Lal Chand
Vs. Union of India & ANR. [2009] INSC 1437 (12 August 2009)
Judgment
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4945
OF 2006 Lal Chand ... Appellant Union of India & Another ... Respondents
WITH Civil Appeals of 2006 CA Nos.4946, 4947, 4948, 4949, 4950, 4951, 4952,
4953, 4954, 4955, 4956, 4957, 4958, 4959, 4960, 4961, 4962, 4963, 4964, 4965,
4966, 4967, 4968, 4969, 4970, 4971, 4972, 4973, 4974, 4976, 4977, 5134, 5135,
5136, 5351, and 5890 Civil Appeals of 2007 CA Nos.23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 465, 603, 886, 887, 888,
889, 890, 891, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1233, 1295, 1300, 1301, 1302,
1303, 1304, 1305, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982,
1984, 2461, 2679, 2721, 2722, 2723, 3990, and 4693 2
R. V.
RAVEENDRAN, J.
1.
This batch of appeals arise out a common judgment dated 27.4.2006
of the High Court of Delhi in RFA No.751/1994 (Jas Rath vs. Union of India) and
other connected cases. They relate to determination of market value in regard
to lands situated at village Rithala on the outskirts of Delhi, acquired for
(i) construction of a supplementary drain;
(ii)
construction of sewage treatment plant; (iii) re-modelling of Nangloi drain;
and (iv) planned development of Delhi. The said four acquisitions were
initiated under notifications dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 13.3.1981 and
31.12.1981 issued under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
("LA Act' for short). The extent of lands acquired and compensation
awarded are as under:
Rate
awarded per Bigha (Unit of 1008 sq. yds.) Date of Extent notification notified
under Bighas-Biswas Sec.4(1) By LAO By Reference By High Court Court (impugned
judgment) (In Rupees) (In Rupees) (In Rupees) 13.2.1981 829 - 00 2600 (Block B)
20,000 25,000 3800 (Block A) 20.2.1981 883 - 08 2600 (Block B) 20,000 25,000
3800 (Block A) 13.3.1981 78 - 16 6500 10,800 25000 31.12.1981 5947 - 00 7000
(Block C) 21,000 27,000 3 9000 (Block B) 10840 (Block A)
2.
The awards of the reference court were challenged by the
landowners. The appeals were decided by the Delhi High Court by judgment dated
4.9.2001 awarding Rs.67000 per bigha in regard to lands covered by
notifications dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981 and Rs.73,584 per bigha
in regard to lands covered by notification dated 31.12.1981. For arriving at
the said market value, the High Court relied upon the allotment rates of Delhi
Development Authority for plots shown in its Brochure issued on 9.2.1981 in
respect of Rohini Residential Scheme (Phase-I), formed by acquiring part of
Rithala village and surrounding villages. The provisional rates of allotment
given in the said brochure were Rs.100, Rs.125, Rs.150, and Rs.200 per sq. m.
respectively
for plots of the size of 26,32,48,60 and 90 sq. m. The High Court took the
average of those allotment rates as Rs.150 per sq. m.
Having
regard to the fact that the said rate was the premium for allotment on
leasehold basis, the High Court inferred that the freehold market value of the
said plots would be at least double, that is Rs.300 per sq. m. Taking note of
the fact that considerable expenditure would have been involved for developing
the plots, the High Court took the wholesale price of freehold plots as Rs.200
per sq. m. and after deducting 60% towards the 4 cost of development and area
required for roads etc., determined the market price at Rs.80 per sq. m. (or
Rs.67/- per sq. yd.). The said rate was awarded as compensation for the first
three acquisitions. In regard to land acquired under the last notification
(dated 31.12.1981) it provided an increase of 12% per annum and arrived at the
market value as Rs.73 per sq. yd. This worked out to Rs.67,536 per bigha in
regard to the first three acquisitions and Rs.73,584 per bigha in regard to the
last acquisition.
3.
Feeling aggrieved the claimants as well as the Union of India
filed appeals before this Court. This court by a common judgment dated 7.9.2005
(reported in Ranvir Singh v. Union of India - 2005 (12) SCC 59) allowed the
appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remanded the matter to
the High Court for determination of the market value afresh. This Court held :
(a) The
lease premium in respect of fully developed plots (which was given in the DDA
brochure) could not be the basis for determining the freehold market value of
undeveloped land, though the undeveloped land may be situated adjacent to the
developed plots. Therefore the DDA brochure rates were not of assistance.
(b) The
sale deeds pertaining to the acquired lands or nearby lands would be the most
relevant pieces of evidence and the High Court ought not to have ignored the
sale deeds exhibited by the parties on the ground that neither the vendors nor
the purchasers relating to the said deeds were 5 examined as witnesses, having
regard to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Cement
Corporation of India Ltd. V. Purya [2004 (8) SCC 270].
(c) The
claim of the land owners that the market value of the acquired lands should be
determined on the basis of acquisition of the year 1961 in the same village, by
increasing the award price of Rs.7,000 per bigha at the rate of 12% per annum
for 20 years, was unacceptable.
4.
After remand, parties let in further evidence. The High Court
examined various pieces of evidence placed before it. It rejected the entire
documentary evidence placed by both parties, except two documents for
determining the compensation. The first is a sale deed (Ex.
PW-1/1)
dated 4/11.4.1980 under which land was sold in Rithala village for Rs.19,000/-
per bigha. The second is another sale deed (Ex. A1) dated 9.4.1981 under which
one bigha of land was sold for Rs.35,000/-. The average of the said two sale
deeds, namely Rs.27,000/- per bigha was determined as the market value in
regard to the lands acquired under notifications dated 31.12.1981. In regard to
the lands that were acquired under notifications dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and
13.3.1981, having regard to the fact that the said acquisitions were about 11
to 10 months prior to the acquisition of 31.12.1981, it determined the market
value as Rs.25,000/- per bigha.
5.
Not being satisfied with the amount awarded the appellants have
filed these appeals. According to them, the compensation awarded is low and it
ought to have been higher. They contend that the High court was not justified
in rejecting the following documents from consideration :
(i) Ex.
X-1 (DDA brochure relating to Rohini Residential Scheme) issued in 1981 showing
an average premium of Rs.150/- per sq. m. in respect of DDA plots for
allotment.
