Bhuwalka
Steel Indus. Ltd. Vs. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Bd. & ANR. [2009] INSC
1806 (17 December 2009)
Judgment
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8452 OF
2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1982 of 2007) Bhuwalka Steel Indus. Ltd. ....
Appellant Versus Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Bd. & Anr. .... Respondents
WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8453 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3624 of 2007)
Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. .... Appellant Versus Grocery Markets
& Ors. .... Respondents WITHSLP (C).... CC No. 4065 of 2007 Steel
Re-Rollers Association of Maharashtra .... Appellant Versus The Bombay Iron
& Steel Labour Board .... Respondent 2 WITH SLP (C).... CC No. 4046 of 2007
Kamgar Utkarsha Sabha .... Appellant Versus Bhuwalka Steel Industries Ltd.
& Ors. .... Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8454-8455 OF 2009 (Arising
out of SLP (C) Nos. 13462-13463 of 2007) Raymond Limited .... Appellant Versus
Cloth Market and Shops Board & Ors. .... Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.
8457 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20206 of 2007) Kalyan Ambernath
Manufacturing Association & Ors. .... Appellants Versus The State of
Maharashtra & Ors. .... Respondents 3 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8458 OF 2009
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9600 of 2008) Valiant Glass Works Pvt. Ltd. ....
Appellant Versus State of Maharashtra & Anr. .... Respondents
V.S.
SIRPURKAR, J.
1.
This judgment will dispose of SLP (Civil) No. 1982 of 2007, SLP
(Civil) No. 3624 of 2007, SLP (Civil).... CC No. 4065 of 2007, SLP (Civil)....
CC No. 4046 of 2007, SLP (Civil) Nos. 13462-13463 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No.
20206 of 2007, and SLP (Civil) No. 9600 of 2008.
2.
Leave granted in SLP (Civil) No. 1982 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No.
3624 of 2007, SLP (Civil) Nos. 13462-13463 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No. 20206 of
2007, and SLP (Civil) No. 9600 of 2008
3.
Two concurrent judgments of the Full Bench of the Bombay High
Court, one written by Hon'ble J.N. Patel and Hon'ble Roshan Dalvi, JJ. and 4 a
separate but concurrent judgment authored by Hon'ble Deshmukh, J.
have
fallen for consideration. The reference to Full Bench was occasioned on account
of the two Learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, principally not agreeing
with another Division Bench Judgment reported in [2000 II CLR 279] in its
interpretation of the term "unprotected worker"
provided
by Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers
(Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as
`Mathadi Act') and term "worker" provided by Section 2(12) of the
Mathadi Act. The referring Bench was of the opinion that the interpretation
given to those two terms in the decision in Century in conflict with the
statutory provisions enacted by the Legislature in the said Mathadi Act. The
question referred to the Full Bench was as under:- "In view of the
statutory definition of the expression "unprotected worker" in
Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers
(Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 is the interpretation placed
by the Division Bench in Century Textiles & Industries aforesaid expression
that it is only casually engaged workers who come within the purview of the
Act, correct and proper?"
In the
two aforementioned judgments of the Bombay High Court, the Learned Judges,
writing the majority judgment, recorded as under:- 5 "For the aforesaid
reasons, we find that the interpretation placed by the Division Bench in
Century Textile and Industries on the definition of the words "unprotected
worker" and "worker" for the purpose of applicability to Mathadi
Act, 1969 that it is only the casual workmen who come within the purview of the
Act, is not correct and proper and it is erroneous which deserves to be ignored
and is overruled."
The
Learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Deshmukh, J.) gave his final verdict in the
following words:- "To conclude, therefore, to my mind it is clear that
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act "unprotected worker"
means
every manual worker who is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled
employment, irrespective of whether he is protected by other labour
legislations or not and "unprotected workers" within the meaning of
the Act are definitely not only those manual workers who are casually
engaged."
4.
The above two judgments are challenged basically on the contention
State of Maharashtra (cited supra) is essentially a correct judgment, while the
view taken by the Full Bench and the interpretation put forth by the same of
the Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, is erroneous inasmuch as the
impugned judgments have ignored to take into account the context in which these
provisions have been enacted and they also ignored the intention of the
Legislature, which is reflected from the Preamble and the other provisions of
this Act.
5.
Lengthy arguments were advanced before us. While arguments on the
side of appellants were led by Shri J.P. Cama, Learned Senior Counsel, the
arguments on behalf of respondents were led by Shri K.K. Singhvi and Ms. Indira
Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel.
6.
Before taking up the issue, the short history of the legislation
is a must.
7.
A Bill was introduced in the Maharashtra Legislature, being Bill
No.
XCIX of
1968 for regulating the employment of unprotected manual workers employed in
certain employments in the State of Maharashtra to make provision for their
adequate supply and proper and full utilization in such employments and for
matters connected therewith. This Bill was first introduced in the Winter
Sessions of Maharasthra Legislature at Nagpur. It was then referred to the
Joint Committee for its report. The basic idea behind bringing this legislation,
as it is reflected in Statement of Objects and Reasons, was that persons
engaged in occupations like mathadi, hamals, fishermen, salt pan workers,
casual labour, jatha workers and those engaged in similar manual work
elsewhere, were not receiving adequate protection and benefits within the ambit
of existing labour legislation. Therefore, with a view to studying the
conditions of the work of the persons engaged in these occupations, the
Government had appointed a Committee on 15.7.1965 to examine whether relief
could be given to 7 these workers within the ambit of the existing labour
legislation and make recommendation as to how such relief could be given. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons mentions that report was made by the Committee
to the Government on 17.11.1967. In that report, it was mentioned that the
persons engaged in vocations like mathadi, hamals, casual workers employed in
docks, lokhandi jatha workers, salt pan workers and other manual workers mostly
work outside fixed premises in the open and are mostly engaged on piece-rate
system in a number of cases. They are not employed directly, but are either
engaged through Mukadum or Toliwalas or gangs as and when there is work and
they also work for different employers on one and the same day. The volume of
work is not always constant. In view of the peculiar nature of work, its
variety, the precarious means of employment and the system of payment and the
particular vulnerability to exploitation of this class of labour, the Committee
had come to the conclusion that the application of the various labour laws to
such workers was impracticable and regulation of their working and other
conditions by introducing amendments to the existing labour laws was not
possible. Therefore, the Committee recommended that the working and the
employment conditions of such unprotected workers should be regulated by a
special enactment.
8.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons further mentions that after
holding series of meetings with the representatives of the interests affected
by the proposed legislation and after considering all these suggestions and
examining the recommendations of the Committee, Government had decided to bring
the Bill which seeks to regulate the employment of mathadis, hamals and other
manual workers employed in certain employments, to make better provision for
their terms and conditions of employment, to provide for their welfare, for
health and safety measures, where such employments require those measures, to
make provision for ensuring an adequate supply to, and full and proper
utilization of such workers in such employments, to prevent avoidable
unemployment and for such purposes to provide for the establishment of Boards
in respect of these employments and (where necessary) in the different areas of
the State and to provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.
Ultimately,
the Act came on the legal anvil vide Act No. XXX of 1969 after it received
assent of the Vice President, acting on behalf of the President on 5.6.1969. It
was extended to the whole State of Maharashtra. It was clarified in Section 1
that it applies to the employments specified in the Schedule and that it shall
come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification in
the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for
different areas, and for different provisions of the Act. The Act was amended
from time to time by 9 Maharashtra Act Nos. 27 of 1972, 40 of 1974, 27 of 1977,
62 of 1981, 28 of 1987 and 27 of 1990. To begin with, it came into force in
Thane District in various areas. (Emphasis supplied)
9.
It will be better to see a few provisions of the Act. Section 2,
which is the definition clause, defines "Board" in sub-Section (1),
to mean a Board established under Section 6. Some other sub-Sections of Section
2 runs as under:- 2(2) "contractor", in relation to an unprotected
worker, means a person who undertakes to execute any work for an establishment
by engaging such workers on hire or otherwise, or who supplies such worker
either in groups, gangs (tollis), or as individuals; and includes a sub-
contractor, an agent, a mukadum or a tolliwala;
2(3)
"employer", in relation to any unprotected worker engaged by or
through contractor, means the principal employer and in relation to any other
unprotected worker, the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the
establishment, and includes any other person to whom the affairs of such
establishment are entrusted, whether such person is called an agent, manager or
is called by any other name prevailing in the scheduled employment;
2(4)
"establishment" means any place or premises, including the precincts
thereof, in which or in any part of which any scheduled employment is being or
is ordinarily carried on;
2(7)
"principal employer" means an employer who engages unprotected
workers by or through a contractor in any scheduled employment;
1 2(11)
"unprotected worker" means a manual worker who is engaged or to be
engaged in any scheduled employment;
2(12)
"worker" means a person who is engaged or to be engaged directly or
through any agency, whether for wages or not, to do manual work in any
scheduled employment, and includes any person not employed by any employer or a
contractor, but working with the permission of, or under agreement with the
employer or contractor; but does not include the members of an employer's
family;
2(13)
"wages" means all remunerations expressed in terms of money or
capable of being so expressed which would, if the terms of contract of
employment, express or implied were, fulfilled, be payable to an unprotected
worker in respect of work done in any scheduled employment, but does not
include- (i) the value of any house accommodation, supply of light, water,
medical attendance; or any other amenity or any service excluded from the
computation of wages by general or special order of the State Government;
(ii) any
contribution paid by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund or
under any scheme of social insurance and the interest which may have accrued
thereon;
(iii) any
travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession;
(iv) any
sum paid to the worker to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature
of his employment; or (v) any gratuity payable on discharge."
