Chitresh
Kumar Chopra Vs. State [2009] INSC 1423 (10 August 2009)
Judgment
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1473
OF 2009 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1827 OF 2007 CHITRESH
KUMAR CHOPRA ... APPELLANT VERSUS
D.K.
JAIN, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
This appeal by special leave is directed against final judgment
and order dated 1st February, 2007 rendered by the High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition No. 62 of 2004. By the impugned judgment,
the High Court has dismissed the Revision Petition filed by the appellant
herein under Section 397 read with Sections 401 and 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short "the Code"), upholding the order passed by
the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, dated 8th January, 2004, framing charge
against the appellant for commission of offence under Section 306 read with
Section 2 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short "the IPC")
arising out of FIR No. 329 of 2002 dated 4th July, 2002 registered at Police
Station Mehrauli.
3.
On 4th July, 2002, one Rahul Kaushik lodged the said First
Information Report (FIR) with Police Station, Mehrauli stating that his father
Jitendra Sharma (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") had
committed suicide on 3rd July, 2002 by shooting himself with his licensed revolver.
It was alleged that the deceased was a partner with the appellant in this
appeal along with two other persons viz., Jahuruddin and Mahavir Prasad and
they were all engaged in the real estate business; he committed suicide on
account of the problems created by these three persons; the deceased left
behind a suicide note which mentioned that there were some money transactions
between them and thus, these three persons had abetted the deceased to commit
suicide. For the sake of ready reference, relevant portion of the suicide note
is extracted below:
"The
money of Shri Bansi Dhar and Shri Grewal is with Ram Pashre. The money of Shri
Puri and Rajendra has been given to Ramjan, Mehrauli by Jahur and Jahur has
become dishonest. The money of B.C. Malik and K.S. Yadav is with Mahesh, who
has written the same and given. The rest, the ex-SDE, Pamer Singh and had taken
and did not do Puri's work.
My
children known nothing about this matter. C.K. Chopra's money has been given by
Jahur, Jahur and 3 Chopra are saying things against me and are thereby
troubling me. Kartar etc., money was taken by Jahur and Mahavir. They had taken
it. The reason for the scandal are Chopra and his friends. They are troubling
me and are pressurizing me to write all this. I am stressed and therefore,
going away."
4.
On completion of investigation, the police filed charge-sheet
against the said three persons including the appellant for allegedly committing
offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the IPC. As per
the charge-sheet, the case of the prosecution in short is that there appeared
to be a dispute between the deceased and the appellant regarding share of
profits from the sale of the lands; prior to the incident, the deceased was
asked to sign a settlement paper, according to which, the share of the deceased
was reduced from 25% to 10% in favour of one Tegh Singh Chabbra and the
appellant, who were otherwise having 45% share each in the profits from sale
proceeds of lands and that due to this dispute, the deceased was mentally
harassed and pressurized by the appellant and the other two accused, as a
result whereof, the deceased committed suicide.
5.
On being charge-sheeted, all the three accused were put up for
trial before the court of the Additional Sessions Judge. The trial court felt
satisfied that there was sufficient material on record 4 for framing of charge
against all the three accused. Accordingly, on 8th January, 2004, the following
charge was framed:
"....
That you
all on 3.7.2002 at about 3.10 p.m. at house No. 108, village Saidulajake, New
Delhi in furtherance of common intention, mentally tortured Jitender Sharma and
abetted him to commit suicide by your said act of mental torture and thus you
thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34
of IPC and within cognizance of this Court.
...."
6.
Aggrieved by the framing of the charge, the appellant preferred a
Revision Petition before the High Court. As already noted, the High Court
declined to interfere with the order framing charge.
Being
dissatisfied with the said order, the appellant (accused No.1) is before us in
this appeal.
7.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8.
Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant, submitted that even if the case of the prosecution is accepted
on its face value, still on the basis of the material brought on record by the
prosecution, offence under Section 306, IPC is not made out against the
appellant. Referring to the undated suicide note (Annexure P-1) and the
document recording some final settlement (Annexure P-3), learned senior counsel
was at pains to explain that even assuming for the sake of argument, that there
was some `settlement' between the 5 deceased, the appellant and the said Tegh
Singh Chabbra, whereunder the deceased was allegedly forced to forego his share
of profits in favour of the said Tegh Singh Chabbra, the settlement neither
shows any instigation on the part of the appellant to the deceased to do
something, nor any role of the appellant in any conspiracy which ultimately
resulted in the commission of suicide by the deceased, and therefore, the
appellant cannot be said to have abetted commission of suicide by the deceased.
It was also argued that since as per the suicide note, the deceased owed some
money to the appellant, he would not encourage or provoke his debtor to commit
suicide so as to lose his money. In support of the proposition that to attract
the offence of abetment under Section 107 of the IPC, an intentional aiding and
active complicity is an essential ingredient of said provision, learned counsel
relied on the decision of this placed on the decisions of this Court in State
of Maharashtra & failed to apply its mind to the question whether or not
there was any ground for presuming that the appellant had committed the 1
(1975) 3 SCC 495 2 (1996) 4 SCC 659 3 (1997) 4 SCC 393 6 alleged offence.
9.
Per contra, Mr. Mohan Jain, learned Additional Solicitor General,
appearing on behalf of the State, supported the decision of the High Court. He
submitted that the suicide note cannot be read de hors the other material,
including the statements of some of the persons recorded during the course of
investigations. It was contended that there is ample material on record for
presuming that the accused, including the appellant, have abetted the
commission of suicide by the deceased. The learned counsel thus, submitted that
the trial court has not committed any illegality in framing charge against the
appellant and, therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing the
Revision Petition filed by the appellant, particularly when the scope of
revision is very limited.
10.
Section 306 of the IPC reads as under:
"306.
Abetment of suicide If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission
of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
11.
From a bare reading of the provision, it is clear that to
constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC, the prosecution has to establish:
(i) that a person committed suicide, and (ii) that such suicide was abetted by
the accused. In other words, an offence 7 under Section 306 would stand only if
there is an "abetment" for the commission of the crime. The
parameters of "abetment" have been stated in Section 107 of the IPC,
which defines abetment of a thing as follows:
"107.
Abetment of a thing A person abets the doing of a thing, who - First-
Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly- Engages with one or more
other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an
act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in
order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or
illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation
1- A person who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a
material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or
attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the
doing of that thing."
12.
As per the Section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing
a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any person to do that thing;
or
secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy
for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in
pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that
thing. Explanation to Section 107 states that any wilful misrepresentation or
wilful 8 concealment of material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also
come within the contours of "abetment". It is manifest that under all
the three situations, direct involvement of the person or persons concerned in
the commission of offence of suicide is essential to bring home the offence
under Section 306 of the IPC.
13.
Therefore, the question for consideration is whether the
allegations levelled against the appellant in the FIR and the material
collected during the course of investigations, would attract any one of the
ingredients of Section 107 IPC?
14.
As per clause firstly in the said Section, a person can be said to
have abetted in doing of a thing, who "instigates" any person to do
that thing. The word "instigate" is not defined in the IPC. The
meaning of the said word was considered by this Court in three-Judge Bench,
R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was) said that instigation is to goad,
urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy
the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that
actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes
"instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the
consequence.
Yet a
reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be 4 (2001) 9 SCC 618 9
capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or
by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased
was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an
"instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of
anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot
be said to be instigation.
15.
Thus, to constitute "instigation", a person who
instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage doing of an act by
the other by "goading" or "urging forward". The dictionary
meaning of the word "goad" is "a thing that stimulates someone
into action: provoke to action or reaction" (See: Concise Oxford English
Dictionary); "to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he
reacts" (See: Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary - 7th Edition).
Similarly, "urge" means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to
do something or to make a person to move more quickly and or in a particular
direction, especially by pushing or forcing such person. Therefore, a person
who instigates another has to "goad" or "urge forward" the
latter with intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by
the latter. As observed in Ramesh Kumar's case (supra), where the accused by
his acts or by a continued course of 10 conduct creates such circumstances that
the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an
"instigation" may be inferred. In other words, in order to prove that
the accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to be established
that: (i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words,
deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until
the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or
wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a
forward direction; and (ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge
or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted
above. Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of
instigation.