(ii) The
circle rates dated 21.1.1989 issued by the Land Division of Government of India
showing a market value of Rs.400/- per square yard for residential plots (and
Rs.800/- per sq. yd. for commercial plots).
(iii)
Award relating to the acquisition of land at Rithala under notification dated
24.10.1961 at Rs.7,000 per Bigha which when increased at a compound rate of 12%
per annum for twenty years, would give a market value of Rs.67,525/- per bigha
in 1981.
(iv) Sale
deeds marked as A-2, A-3, A-10 to A-13 all of the year 1981, showing a market
value ranging from Rs.35000/- per bigha to Rs.68570/- per bigha.
The
appellants contend that by taking those documents into account, the High Court
ought to have determined the market value as at least Rs.49000/- per Bigha. The
DDA has filed cross-objections in several appeals for reducing the compensation
to what was awarded by the 7 reference court.
Whether
DDA brochure is relevant evidence?
6.
The DDA brochure (Ex.X1) dated 9.2.1981 is an invitation seeking
applications from members of public for allotment of plots on lease basis under
Rohini Residential Housing Scheme. The Brochure stated that the plots were in a
layout formed/to be formed in Rithala and the surrounding villages. The
brochure gives the following provisional rates for allotment of plots on
leasehold basis :
S.No.
Plot size Category Rate (Per Sq.m.)
1. 26 sqm
Economically weaker sections(EWS) Rs. 100/-
2. 32 sqm
Low Income Group(LIG) Rs. 125/-
3. 48 sqm
Low Income Group (LIG) Rs. 150/-
4. 60 sqm
Middle Income Group (MIG) Rs. 200/-
5. 90 sqm
Middle Income Group (MIG) Rs. 200/- The appellants contend that Rs.150/- per
sq. m. which is the average of the said provisional rates, should be taken as
indicative of the ruling market price.
7.
On careful consideration, we are of the view that such allotment
rates of plots adopted by Development Authorities like DDA cannot form the
basis for award of compensation for acquisition of undeveloped lands for
several reasons. Firstly market value has to be determined with reference to
large tracts of undeveloped agricultural lands in a rural area, whereas the
allotment rates of development authorities are with reference to small plots in
a developed lay out falling within Urbana. Secondly DDA and other statutory
authorities adopt different rates for plots in the same area with reference to
the economic capacity of the buyer, making it difficult to ascertain the real
market value, whereas market value determination for acquisitions is uniform
and does not depend upon the economic status of the land loser. Thirdly we are
concerned with market value of freehold land, whereas the allotment
"rates" in the DDA Brochure refer to the initial premium payable on
allotment of plots on leasehold basis. We may elaborate on these three factors.
8.
First factor: The percentage of 'deduction for development' to be
made to arrive at the market value of large tracts of undeveloped agricultural
land (with potential for development), with reference to the sale price of
small developed plots, varies between 20% to 75% of the price of such developed
plots, the percentage depending upon the nature 9 of development of the lay out
in which the exemplar plots are situated.
The
'deduction for development' consists of two components. The first is with
reference to the area required to be utilised for developmental works and the
second is the cost of the development works. For example if a residential
layout is formed by DDA or similar statutory authority, it may utilise around
40% of the land area in the layout, for roads, drains, parks, play grounds and
civic amenities (community facilities) etc. The Development Authority will also
incur considerable expenditure for development of undeveloped land into a
developed layout, which includes the cost of levelling the land, cost of
providing roads, underground drainage and sewage facilities, laying waterlines,
electricity lines and developing parks and civil amenities, which would be
about 35% of the value of the developed plot. The two factors taken together
would be the `deduction for development' and can account for as much as 75% of
the cost of the developed plot. On the other hand, if the residential plot is
in an unauthorised private residential layout, the percentage of `deduction for
development' may be far less. This is because in an un-authorized lay outs,
usually no land will be set apart for parks, play grounds and community
facilities. Even if any land is set apart, it is likely to be minimal. The
roads and drains will also be narrower, just adequate for movement of vehicles.
The amount spent on 10 development work would also be comparatively less and
minimal. Thus the deduction on account of the two factors in respect of plots
in unauthorised layouts, would be only about 20% plus 20% in all 40% as against
75% in regard to DDA plots. The `deduction for development' with references to
prices of plots in authorised private residential layouts may range between 50%
to 65% depending upon the standards and quality of the layout. The position
with reference to industrial layouts will be different. As the industrial plots
will be large (say of the size of one or two acres or more as contrasted with
the size of residential plots measuring100 sq.m. to 200 sq.m.), and as there
will be very limited civic amenities and no playgrounds, the area to be set
apart for development (for roads, parks, playgrounds and civic amenities) will
be far less; and the cost to be incurred for development will also be
marginally less, with the result the deduction to be made from the cost of a
industrial plot may range only between 45% to 55% as contrasted from 65 to 75%
for residential plots. If the acquired land is in a semi-developed urban area, and
not an undeveloped rural area, then the deduction for development may be as
much less, that is, as little as 25% to 40%, as some basic infrastructure will
already be available. (Note: The percentages mentioned above are tentative
standards and subject to proof to the contrary).
9.
Therefore the deduction for the 'development factor' to be made
with reference to the price of a small plot in a developed lay out, to arrive
at the cost of undeveloped land, will be for more than the deduction with reference
to the price of a small plot in an unauthorized private lay out or an
industrial layout. It is also well known that the development cost incurred by
statutory agencies is much higher than the cost incurred by private developers,
having regard to higher overheads and expenditure.
Even
among the layouts formed by DDA, the percentage of land utilized for roads,
civic amenities, parks and play grounds may vary with reference to the nature
of layout - whether it is residential, residential- cum-commercial or
industrial; and even among residential layouts, the percentage will differ
having regard to the size of the plots, width of the roads, extent of community
facilities, parks and play grounds provided.
Some of
the layouts formed by statutory Development Authorities may have large areas
earmarked for water/sewage treatment plants, water tanks, electrical
sub-stations etc. in addition to the usual areas earmarked for roads, drains,
parks, playgrounds and community/civic amenities. The purpose of the aforesaid
examples is only to show that the `deduction for development' factor is a
variable percentage and the range of percentage itself being very wide from 20%
to 75%.
10.