Some
other Sections of the Act, which were referred to by the Learned Senior Counsel
during the arguments are as under:- 1 3(1) For the purpose of ensuring an
adequate supply and full and proper utilization of unprotected workers in
scheduled employments, and generally for making better provision for the terms
and condition of employment of such workers, the State Government may by means
of a scheme provide for the registration of employers and unprotected workers
in any scheduled employment or employments and provide for the terms and
conditions of work of registered unprotected workers and make provision for the
general welfare in such employments.
3(2) In
particular, a scheme may provide for all or any of the following matters that
is to say:- (a)-(c) x x x x x x (d) for regulating the employment of registered
unprotected workers, and the terms and conditions of such employment, including
rates of wages, hours of work, maternity benefit, overtime payment, leave with
wages, provision for gratuity and conditions as to weekly and other holidays
and pay in respect thereof;
(e) for
securing that, in respect of periods during which employment or full employment
is not available to registered unprotected workers though they are available
for work, such unprotected workers will, subject to the conditions of the
scheme, receive a minimum wage;
(f) for
prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling the employment of unprotected
workers to whom the scheme does not apply, and the employment of unprotected workers
by employers to whom the scheme does not apply;
(g) for
the welfare of registered unprotected workers covered by the scheme insofar as
satisfactory provision therefor, does not exist, apart from the scheme;
1 (h) for
health and safety measures in place where the registered unprotected workers
are engaged, insofar as satisfactory provision therefor, is required but does
not exist, apart from the scheme;
5. If any
question arises whether any scheme applies to any class of unprotected workers
or employers, the matter shall be referred to the State Government and the
decision of the State Government on the question, which shall be taken after
consulting the Advisory Committee constituted under Section 14, shall be final.
7(1) The
Board shall be responsible for administering a scheme, and shall exercise such
powers and perform such functions as may be conferred on it by the scheme.
7(2) The
Board may take such measures as it may deem fit for administering the scheme.
7(3) The
Board shall submit to the State Government, as soon as may be, after the 1st of
April every year, and not later than the 31st day of October, an annual report
on the working of the scheme during the preceding year ending on the 31st day
of March of that year. Every report so received shall be laid as soon as may be
after it is received before each House of the State Legislature, if it is in
session, or in the session immediately following the date of receipt of the
report.
7(4) In
exercise of the powers and discharge of its functions, the Board shall be bound
by such directions, as the State Government may, for reason to be stated in
writing, give to it from time to time.
15(1) The
Board may appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be Inspectors possessing the
prescribed qualifications for the purpose of this Act or of any scheme and may
define the limits of their jurisdiction.
15(2)
Subject to any rules made by the State Government in this behalf, an Inspector
may- 1 (a) enter and search at all reasonable hours, with such assistants as he
thinks fit, any premises or place, where unprotected workers are employed, or
work is given out to unprotected workers in any scheduled employment, for the
purpose of examining any register, record of wages or notices required to be
kept or exhibited under any scheme, and require the production thereof, for
inspection;
(b)
examine any person whom he finds in any such premises or place and who, he has
reasonable cause to believe, is an unprotected worker employed therein or an
unprotected worker to whom work is given out therein;
(c)
require any person giving any work to an unprotected worker or to a group of
unprotected workers to give any information, which is in his power to give, in
respect of the names and addresses of the persons to whom the work is given,
and in respect of payments made, or to be made, for the said work;
(d) seize
or take copies of such registers, records of wages or notices or portions
thereof, as he may consider relevant, in respect of an offence under this Act
or scheme, which he has reason to believe has been committed by an employer;
and (e) exercise such other powers as may be prescribed:
Provided
that, no one shall be required under the provisions of this section to answer
any question or make any statement tending to incriminate himself.
15(3)
Every Inspector appointed under this section shall be deemed to be public
servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.
21.
Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any rights or privileges, which any
registered unprotected worker employed in any scheduled employment is entitled
to, on the date on which this Act comes into force, under any other law,
contract, custom or usage applicable to such worker, if such rights or
privileges are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled
under this Act and the scheme:
Provided
that such worker will not be entitled to receive any corresponding benefit
under the provisions of this Act and the scheme.
22. The
State Government may, after consulting the Advisory Committee, by notification
in the Official Gazette, and subject to such conditions and for such period as
may be specified in the notification, exempt from the operation of all or any
of the provisions of this Act or any scheme made thereunder, all or any class
or classes of unprotected workers employed in any scheduled employment, or in
any establishment or part of any establishment of any scheduled employment, if
in the opinion of the State Government all such unprotected workers or such
class or classes of workers, are in the enjoyment of benefits which are on the
whole not less favourable to such unprotected workers than the benefits
provided by or under this Act or any scheme framed thereunder:
Provided
that before any such notification is issued, the State Government shall publish
a notice of its intention to issue such notification, and invite objections and
suggestions in respect thereto, and no such notification shall be issued until
the objections and suggestions have been considered and a period of one month
has expired from the date of first publication of the notice in the Official
Gazette:
Provided
further that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
at any time, for reasons to be specified, rescind the aforesaid notification.
10.
It is in the backdrop of these provisions generally that it has to
be seen as to whether the interpretation put forward by the Full Bench in two
separate but concurrent judgments, is correct or not. Though the question
referred to the Full Bench was restricted to the correctness of the
interpretation of the term `unprotected worker' in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi
Act as given in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. question has
to be properly understood. In that case, it was held by the Division Bench of
that Court that the workers who were working in the factory of the petitioner
could not be termed as `unprotected workers'. It was held specifically that the
Mathadi Act did not deal with the employees engaged on monthly basis, as such
workers were protected under the Shops and Establishments Act and other
enactments. It was further held that it was only the casually engaged workmen,
who would come within the purview of the Mathadi Act. The High Court further
said that where the material produced on record clearly show that the workmen
are protected workmen, more particularly, with reference to the Agreement under
Section 2(p) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, the Act in question would not
apply. Therefore, the referred question was whether it was only casually
engaged workers, who came within the purview of the Act. The majority judgment
gave a straight answer to this question that the meaning of the term
`unprotected worker' was only the casual workman, was not 1 correct, while the
Learned Single Judge did not stop at that and gave a broader answer
interpreting Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and held that every manual worker
engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, irrespective of whether
he is protected by other labour legislations or not, would be termed as
`unprotected worker', and further that the definition was not restricted to those
manual workers who are casually engaged. Though the judgment of the Learned
Single Judge was criticized by Shri J.P. Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants that it went beyond the reference made, we feel that the Learned
Single Judge has not travelled beyond the reference. The reference has to be
read as requiring the correct interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi
Act and the term `unprotected worker' and, therefore, in our opinion, it would
have to be explained as to what is the true scope and meaning of the term
`unprotected worker' as envisaged by Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. In that,
the debate cannot be restricted to the narrower question as to whether the term
means only the casually engaged workers.
In our
opinion, the true impact of the term `unprotected worker' has to be considered
and it will have also to be pointed out as to who can be said to be
`unprotected worker'. The objection in that behalf raised by the appellant to
the Full Bench judgment is not correct. When we see the 1 Shops Board, Mumbai
& Ors. [2006 III LLJ 824 Bom], it is clear that the Court had posed two
questions:- (i) Whether the expression `unprotected worker' means a worker not
protected by labour legislation or whether the expression means a manual worker
who is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment as defined in
Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act? (ii) Whether a Mathadi worker, who has been
engaged directly by an employer, would fall outside the purview of the Mathadi
Act? The Division Bench in this case did not agree with the judgment in (cited
supra). The referring judgment clearly goes on to show that it did not agree
with the narrower judgment in the case of Century Textiles & forgotten that
the two questions framed by it clearly show that the consideration could not be
restricted to the narrower question as to whether the view taken in the case of
Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. question which arose for consideration
on account of the two Benches not agreeing was as to what was the true scope of
the definition of the expression `unprotected worker' in Section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act.
1
Considering the clear language and the questions considered in the referring
judgment by Hon'ble F.K. Rebello and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ., we feel that
the Learned Single Judge did not exceed the question referred in considering
the full scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and the term
`unprotected worker'. We will, therefore, proceed on the basis that the Full
Bench had to decide the true scope of the term `unprotected worker' as defined
in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and to point out as to who could be covered
under that definition.
11.
