Sarla Verma &
Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corp.& ANR. [2009] INSC 756 (15 April 2009)
Judgment
Reportable IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO 3483 OF
2008 (Arising out of SLP [C] No.8648 of 2007) Smt. Sarla Verma & Ors. ...
Appellants Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr. ... Respondents
ORDER R.V.
RAVEENDRAN, J.
1.
The
claimants in a motor accident claim have filed this appeal by special leave
seeking increase in compensation.
2.
One
Rajinder Prakash died on account of injuries sustained in a motor accident
which occurred on 18.4.1988 involving a bus bearing No.DLP 829 belonging to the
Delhi Transport Corporation. At the time of the accident and untimely death,
the deceased was aged 38 years, and was working as a 2 Scientist in the Indian
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) on a monthly salary of Rs.3402/- and
other benefits. His widow, three minor children, parents and grandfather (who
is no more) filed a claim for Rs.16 lakhs before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal,
New Delhi. An officer of ICAR, examined as PW-4, gave evidence that the age of
retirement in the service of ICAR was 60 years and the salary received by the
deceased at the time of his death was Rs.4004/- per month.
3.
The
Tribunal by its judgment and award dated 6.8.1993 allowed the claim in part.
The Tribunal calculated the compensation by taking the monthly salary of the
deceased as Rs.3402. It deducted one-third towards the personal and living
expenses of the deceased, and arrived at the contribution to the family as
Rs.2250 per month (or Rs.27,000/- per annum).
In view of the
evidence that the age of retirement was 60 years, it held that the period of
service lost on account of the untimely death was 22 years.
Therefore it applied
the multiplier of 22 and arrived at the loss of dependency to the family as
Rs.5,94,000/-. It awarded the said amount with interest at the rate of 9% per
annum from the date of petition till the date of realization. After deducting
Rs.15000/- paid as interim compensation, it apportioned the balance
compensation among the claimants, that is, 3 Rs.3,00,000/- to the widow,
Rs.75000/- to each of the two daughters, Rs.50000/- to the son, Rs.19000/- to
the grandfather and Rs.30000/- to each of the parents.
4.
Dissatisfied
with the quantum of compensation, the appellants filed an appeal. The Delhi
High Court by its judgment dated 15.2.2007 allowed the said appeal in part. The
High Court was of the view that though in the claim petition the pay was
mentioned as Rs.3,402 plus other benefits, the pay should be taken as
Rs.4,004/- per month as per the evidence of PW-4.
Having regard to the
fact that the deceased had 22 years of service left at the time of death and
would have earned annual increments and pay revisions during that period, it
held that the salary would have at least doubled (Rs.8008/- per month) by the
time he retired. It therefore determined the income of the deceased as
Rs.6006/- per month, being the average of Rs.4,004/- (salary which he was
getting at the time of death) and Rs.8,008/- (salary which he would have
received at the time of retirement). Having regard to the large number of
members in the family, the High Court was of the view that only one fourth
should be deducted towards personal and living expenses of the deceased,
instead of the standard one-third deduction.
After such deduction,
it arrived at the contribution to the family as Rs.4,504/- per month or
Rs.54,048/- per annum. Having regard to the age of 4 the deceased, the High
Court chose the multiplier of 13. Thus it arrived at the loss of dependency as
Rs.702,624/-. By adding Rs.15,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs.2,000/-
as funeral expenses, the total compensation was determined as Rs.7,19,624/-.
Thus it disposed of the appeal by increasing the compensation by Rs.1,25,624/-
with interest at the rate of 6% P.A. from the date of claim petition.
5.
Not
being satisfied with the said increase, the appellants have filed this appeal.
