, however, is as to whether even in terms of the said
delegated power, the respondent could direct suspension of permit of a bus
belonging to appellant and in respect whereof inter-State permit had been
granted by the U.P. State Transport Authority.
28.
Section
86 of the Act, on a plain reading, clearly confers power to suspend a permit
only on the authority which had granted it. Even the conditions therefor have
been laid down.
29.
It
is not in dispute that inter-State permits have been granted pursuant to the
agreements entered into by and between the State of U.P. and National Capital
Territory of Delhi. Mr. Srivastava has placed before us a sample copy of the
Agreement. Paragraph 4 of the said Agreement refers to stage carriage (substantive
permits). Paragraph 14 of the said Agreement provides for the general powers.
We may refer to some of the clauses thereof:
20 "(ii)
Permits issued within the terms of reciprocal agreement shall be countersigned
immediately on presentation before the Regional Transport Authority or the
State Transport Authority subject to payment of countersignature fee and other
taxes due to that State.
(iv) Except as
provided otherwise in the agreement, the vehicles of the one reciprocating
State plying in the other State shall be governed by the rules, other than the
provisions relating to payment of taxes and fees, and fare of the State which
granted the permit.
(v) Before any action
is taken for breach of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and the
Rules framed thereunder against the State Transport Undertakings of the
reciprocating State a prior reference to the Head of the State Transport
Undertaking concerned shall be made in order to decide if departmental action
would not be adequate instead of prosecuting them in the Court of Law."
30.
In
terms of the aforementioned Agreement also, thus, in case of any violation by
any driver of any vehicle for which such carriage permit had been granted, it
is the authorities of the State of U.P. who could take action.
The rules framed by
the State of U.P. alone would be applicable in relation thereto. Thus, Rule 64A
of the Delhi Rules pursuant whereto or in furtherance whereof the delegation of
power in favour of the respondents had been made, would not apply. Even
otherwise, the countersigning State would not be entitled to suspend or cancel
the permit of a vehicle wherefor a stage carriage permit has been granted by
the State of U.P.
31.
The
question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High
Court in Gajalakshmi Ammal Manonmaniammal Bus Service vs. The State Transport
Appellate Tribunal, Madras & Anr. [AIR 1962 MADRAS 173] wherein
interpreting the provisions of Section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which
is in pari materia with Section 86 of the Act, it was held:
"(3) There can
be no doubt that overloading of passengers in a stage carriage is a breach of
the conditions of the permit. Section 63 relates to the issue of permits over
inter-district routes. Sub- section (1) of that section provides that a permit
granted by the Regional Transport Authority of one region could be valid for
another region, if the Regional Transport Authority of the latter region counter-signs
the permit. It follows from the provisions of the section that the original or
primary permit is granted under S.60 and that S.63 (1) only provides for its
validation by a counter- signature. Section 63 (3) only means that the power of
suspension would apply even in regard to breach of a condition with respect to
inter district permits, i.e., it confers a power on the authority granting the
primary permit to take cognizance of offences in the course of the route, even
though such route is outside his jurisdiction and to cancel or suspend the
permit, if there is a breach of any condition relating to the same. We are
therefore of opinion that the Regional Transport Authority of North Arcot, who
issued 22 the original permit, had jurisdiction to impose punishment in
respect of the breach of the conditions of the permit, even if any such breach
took place in the South Arcot Dt."
32.
A
similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
A. Annamalai vs. State Transport Authority Andhra Pradesh & ors. [AIR 1962
AP 148] wherein Jaganmohan Reddy, J. (as His Lordship then was) held :
"From a reading
of this section it is seen that where the vehicle is to be used in two or more
regions in the same State, that authority is given jurisdiction in which the
majority of the route is to be operated, or if the route is equally divided
between two regions in the same state, that authority has jurisdiction where
the vehicle is kept. When it comes to the jurisdiction of the authority where the
vehicle is plying between two States, the Legislature has vested jurisdiction
in that authority where the applicant resides or has his principal place of
business. There is a clear indication in this section to vest the jurisdiction
in that authority which has control over the applicant by reason of his being
domiciled within that state.
The counter signature
by the countersigning authority under S.42 is dependent upon the grant of the
primary permit. If the permit is cancelled by the primary authority, the
vehicle cannot possibly be plied in the region of the countersigning authority;
but if the countersignature is cancelled for any breach of the conditions
imposed by the countersigning authority, the vehicle can be plied up that
region.
23 In such
circumstances, therefore, the anomaly to which the learned advocate for the
petitioner has adverted does not in fact exist because, for the breach of any
independent conditions imposed by the countersigning authority which conditions
are not the conditions imposed by the primary authority, it is only the
countersigning authority that can cancel the counter signature. But if the
conditions of the permit issued by the primary authority are merely counter
signed, then the jurisdiction to cancel the permit for any breach of the
conditions in the region of the counter signing authority would vest in the
primary authority also because such suspension or cancellation would be the
only effective method of control over such stage carriage permit holder. The
cancellation of the countersignature, as we have already indicated, would be
ineffective."
33.
Submission
of Mr. Qadri that action could have been taken by the respondent in exercise of
its power under other provisions of the Act, in particular Section 207 there of,
cannot be accepted. The respondent has not exercised its jurisdiction under
Section 207. Even the conditions precedents for exercise of the said
jurisdiction did not exist in the case. If the respondent for the reasons
stated hereinbefore was not entitled to pass an order suspending the permit,
the entire proceeding was vitiated in law. It could not have even issued a
notice therefor. It is, therefore, not a case where the respondent had even
otherwise jurisdiction to suspend a permit but merely a wrong provision was
quoted in the notice and by reason whereof no prejudice was caused to appellant.
34.
For
the self same reasons, submission of Mr. Qadri that if the impugned order is
set aside, the same shall give rise to another illegal order is also without
any force. Respondent has exercised its jurisdiction on a wrong premise. It
will be a repetition to state that it was not a case where jurisdiction under
the provisions of Section 207 or any other provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act
could be exercised. In a case of this nature where exercise of jurisdiction on
the part of the statutory authority is found to be wholly illegal, we are not
in a position to agree with the submission of Mr. Qadri that this Court may not
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India. It is really a matter of some surprise to us that such a contention
has been raised by a State against a State. By reason of the order impugned,
permit of the vehicle was suspended for a period of seven days. However, the said
period is over.
While exercising
jurisdiction under Section 207 of the Act, the respondent could not have
directed production of the bus for the period during which the permit was
directed to be suspended. Power of detention of a vehicle, as noticed hereinbefore,
could be exercised only for a limited purpose. Such a power could not include a
power directing the owner of a bus to produce the offending vehicle for the
purposes mentioned in the notice.
35. For the reasons
aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. They are set aside
accordingly. The appeals are allowed and consequently the orders impugned in
the writ petitions will stand quashed.
There shall, however,
be no order as to costs.
.....................................J.
[S.B. Sinha]
.....................................J.
[Cyriac Joseph]
New
Delhi;
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