Basically, the contentions raised by the parties are as follows:
Legal
Submissions on behalf of the Appellants A. Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act
cannot be interpreted independently of Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, which
is the definition of `worker' and conjoined reading of these two Sections in
the light of other provisions of the Act would clearly bring out that those
workers who are regularly employed and who have the protection of other labour
legislations, cannot be termed as `unprotected workers'. For that purpose, the
two Sections cannot be interpreted merely on the basis of plain meaning of the
language of the Sections, instead the interpretation has to be done taking into
consideration the 1 context of the Mathadi Act, the Statement of Objects and
Reasons and legislative history of the Act. Shri J.P. Cama, Learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants further contended that the Full Bench had erred in
interpreting the said definition in isolation and not in the context of the
Act. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the Mathadi Act was intended to
cover only itinerant workers doing manual works for short time periods.
B. The
Learned Senior Counsel further argued that if the literal interpretation is
accepted, as has been done by the Full Bench, number of other provisions in the
Act like Section 15(2)(b) would be rendered otiose and redundant, so also other
anomalies would creep in. The Learned Senior Counsel also urged that the Full
Bench had erred in ignoring the doctrine of stare decisis, inasmuch as the
provision had received consistent interpretation for a considerable period and
hence, that interpretation was liable to be respected, particularly because the
rights and obligations of the parties covered by this Act had remained settled
for a long period of time. Therefore, even if the earlier interpretation might
not be strictly correct or where two views were possible, the settled 2
principle of law could not be unsettled. The Learned Senior Counsel contended
that the law was settled by two judgments of the Bombay High Court by Hon'ble
Rege, J. in C. Jairam State of Maharashtra & Ors. [Misc. Petition No. 414
of 1973] pronounced on 24.4.1974 and four other Division Bench Maharashtra
& Ors. [Writ Petition No. 119 of 1979] Port Trust [1994 I CLR 187], Century
Textiles & Industries Court judgment in Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport
Ors. [1995 Supp. 3 SCC 28].
C. The
Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the Rule of Contemporanea Expositio
Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege.
According
to the Learned Senior Counsel, the Full Bench should have considered how the
authorities themselves construed and understood the law. In that behalf, the
ruling in 2 of India & Ors. [2004(7) SCC 68] was relied upon heavily.
Reference
was made by the Learned Senior Counsel to few letters to show as to how the
authorities themselves understood the term `unprotected worker'. In this behalf
the [1994 I CLR 187] was heavily relied.
D.
Reference was also made to Article 254 of the Constitution of India and it was
suggested that in the matters falling in the Concurrent List, the Central
Legislation will supersede the State Legislation if both cover the same field.
It was suggested that there was no need for direct conflict between the two
enactments and the repugnancy arises even if obedience to both laws is
possible. Further, the Learned Senior Counsel suggested that specific
contradictions between the two Statutes is not the only criteria. It is enough
if Parliament had evinced the intention to cover the whole field. It was also
suggested that the Presidential assent given to this Act was irrelevant to
those Central Acts, which were enacted after the assent, for example, the
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Therefore, it was pointed
out that State Act cannot survive if the Central Act 2 covers the same category
of workers. It was tried to be pointed out that there was nothing on record to
indicate as to what extent the Presidential assent was obtained. It was,
therefore, contended that Central labour enactments, which firstly create and
regulate the employer-employee relationship and those which confer the benefits
to such employees, would exclude the operation of Mathadi Act and as a result,
those workers who enjoy the benefits under the Central labour legislation and
whose rights are regulated by the Central legislation would not be covered by
the present State legislation. Reliance was also placed on various reports like
1963 Committee Report, the Report of the Lokhandi Jatha Kamgar Enquiry
Committee to harp upon the real object of the enactment and it was suggested
that the definition read in the light of these reports would clearly bring out
the interpretation suggested by the appellant. Various Sections were referred
like Section 4(a), Sections 15, 21 and 22 to show that the interpretation given
by the Full Bench would lead to absurdity.
12.
As against this, Shri K.K. Singhvi and Smt. Indira Jaising,
Learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Vimal Chandra S. Dave, Learned Counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents raised various contentions.
2 Legal
Submissions on behalf of the respondents A. Learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents contended that in the absence of any ambiguity, no harm can be
caused to the plain language of the Statute. According to all the Learned
Counsel, impugned judgments of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court were in
accordance with the plain language of the Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the
Mathadi Act.
Numbers
of authorities for this proposition were relied upon.
Reliance
was also placed on Sections 21 and 22 of the Mathadi Act and Clauses 4(c),
11(3), 16(3), 16(4), 16(5), 33, 35(6) and 36 of the Scheme framed under the
Mathadi Act. In short, it was contended that under Section 21, the workmen
could retain the privileges and benefits under any Act, Award or Contract, if
such privileges were better than the ones offered by the Act and in that sense,
even if the manual worker was protected under the various labour laws, he could
still be governed by the Mathadi Act. Same argument was in respect of Section
22 of the Mathadi Act, providing that a manual worker, who is in receipt of
better benefits from his employer either on the date of commencement of this
Act or at 2 any time thereafter, he could seek exemption from all or any of the
provisions of the Mathadi Act. Reference was made to Clauses 4(c), 11(3), 16(3),
16(4), 16(5), 33, 35(6) and 36 of the Scheme framed under the Mathadi Act.
B. It was
further contended that the argument on behalf of the appellant that the
intention of the Legislature should be ascertained with reference to the
history of legislation, the reports of the Committee, notes on the Clauses of
the Bill and debates in Assembly, was erroneous as the plain meaning of the
Section was not susceptible to any other meaning. It was, however, further
contended that the language of the Section was clear and unequivocal and even
if such extraneous aids of the interpretation were to be relied upon, no other
interpretation could be obtained. It was pointed out that though in the Bill,
as originally introduced, the words "is not adequately protected by legislation"
were to be found and though the note on the Clauses also mentioned about such
non-protection by the welfare Legislature, the amended Bill omitted those
words, so also the necessary amendments were made in Item 5 of the Schedule
attached to the Bill. Therefore, the Learned Counsel argued that there was a
clear, deliberate 2 and cautious intendment to include all manual workers
engaged in the scheduled employment, whether protected by any labour law or
not, in the definition of "protected worker".
The
Learned Counsel further argued that there could be no practical difficulties in
such workers being registered with the Board and the fear expressed by the
Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant was not realistic. It was
pointed out that if the service conditions of a workman were better before the
commencement of the Mathadi Act, he would still continue to be benefited by
those better conditions and as such, there was no anomaly created by giving the
plain meaning to the Section depending upon its language. The argument that
giving the plain meaning would deprive the workers of the protection under
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 of raising industrial disputes before the
Labour Court and the Industrial Court, was also termed as incorrect argument,
as firstly, there was no vested right for selecting the forum and secondly, the
Legislature had the competence to enact special laws for a class or section of
workmen for improving their conditions of service and such special law would
always prevail over any general law covering the same field. The cases relied
upon by the appellants were distinguished on 2 various grounds. This was
especially done in the case of Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. [2008(10) SC
166]. It was also pointed out that the scheme of Security Guards was different
from the scheme of the Act, as in the scheme of the Act, a directly recruited
Security Guard was specifically excluded from the provisions of the Security
Guards Act.
C. As
regards the doctrine of stare decisis relied upon by the appellants, it was
pointed out that in both the judgments of of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited
supra), the Learned Judge has called upon the constitutionality of the certain
provisions of the Cotton Merchants Unprotected Workers (Regulation of Employment
and Welfare) Scheme, 1972 and in that sense, the question of interpretation of
Section 2(11) did not fall for consideration in those cases. Similarly in the
matter of Ors. (cited supra) decided by a Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court on 16.1.1980, the Division Bench was not called upon to decide the
interpretation of Section 2(11).
2
Therefore, it could not be said that that case depended upon the interpretation
of Section 2(11). Even as regards the Maharashtra (cited supra), the question
was limited to the extent whether a manual worker engaged by the petitioner
therein through a contractor was an unprotected worker although he was covered
by various labour acts. It was pointed out that the referring judgment itself
differed with the view expressed in the decision in Century Textiles & was,
therefore, pointed out that it could not be said that there was a breach of
doctrine of stare decisis in giving a contrary meaning of Section 2(11) as it
was pointed out that the doctrine of stare decisis was not an absolute doctrine
and that it was for this Court to lay down the correct law under Article 141 of
the Constitution of India.
D. As
regards the Rule of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege,
the argument was that there was no evidence that the law makers, or as the case
may be, the Government understood the scheme in the particular manner.
Even
otherwise, it was pointed out that such interpretation, if it 2 was palpably
correct, could not be accepted. To the same effect, was the argument by Smt.
Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
13.
It is on the basis of these conflicting arguments that we have to
proceed to decide the true interpretations of the Section. In the referring
judgment by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, consisting of Hon'ble
F.K. Rebello and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ. In the case of Kay Mumbai & Ors.
(cited supra), the Division Bench made reference to paras 31 and 41 of the
judgments. The Division Bench accepted the contentions raised on behalf of the
Board that the Division Bench in the (cited supra) adopted a meaning, which
could be attributed in common parlance to the expression "unprotected
worker", totally ignoring the plain meaning of the expression as defined
in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.
