U. P. State
Road Transport Corp. Vs. Nanhe Lal Kushwaha [2009] INSC 1393 (4 August 2009)
Judgment
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.
5114 OF 2009 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 4224/2009] U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT
CORPORATION ... APPELLANT(S) :VERSUS:
S.B.
Sinha, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
Appellant is constituted under the Road Transport Corporation Act.
It employed the respondent herein as a conductor. Indisputably, he had been
charged for carrying passengers without tickets on or about 06.04.1984,
10.7.1984, 14.7.1985, 6.3.1986, 23.2.1987 and 4.3.1987. A disciplinary
proceeding was initiated against him on or about 6.9.1987. In the said
departmental proceedings he was found guilty of the charges levelled against
him. He was removed from service by the appointing authority by an order dated
18.12.1991.
3.
He raised an industrial dispute. The State of U.P. referred the
dispute to Labour Court-II, Kanpur for its decision on the following question:
2
"Whether termination of services by the employers of their workman Nanhe
Lal Kushwaha, S/o Heera Lal Kushwaha, Conductor vide order dated 18.12.1991 is
legal and/or valid? If not, then to what relief/compensation the concerned
workman is entitled to get? And with what other details?"
4.
By reason of its award dated 29.2.2000 the Labour Court directed
reinstatement of the respondent with 75% back-wages, stating:
"I
have duly perused all the documents available on record and considered the
above discussions. The misconducts of carrying without ticket passengers on
06.03.1986 and 04.03.1987 which had been levelled against the petitioner
workman, the same have been found proved on the basis of evidence of the
witnesses produced by the Respondents. But misconducts regarding the incidents
of 10.04.1984, 14.07.1985, 06.04.1984 and 23.02.1987 for which Respondents have
chargesheeted the workman the same are not found to be proved. Hence the
workman concerned with the dispute is fully guilty for the misconduct committed
on 06.03.1986 and 04.03.1987 but he is not guilty for the misconducts committed
on 10.04.1984, 14.07.1985, 06.4.1984 and 23.02.1987. Considering all the fact
and circumstance in the present case I have reached to the conclusion that the
punishment imposed by order dated 18.12.1991 by the employers on the workman
concerned with the dispute, Nanhe Lal Kushwaha is excessive considering the
seriousness of charges. Therefore, amending the order dated 18.12.1991 passed
by Respondent, they are being directed to reinstate Shri Nanhe Lal Kushwaha,
S/o Shri Heera Lal Kushwaha, Conductor from the date of removal from service
i.e. 18.12.1991 with continuity of service. Since two charges have been found
proved against the workman concerned with the dispute hence the Respondents are
directed that they will pay 75% of wages and other wages and other benefits to
the concerned workman during the period of unemployment."
5.
Questioning the correctness of the said award, appellant filed a
writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. By reason of the impugned
judgment dated 14.08.2008, the High Court while noticing the submission on
behalf of the appellant that the respondent was holding the post of trust
wherefor honesty and 3 integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, held:
"However,
in view of the fact that the Respondent workman was reinstated in service under
the interim order of this Court dated 17.7.2000 and has now retired from
service, it is directed that the award of the Labour Court shall stand modified
to the extent that no back-wages shall be payable to the workman concerned but
he may be given continuity of service for the purposes of retiral benefits. The
retiral benefits etc. of the workman concerned be paid in accordance with law
within a period of 4 months from the date of production of a certified copy of
this order.
For the
reasons stated above, the writ petition is partly allowed. No order as to
costs."
6.
The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that
the Labour Court also found the respondent guilty of carrying the passengers
without tickets on two occasions and that the respondent should have been dealt
with iron hands and it was held:
"Since
charges have been found proved against the workman concerned with the dispute
hence the Respondents are directed that they will pay 75% of wages and other
wages and other benefits to the concerned workman during the period of
unemployment."
7.