Second factor: DDA and other statutory development authorities
adopt different rates for allotment, plots in the same layout, depending upon
the economic status of the allottees, classifying them as high income group,
middle income group, low income group, and economically weaker sections. As a
consequence, in the same layout, plots may be earmarked for persons belonging
to economically weaker section at a price/premium of Rs. 100/- sq.m, whereas
the price/premium charged may be Rs.150/- per sq.m for members of low income
group, Rs.200/- per sq.m for persons belonging to middle income group and Rs. 250/-
per sq. m. for persons belonging to High income groups. The ratio of sites in a
layout reserved for HIG, MIG, LIG and EWS may also vary.
All these
varying factors reflect in the rates for allotment. It will be illogical to
take the average of the allotment rates, as the 'market value' of those plots,
does not depend upon the cost incurred by DDA statutory authority, but upon the
paying capacity of the applicants for allotment.
11.
Third factor: Some development authorities allot plots on freehold
basis, that is by way of absolute sale. Some development authorities like DDA
allot plots on leasehold basis. Some have premium which is almost equal to sale
price, with a nominal annual rent, whereas others have lesser 13 premium, and
more substantial annual rent. There are standard methods for determining the
annual rental value with reference to the value of a freehold property. There
are also standard methods for determining the value of freehold (ownership)
rights with reference to the annual rental income in regular leases. But it is
very difficult to arrive at the market value of a freehold property with
reference to the premium for a leasehold plot allotted by DDA. As the period of
lease is long, the rent is very nominal, some times there is a tendency among
public to equate the lease premium rate (allotment price) charged by DDA, as
being equal to the market value of the property. However, in view of the
difficulties referred to above, it is not safe or advisable to rely upon the
allotment rates/auction rates in regard to the plots formed by DDA in a
developed layout, in determining the market value of the adjoining undeveloped
freehold lands. The DDA brochure price has therefore to be excluded as being
not relevant.
Whether
the circle rates/guideline value rates can be relied upon to determine the
market value?
12.
The appellant relied upon the notification dated 21.1.1981 issued
by the Land Division of Government of India, Ministry of Works and 14 Housing,
notifying the Schedule of Market Rates of land in different parts of Delhi and
various outlying areas - showing the minimum rates Rs.400/- per sq. yard for
residential and Rs.800/- sq. yard for non- residential plots. The question is
whether the same could be relied upon for determination of market value in
regard to land acquisition. When the matter came up before this Court in the
earlier round, the counsel for the appellant had conceded that such rates could
not form the basis for determining the market value of the acquired lands. In
spite of it, the learned counsel for appellant submitted before us that though
the said circle rates cannot be the basis for determining the market value, it
may be taken note of as one of the relevant pieces of evidence indicative of
the market value. There is some confusion as to whether such basic
rates/guideline value/minimum registration value rates could form the basis for
determining the market value.
13.
This Court in Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue Divisional Officer
[1994 (4) SCC 595] and several cases following it, including Land Acquisition
Officer, Eluru vs Jasti Rohini [1995 (1) SCC 717], U.P.
Jal
Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman vs M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. Lucknow
[1996 (3) SCC 124] and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Sahaswan v. Bipin Kumar
[2004 (2) SCC 283] held that maket value 15 under section 23 of LA Act cannot
be fixed on the basis of the rates mentioned in the Basic Valuation Registers'
maintained for the purpose of detection of undervaluation and collection of
proper stamp duty.
13.1) In
Jawajee Nagnatham, the land owners had appealed to the Andhra Pradesh High
Court against the order of Reference Court, claiming increase, relying up on
the market value entered in the Basic Valuation Register maintained by the
Revenue Authorities under the Stamp Act. The High Court rejected the claim
based on the Basic Valuation Register, as such Register had no evidentiary
value or statutory basis. In appeals by the land owners, this Court held that
the Basic Valuation Register was maintained for the purpose of collecting stamp
duty under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (as amended in Andhra
Pradesh); that Section 47A conferred no express power to the Government to
determine the market value of the lands prevailing in a particular area, village,
block, district or region and to maintain Basic Valuation Register for levy of
stamp duty in regard to instruments presented for registration; that there was
no other statutory provision or rule having statutory force providing for
maintaining such Valuation Register; and therefore, such Register prepared and
maintained for the purpose of collecting stamp duty had no statutory base or
force and 16 cannot form the basis to determine the market value of any
acquired land under Section 23 of the LA Act. Jasti Rohini also arose from
Andhra Pradesh and followed Jawajee Naganatham and held that the Basic
Valuation Register had no statutory basis.
13.2) The
case of U.P. Jal Nigam arose from Uttara Pradesh. In that case, the land owner
filed a writ petition seeking a direction to U.P. Jal Nigam to pay compensation
in regard to lands acquired on the basis of market value assessed by the
Collector, Lucknow. The High Court allowed the petition and directed the U.P.
Jal Nigam to pay compensation at the rate determined by the Collector, on the
basis of the basic valuation circulars issued for purposes of stamp duty. This
Court reversed the decision of the High Court following its earlier decision in
Jawajee Naganatham and held that the Collector committed an error in
determining the market value on the basis of Basic Value Circulars.
Jawajee
Naganatham was again followed in Bipin Kumar, which is another case from Uttar
Pradesh.
17 13.3)
All the four decisions rejected the value entered in the Basic Valuation Registers,
on the ground that they had no statutory basis having regard to the provisions
of stamp law applicable in the respective States (Andhra Pradesh and Uttar
Pradesh) and cannot be the basis for determination of market value under
Section 23 of LA Act.
14.
There are also another set of decisions considering such circle
rates could be considered as prima facie basis, for purposes of ascertaining
the market value and determining whether there was any undervaluation of the
instrument for purposes of stamp duty, which is a revenue collection exercise.
We may refer to one of those cases, that is Ramesh Chand Bansal v. District
Magistrate/Collector, Ghaziabad [1999 (5) SCC 62], wherein this Court held :
"Reading
S. 47-A with the aforesaid R. 340-A it is clear that the circle rate fixed by
the Collector is not final but is only a prima facie determination of rate of
an area concerned only to give guidance to the Registering Authority to test
prima facie whether the instrument has properly described the value of the
property. The circle rate under this Rule is neither final for the authority
nor to one subjeted to pay the stamp duty. So far sub-sections (1) and (2) it
is very limited in its application as it only directs the Registering Authority
to refer to the Collector for determination in case property is under-valued in
such instrument. The circle rate does not take away the right of such person to
show that the property in question is correctly valued as he gets an
opportunity in case of under-valuation to prove it before the Collector after
reference is made."