Relying
on Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, wherein the expression "worker"
was defined, the Bench further held that when the Legislature uses the `means
and includes' formula, the intention of the legislature is to provide an
exhaustive definition, and in such a case, the inclusive part of the definition
brings within the fold of the expression objects or activities which would
ordinarily not fall within the purview of the definition. Carrying 2 the logic
further, the Bench held that by the inclusive part, the definition included a
person who is not employed by any employer or a contractor, but who works with
the permission or under agreement with the employer or contractor. On the same
logic, the Bench went on to hold that:- "Once the Act defines the
expression `unprotected worker', the definition in the Act provides a statutory
dictionary which the Court is under the bounden duty to apply in construing the
provisions of the Act. It is not open to the Court to adopt a meaning of the
expression `unprotected worker' at variance with what has been legislated by the
competent legislature."
It was
pointed out further that if the legislature intended that the benefit of Act
could not be available to workers who were otherwise governed by some other
industrial legislation, it was open to the legislature to legislate accordingly
and it was, therefore, that the Division Bench did State of Maharashtra (cited
supra). It was also pointed out by the Division Bench that the notes on Clauses
appended to the Bill did not override express statutory provisions. A reference
was then made to Section 22 of the Mathadi Act and the same logic was used as
was relied and argued by the Learned Counsel for the respondents before us.
14.
On these conflicting claims, we have to interpret Section 2(11) of
the Mathadi Act and also the scope of the definition in the Section. We have
already quoted the provisions of Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi 3 Act
in the earlier part of the judgment. There can be no dispute that the term
"worker" is used in the definition of "unprotected worker"
in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. Therefore, while considering the Section
2(11), the scope of the term "worker", which is separately defined by
Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, would have to be taken into consideration.
The definition of the term "worker" is an inclusive definition. It
includes a worker, who is engaged by the employer directly or through any
agency and it is not necessary that such worker gets the wages or not. The term
"wages" is also defined vide Section 2(13) of the Mathadi Act. Therefore,
even if such person does not earn the wages, as contemplated in Section 2(13),
such person who is engaged to do manual work in any scheduled employment, would
be a worker. Further, even if such worker is not employed in the strict sense
of the term by an employer or a contractor, but is working with the permission
or under the agreement with the employer or contractor, even then such worker
would be a "worker" within the meaning of Section 2(12) of the
Mathadi Act. The only exception is that such worker should not be a member of
employer's family. As per the plain meaning, when such worker is engaged or is
to be engaged in the scheduled employment, he becomes the unprotected worker.
It has been correctly held in the judgment of the Learned Single Judge (Hon'ble
Deshmukh, J.) that these two definitions ("worker" and
"unprotected worker") given in Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the
Mathadi Act would have 3 to be read together for realizing the scope of the
Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. Therefore, insofar as the language of Section
2(11) is concerned, it is plain, unambiguous and clear. It means that every
worker, who is doing manual work and is engaged or to be engaged in any
scheduled employment, would be covered by that definition and would become an unprotected
worker. The question is whether we should accept this plain language. The
appellants take strong exception to this approach.
15.
Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants contended in no uncertain terms that the reliance on the plain
meaning of the Section, as it appears, would not only be hazardous, but would
also lead to absurdity. According to him, while interpreting Section 2(11) of
the Mathadi Act, it cannot be done bereft of the context of the legislation. Our
attention was invited to Statement of Objects and Reasons, as also the
legislative history of the legislation. According to the Learned Senior
Counsel, the acceptance of such plain meaning would result in rendering some
other provisions of the Act, otiose. Further, such interpretation would also
hit doctrine of stare decisis, as the interpretation of this doctrine prior to
the impugned Full Bench Judgment and more particularly given in various
judgments of the Bombay High Court including 3 Maharashtra (cited supra) has
remained intact for more than 25 years, which is a long period. The further
contention is that such interpretation would also be violative of the doctrine
of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege, since the relevant
authorities have consistently understood the meaning of that definition in a
particular way and now, there would be no justification to disturb that
understanding. It was also suggested by Shri Cama that the provisions of State
Act cannot survive if the Central Act covers the same category of workers and
in this case, such workers who were covered by the other Central Acts could not
have been brought under the cover of the definition in Section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act, it being a State Act. The Learned Senior Counsel, therefore,
suggested that those workers, who enjoy the benefits under the Central labour
legislation and whose rights were regulated by the Central legislations, have
to be held outside the definition in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.
16.
The respondents, however, relied on the principle that where the
language of the Statute is clear and unequivocal, there would be no need to go
to the extraneous aids of the interpretation and the plain meaning of the
language has to be accepted as the correct interpretation. In fact, according
to Shri Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents,
it was not necessary to interpret the provision of Section 3 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act, since the language of that Section was extremely clear, which
clearly expressed the deliberate and the cautious intention of the legislature
to include all manual workers engaged in scheduled employment, whether
protected by any labour law or not, in the definition of "unprotected
worker". Shri Singhvi also dispelled the argument that the number of other
provisions in the Act would be rendered otiose by acceptance of the clear and
unequivocal meaning displayed by the language of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi
Act.
17.
As regards the argument on the principle of stare decisis, the
Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that there will be no question of allowing a
totally wrong interpretation to remain on the legislative scene, particularly
in view of the clear cut meaning, which could be attached because of the plain and
unequivocal language of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. At any rate, the
Learned Senior Counsel contended that the doctrine of stare decisis was not an
absolute doctrine.
18.
Even as regards the rule of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et
Fortissima In Lege, the Learned Senior Counsel argued that there was no
evidence that the law makers, or as the case may be, the Government, understood
the scheme in a particular manner.
19.
We have already pointed out that the plain meaning of the language
is almost a rule and it is only by way of an exception that the external aids
Officer, Thandla & Ors. [2003(1) SCC 692], this Court has reiterated that
where the language of the Statue is clear and unambiguous, the external aids
for interpretation should be avoided. In Cable Corporation of India observed in
Para 16 that when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one
meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks
for itself. There can be no dispute that the language of Section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act is not capable of any other meaning since it is clear and
unambiguous. Some debate went on about the use of the word "means",
which is to be found in the concerned Section. It was contended by Shri Singhvi,
Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that when a definition of the word
begins with "means", it is indicative of the fact that the meaning of
the word is restricted, that is to say, it would not mean anything else, but
what has been indicated in the definition itself. In support of this
proposition, he relied on the decision in Feroz N. Dotivala College of
Technology & Ors. [AIR 1995 SC 1395], it has been held by this Court that
the use of the word "means" indicates that the definition is a 3 hard
and fast definition and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than
that is put down in the definition. We have already Ors. (cited supra). All
these three judgments indicate that, firstly, where the language of the
provision is plain and unambiguous, than that is the only avenue available
while interpreting the same. We may also say as we have already expressed that
once the language of the Section is absolutely clear, there is hardly any scope
for interpretation. This position is then further crystallized by the user of
the word "means", which then positively rules aside any other meaning
than the one which is dependent upon the plain and unambiguous language of the
provision. One more decision of this Court, which was heavily relied upon by
the respondents in para 21, it was observed:- "The golden rule of
construction is that when the words of the legislation are plain and
unambiguous, effect must be given to them. The basic principle on which this
rule is based is that since the words must have spoken as clearly to
legislatures, as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the legislature
intended what the words plainly say. The legislative intent of the enactment
may be gathered from several sources which are, from the statute itself, from
the preamble to the statute, from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, from
the legislative debates, reports of committees and commissions which preceded
the legislation and finally from all legitimate and admissible sources from
where they may be allowed.
Reference
may be had to legislative history and latest legislation also. But, the primary
rule of construction would be 3 to ascertain the plain language used in the
enactment which advances the purpose and object of the
legislation............"
(Emphasis
supplied)
20.
However, Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants
submitted that in this case, unless the context is taken into account, it would
lead to absurd and unintended result. The Learned Senior Counsel urged that the
definition cannot and should not be mechanically applied.
Commercial
Tax Officer & Ors. [1994 (2) SCC 434]. About the principles to be borne in
mind while interpreting a definition, the Learned Senior [1997(2) SCC 53],
wherein in para 11, this Court has observed that the interpretation placed on a
definition should not only be repugnant to the context, but it should also be
such as would aid the achievement of the purpose, which is sought to be served
by the Act. This Court further held that a construction which would defeat or
is likely to defeat the purpose of the Act, has to be ignored and not accepted.
The Learned Senior Counsel Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors.
[1980(2) SCC 593] and contended that the statutory construction, which fulfills
the mandate of the statute, must find favour with the judges, except where the
words and the context rebel against such flexibility. This Court, in this case
observed:- 3 "We would prefer to be liberal rather than lexical when
reading the meaning of industrial legislation which develops from day to day in
the growing economy of India."
Once it
is held that the meaning of the Section is clear on the basis of the
unambiguous language used, it should ordinarily be end of the matter. However,
Shri Cama and his other colleagues Shri C.U. Singh, Shri Sudhir Talsania and
Shri S.S. Naganand, Learned Senior Counsel and Shri Manish Kumar, Shri Gopal
Singh, Ms. Pragya Baghel, Shri Debmalya Banerjee, Shri Animesh Sinha, Smt.