They contend that the High Court erred in holding that there was no evidence in
regard to future prospects; and that though there is no error in the method
adopted for calculations, the High Court ought to have taken a higher amount as
the income of the deceased. They submit that two applications were filed before
the High Court on 2.6.2000 and 5.5.2005 bringing to the notice of the High
Court that having regard to the pay revisions, the pay of the deceased would
have been Rs.20,890/- per month as on 31.12.1999 and Rs.32,678/- as on
1.10.2005, had he been alive. To establish the revisions in pay scales and
consequential re-fixation, the appellants produced letters of confirmation
dated 7.12.1998 and 28.10.2005 issued by the employer (ICAR). Their grievance
is that the High Court did not take note of those indisputable documents to
calculate the income and the loss of dependency. They contend that the monthly
income of the deceased should be taken as Rs.18341/- being the average of
Rs.32,678/- (income shown as on 1.10.2005) and Rs.4,004/- (income at the time
of death). They submit that only one-eighth should have been deducted towards
personal and living expenses of the deceased. They point out that even if only
one fourth (Rs.4585/-) was deducted therefrom towards personal and living
expenses of the deceased, the contribution to the family would have been
Rs.13,756/- per month or Rs.1,65,072/- per annum. They submit that having
regard to the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (`Act' for
short), the appropriate multiplier for a person dying at the age of 38 years
would be 16 and therefore the total loss of dependency would be Rs.26,41,152/-.
They also contend that Rs.1,00,000/- should be added towards pain and suffering
undergone by the claimants. They therefore submit that Rs.27,47,152/- should be
determined as the compensation payable to them.
6.
The
contentions urged by the parties give rise to the following questions:
(i) Whether the
future prospects can be taken into account for determining the income of the
deceased ? If so, whether pay revisions that occurred during the pendency of
the claim proceedings or appeals therefrom should be taken into account ? 6
(ii) Whether the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased
should be less than one-fourth (1/4th) as contended by the appellants, or
should be one-third (1/3rd) as contended by the respondents ? (iii) Whether the
High Court erred in taking the multiplier as 13 ? (iv) What should be the
compensation ? The general principles
7.
Before
considering the questions arising for decision, it would be appropriate to
recall the relevant principles relating to assessment of compensation in cases
of death. Earlier, there used to be considerable variation and inconsistency in
the decisions of courts Tribunals on account of some adopting the Nance method
enunciated in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Rly. Co. Ltd. [1951 AC 601]
and some adopting the Davies method enunciated in Davies v. Powell Duffryn
Associated Collieries Ltd., [1942 AC 601]. The difference between the two
methods was considered and explained by this Court in General Manager, Kerala
State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas [1994 (2) SCC 176]. After
exhaustive consideration, this Court preferred the Davies method to Nance
method. We extract below the principles laid down in Susamma Thomas:
"In fatal
accident action, the measure of damage is the pecuniary loss suffered and is
likely to be suffered by each dependant as a result of the 7 death. The
assessment of damages to compensate the dependants is beset with difficulties
because from the nature of things, it has to take into account many
imponderables, e.g., the life expectancy of the deceased and the dependants,
the amount that the deceased would have earned during the remainder of his
life, the amount that he would have contributed to the dependants during that
period, the chances that the deceased may not have lived or the dependants may
not live up to the estimated remaining period of their life expectancy, the
chances that the deceased might have got better employment or income or might
have lost his employment or income altogether."
"The matter of
arriving at the damages is to ascertain the net income of the deceased
available for the support of himself and his dependants, and to deduct
therefrom such part of his income as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon
himself, as regards both self-maintenance and pleasure, and to ascertain what
part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of
the dependants. Then that should be capitalized by multiplying it by a figure
representing the proper number of year's purchase."
"The multiplier
method involves the ascertainment of the loss of dependency or the multiplicand
having regard to the circumstances of the case and capitalizing the multiplicand
by an appropriate multiplier. The choice of the multiplier is determined by the
age of the deceased (or that of the claimants whichever is higher) and by the
calculation as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest
appropriate to a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual
interest. In ascertaining this, regard should also be had to the fact that
ultimately the capital sum should also be consumed-up over the period for which
the dependency is expected to last."
"It is necessary
to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically sound and legally
well-established. There are some cases which have proceeded to determine the
compensation on the basis of aggregating the entire future earnings for over
the period the life expectancy was lost, deducted a percentage therefrom
towards uncertainties of future life and award the resulting sum as
compensation. This is clearly unscientific. For instance, if the deceased was,
say 25 year of age at the time of death and the life expectancy is 70 years,
this method would multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years - virtually
adopting a multiplier of 45 - and even if one-third or one-fourth is deducted
therefrom towards the uncertainties of future life and for immediate lump sum
payment, the effective multiplier would be between 30 and 34. This is wholly
impermissible."