This Court times without number has deprecated the practice
adopted by the High Courts in disposing of the writ petitions without assigning
any reason. It is well settled that industrial tribunal or a labour court may
interfere with a quantum of punishment awarded by the employer in exercise of
its power under Section 11A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act but,
ordinarily, the discretion exercised by the employer should not be interfered
with. The learned Labour Court did not assign any sufficient and cogent reason
as to on what 4 premise the punishment imposed upon the respondent by the
employer by an order dated 18.12.1991, can be said to be excessive; keeping in
view the seriousness of the charges. The question as to whether an order of
punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of charge on the basis whereof
the workman has been found to be guilty, must be spelt out in a clear and
cogent manner.
8.
The High Court also, as indicated hereinbefore, despite noticing
the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, did not choose to deal
therewith. It passed the operative portion of the order without discussing any
materials on record. Even the principles of law on the basis whereof the
purported discretionary jurisdiction was sought to be exercised, has not been
stated. The High Court noticed the decision of this Court in Regional Manager,
U.P.SRTC, Etawah and Ors. v. Hoti Lal and Anr., 2003 (3) SCC 605, but failed
and/or neglected to advert to the ratio laid down therein. In Hoti Lal (supra)
this Court opined:
"It
is the responsibility of the bus conductors to collect the correct fare from
the passengers and deposit the same with the Corporation. They act in a
fiduciary capacity and it would be a case of gross misconduct if knowingly they
do not collect any fare or the correct amount of fare."
The
learned Judges held :
"It
needs to be emphasized that the court or tribunal while dealing with the
quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the
punishment was not commensurate with the proved charges. As has been
highlighted in several cases to which reference has been made above, the scope
for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases in the
indicated circumstances. Unfortunately, in the present case as the quoted 5
extracts of the High Court's order would go to show, no reasons whatsoever have
been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate.
Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taken to the
controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Failure to
give reasons amounts to denial of justice. [See Alexander Machinery (Dudley)
Ltd. v. Crabtree, 1974 LCR 120 (NITC)] A mere statement that it is disproportionate
would not suffice. A party appearing before a court, as to what it is that the
court is addressing its mind. It is not only the amount involved but the mental
set-up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go
into the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is
proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of
trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it
would not be proper to deal with the mater leniently. Misconduct in such cases
has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is
engaged in financial transactions or ac in a fiduciary capacity, the highest
degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged
in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not
appear to be proper."
9.
The High Court, in our opinion, committed the same error which had
been pointed out in the aforesaid decision. Apart there from, this Court in
L.K. Verma v. HMT Ltd. and Anr., 2006 (2) SCC 269, opined:
"So
far as the contention as regards quantum of punishment is concerned, suffice it
to say that verbal abuse has been held to be sufficient for inflicting a
punishment of dismissal."
This
Court further noticed :
"23.
Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.N. Narawade etc. [JT 2005 (2) SC 583 : (2005) 3
SCC 134] is a case wherein the misconduct against the delinquent was 'verbal
abuse'. This Court held :
'It is no
doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes
Act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the Labour Court/Industrial
Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the
management where the workman concerned is found guilty of misconduct. The said
area of discretion has been very well defined by the various 6 judgments of
this Court referred to hereinabove and it is certainly not unlimited as has
been observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The discretion which can
be exercised under Section 11-A is available only on the existence of certain
factors like punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so
as to disturb the conscience of the court, or the existence of any mitigating
circumstances which require the reduction of the sentence, or the past conduct
of the workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce the punishment. In
the absence of any such factor existing, the Labour Court cannot by way of
sympathy alone exercise the power under Section 11-A of the Act and reduce the
punishment. As noticed hereinabove at least in two of the cases cited before us
i.e. Orissa Cement Ltd. and New Shorrock Mills this Court held:
"Punishment of dismissal for using of abusive language cannot be held to
be disproportionate.' In this case all the forums below have held that the
language used by the workman was filthy. We too are of the opinion that the
language used by the workman is such that it cannot be tolerated by any civilised
society. Use of such abusive language against a superior officer, that too not
once but twice, in the presence of his subordinates cannot be termed to be an
indiscipline calling for lesser punishment in the absence of any extenuating
factor referred to hereinabove.'