Manik Karanjawala, Ms. Nandini Gore, Shri Raghvendra S. Srivatsav, Shri T.R. Venkat
Subramanium, Shri Abhijit P. Medh, Shri P.V. Dinesh, Ms. Sindhu T.P. and Shri
P.S. Sudheer, Learned Counsel argued that the legislative history of the
statute would militate against the language and to accept the meaning from the
plain language would be completely out of context. Shri Cama and his colleagues
also heavily relied upon the history, which led to the introduction of the
Bill, as also the Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing the Bill in
the legislature by the then Hon'ble Labour Minister.
We were
also taken through the debates, as also the Statement of Objects and Reasons
presented to the State legislature on 19.12.1968 by the then Hon'ble Labour
Minister. Our attention was invited to the basic definition of the
"unprotected worker", which was as follows:- "2(11) `Unprotected
worker' has been defined to mean a manual worker, who but for the provisions of
this Act, is not 3 adequately protected by legislation for welfare and benefits
of the labour force in the State."
21.
Relying heavily on the Report of the "Mathadi Labour Enquiry
Committee, Greater Bombay, 1963", Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel
invited our attention to para 2 thereof, which refers to "such
labourers", who are deprived of regular wage-scales, permanency, earned leave,
bonus, provident fund, gratuity, medical benefits, compensation, pension etc.
It was argued by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellants that in Chapter 6 thereof, under the heading "Employer and
Employee relationship", there is expression "the real difficulty is
that there is no `employer' as such". It was also pointed out that the
difficulty, which was felt was that the employment of the worker was only
through the contractor and technically, there was no direct relationship of
employer and employee, as between the Mills of Factories and the Mathadi
workers. Similar was the case with the merchants, traders and other concerns as
they engage the labour through Mukadam or Toliwala and such Mukadam or Toliwala
engaged his men or the workers with him and paid wages to them and, therefore,
technically, there was no direct relationship of the employer and employee, as
between the merchants or concerns and the workers. It was also argued that if
the direct relationship was established, such benefits would flow to the
Mathadi workers. From this, the Learned Senior Counsel argued that where there
is a direct 3 relationship in case of the monthly workers, there would be no
question of applying this broad definition to such workers. It was also pointed
out that the Committee considered that there was a positive reluctance to
appoint these workers as the direct employees and only a few merchants
expressed their willingness to accept the workers as their direct employees,
and there was also reluctance on the part of the workers to be employed
directly. This was obviously with a view to argue that what was contemplated by
the Committee was not for the direct workers and, therefore, the directly
appointed workers would be outside the definition of "unprotected
worker". Shri Singh also carried on his argument further relying on the
para 13 under the head "Adjudication" and pointed out the following
observations:- "13. The labour laws in force are not applicable to the
Mathadi workers and thus they are without any remedy at law. To obtain
amelioration of the conditions of their work and wages, they are inevitably led
to organize `Morchas' or stage `Strikes'. To avoid such exigencies as also to
enable them to obtain the other benefits, it is necessary to provide for them a
remedy at law."
22.
Our attention was also invited to some portions of the Report of
the "Lokhandi Jatha Kamgar Enquiry Committee, December, 1965" and its
working. We were also taken through para 13 of Chapter IV thereof titled
"Application of labour laws".
23.
We were also taken through the Report of the "Committee for
Unprotected Labour, 1967" and more particularly, through Chapter II
thereof titled "Conditions existing in the Avocations", as also
Chapter IV titled "Reasons, Conclusions and Recommendations and draft
outline of the legislation". The contents, which were heavily relied upon
are:- "The persons engaged in the avocations like hamals, mathadis, casual
workers employed in Docks, Lokhandi Jatha workers, Salt Pan workers mostly work
outside fixed premises in open space. Most of the persons are engaged on piece
rate system. In a number of cases they are not employed directly but are either
engaged through Mukadams or Tolliwalas as and when there is work. The persons
in a number of cases, work for different persons on one and the same day. In
view of the peculiar nature of work and the system of payment, the application
of the various labour laws to such workers has become difficult. The rickshaw
pullers who are not self employed are also pulling the rickshaw taken on hire.
The question of regulation of the working and other conditions of such persons,
therefore, is not possible by introducing amendments to the existing labour
laws. The object can be achieved if a special legislation is prepared for the
purpose by incorporating beneficial provisions of the important labour
enactments applicable to similar workers employed in regular establishments and
factories."
From
this, the argument was tried to be developed by Shri Cama and Shri Singh that
the objective was very clear and under the same what was contemplated was only
the cases of those workers who were not directly engaged and as such, the term
"unprotected worker" should be interpreted to exclude all the directly
appointed workers employed in the factories, even if they are working in the
scheduled employments.
24.
We were also taken through the Objects and Reasons and Preamble
and a very strong argument was advanced that if the definition is read in that
light, there would be no question of accepting the literal interpretation. In
our opinion, in view of the clear and settled law of interpretation, it would
really not be necessary to go into these contentions, particularly, because the
law is very clear that where the language is clear and admits of no doubts, it
is futile to look for the meaning of the provision on the basis of these
external aids. It is possible where the plain meaning rungs counter to the
objects or creates absurdity or doubts by attributing that plain language. In
our considered opinion, it is very difficult to find out any such absurdity or
contradiction if the plain language of the Section 2(11) is accepted and acted
upon for the purposes of interpretation. It must, at this juncture, be noted
that inspite of Section 2(11), which included the words "but for the
provisions of this Act is not adequately protected by legislation for welfare
and benefits of the labour force in the State", these precise words were
removed by the legislature and the definition was made limited as it has been
finally legislated upon. It is to be noted that when the Bill came to be passed
and received the assent of the Vice President on 5.6.1969 and was first
published in Maharashtra Government Gazette Extraordinary Part IV on 13.6.2009,
the aforementioned words were omitted. Therefore, this would be a clear pointer
to the legislative intent that the legislature being conscious of the 4 fact
and being armed with all the Committee Reports and also being armed with the
factual data, deliberately avoided those words. What the appellants are asking
was to read in that definition, these precise words, which were consciously and
deliberately omitted from the definition. That would amount to supplying the
casus omissus and we do not think that it is possible, particularly, in this
case. The law of supplying the casus omissus by the Courts is extremely clear
and settled that though this Court may supply the casus omissus, it would be in
the rarest of the rare cases and thus supplying of this casus omissus would be
extremely necessary due to the inadvertent omission on the part of the
legislature. But, that is certainly Govind Singh (2005 (10) SCC 437)]. Reliance
was also placed on the SCC 409 (Paras 27 and 28)], wherein it was held that the
definition is not to be read in isolation and it must be read in the context of
the phrase which would define it. It should not be vague or ambiguous and the
definition of the words must be given a meaningful application; where the context
makes the definition given in the interpretation clause inapplicable, the same
meaning cannot be assigned. We must point out here that this ratio will not
apply for the simple reason that the definition given in Section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act is extremely clear and there is no vagueness or ambiguity about it.
We have already pointed out that even if it is read in 4 the context, we cannot
ignore the fact that the legislature had deliberately deleted the words
"but for the provisions of this Act is not adequately protected by
legislation for welfare and benefits of the labour force in Mohan Singh &
Anr. [2004(8) SCC 402 (Para 11)] would be of no consequence in the present
controversy. The omission of the words as proposed earlier from the final definition
is a deliberate and conscious act on the part of the legislature, only with the
objective to provide protection to all the labourers or workers, who were the
manual workers and were engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment.
Therefore, there was a specific act on the part of the legislature to enlarge
the scope of the definition and once we accept this, all the arguments
regarding the objects and reasons, the Committee Reports, the legislative
history being contrary to the expressed language, are relegated to the
background and are liable to be ignored.
25.
Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants relied on
Maharashtra & Ors. [2003(4) SCC 200], in which observation in para 16 was
relied upon, which is as follows:- "16. ...........If certain provisions
of law, construed in one way, would make them consistent with the Constitution
and 4 another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court
would lean in favour of the former construction."
The case
is clearly not applicable, since there is no constitutional matter involved. We
would comment regarding Article 254 of the Constitution of India, in the later
part of the judgment. To the same effect Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co.
& Anr. [1972 (1) SCC 209], relied upon by the Learned Senior Counsel. We do
not see any such problem about two interpretations. We have already stated that
there may not be two interpretations. Therefore, contention of the Learned
Senior Counsel based upon this decision is also incorrect. One more decision
was relied Industries Ltd. [2003 (1) SCC 81 (Paras 33 and 34)]. This decision
is also of no consequence, since the Paras relied upon in this decision deal
with the words "Notes and Clauses" while interpreting the provision.
That is not the case here.
26.
We were also taken through the Preamble of the Mathadi Act, which
is as under:- "An Act for regulating the employment of unprotected manual
workers employed in certain employments in the State of Maharashtra, to make
provision for their adequate supply and proper and full utilization in such
employments, and for matters connected therewith.
4
WHEREAS, it is expedient to regulate the employment of unprotected manual
workers, such as, Mathadi, Hamal etc., engaged in certain employments, to make
better provision for their terms and conditions of employment, to provide for
their welfare, and for health and safety measures where such employments
require these measures; to make provision for ensuring an adequate supply to,
and full and proper utilization of, such workers in such employments to protect
avoidable unemployment; for these and similar purposes, to provide for the
establishment of Boards in respect of these employments and (where necessary)
in the different areas of the State; and to provide for purposes connected with
the matters aforesaid;
It is
hereby enacted in the Twentieth Year of the Republic of India as
follows:-................"