8.
8
In UP State Road Transport Corporation vs. Trilok Chandra [1996 (4) SCC 362],
this Court, while reiterating the preference to Davies method followed in
Susamma Thomas, stated thus :
"In the method
adopted by Viscount Simon in the case of Nance also, first the annual
dependency is worked out and then multiplied by the estimated useful life of
the deceased. This is generally determined on the basis of longevity. But then,
proper discounting on various factors having a bearing on the uncertainties of
life, such as, premature death of the deceased or the dependent, remarriage,
accelerated payment and increased earning by wise and prudent investments,
etc., would become necessary. It was generally felt that discounting on various
imponderables made assessment of compensation rather complicated and cumbersome
and very often as a rough and ready measure, one-third to one-half of the
dependency was reduced, depending on the life-span taken. That is the reason
why courts in India as well as England preferred the Davies' formula as being
simple and more realistic. However, as observed earlier and as pointed out in
Susamma Thomas' case, usually English courts rarely exceed 16 as the
multiplier. Courts in India too followed the same pattern till recently when
Tribunals/Courts began to use a hybrid method of using Nance's method without
making deduction for imponderables........Under the formula advocated by Lord
Wright in Davies, the loss has to be ascertained by first determining the
monthly income of the deceased, then deducting therefrom the amount spent on
the deceased, and thus assessing the loss to the dependents of the deceased.
The annual dependency assessed in this manner is then to be multiplied by the
use of an appropriate multiplier."
[emphasis supplied]
9.
The
lack of uniformity and consistency in awarding compensation has been a matter
of grave concern. Every district has one or more Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal/s. If different Tribunals calculate compensation differently on the
same facts, the claimant, the litigant, the common man will be confused,
perplexed and bewildered. If there is significant 9 divergence among Tribunals
in determining the quantum of compensation on similar facts, it will lead to
dissatisfaction and distrust in the system. We may refer to the following
observations in Trilok Chandra :
"We thought it
necessary to reiterate the method of working out `just' compensation because,
of late, we have noticed from the awards made by Tribunals and Courts that the
principle on which the multiplier method was developed has been lost sight of
and once again a hybrid method based on the subjectivity of the Tribunal/Court
has surfaced, introducing uncertainty and lack of reasonable uniformity in the
matter of determination of compensation. It must be realized that the
Tribunal/Court has to determine a fair amount of compensation awardable to the
victim of an accident which must be proportionate to the injury caused."
Compensation awarded
does not become `just compensation' merely because the Tribunal considers it to
be just. For example, if on the same or similar facts (say deceased aged 40
years having annual income of 45,000/- leaving him surviving wife and child),
one Tribunal awards Rs.10,00,000/- another awards Rs.5,00,000/-, and yet
another awards Rs.1,00,000/-, all believing that the amount is just, it cannot
be said that what is awarded in the first case and last case, is just
compensation. Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and
equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss
suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the
well settled principles relating to award of compensation. It is not intended
to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit. Assessment of compensation
though involving certain hypothetical considerations, should nevertheless be
objective.
Justice and justness
emanate from equality in treatment, consistency and thoroughness in
adjudication, and fairness and uniformity in the decision making process and
the decisions. While it may not be possible to have mathematical precision or
identical awards, in assessing compensation, same or similar facts should lead
to awards in the same range. When the factors/inputs are the same, and the
formula/legal principles are the same, consistency and uniformity, and not
divergence and freakiness, should be the result of adjudication to arrive at
just compensation. In Susamma Thomas, this Court stated :
"So the proper
method of computation is the multiplier method. Any departure, except in
exceptional and extra-ordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle,
lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability, for the assessment of
compensation."
9. Basically only
three facts need to be established by the claimants for assessing compensation
in the case of death : (a) age of the deceased; (b) income of the deceased; and
the (c) the number of dependents. The issues to be determined by the Tribunal
to arrive at the loss of dependency are (i) additions/deductions to be made for
arriving at the income; (ii) the deduction to be made towards the personal
living expenses of the deceased;
and (iii) the
multiplier to be applied with reference of the age of the deceased. If these
determinants are standardized, there will be uniformity 11 and consistency in
the decisions. There will lesser need for detailed evidence. It will also be
easier for the insurance companies to settle accident claims without delay. To
have uniformity and consistency, Tribunals should determine compensation in
cases of death, by the following well settled steps:
Step 1 (Ascertaining
the multiplicand) The income of the deceased per annum should be determined.