15.
In R. Sai Bharathi v. J. Jayalalitha [2004 (2) SCC 9], while 18
examining the issue in the context of a case relating to disproportionate
assets, this Court held :
"The
guideline value is a rate fixed by authorities under the Stamp Act for purposes
of determining the true market value of the property disclosed in an instrument
requiring payment of stamp duty. Thus the guideline value fixed is not final
but only a prima facie rate prevailing in an area. It is open to the
registering authority as well as the person seeking registration to prove the
actual market value of property. The authorities cannot regard the guideline
valuation as the last word on the subject of market value. x x x x This scheme
of the enactment and the Rules contemplate that guideline value will only
afford a prima facie basis to ascertain the true or correct market value. Undue
emphasis on the guideline value without reference to the setting in which it is
to be viewed will obscure the issue for consideration. It is clear, therefore,
that guideline value is not sacrosant as urged on behalf of the appellants, but
only a factor to be taken note of, if at all available in respect of an area in
which the property transferred lies."
16.
It should however be noted that as contrasted from the assessment
of market value contained in non-statutory Basic Value Registers, the position
may be different, where the guideline market values are determined by Expert
Committees constituted under the State Stamp Law, by following the detailed
procedure laid down under the relevant rules, and are published in the State
Gazette. Such state stamp Acts and the Rules thereunder, provide for scientific
and methodical assessment of market value in different areas by Expert
Committees. These statutes provide that such committees will be constituted
with officers from the Department of Revenue, Public Works, Survey &
Settlement, Local Authority and an expert in the field of valuation of
properties, with the 19 sub-registrar of the sub-registration district as the
member secretary.
They also
provide for different methods of valuation for lands, plots, houses and other
buildings. They require determination of the market value of agricultural lands
by classifying them with reference to soil, rate of revenue assessment, value
of lands in the vicinity and locality, nature of crop yield for specified
number of years, and situation (with reference to roads, markets etc.). The
rates assessed by the committee are required to be published inviting
objections/suggestions from the members of public. After considering such
objections/suggestions, the final rates are published in the Gazette. Such
published rates are revised and updated periodically. When the guideline market
values, that is, minimum rates for registration of properties, are so evaluated
and determined by expert committees as per statutory procedure, there is no
reason why such rates should not be a relevant piece of evidence for
determination of market value. One of the recognised methods for determination
of market value is with reference to opinion of experts. The estimation of
market value by such statutorily constituted expert committees, as expert
evidence can therefore form the basis for determining the market value in land
acquisition cases, as a relevant piece of evidence. It will be however open to
either party to place evidence to dislodge the presumption that may flow from
such guideline market value. We however hasten to add 20 that the guideline market
value can be a relevant piece of evidence only if they are assessed by
statutorily appointed Expert Committees, in accordance with the prescribed
assessment procedure (either street-wise, or road-wise, or area-wise, or
village-wise) and finalised after inviting objections and published in the
Gazette. Be that as it may. We have referred to this aspect only to show that
there are different categories of Basic Valuation Registers in different states
and what is stated with reference to the stamp law in Andhra Pradesh or Uttar
Pradesh, may not apply with reference to other states where state stamp laws
have prescribed the procedure for determination of market value, referred to
above.
17.
In this case, there is nothing to show the circle rates have been
determined by any statutorily appointed committee by adopting scientific basis.
Hence, the principle in Jawajee Naganatham will apply and they will not be of
any assistance for determining the market value. Further, they do not purport
to be the market value for lands in rural areas on the outskirts of Delhi, nor
the market values relating to Rithala village. The circle rates relate to
urban/city areas in Delhi and are wholly irrelevant.
Whether
the award relating to acquisition on 24.10.1961 is relevant.
18.
The appellants contend that some lands in Rithala were acquired
under section 4(1) notification dated 24.10.1961 for the planned development of
Delhi and compensation was awarded at the rate of Rs.7000 per bigha. Their
contention is that as the present acquisition is in the year 1981, the market
value of the acquired land should be determined with reference to the market
value determined for the 1961 acquisition by providing an appropriate increase
at the cumulative/ compounded rate of 12% per annum.
19.
This Court had occasion to examine this issue recently. In The
General Manager, Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai
Patel [2008 (11) SCALE 637], this court held :
"Normally,
recourse is taken to the mode of determining the market value by providing
appropriate escalation over the proved market value of nearby lands in previous
years (as evidenced by sale transactions or acquisition), where there is no
evidence of any contemporaneous sale transactions or acquisitions of comparable
lands in the neighbourhood. The said method is reasonably safe where the
relied-on-sale transactions/acquisitions precedes the subject acquisition by
only a few years, that is upto four to five years. Beyond that it may be
unsafe, even if it relates to a neighbouring land. What may be a reliable
standard if the gap is only a few years, may become unsafe and unreliable
standard where the gap is larger. For example, for determining the market value
of a land acquired in 1992, adopting the annual increase method with reference
to a sale or acquisition in 1970 or 1980 may have many pitfalls. This is
because, over the course of years, the 'rate' of annual increase may itself
undergo drastic change apart from the likelihood of occurrence of varying
periods of stagnation in prices or sudden spurts in prices affecting the very
standard of increase."
22
(emphasis supplied) Even if the relied upon transaction is only two to three
years prior to the acquisition, court should, before adopting a standard
escalation, satisfy that there were no adverse circumstances. For example, if
the acquisition is of this year 2009, it may not be possible to determine the
market value, based on the 2007 or 2008 prices, by providing an increase of 12%
or 15% per year, as the newspaper reports disclose that the price of immovable
properties in most areas of the country came down by more than 40% to 50% from
the 2007 rates. Caution is therefore necessary before increasing the price with
reference to the old transactions. Be that as it may. It is clear that the
award made in regard to a 1961 acquisition will not be of any use for
determining the market value for a 1981 acquisition.
Whether
the High Court was justified in rejecting the sale deeds (Ex.A- 2 to A-3 and
A-10 to A-13 and Ex.R3 to R7) from consideration?