Great
stress was led on the words "such as" and it was tried to be
suggested that the Preamble carves out a class of the unprotected manual
workers. Further, it was stressed that the object of the law is to provide for
the welfare, health and safety measures, where such employments require those
measures. From this, it was suggested that it is only where the other
legislations are unable to provide for the welfare and the better conditions,
then alone this Act (Mathadi Act) would be brought into and, therefore,
necessarily the unprotected workmen would be such workmen, who are deprived of
the better conditions of service and further, therefore, if the workers were
adequately protected, there would be no question of applying the provisions of
the Mathadi Act to them and they cannot be covered under Section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act. The argument is clearly incorrect for the reason that the mention
of "unprotected manual workers" is clearly in the wider sense and
even the Preamble of the Mathadi Act 4 displays the intentions of the State
Government to make better provision for the unprotected manual workers. Merely
because some workmen are manual workers and not casual workers, that by itself,
would not make any different. It is to be noted that in the Preamble,
terminology of "casual workers" is not to be found. Therefore, even
on this basis, the definition cannot be restricted. The argument is, therefore,
rejected.
27.
Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants
referred to the Reports of the three Committees in 1963, 1965 and 1967. We have
already referred to those Reports and we find nothing contradictory in those
Reports in view of our finding on the plain language of the Section.
28.
We were also taken through the decision in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. particularly,
Para 18 therein providing the principles for interpreting the State of Bihar
& Anr. [2007(1) SCC 467]. We have examined this decision. Para 30 makes a
reference to 3 decisions. They are Mukesh K.
first
mentioned decision, the word "include" was used, which would make all
the difference and thereby, it was held that the definition may deserve a 4
broader meaning and, therefore, it was necessary to keep in view the scheme of
the object and purport of the statute. That is not the case here.
We have
already referred to the second mentioned case of Ramesh cannot, however, be
read in isolation. Again, it is not that every definition has to be read in the
context of the phrase, which would define it. We have again pointed out that
even the context does not require us to restrict the meaning of Section 2(11).
The third mentioned case of State of consequence, as the phraseology therein
was entirely different. As Tax Officer & Ors. (cited supra), we do not
think that the case is helpful to the appellants. Therein, the controversy was
about the definition of "goods" in Section 8(3)(b) of the Central
Sales Tax Act and the controversy was as to whether the word "goods"
could be read in a different manner.
Such is
not the controversy here.
29.
We also find no absurdity, inconsistency or any contradiction with
the other provisions of the Act. Shri Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents alongwith his colleagues Ms. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior
Counsel, Ms. Lata Desai, Ms. Pallavi Divekar and Shri Vimal Chandra S. Dave,
Shri Nitin S. Tambwekar, Shri B.S. Sai, Shri K. Rajeev, 4 Ms. Bharathi, Ms.
Mehak G. Sethi, Shri Naveen R. Nath, Shri Arun R. Pendekar, Shri Sanjay Kharde,
Ms. Asha Gopalan, Shri Vishnu Sharma, Shri Shrish Kumar Misra and Shri Rajesh
Kumar, Learned Counsel invited our attention to Section 21 of the Mathadi Act
and pointed out that there was absolutely no inconsistency because where a
directly appointed worker was having better rights or privileges, then those
rights or privileges remains unaffected and in that case, such worker would
have the choice for those more favourable rights and privileges under other
beneficial legislations, the only rider being that such worker would not be
entitled to receive any corresponding benefit under the provisions of the
Mathadi Act and the scheme. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, this
provision was enough to repel the arguments of the appellants that the directly
employed workers were enjoying the better benefits and they would be deprived
of the same in case they are included in the wider definition under Section
2(11) of the Mathadi Act.
30.
We were also taken through Section 22 of the Mathadi Act, which
provides for the exemptions. The Section provides that the State Government may
exempt from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the Act or any
scheme, all or any of the classes of unprotected workers employed in any
scheduled employment or the establishment or part of any establishment, if in
the opinion of the State Government, all such 4 unprotected workers are in the
enjoyment of benefits, which are, on the whole, not less favourable to such
unprotected workers than the benefits provided by or under the Mathadi Act, of
course, subject to certain conditions and after the consultation with Advisory
Committee. If this is the position, then there would be no question of
accepting the argument that by the acceptance of the plain meaning of the wider
definition given out in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act, there would be
creations of contradictions. A Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing
the Bill is of course an external aid, which should be of no consequence if the
language is clear. However, even if we read the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, it does not further the cause of the appellants. We have very
carefully gone through the Statement of Objects and Reasons and find nothing
therein to support the contention raised herein. Shri Cama, Learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants, while relying on the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, firstly urged that it was because the workers in various employments
were not receiving adequate protection and benefits within the ambit of
existing labour legislation that this Bill was introduced alongwith Statement
of Objects & Reasons. Our attention was also invited to read clause 2. From
this, it was pointed out that the adequacy of the protection was the main
issue. Now, if inspite of this, the legislature went on to delete those words,
which we have already quoted, the intention of the legislature must be loud and
clear and we cannot persuade ourselves 5 to hold that there is anything
contradictory to the definition in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. In our
opinion, even if that was so, when the legislature consciously deletes certain
words, then there will be no question of relying and insisting upon those
words.
31.
We were taken through some alleged inconsistencies, for example,
Section 15 of the Mathadi Act. It was expressed that Section 15(2)(b) would
become redundant if we accept the interpretation put forward by the
respondents. Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 provides for the appointment of
Inspectors, possessing prescribed qualifications for the purposes of the
Mathadi Act or of any scheme. Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 and more
particularly, clause (a) thereof defines the powers of the Inspector. Clause
(b), on which great stress was led by Shri Cama runs as under:- "15(2)(b)
examine any person whom he finds in any such premises or place and who, he has reasonable
cause to believe, is an unprotected worker employed therein or an unprotected
worker to whom work is given out therein."
According
to Shri Cama, when all the persons working in a scheduled industry, doing
manual work, become the unprotected workers, then there is no question of the
Inspector examining any such person, because everybody would be an unprotected
worker. The argument is clearly wrong. What is required is that every
unprotected worker has to be registered with the Board. If the Inspector suspects
that any such worker, 5 though an unprotected worker, is either not registered
or does not get the protection of the Board and is engaged by the employer,
then he can examine such a person. We do not think that the Section would
become unworkable, as has been argued. The argument is, therefore, clearly
incorrect.
32.
Shri S.S. Naganand, Learned Senior Counsel also referred to
Sections 17G, 18, 19 and 20 of the Mathadi Act. Section 17G provides that the
provisions of Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 would be applicable in case
of trial of offences under this Act. Similarly, Section 18 provides that
provisions of Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923 shall mutatis mutandis apply
to registered unprotected workers and they shall be deemed to be workmen within
the meaning of that Act. Section 19 makes the similar provision regarding the Payment
of Wages Act, 1936 to the workers, while Section 20
provides the application of Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. We do not see any
relevance of these Sections, particularly, to arrive at the correct meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. In all these Sections, the words used are
"registered unprotected workers".
There is
a provision for creation of the Boards under Section 6 of the Mathadi Act and
every unprotected worker has to register himself with the Board. Therefore, the
reliance on these provisions would be no consequence. The terminology of
"registered unprotected workers" in 5 Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the
Mathadi Act was brought into force by Maharashtra Act No. 40 of 1974 and under
that, these words deemed always to have been substituted for the original terminology
of "unprotected workers". We do not, therefore, see any reason to
take any different view in the light of these Sections.
33.
Shri Sudhir Talsania, Learned Senior Counsel arguing on behalf of
the appellants also argued about the nature of Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the
Mathadi Act. He contended that while Section 2(12) is a general provision,
Section 2(11) is a specific provision. We have no quarrel with that. We would
only observe that so long as that language of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act
is clear enough, there will not be any question of cutting the scope of the
term "unprotected workman". He further argued that this
interpretation would lead to absurd results, whereby Sections 2(11) and 2(12)
would be identical. We have already explained that such is not the possibility.
This is true that the Sections have to be read together. Section 2(12)
specifies the worker, which in turn is used in Section 2(11) further.
Therefore, they would not be identical under any circumstances.
34.
It was argued by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants that as per Sections 3(13) and 3(14) of the Bombay Industrial
Relations Act, all the employees are covered and any reduction from those 5
employees has to be only after the notice of change is given. Our attention was
also invited to Section 44 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. We have no
difficulty with the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, as that
Act operates in different spheres altogether. We do not think that there is any
relevance of those provisions, particularly, while interpreting the terms of
the Mathadi Act and more particularly of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. All
the Learned Counsel for the appellants expressed their apprehension about the
working of Section 3 of the Mathadi Act and posed a question as to who will
decide as to whether an industry has or has not adequate employees, whether it
would be Board or employer or employee union. In our view, such argument is
clearly incorrect for the simple reason that such question does not come within
the scope of the Mathadi Act. Once a workman is engaged to do the manual work,
he automatically becomes an unprotected workman and would have to be registered
with the Board. In our opinion, such argument has to be rejected. Our attention
was invited to the decision in Chairman, Indore [2007(8) SCC 705],
particularly, paras 79, 80 and 81 thereof. The term "at any time" in
Section 50(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (No. 23
of 1973) had fallen for consideration. Hon'ble Sinha, J. had held that the term
will have to be interpreted in a particular manner, otherwise it would lead to
manifest injustice and absurdity, which 5 is not contemplated by the statute.