Out of the said income a deduction should be made in regard to the amount which
the deceased would have spent on himself by way of personal and living
expenses. The balance, which is considered to be the contribution to the
dependant family, constitutes the multiplicand.
Step 2 (Ascertaining
the multiplier) Having regard to the age of the deceased and period of active
career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does not mean
ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or worked but for the
accident. Having regard to several imponderables in life and economic factors,
a table of multipliers with reference to the age has been identified by this
Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said table with reference to
the age of the deceased.
Step 3 (Actual
calculation) The annual contribution to the family (multiplicand) when
multiplied by such multiplier gives the `loss of dependency' to the family.
Thereafter, a
conventional amount in the range of Rs. 5,000/- to Rs.10,000/- may be added as
loss of estate. Where the deceased is survived by his widow, another
conventional amount in the range of 5,000/- to 10,000/- should be added under
the head of loss of consortium. But no amount is to be awarded under the head
of pain, suffering or hardship caused to the legal heirs of the deceased.
The funeral expenses,
cost of transportation of the body (if incurred) and cost of any medical
treatment of the deceased before death (if incurred) should also added.
12 Question (i) -
addition to income for future prospects
10.
Generally
the actual income of the deceased less income tax should be the starting point
for calculating the compensation. The question is whether actual income at the
time of death should be taken as the income or whether any addition should be
made by taking note of future prospects. In Susamma Thomas, this Court held
that the future prospects of advancement in life and career should also be sounded
in terms of money to augment the multiplicand (annual contribution to the
dependants); and that where the deceased had a stable job, the court can take
note of the prospects of the future and it will be unreasonable to estimate the
loss of dependency on the actual income of the deceased at the time of death.
In that case, the salary of the deceased, aged 39 years at the time of death,
was Rs.1032/- per month.
Having regard to the
evidence in regard to future prospects, this Court was of the view that the
higher estimate of monthly income could be made at Rs.2000/- as gross income
before deducting the personal living expenses.
The decision in
Susamma Thomas was followed in Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav [1996 (3) SCC 179],
where the deceased was getting a gross salary of Rs.1543/- per month. Having
regard to the future prospects of promotions and increases, this Court assumed
that by the time he retired, his earning would have nearly doubled, say
Rs.3000/-. This court took the average of 13 the actual income at the time of
death and the projected income if he had lived a normal life period, and
determined the monthly income as Rs.2200/- per month. In Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy.
Director General, Geological Survey of India [2003 (3) SCC 148], as against the
actual salary income of Rs.42,000/- per annum, (Rs.3500/- per month) at the
time of accident, this court assumed the income as Rs.45,000/- per annum,
having regard to the future prospects and career advancement of the deceased
who was 40 years of age.
11.
In
Susamma Thomas, this Court increased the income by nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit,
the income was increased only by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah the income was
increased by a mere 7%. In view of imponderables and uncertainties, we are in
favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to
the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the
deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. [Where the annual income
is in the taxable range, the words `actual salary' should be read as `actual
salary less tax']. The addition should be only 30% if the age of the deceased
was 40 to 50 years.
There should be no
addition, where the age of deceased is more than 50 years. Though the evidence
may indicate a different percentage of 14 increase, it is necessary to
standardize the addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or
different methods of calculations being adopted. Where the deceased was
self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments
etc.), the courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of
death. A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases
involving special circumstances.
Re : Question (ii) -
deduction for personal and living expenses
12.
We
have already noticed that the personal and living expenses of the deceased
should be deducted from the income, to arrive at the contribution to the
dependents. No evidence need be led to show the actual expenses of the
deceased. In fact, any evidence in that behalf will be wholly unverifiable and
likely to be unreliable. Claimants will obviously tend to claim that the
deceased was very frugal and did not have any expensive habits and was spending
virtually the entire income on the family. In some cases, it may be so. No
claimant would admit that the deceased was a spendthrift, even if he was one.