20.
The appellants have relied upon A-2, A-3 and A-10 to A-13 relating
to sale of land in Rithala village, the details of which are as under:
S.No. Ex.
No. Date of Sale Extent sold Rate per bigha execution consideration
1. A-1
09.4.1981 35000 1 bigha 35000
2. A-2
15.9.1981 35000 1 bigha 35000 23
3. A-13
15.9.1981 35000 1 bigha 35000
4. A-3
27.7.1981 49000 1 bigha 49000
5. A-10
03.11.1981 24000 7 biswas 68571
6. A-11
03.11.1981 24000 7 biswas 68571
7. A-12
01.12.1981 49000 1 bigha 49000
21.
On the other hand, the respondents relied upon Ex.R3 to R7
relating to sale of land in Rithala Village,the details of which are as under:
S Ex.
Extent of land Date of Sale Rate per No. No. Bigha-Biswas Execution
consideration Bigha
1. R5 1-3
09.2.1981 Rs.10,800/- Rs.9,391/-
2. R7 1-3
09.2.1981 Rs.10,800/- Rs.9391/-
3. R4 3 -
12 05.6.1981 Rs.32,500/- Rs.9028/-
4. R6 3-3
17.7.1981 Rs.34,000/- Rs.10,793/-
5. R3 4 -
12 28.11.1981 Rs.46,000/- Rs.10000/-
22.
The High Court, as noticed above, determined the market value as
Rs.27000/- per bigha by taking the average of the prices disclosed by Ex.A1
dated 9.4.1981 (Rs.35000/-) and Ex. PW1/1 dated 4/11.4.1980 (Rs.19000/-). It
rejected Ex. A2, A3 and A10 to A13 on the ground that they were
post-notification sales with reference to acquisitions dated 13.2.1981,
20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981. Then it examined whether the said sale deeds were of
any relevance to determine the market value in regard 24 to the acquisition under
notification dated 13.12.1981. It was of the view that Ex. A10 to A12 related
to small bits of land and therefore were not of any assistance. It referred to
the fact that the sales on 3.11.1981 (Ex. A10 and A11) were at a price of
Rs.68571 per bigha and sales on 27.7.1981 and 1.12.1981 (Ex.A3 and A12) were at
a price of Rs.49,000/-, whereas the market price on 9.4.1981 (Ex. A1) was only
Rs.35000 per bigha, thereby showing a steep increase in seven months. The High
Court was of the view that the increase of nearly 95% in a period of 7 months
or even a 40% increase in four/eight months demonstrated that they were not
bonafide transactions and therefore, they should be ignored. The High Court did
not consider the possibility that the steep increase may be a genuine increase
on account of the rapid urbanisation of the area, or on account of the
acquisitions in February and March, 1981 and/or on account of the locational
advantage (such as nearness to road or nearness to developed area).
23.
The High Court also rejected Ex.R3 to R7 relied upon by the
respondents, solely on the ground that the prices therein were lower than the
market value offered by Land Acquisition Collector and therefore, they had to
be excluded under section 25 of the LA Act. Section 25 provides that the amount
of compensation awarded by a reference court 25 shall not be less than the
amount awarded by the Collector under section 11. We fail to see how the said
section has any relevance in regard to determination of market value as contrasted
from award of compensation. If the sale deeds relied on by the respondents
showed a particular market value, they cannot be ignored merely because the
Collector had awarded compensation at a higher rate in regard to the acquired
land. All that section 25 requires is that courts should not award an amount
which is less than what is awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector, even if
the evidence may show a lesser market value. So, the bar under section 25 of
the LA Act is not in regard to determination of a market value, which is less
than what was awarded by the LAO. The bar is only upon the reference court (or
any higher court) reducing the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition
Collector. The fact that the Land Acquisition Collector has awarded compensation
at a particular rate does not mean that the sale deeds which are otherwise
reliable, cannot be relied upon to find out what was the real market value.
Further the very assumption that all awards made by the Collector were at a
rate higher than what was disclosed by the sale deeds (Ex.R3 to R7) is also not
correct. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded a sum of Rs.2600 to Rs.3800 per
bigha in regard to acquisitions under notifications dated 13.2.1981 and
20.2.1981, Rs.6500 in regard to acquisition under 26 notification dated
13.3.1981. These amounts were certainly lower than the market value shown by
Ex.R3 to R7. Even in regard to the acquisition under notification dated
13.12.1981, the award by the Collector at Rs.7,000/- and Rs.9000/- were lower
than the value disclosed by Ex.R3 to R7. As noticed above, these sale deeds
show that the market value was around Rs. 9000 per bigha in February to June
1981 and 10,000 to 11,000 per bigha between July, 1981 and November, 1981. The
Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs. 10,840 (which is more than the price shown
by Ex.R3 to R7) in regard to only some lands acquired under the December, 1981
acquisition. Be that as it may. As the sale deeds (Ex.R3 to R7) relate to sales
of lands in Rithala Village, they cannot be excluded from consideration merely
on the ground that what has been awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector was
higher in regard to some of the acquired lands. We accordingly find that the
ground on which the High Court excluded the sale deeds Ex.R3 to R7 is not
sound. The question whether these deeds (Ex.R3 to R7) should be excluded on any
other relevant ground will be considered later.
24.
We are therefore of the considered view that the reasons assigned
by the High Court for rejecting Ex. A2,3, A10 to A13 and Ex R3 to R7 are not
sound. All the sale deeds related to Rithala village and were of the 27 year of
acquisition, namely 1981. They were prior to the acquisition under notification
dated 31.12.1981, which is the largest of the four acquisitions. The difficulty
arises because of the marked difference in value, disclosed by the sale deeds
exhibited by the respondents (Ex.R3 to R7) and the sale deeds exhibited by the
appellants (Ex.A1 to A3 and A10 to A13). The sale deeds produced by the respondents
(Ex. R3 to R7) which are of the period between 9.2.1981 to 28.11.1981 disclose
a value of Rs.9028 to Rs.10791 per bigha, that is an average of Rs.10000 per
bigha. On the other hand the sale deeds, produced by the appellant (Ex. A1 to
A3 and A10 to A13) which are the period 9.4.1981 to 1.12.1981 show market
values of Rs.35000/-, Rs.49000/- and Rs.68371/- per bigha, the average being
Rs.50790/- per bigha. The variation between the sale deeds relied upon by the
respondents and appellants is as much as 400%.