16.
In the background of this legal position, we may advert to the
case at hand. The question as to what is the cause of a suicide has no easy
answers because suicidal ideation and behaviours in human beings are complex
and multifaceted. Different individuals in the same situation react and behave
differently because of the personal meaning they add to each event, thus
accounting for individual vulnerability to suicide. Each individual's
suicidability pattern depends on his inner subjective 11 experience of mental
pain, fear and loss of self-respect. Each of these factors are crucial and
exacerbating contributor to an individual's vulnerability to end his own life,
which may either be an attempt for self-protection or an escapism from intolerable
self.
17.
In the present case, the charge against the appellant is that he
along with other two accused "in furtherance of common intention",
mentally tortured Jitendra Sharma (the deceased) and abetted him to commit
suicide by the said act of mental torture. It is trite that words uttered on
the spur of the moment or in a quarrel, without something more cannot be taken
to have been uttered with mens rea. The onus is on the prosecution to show the
circumstances which compelled the deceased to take an extreme step to bring an
end to his life. In the present case, apart from the suicide note, extracted
above, statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation,
tend to show that on account of business transactions with the accused, including
the appellant herein, the deceased was put under tremendous pressure to do
something which he was perhaps not willing to do. Prima facie, it appears that
the conduct of the appellant and his accomplices was such that the deceased was
left with no other option except to end his life and, therefore, 12 clause
firstly of Section 107 of the IPC was attracted. Briefly dealing with the
material available on record, in the order directing framing of charge against
the appellant, the learned trial court has observed as under:
"In
the present case the evidence shows threatening given to the deceased. One
witness called Kartar Singh says that CK Chopra was heard saying to the
deceased that the deceased had become dishonest because he was refusing to sign
a paper in which the share in some joint property was shown to be 10%. On
another occasion Chopra was heard by this witness to say that Chopra would ruin
the deceased if he did not give up his claim for 25% and did not agree to
accept 10%. Witness Padam Bahadur has stated inter alia that he overheard
Jahoor and Mahavir telling the deceased that Chopra had asked them to say that
this was the last opportunity to sign the document and that if he wanted to
live in the society he should sign the agreement or should die by taking
poison.
Soon
thereafter the deceased committed suicide.
Thus the
evidence is not of a mere quarrel in which one person told the other go and die
without actually suggesting that the opponent should commit suicide. In the
present case the evidence collected by the investigation suggest that the
deceased had been actually pushed to the wall and the escape by committing
suicide was suggested by the accused persons."
18.
In the light of the material on record, in our judgment, it cannot
be said that the trial court was in error in drawing an inference that the
appellant had "instigated" the deceased to commit suicide and,
therefore, there was ground for presuming that the appellant has committed an
offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC. It is trite that
at the stage of 13 framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the
material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts
emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all
the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited
purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the
initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At
this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out
if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an
offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not
likely to lead to a conviction. (See: Bhimraj Bijja & Ors5).
19.
In Som Nath Thapa & Ors. (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this
Court explained the meaning of the word "presume".
Referring
to dictionary meanings of the said word, the Court observed thus:
"...if
on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that
commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of
charge exists. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the
accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for
conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has commuted the
offence. It is apparent that at 5 (1990) 4 SCC 76 14 the stage of framing of
charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the
materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at
that stage".
(emphasis
supplied)
20. In
view of the settled legal position, noted above, we are convinced that the
trial court was correct in law in coming to the conclusion that a case for framing
charge against the appellant had been made out. Similarly, the scope of
revisional powers of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code being
limited, the High Court was justified in dismissing the Revision Petition,
preferred by the appellant.
20.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in
this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly. It goes without saying that
nothing said by the High Court or by us hereinabove shall be construed as
expression of any opinion on the merits of the case pending trial.
..............................................J. (D.K. JAIN)
...............................................J. (H.L. DATTU)
NEW DELHI,
AUGUST 10, 2009.
Back
Pages: 1 2