It is also very difficult for the respondents in a claim petition to produce
evidence to show that the deceased was spending a considerable part of the
income on himself or that he was contributing only a small part 15 of the
income on his family. Therefore, it became necessary to standardize the
deductions to be made under the head of personal and living expenses of the
deceased. This lead to the practice of deducting towards personal and living
expenses of the deceased, one-third of the income if the deceased was a
married, and one-half (50%) of the income if the deceased was a bachelor.
This practice was
evolved out of experience, logic and convenience. In fact one-third deduction,
got statutory recognition under Second Schedule to the Act, in respect of
claims under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (`MV Act' for short).
13.
But,
such percentage of deduction is not an inflexible rule and offers merely a
guideline. In Susamma Thomas, it was observed that in the absence of evidence,
it is not unusual to deduct one-third of the gross income towards the personal
living expenses of the deceased and treat the balance as the amount likely to have
been spent on the members of the family/dependants. In UPSRTC v. Trilok Chandra
[1996 (4) SCC 362], this Court held that if the number of dependents in the
family of the deceased was large, in the absence of specific evidence in regard
to contribution to the family, the Court may adopt the unit method for arriving
at the contribution of the deceased to his family. By this method, two units is
allotted to each adult and one unit is allotted to each minor, and total 16
number of units are determined. Then the income is divided by the total number
of units. The quotient is multiplied by two to arrive at the personal living
expenses of the deceased. This Court gave the following illustration:
"X, male, aged
about 35 years, dies in an accident. He leaves behind his widow and 3 minor
children. His monthly income was Rs. 3500. First, deduct the amount spent on X
every month. The rough and ready method hitherto adopted where no definite
evidence was forthcoming, was to break up the family into units, taking two units
for and adult and one unit for a minor. Thus X and his wire make 2+2=4 units
and each minor one unit i.e. 3 units in all, totaling 7 units. Thus the share
per unit works out to Rs. 3500/7=Rs. 500 per month. It can thus be assumed that
Rs. 1000 was spent on X. Since he was a working member some provision for his
transport and out-of-pocket expenses has to be estimated. In the present case
we estimate the out-of-pocket expense at Rs. 250. Thus the amount spent on the
deceased X works out to Rs. 1250 per month per month leaving a balance of Rs.
3500-1250=Rs.2250 per month. This amount can be taken as the monthly loss of
X's dependents."
In Fakeerappa vs
Karnataka Cement Pipe Factory - 2004 (2) SCC 473, while considering the
appropriateness of 50% deduction towards personal and living expenses of the
deceased made by the High Court, this Court observed:
"What would be
the percentage of deduction for personal expenditure cannot be governed by any
rigid rule or formula of universal application. It would depend upon
circumstances of each case. The deceased undisputedly was a bachelor. Stand of
the insurer is that after marriage, the contribution to the parents would have
been lesser and, therefore, taking an overall view the Tribunal and the High
Court were justified in fixing the deduction."
In view of the
special features of the case, this Court however restricted the deduction
towards personal and living expenses to one-third of the income.
14.
Though
in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is
calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra, the general
practice is to apply standardized deductions. Having considered several
subsequent decisions of this court, we are of the view that where the deceased was
married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased,
should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2
to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependant family members is 4 to
6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependant family members exceed
six.
15.
Where
the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction
follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is
deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor
would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the
possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the
contribution to the parent/s and siblings is likely to be cut drastically.
Further, subject to
evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will
not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a
dependent. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters
will not be considered as dependents, because they will either be independent
and earning, or married, or be dependant on the father. Thus even if the
deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be
considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and
living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family.
However, where family of the bachelor is large and dependant on the income of
the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of
younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may
be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as
two-third.
Re :Question (iii) -
selection of multiplier
16.
In
Susamma Thomas, this Court stated the principle relating to multiplier thus:
"The multiplier
represents the number of years' purchase on which the loss of dependency is
capitalized. Take for instance a case where annual loss of dependency is Rs.10,000.