The
question then is which set of sale deeds should be accepted, for determination
of the market value of the acquired lands.
25.
The appellants contend that the sale transactions as per Ex.R3 to
R7 relied upon by the respondents, showing an average value of Rs.10000 per
bigha, should be excluded from consideration as they do not reflect the true
market value and as they were obviously undervalued transactions where only a
part of sale price was shown in the document, 28 the balance having been suppressed
either to evade capital gains tax and stamp duty, or to invest black money.
Alternatively, it is submitted that they may be distress sales. On the other
hand the respondents submitted that the sale deeds exhibited by them represent
the true market value as they showed a consistent price range whereas the sale
deeds exhibited by the appellants (Ex. A1 to A3 and A10 to A13) showed prices
with a large variation demonstrating that they were got up to show artificially
increased value and that it should be inferred that they were created only for
the purpose of providing proof in support of the claim for higher compensation.
It is submitted that they do not represent bona fide transactions. It is
pointed out that the residents of the locality knew in the year 1980 itself, or
at least by February, 1981 that there will be further acquisition of lands in
Rithala village for development of existing Rohini Scheme and related purposes
and therefore, these documents were brought into existence to create evidence
of a higher than real market price. It is submitted that there is no
explanation regarding the large variance in the price disclosed by Ex.A1 to A3
and A10 to A13. This necessitates consideration of effect of section 51A of the
LA Act and the relevance of undervalued documents.
What is
the effect of section 51A of LA Act? 29
26.
Before the amendment to the LA Act, introducing section 51A, it
was necessary to examine either the vendor or a vendee to exhibit a sale deed
and prove its contents. If the vendor or vendee was so examined, it was
possible to cross-examine them so as to ascertain whether the transaction
reflected by the exhibited instrument was a genuine transaction or a
transaction showing a depressed value or a boosted value.
But with
the insertion of section 51A, certified copies of registered sale deeds could
be tendered as evidence without examining the vendor or vendee thereof and the
court is enabled to accept them as evidence of the transaction recorded
therein. The scope of section 51A was explained by a Constitution Bench of this
Court in Cement Corporation of India v.
Purya
[2004 (8) SCC 270] thus :
"But
when the statute enables a court to accept a sale deed on the records
evidencing a transaction, nothing further is required to be done. .........
Even the vendor or vendee thereof is not required to examine themselves for
proving the contents thereof. This, however, would not mean that the contents
of the transaction as evidenced by the registered sale deed would automatically
be accepted. The legislature has advisedly used the word `may'. A discretion,
therefore, has been conferred upon a court to be exercised judicially, i.e.
upon taking into consideration the relevant factors.
The
submission of Mr. G. Chandrasekhar to the effect that the contents of a sale
deed should be a conclusive proof as regard the transaction contained therein
or the court must raise a mandatory presumption in relation thereto in terms of
Section 51 of the Act cannot be accepted as the Court may or may not receive a
certified copy of sale deed in evidence. It is discretionary in nature. Only
because a document is admissible in evidence, as would appear from the
discussions made hereinbefore, the same by itself would not mean that the
contents thereof stand proved. Secondly, having regard to the other materials
30 brought on record, the court may not accept the evidence contained in a deed
of sale. When materials are brought on record by the parties to the lis, the
court is entitled to appreciate the evidence brought on records for determining
the issues raised before it and in the said process, may accept one piece of
evidence and reject the other."
[emphasis
supplied] The following view expressed earlier in Land Acquisition Officer and
Mandal Revenue Officer vs. Narasaiah [2001 (3) SCC 530], was approved in Cement
Corporation of India (supra) and is extracted below :
"The
words "may be accepted as evidence" in the Section indicate that
there is no compulsion on the court to accept such transaction as evidence, but
it is open to the court to treat them as evidence. Merely accepting them as
evidence does not mean that the court is bound to treat them as reliable
evidence. What is sought to be achieved is that the transactions recorded in
the documents may be treated as evidence, just like any other evidence, and it
is for the court to weigh all the pros and cons to decide whether such
transaction can be relied on for understanding the real price of the land
concerned".
Therefore,
courts may accept and act upon certified copies of sale deeds exhibited without
examining the vendor or vendee. They may not be relied upon if there is other
acceptable evidence which throw a doubt about the correctness of the sale price
shown therein.
27.
The evidence to reject an exemplar sale deed as not relevant, may
be either extrinsic or intrinsic. The statement of a witness describing the
advantageous or disadvantageous features of the land which is the subject
matter of such document will be extrinsic evidence. An absurdly low or 31 high
freakish value when compared to the prevailing price disclosed by other
contemporaneous transactions may also be an extrinsic evidence.
Where the
sale deed recites the financial difficulties of the vendor and the urgent need
to find money as reasons for the sale, that will be an intrinsic evidence of a
distress sale. Therefore, though a certified copy of a sale deed may be
received in evidence and exhibited even without examining the vendor and
vendee, and accepted as proof of the transaction to which it relates, the
courts have the discretion to rely upon it or reject it as unreliable or
unacceptable for reasons to be recorded.
28.
But a word of caution. What Narsaiah and Cement Corporation of
India clarified was that a certified copy of a sale deed could be marked as an
exhibit and its contents may be relied upon as evidence of the sale
transaction, even without examining either the vendor or the vendee, in view of
the enabling provision in Section 51 of the LA Act. If the acquisition is in
regard to a large area of agricultural lands in a village, and the exemplar
sale deed is also in respect of an agricultural land in the same village, it
may be possible to rely upon the sale deed as prima facie evidence of the
prevailing market value, even if such land is at the other end of the village
at a distance of one or two kilometres. But the same 32 may not be the position
where the acquisition relates to plots in a town or city where every locality
or road has a different value. For example in a place like Delhi there are some
areas where the plot value is many times more than the value of plots in a
neighbouring middle class locality which in turn may be many time more than the
value of plot in a neighbouring slum area. Or the price of a property on a main
road may be many times more than the price of a property on a parallel smaller
road, though the two properties may be situated back to back. It cannot be said
that merely because two properties adjoin each other or touch each other the
value applicable to the property facing a main road, should be applied to the
property to its rear facing a service road. Therefore, while a distance of
about a kilometre may not make a difference for purposes of market value in a
rural village, even a distance of 50 metre may make a huge difference in market
value in urban properties.