We have absolutely no quarrel with the proposition, however, we have already
held that the interpretation that we propose to give, does not make any of the
provision absurd and does not lead to manifest the injustice or the absurdity.
35.
Similarly, reliance was placed by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants on the decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd.
Vehicles
Act, 1988 and more particularly, Sections 147, 145 (d) and 149 fell for
consideration therein. There also, the Court held that the golden rule of
interpretation is that the statutes are to be interpreted according to
grammatical and ordinary sense of the word in grammatical or literal meaning
unmindful of consequence of such interpretation. It was only when such
grammatical and literal interpretation leads to unjust results which the
legislature never intended that the said rule has to give place to the
"rule of legislative intent". We have already pointed out that in
this case, the golden rule of interpretation would not lead to any injustice.
Therefore,
this ruling is more helpful to the respondents than the appellants. Another
ruling, which was relied upon was Bombay Dyeing & [2006(3) SCC 434].
Reliance was placed on the observations made in para 176. Hon'ble Sinha, J.
therein had quoted paras 1392, 1477 and 5 1480 of Halsbury's Laws of England
(4th Edn.), Vol. 44(1) (Reissue).
Those
paras are as under:- "1392. Common-sense construction rule: It is a rule
of the common law, which may be referred to as the common- sense construction
rule, that when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case,
which of the opposing constructions of the enactment would give effect to the
legislative intention, the Court should presume that the legislator intended
common sense to be used in construing the enactment.
1477.
Nature of presumption against absurdity: It is presumed that Parliament intends
that the Court, when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case,
which of the opposing construction of an enactment corresponds to its legal
meaning, should find against a construction which produces an absurd result,
since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Here `absurd' means
contrary to sense and reason, so in this context the term `absurd' is used to
include a result which is unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient, anomalous
or illogical, futile or pointless, artificial or productive of a
disproportionate counter-mischief.
1480.
Presumption against anomalous or illogical result:
It is
presumed that Parliament intends that the Court, when considering, in relation
to the facts of the instant case, which opposing constructions of an enactment
corresponds to its legal meaning, should find against a construction that
creates an anomaly or otherwise produces an irrational or illogical result. The
presumption may be applicable where on one construction a benefit is not
available in like cases, or a detriment is not imposed in like cases, or the
decision would turn on an immaterial distinction or an anomaly would be created
in legal doctrine. Where each of the constructions contended for involves some
anomaly then, insofar as the Court uses anomaly as a test, it has to balance
the effect of each construction and determine which anomaly is greater. It may
be possible to avoid 5 the anomaly by the exercise of a discretion. It may be,
however, that the anomaly is clearly intended, when effect must be given to the
intention. The Court will pay little attention to a proclaimed anomaly if it is
purely hypothetical, and unlikely to arise in practice."
It will
be seen that the absurdity which the appellants are referring again and again
has to be such that it should be contrary to the sense and reason and,
therefore, should include a result, which is unworkable or impracticable,
inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless, artificial or
productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief. We do not think that such
absurdity could be arrived at if the literal interpretation is given to the
term. We, therefore, reject the argument of Shri C.U. Singh in this behalf.
Once we accept the literal construction, there will be no further question of
holding otherwise on the basis of the intent of the legislature.
We have
already pointed out that there would arise no absurdity of any kind if the
literal interpretation is given.
36.
That takes us to the next argument regarding stare decisis. Shri
Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants urged that under this rule,
where a particular enactment has received a consistent interpretation by Courts
of law for a considerable period of time, that interpretation must be respected
because the rights and obligations by parties covered by such interpretation
have remained settled thereby during the long period of 5 time involved. It was
urged by him that if the settled interpretation is upset, then it would do a
greater injustice to all the parties concerned. The Learned Senior counsel went
to the extent of saying that the rule of stare decisis should be honoured even
in case where the earlier interpretation, though consistently upheld for a long
time, may not strictly be correct or may produce two possible views. Our
attention was invited to the Institute of Chemical Biology & Ors. [2002 (5)
SCC 111], Union of (8) SCC 534]. It was urged by the Learned Senior Counsel
that there was a consistent line of judgments starting from year 1974 right
upto the present judgment of the Full Bench in 2006, covering period of 32
years, wherein the Bombay High Court has taken a consistent view in
interpretation of the term "unprotected workers" to mean only casual
workers, or as the case may be, the workers, who did not enjoy the protection
of the other labour welfare legislations. It was pointed out that firstly, the
challenge to the constitutional validity was rejected by Hon'ble Rege, J. in
his two judgments cited supra, solely on the ground that the said Act applied
to a special class of workmen, who needed special protection and classification
and, therefore, such persons were entitled to 5 the special treatment. The
reliance was placed on the judgments passed Maharashtra & Ors. (cited
supra) on 24.4.1974 and four other Division of Maharashtra (cited supra)
including this Court judgment in State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra).
Very heavy reliance was (cited supra), where the Division Bench has specifically
rejected the employers' arguments under Article 254 of the Constitution of
India solely on the ground that in the docks, the expression
"mathadis" would be limited to only such workers doing loading and
unloading operations as were not protected by legislation under the Dock
Workers' Act, 1948.
37.
Heavy reliance was placed on paras 34, 35 and 36 of that decision.
On the
other hand, Shri Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents urged that
the rule of stare decisis was not and could not be viewed as an absolute rule.
Reliance was also placed on the decision in 5 Ors. [2008 (1) SCC 494]. So also
Smt. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents repelled this
argument relying on the of India [2001 (7) SCC 740]. Our attention was also
invited to treatise by Justice G.P. Singh, (11th Edition). It was urged by Shri
Singhvi that in the aforementioned judgments of the Bombay High Court,
excepting the Maharashtra (cited supra), this question has not fallen for
consideration at all. The Full Bench and more particularly, the Learned Single
Judge (Hon'ble Deshmukh, J.) has rejected this argument that this question was
not squarely before Hon'ble Rege, J. in his two judgments in C. Jairam Bombay
Port Trust (cited supra), Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra). The Learned Single Judge noted the
argument that it was expressed in Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. 6 apply to the
manual workers in the scheduled employment, who were protected by the other
labour legislations and the said judgment was State of Maharashtra (cited
supra) and, therefore, on principle of stare decisis, the settled position of
law should not be disturbed. The Learned Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors. (cited
supra). The Learned Single Judge then, relying on the judgment of this Court in
M/s. Good Year India Ltd. is an authority only for what it actually decides and
not for what may remotely or logically follow from it. The Learned Single Judge
then went on to hold that what is binding is the ratio decidendi of the
judgment. The Learned Judge noted that this question did not fall for
consideration either Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) or even in the
judgment in Lallubhai our view, the Learned Judge was absolutely correct in so
holding. Close examination of judgments by Hon'ble Rege, J., as also judgment
in supra) will show that the question about the correct interpretation and
scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act did not fall for consideration 6
in those cases. of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) has specifically quoted
from the was decided therein, there are two observations of a general
character, which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have very often
said before - that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular
facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions
which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law,
but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which
such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority
for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a
proposition that may seem to follow logically from it.
Such a
mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas
every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all."
(Emphasis supplied) The Court therein again referred to the decision in Ambica
Quarry observations therein to the effect that:- "18. The ratio of any
decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has
been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually
decides and not what logically follows from it."
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
The Court further relied upon the decisions in Bhavnagar 6 761]
and has quoted the following observations there from:- "There is always
peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words
in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances
are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.
11.
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world
of difference between conclusions in two cases.
Disposal
of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper."
Now, when
we examine all the Bombay High Court's judgments on the basis of this ratio, it
is clear that excepting the decision in Century position could not be obtained.
There can be no dispute about the importance attached by this Court in the
above mentioned cases, as relied upon by the appellants, which favour the
consistency of law. Further, it is Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat &
Ors. (cited supra). In paras 111 and 112, this Court observed:- "111.
................ However, according to Justice Frankfurter, the doctrine of
stare decisis is not `an imprisonment of reason' (Advanced Law Lexicon, P.
Ramanatha Aiyer, 3rd Edn., 2005, Vol. 4, P 4456). The underlying logic of the
doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid uncertainty. The guiding
philosophy is that a view which has held the field for a long time should not
be disturbed only because another view is possible.
6 112.
The trend of judicial opinion, in our view, is that stare decisis is not a
dogmatic rule allergic to logic and reason; it is a flexible principle of law
operating in the province of precedents providing room to collaborate with the
demands of changing times dictated by social needs, State policy and judicial
conscience."