If a sum of Rs.1,00,000 is invested at 10% annual interest, the interest will
take care of the dependency, perpetually, the multiplier in this case work out
to 10. If the rate of interest is 5% per annum and not 10% then the multiplier
needed to capitalize the loss of the annual dependency at Rupees 10,000 would
be 20. Then the multiplier, i.e. the number of years' purchase of 20 will yield
the annual dependency perpetually. Then allowance to scale down the multiplier
would have to be made taking into account the uncertainties of the future, the
allowances for immediate lumpsum payment, the period over which the dependency
is to last being shorter and the capital feed also to be spent away over the
period of dependency is to last etc., Usually in English Courts the operative
19 multiplier rarely exceeds 16 as maximum. This will come down accordingly as
the age of the deceased person (or that of the dependents, whichever is higher)
goes up."
17.
The
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 was amended by Act 54 of 1994, inter alia inserting
Section 163A and the Second Schedule with effect from 14.11.1994. Section 163A
of the MV Act contains a special provision as to payment of compensation on
structured formula basis, as indicated in the Second Schedule to the Act. The Second
Schedule contains a Table prescribing the compensation to be awarded with
reference to the age and income of the deceased. It specifies the amount of
compensation to be awarded with reference to the annual income range of
Rs.3,000/- to Rs.40,000/-. It does not specify the quantum of compensation in
case the annual income of the deceased is more than Rs.40,000/-. But it
provides the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the
deceased. The table starts with a multiplier of 15, goes upto 18, and then
steadily comes down to 5. It also provides the standard deduction as one-third
on account of personal living expenses of the deceased. Therefore, where the
application is under section 163A of the Act, it is possible to calculate the
compensation on the structured formula basis, even where compensation is not
specified with reference to the annual income of the deceased, or is more than
Rs.40,000/-, by applying the formula : (2/3 x AI x M), that is two-thirds of
20 the annual income multiplied by the multiplier applicable to the age of the
deceased would be the compensation. Several principles of tortious liability
are excluded when the claim is under section 163A of MV Act. There are however
discrepancies/errors in the multiplier scale given in the Second Schedule
Table. It prescribes a lesser compensation for cases where a higher multiplier
of 18 is applicable and a larger compensation with reference to cases where a
lesser multiplier of 15, 16, or 17 is applicable. From the quantum of compensation
specified in the table, it is possible to infer that a clerical error has crept
in the Schedule and the `multiplier' figures got wrongly typed as 15, 16, 17,
18, 17, 16, 15, 13, 11, 8, 5 & 5 instead of 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 14, 12,
10, 8, 6 and 5. Another noticeable incongruity is, having prescribed the
notional minimum income of non-earning persons as Rs.15,000/- per annum, the
table prescribes the compensation payable even in cases where the annual income
ranges between Rs.3000/- and Rs.12000/-.
This leads to an
anomalous position in regard to applications under Section 163A of MV Act, as
the compensation will be higher in cases where the deceased was idle and not
having any income, than in cases where the deceased was honestly earning an
income ranging between Rs.3000/- and Rs.12,000/- per annum. Be that as it may.
18.
The
principles relating to determination of liability and quantum of compensation
are different for claims made under section 163A of MV Act and claims under
section 166 of MV Act. (See : Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Meena Variyal -
2007 (5) SCC 428). Section 163A and Second Schedule in terms do not apply to
determination of compensation in applications under Section 166. In Trilok
Chandra, this Court, after reiterating the principles stated in Susamma Thomas,
however, held that the operative (maximum) multiplier, should be increased as
18 (instead of 16 indicated in Susamma Thomas), even in cases under section 166
of MV Act, by borrowing the principle underlying section 163A and the Second
Schedule. This Court observed:
"Section 163-A
begins with a non obstante clause and provides for payment of compensation, as
indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal representatives of the deceased
or injured, as the case may be. Now if we turn to the Second Schedule, we find
a table fixing the mode of calculation of compensation for third party accident
injury claims arising out of fatal accidents. The first column gives the age
group of the victims of accident, the second column indicates the multiplier
and the subsequent horizontal figures indicate the quantum of compensation in
thousand payable to the heirs of the deceased victim.
According to this
table the multiplier varies from 5 to 18 depending on the age group to which
the victim belonged. Thus, under this Schedule the maximum multiplier can be up
to 18 and not 16 as was held in Susamma Thomas case.....