29.
There would be lesser likelihood of rejection of a sale deed
exhibited to prove the market value, if some witness speaks about the property
which is the subject matter of the exemplar sale deed and explains its
situation, potential, as also about the similarities or dissimilarities with
the acquired land. The distance between the two 33 properties, the nature and
situation of the property, proximity to the village or a road and several other
factors may all be relevant in determining the market value. Mere production of
some exemplar deeds without `connecting' the subject matter of the instrument,
to the acquired lands will be of little assistance in determining the market
value.
Section
51A of the LA Act only exempts the production of the original sale deed and
examination of the vendor or vendee.
What is
the utility or relevance of under-valued sale deeds in determing market price?
30.
This takes us to the value of "undervalued" sale deeds.
When the respondents rely upon certain sale deeds to justify the value
determined by the Land Acquisition Collector or to show that the market value
was less than what is claimed by the claimants, and if the claimants produce
satisfactory evidence (which may be either with reference to contemporaneous
sale deeds or awards made in respect of acquisition of comparable land or by
other acceptable evidence) to show that the market value was much higher, the
sale deed relied upon by the respondents showing a lesser value may be inferred
to be undervalued, or not showing the true value. Such deeds have to be
excluded from consideration as being unreliable evidence. A document which is
found to be undervalued 34 cannot be used as evidence.
31.
But we have noticed a disturbing trend in some recent cases, where
a court accepts the sale deed exhibited by the claimants as the basis for
ascertaining the market value. But then, it also accepts a contention of the
claimants that the general tendency of members of public is not to show the
real value, but show a lesser value to avoid tax/stamp duty and therefore the
sale deeds produced and relied on by them, should be assumed to be under
valued. On such assumption, some courts have been adding some fancied
percentage to the value shown by the sale deeds to arrive at what they consider
to be `realistic market value'. The addition so made may vary from 10% to 100%
depending upon the whims, fancies, and the perception of the learned Judge as
to what is the general extent of suppression of the price in sale deeds. Such
increase, in the market value disclosed by the sale deeds, on the assumption
that all sale deeds show a `depressed' market value instead of the real value,
is impermissible. The Court can either accept the document as showing the
prevailing market value, in which event it has to be acted upon. Or the Court
may find a document to be undervalued in which it should be rejected
straightaway as not reliable. There is no third way of accepting a document, by
adding to the market value disclosed by the document, some percentage to off-
35 set the under-valuation. There is no legal basis to proceed on a general
assumption that parties, without exception, fail to reflect the true
consideration in the sale deeds, that there is always undervaluation or
suppression of the true price and that consequently, all sale deeds reflect a
depressed value and not the real market value and therefore, some percentage
should be added to arrive at the real value. Such a course also amounts to branding
all vendors and purchasers as dishonest persons without any evidence and
without hearing them. It ignores the fact that government has fixed minimum
guideline values and whenever a registering authority is of the view that a
sale deed is undervalued, proceedings are initiated for determination of the
true market value. It also ignores the fact that a large number of sale deeds
are accepted by the registering authorities as disclosing the current market
value. Be that as it may.
Whether
valuation by the High Court is proper?
32.
The existence of several other sale deeds showing a much higher
value and the fact that the Land Acquisition Collector chose to award a higher
rate in regard to some of the acquired lands, leads to an inevitable inference
that Ex.R3 to R7 were either undervalued or were distress sales.
Whatever
be the reason, they are liable to be excluded from 36 consideration.
33.
The sale transactions under Ex. A1 to A3 and A10 to A13 relate to
plots used for residential or other non-agricultural purposes. Though these
sale deeds describe the lands sold as agricultural lands, having regard to the
prevailing land reforms laws, the size of the plots show that they were not
used for agricultural purposes. For example, two of the sale deeds - Exs. A10
and A11, relate to 7 biswas of land each (about 350 sq. yds. each) and the
purchaser is a business firm (M/s. Sant & Co.).
Obviously,
the land was not sold for agricultural purpose, as it is not possible to
imagine plots measuring only 350 sq. yards being sold for agricultural
purposes. Significantly, the other sale deeds, each of which relate to an area
of one bigha and show a price of Rs.35000/- per bigha (three deeds) and
Rs.49000/- per bigha (two deeds). It is evident the plots which were the
subject matter of these sale deeds were sold as semi-urban land for residential
or other non-residential purposes. There is no evidence or material to show
that they were nominal or sham documents intended to create evidence of a
higher market value. The variation in price between Rs.35000 to Rs.68571 may
possibly be on account of several factors. It is possible that some plots were
nearer while others were far away from roads or developed areas. In the absence
of the 37 evidence of vendors/vendees of these documents, we propose to take
average of these transactions, which is approximately Rs.50,790/- per bigha, as
the market value of small plots sold for residential or non- agricultural
purposes.
34.
But when the market value of such small plots intended for non-
agricultural purposes is made the basis for determining the market value of
large tracts of agricultural lands, it is necessary to make an appropriate
deduction towards `development' factor. The evidence shows that the acquired
lands were at the relevant time (1981) in a rural area on the outskirts of
Delhi, with access to roads and services nearby. In fact the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi, within a few months after the acquisition, issued a
notification dated 23/4/1982, under section 507(a) of Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957 declaring that Rithala in the northern zone of Delhi
shall cease to be a rural area. The appellants have also let in evidence to
show that the acquired lands were situated in an area having a potential for
development for residential use. The policy resolution dated 27.12.1980 of
Delhi Development Authority in regard to development of Zones H7 and H8 (Rohini
Scheme) in North-West Delh shows that the area was earmarked for fast urban
development. Some facilities like roads, water, electricity had reached the
area in a limited manner. Therefore, the appropriate deduction towards
development, 38 needs to be only 40% instead of the higher standard percentage
of 60% to 70%.
35.
On deduction of 40% from Rs.50790/- per bigha which the market
value of small plots, the market value for the large tracts of lands acquired
in December, 1981 would be Rs.30,474/- (rounded off to Rs.30500/-) per bigha.