Again, in
para 113, this Court observed:- "113. According to Professor Lloyd,
concepts are good servants but bad masters. Rules, which are originally
designed to fit social needs, develop into concepts, which then proceed to take
on a life of their own to the detriment of legal development. The resulting
`jurisprudence of concepts' produces a slot-machine approach to law, whereby
new points posing questions of social policy are decided, not by reference to
the underlying social situation, but by reference to the meaning and definition
of the legal concepts involved. This formalistic a priori approach confines the
law in a straitjacket instead of permitting it to expand to meet the new needs
and requirements of changing society (Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. At P.
187). In such cases, the Courts should examine not only the existing laws and
legal concepts, but also the broader underlying issues of
policy......................."
In para
114, quoting from the Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., the Court saw the
need of the Judge looking at existing laws, the practical social results of any
decision he makes and the requirements of fairness and justice. In para 116
again, the Court observed:- "116. Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command of the Constitution or jurisprudence. A careful study of our legal system
will discern that any deviation from the straight path of stare decisis in our
past history has occurred for articulable reasons, and only when the Supreme
Court has felt obliged to bring its opinions in line with new ascertained
facts, circumstances and experiences. (Precedent in Indian Law, A. Laxminath,
2nd Edn. 2005, P. 8)"
6 In para
118, this Court observed that:- "118. The doctrine of stare decisis is
generally to be adhered to, because well-settled principles of law founded on a
series of authoritative pronouncements ought to be followed. Yet, the demands
of the changed facts and circumstances, dictated by forceful factors supported
by logic, amply justify the need for a fresh look."
Tested on
the basis of this logic in the celebrated decision of State supra), we have no
hesitation, but to hold that the application of doctrine of stare decisis
cannot help the appellants in this case. We must express here that while
rejecting the arguments of appellants, we have in our minds, those thousands of
workmen who are otherwise exploited by Toliwalas, Mukadams and at times, the
employers. The enactment is a beneficial enactment, providing the protection to
such workers, who do not have the honest representation and it is with this
lofty idea that a progressive State like State of Maharashtra has brought about
this legislation. Viewed from these angles, it will have to be held that the
definition would have to be all the more broad, engulfing maximum area to the
advantage of a workman. It is with this idea that we reject the argument of the
stare decisis, though very ably put by Shri Cama, Shri C.U. Singh, Learned
Senior Counsel and other Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants.
39.
The other argument raised was on the basis of maxim of Contemporanea
Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege, shortly stated, Contemporanea
Expositio. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, this is the doctrine that
the best meaning of a statute or document is the one given by those who enacted
it or signed it, and that the meaning publicly given by contemporary or long
professional usage is presumed to be the true one, even if the language may
have a popular or an etymological meaning that is very different. Shri Cama,
Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants argued that in the Committee's
Reports, right from 1963 clearly only those workers were viewed, who did not
have the protection of the other labour laws and the Committee had identified
only those manual workers who were engaged in loading and unloading operations.
The reliance was made on a letter No. (c) 20206 dated 7.9.1992, written by one
Shri G.K. Walawalkar, Desk Officer, informing that in an establishment till the
workers doing Mathadi type work are on their muster roll as direct workers and
they are getting total protection and benefits under the various labour laws,
till then such establishment shall not be included in the Mathadi Act or the
schemes thereunder. Two other letters were also referred to by the Learned
Senior Counsel. First Letter was dated 10.5.1990 addressed to the Western India
Corrugated Box Manufacturers' Association, authored by one Divisional Officer,
informing to the Chairman, Western India Corrugated Box Manufacturers' 6
Association that the provisions of Mathadi Act are not applicable to the
directly employed workers (employed no permanent basis) by the company. Another
letter was dated 3.10.1991 addressed to the Secretary, Mumbai Timber Merchants
Association Ltd., specifying that the direct labourers of the employer doing
loading/unloading work would not be covered by the said Act. Though these two
letters were never procured, they were produced before us. Further, a reference
is made to the letter of Mathadi Board (Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board)
dated 17.11.1983, wherein the Mathadi Board understood and applied the Act only
to that special class of workers doing loading and unloading operations in
scheduled employments, who were in the regular employments of an employer and,
therefore, were not protected by other applicable labour legislations. It was
also urged that only after the impugned judgment was passed, the Mathadi Boards
have started asking the employers to register them under the Act even if they
are engaging regular full time workers. It supra), the Mathadi Board had taken
such a position and they could not now turn back from their stance. From this,
the Learned Senior Counsel urged that since the State Government itself
understood the provision in a particular manner, such understanding should be
honoured by the Courts.
40.
The argument is clearly erroneous for the simple reason that it is
not the task of the State Government, more particularly, the Executive Branch
to interpret the law; that is the task of the Courts. Even if the State
Government understood the Act in a particular manner, that cannot be a true and
correct interpretation unless it is so held by the Courts.
Therefore,
how the State Government officials understood the Act, is really irrelevant.
The Learned Senior Counsel, in his address, relied on the India & Ors.
[2004(7) SCC 68] and more particularly, para 32 therein.
There,
Hon'ble Srikrishna, J. accepted the meaning of the concerned provision as it
was understood by the State authorities. However, the Learned Judge was careful
enough to say that:- "While this may not be really conclusive, it
certainly indicates the manner of the State authority viewing its power and the
Rules under which it was exercising the power. The Court can certainly take
into account this situation on the doctrine of contemnporanea expositio.
(Emphasis
supplied) Therefore, this cannot be viewed to be an absolute doctrine. There
are number of authorities, which speak about the powers of the Court, vis- 6 if
the person who dealt with the Act understood it in a particular manner, that
does not prevent the Court in giving to the Court, its true construction.
India
(cited supra) that the doctrine is confined to the construction of ambiguous
language used in very old statutes where indeed the language itself have had a
rather different meaning in those days. The Learned author Justice Shri G.P.
Singh, in his celebrated treatise quoted that:- "Subject to use made of
contemporary official statements and statutory instruments the principle of
contemporanea expositio is not applicable to a modern statute."
Punjab
[1991 (1) SCC 86]. Considering this settled position, we do not think we are in
a position to accept the contention raised. Same logic applies that even if the
Mathadi Board's stand was somewhat contradictory it did not really create a bar
against it from changing its stance for a correct interpretation of Section
2(11) of the Mathadi Act.
41.
The next argument was based on Article 254 of the Constitution of
India. It was suggested that the said Article prescribes that in the matters
falling in the Concurrent List, any Central legislation, whether made before 6
or after a State legislation, supersede such State legislation, if they both
cover the same field. An exception to this lies in sub-Article (2), which
preserves and protects a State enactment to the extent it has received the
assent of the Vice President. Needless to say that this challenge is in the
nature of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision of the
State Act. Such was not the challenge. The appellants never urged that the Act
was constitutionally invalid and in fact, the constitutional validity of the
Act has already been upheld. Article 254 does not provide a guide for the
interpretation of a State statute. The appellants are also not certain about
the proposal of the assent of the Vice President, which was received on
5.6.1969, since the said proposal could not be located by them.
Therefore,
all the arguments must fall to the ground once the Presidential assent under
Article 254(2) is received to the Act. This is apart from the fact that the
grounds on the basis of Article 254 cannot be used for the interpretation of
the Act. In strict sense, this question was never before the Full Bench and in
our opinion, the Full Bench rightly rejected this argument on the ground that
this was not the case of the appellants. Therefore, Textile Corporation Ltd.
[2002 (8) SCC 182] and Thirumuruga Kirupa Nanda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara
Swamigal Medical Educational is of no consequence. The argument is thus rejected.
42.
Thus, in our considered opinion, the Full Bench was absolutely
correct in coming to the conclusions that it did.
43.
Before parting with the judgment, we must refer to the fact that
this legislation, which came way back in 1969, have in its view, those poor
workmen, who were neither organized to be in a position to bargain with the
employers nor did they have the compelling bargaining power. They were mostly
dependent upon the Toliwalas and the Mukadams. They were not certain that they
would get the work everyday. They were also not certain that they would work
only for one employer in a day. Everyday was a challenge to these poor workmen.
It was with this idea that the Board was created under Section 6 of the Mathadi
Act. Deep thoughts have gone into, creating the framework of the Boards, of the
schemes etc. With these lofty ideas that the Act was brought into existence. In
these days when Noble Laureate Professor Mohd. Yunus of Bangladesh is
advocating the theory of social business as against the business to earn
maximum profits, it would be better if the employers could realize their social
obligations, more particularly, to the have-nots of the society, the workers
who are all contemplated to be the inflicted workers in the Act.
Again,
before parting, we must appreciate the valuable contributions made on behalf of
the appellants and the respondents, more particularly, Shri J.P. Cama, Shri
C.U. Singh, Shri Sudhir Talsania, Shri K.K. Singhvi and 7 Ms. Indira Jaising,
Learned Senior Counsel. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed and under
the circumstances, there shall be no orders as to the costs.
SLP
(C).... CC No. 4065 of 2007 And SLP (C).... CC No. 4046 of 2007 Permission to
file Special Leave Petition in these two cases is not granted.
Dismissed.
......................................J. (Tarun Chatterjee)
......................................J. (V.S. Sirpurkar)
New Delhi;
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