24. In
Muriadih Colliery v. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union [(2005) 3 SCC 331], this
Court, inter alia, following Mahindra and Mahindra (supra) held :
'It is
well-established principle in law that in a given circumstance it is open to
the Industrial Tribunal acting under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 has the jurisdiction to interfere with the
punishment awarded in the domestic inquiry for good and valid reasons. If the
Tribunal decides to interfere with such punishment it should bear in mind the
principle of proportionality between the gravity of the offence and the
stringency of the punishment. In the instant case it is the finding of the
Tribunal which is not disturbed by the writ courts that the two workmen
involved in this appeal along with the others formed themselves into an
unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons, went to the office of the General
Manager and assaulted him and his colleagues causing them injuries. The
injuries suffered by the General Manager were caused by lathi on the head. The
fact that the victim did not die is not a mitigating circumstance to reduce the
sentence of 7 dismissal.'
25. These
questions recently came up for consideration in Hombe Gowda Edn. Trust &
Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.
[2005
(10) SCALE 307], upon considering a large number of cases, this Court held:
'Indiscipline
in an educational institution should not be tolerated. Only because the
Principal of the Institution had not been proceeded against, the same by itself
cannot be a ground for not exercising the discretionary jurisdiction by us. It
may or may not be that the Management was selectively vindictive but no
Management can ignore a serious lapse on the part of a teacher whose conduct
should be an example to the pupils.
This
Court has come a long way from its earlier view points.
The
recent trend in the decisions of this Court seek to strike a balance between
the earlier approach of the industrial relation wherein only the interest of
the workmen was sought to be protected with the avowed object of fast
industrial growth of the country. In several decisions of this Court it has
been noticed that how discipline at the workplaces/ industrial undertaking
received a set back. In view of the change in economic policy of the country,
it may not now be proper to allow the employees to break the discipline with
impunity. Our country is governed by rule of law. All actions, therefore, must
be taken in accordance with law. Law declared by this Court in terms of Article
141 of the Constitution of India, as noticed in the decisions noticed supra,
categorically demonstrates that the Tribunal would not normally interfere with
the quantum of punishment imposed by the employers unless an appropriate case
is made out therefor.
The
Tribunal being inferior to that of this court was bound to follow the decisions
of this Court which are applicable to the fact of the present case in question.
The Tribunal can neither ignore the ratio laid down by this Court nor refuse to
follow the same.' [See also State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Mohammed Ayub Naz,
2006 (1) SCALE 79). "
10.
To the similar effect is the decision of this Court in Divisional
Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C. v. H. Amaresh, 2006 (6) SCC 187, wherein it was held:
"In
our view, even short remittance amounts to misconduct and, 8 therefore,
applying eh rulings of this Court, the impugned order ought not to have been
passed by the Division Bench ordering reinstatement. We, therefore, have no
hesitation to set aside the order passed by the leaned Judges of the Division
Bench and restore the order of dismissal of the respondent from service. It is
stated that pursuant to the order of Labour Court the respondent was reinstated
in service. Since there was no stay granted by this Court the respondent had
continued in service of the Corporation.
In view
of the law laid down by this Court and of the facts and circumstances of this
case, the respondent, in our opinion, has no legal right to continue in service
any further. We, therefore, direct the appellant Corporation to immediately
discharge the respondent from service. However, we make it clear that the
salary paid to the respondent and other emoluments during this period shall not
be recovered from the respondent. We also make it further clear that in view of
the order of dismissal the respondent shall not be entitled to any further
emoluments."
11.
Mr. S.R. Singh, learned senior appearing on behalf of the
respondent, however, would contend that this Court in a situation of this
nature where the employee has already retired and he has been found guilty for
commission of a minor offence, should not interfere with the impugned judgment.
12.
We regret our inability to accede to the said request. As the
respondent was appointed as a conductor and in that capacity was holding the
position of trust, it is not the amount which would be very material for the
purpose of determining the quantum of punishment. He was charged for commission
of similar misconducts on six occasions; at least misconduct has been found to
be proved in respect of two charges even by the Labour Court.
13.
In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal
is allowed.
However,
there shall be no order as to costs.
....................J (S.B. SINHA)
....................J (DEEPAK VERMA)
NEW DELHI,
AUGUST 4, 2009.
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