As the earlier three acquisitions were of the same year, but were in February
and March (that is on 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981) which are about 10 to
11 months earlier, the compensation in regard to the three earlier acquisitions
is determined as Rs.28000/- per bigha. To this extent, the award of the High
Court requires to be modified.
36.
The learned counsel for DDA contended that market value determined
by the High Court required to be reduced with reference to the market value of
the acquired lands in the neighbouring village. He relied upon the decision of
this Court in Union of India vs. Ram Phool - 2003 (10) SCC 167, which related
to acquisition of 5484 bighas of land in revenue village Poothkalan on the
outskirts of Delhi, in regard to which the preliminary notification was issued
on 11.12.1981. The reference court had, after referring to several sale
transactions, determined the market value as Rs.15,700/- per bigha in one case
and 39 Rs.18,500/- per bigha in another case. On appeal by the claimants, the
High Court excluded several sale transactions relied upon by the reference
court as not inspiring confidence, and on the basis of a solitary transaction
dated 10.9.1981 in regard to a small area of one bigha, increased the market
value to Rs.30,000/- per bigha. This Court held that the High Court erred in
relying upon a single sale deed relating to a small extent of one bigha to
determine the market value of a large extent of 5484 bighas. It further held
that if that sale deed was excluded, there was no other evidence to support the
increase in compensation made by the High Court. Consequently, this Court set
aside the increase awarded by the High Court and restored the market value
determined by the reference court. The learned counsel for DDA submitted that a
rate in that range (Rs.15700 to Rs.18500 per bigha) should therefore be adopted
for the Rithala lands also. But that decision relating to Poothkalan is not of
any assistance with reference to the Rithala acquisitions for the following
reasons:
(i) It is
now well settled that sale transactions or awards relating to neighbouring
village will not be relied on when acceptable evidence by way of
contemporaneous sale transactions or awards are available in regard to the very
village where the acquisition took place. (Where there are no contemporaneous
sale deeds or awards relating to the same village, then the sale transactions
or awards of the same period relating to the 40 neighbouring village can be
considered provided there is evidence to show that the acquired lands and the
lands covered by the exemplar deeds of the neighbouring village are similarly
situated).
(ii) The
decision in Ram Phool itself lays down as follows:
`Contemporaneous
award no doubt is a useful guide for every court to determine the market value
but that award must be taken into evidence in accordance with law by giving an
opportunity to the other side for rebutting the same and that has not been done
in the case on hand.' In this case while the learned counsel for respondents
contended that the lands at Rithala and Poothkalan were similar, the learned
counsel for the appellants submitted that the acquired lands in Rithala were
far more valuable than the lands in Poothkalan and that Rithala was nearer to
the city when compared to Poothkalan. Neither stand is supported by any
evidence or material on record. In the absence of any evidence, we cannot
assume that acquired lands in Rithala and lands acquired in Poothkalan were
similarly situated.
(iii) In
Ram Phool, this Court set aside the decision of the High Court and restored the
award of reference court, not because it came to the conclusion that the market
value was only Rs.15,700/-/Rs.18,500/- as decided by the reference court, but
because the only piece of evidence that was relied on by the High Court to fix
the market value of Rs.30,000/- was found to be not reliable and no other
evidence was available. Therefore, decision of this Court in Ram Phool was not
a positive determination of market value of Poothkalan lands, but the rejection
of a determination of a higher value by High Court for want of acceptable
evidence.
41
Conclusion :
37.
We accordingly increase the compensation, in regard to acquisition
dated 31.12.1981 from Rs.27000/- to Rs.30,500/- per bigha. We also increase the
compensation in regard to the acquisition dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and
13.3.1981 from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.28,000/- per bigha. The statutory benefits and
interest awarded are not disturbed.
38.
The appeals by the claimants are partly allowed increasing the
compensation as per para 37 above. As a consequence, the cross objections by
DDA seeking reduction of the compensation are rejected without going into the
question whether such cross objections are maintainable. Parties to bear their
respective costs.
......................................J. (R V Raveendran)
....................................J.
New Delhi;
August
12, 2009. (B. Sudershan Reddy) 42 Not Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1853 OF 2007 Karam Singh (dead)
Through LRs & Ors. ... Appellants Union of India & Anr. ... Respondents
WITH
Civil Appeal Nos.1981 of 2007, 4118 to 4124 of 2008, 4283 of 2008, 5429 of 2008
and 551 of 2009 AND CA No. 5792 of 2009 (@ SLP(C)No.1684/2007) CA No. 5361 of
2009 (@ SLP(C) No.6560/2007) CA No. 5362 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.6563/2007) CA No.
5363 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.8259/2007) CA No. 5364 of 2009 (@ SLP(C)
No.12121/2007) CA No. 5365 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12746/2007) CA No. 5366 of 2009
(@ SLP(C) No.12933/2007) CA No. 5367 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12935/2007) CA No.
5368 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12936/2007) CA Nos. 5369-5370 of 2009 (@ SLP(C)
No.12937-12938/2007) CA No. 5371 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12939/2007) CA No. 5372
of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.12940/2007) CA No. 5373-5374 of 2009 (@ SLP(C)
No.12942-12943/2007) CA No. 5375 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.14313/2007) CA No. 5377
of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.14314/2007) CA No. 5378 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.14315/2007)
43 CA No. 5379 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.16352/2007) CA No. 5380 of2009 (@ SLP(C)
No.16353/2007) CA No. 5381 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.4334/2008) CA No. 5382 of 2009
(@ SLP(C) No.13579/2008) CA Nos. 5383-5384 of 2009 (@ SLP(C)
No.16207-16208/2008) CA No. 5385 of 2009 (@ SLP(C) No.28889/2008)
R. V.
RAVEENDRAN, J.
Leave
granted in the special leave petitions.
2. These
appeals are by claimants for increase in compensation in regard to acquisitions
of lands situated at Rithala village initiated under preliminary notifications
dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981, 13.3.1981, and 31.12.1981.
3. These
matters are covered by the judgment in Lal Chand vs. Union of India [Civil
Appeal No.4945 of 2006] and connected cases, decided today. Following the
decision and in terms of it, these appeals are allowed in part.
......................................J. (R V Raveendran)
....................................J.
New Delhi;
Back
Pages: 1 2