Besides, the
selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of
the deceased. For example, if the deceased, a bachelor, dies at the age of 45
and his dependents are his parents, age of the parents would also be relevant
in the choice of the multiplier......What we propose to emphasise is that the
multiplier cannot exceed 18 years' purchase factor. This is the improvement
over the earlier position that ordinarily it should not exceed 16..."
19.
In
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Charlie [2005 (10) SCC 720], this Court
noticed that in respect of claims under section 166 of the MV Act, the highest
multiplier applicable was 18 and that the said multiplier should be applied to
the age group of 21 to 25 years (commencement of normal productive years) and
the lowest multiplier would be in respect of persons in the age group of 60 to
70 years (normal retiring age). This was reiterated in TN State Road Transport
Corporation Ltd. vs. Rajapriya [2005 (6) SCC 236] and UP State Road Transport
Corporation vs. Krishna Bala [2006 (6) SCC 249]. The multipliers indicated in
Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie (for claims under section 166 of MV
Act) is given below in juxtaposition with the multiplier mentioned in the
Second Schedule for claims under section 163A of MV Act (with appropriate
deceleration after 50 years) :
Age of the Multiplier
Multiplier Multiplier Multiplier Multiplier actually deceased scale as scale as
scale in Trilok specified in used in Second envisaged in adopted Chandra as
second column in Schedule to MV Act Susamma by Trilok clarified in the Table in
II (as seen from the Thomas Chandra Charlie Schedule to MV quantum of Act
compensation) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Upto 15 yrs - - 15 20 15 to 20 yrs. 16 18
18 16 19 21 to 25 yrs. 15 17 18 17 18 26 to 30 yrs. 14 16 17 18 17 31 to 35
yrs. 13 15 16 17 16 36 to 40 yrs. 12 14 15 16 15 41 to 45 yrs. 11 13 14 15 14
46 to 50 yrs. 10 12 13 13 12 51 to 55 yrs. 9 11 11 11 10 56 to 60 yrs. 8 10 09
8 8 61 to 65 yrs. 6 08 07 5 6 Above 65 5 05 05 5 5 yrs. 23 20.
Tribunals/courts adopt and apply different operative multipliers.
Some follow the
multiplier with reference to Susamma Thomas (set out in column 2 of the table
above); some follow the multiplier with reference to Trilok Chandra, (set out
in column 3 of the table above); some follow the multiplier with reference to
Charlie (Set out in column (4) of the Table above); many follow the multiplier
given in second column of the Table in the Second Schedule of MV Act (extracted
in column 5 of the table above); and some follow the multiplier actually
adopted in the Second Schedule while calculating the quantum of compensation
(set out in column 6 of the table above). For example if the deceased is aged
38 years, the multiplier would be 12 as per Susamma Thomas, 14 as per Trilok
Chandra, 15 as per Charlie, or 16 as per the multiplier given in column (2) of the
Second schedule to the MV Act or 15 as per the multiplier actually adopted in
the second Schedule to MV Act. Some Tribunals, as in this case, apply the
multiplier of 22 by taking the balance years of service with reference to the
retiring age. It is necessary to avoid this kind of inconsistency. We are
concerned with cases falling under section 166 and not under section 163A of MV
Act. In cases falling under section 166 of the MV Act, Davies method is
applicable.
20.
We
therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column
(4) of the Table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and
Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups
of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that
is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years,
M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units
for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years,
M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.
Question (iv) -
Computation of compensation
21.
In
this case as noticed above the salary of the deceased at the time of death was
Rs.4,004. By applying the principles enunciated by this Court to the evidence,
the High Court concluded that the salary would have at least doubled
(Rs.8008/-) by the time of his retirement and consequently, determined the
monthly income as an average of Rs.4004/- and Rs.8008/- that is Rs.6006/- per
month or Rs.72072/- per annum. We find that the said conclusion is in
conformity with the legal principle that about 50% can be added to the actual
salary, by taking note of future prospects.
22.
Learned
counsel for the appellants contended that when actual figures as to what would
be the income in future, are available it is not proper to take a nominal
hypothetical increase of only 50% for calculating the income. He submitted that
though the deceased was receiving Rs.4004/- per month at the time of death, as
per the certificates issued by the employer (produced before High Court), on
the basis of pay revisions and increases, his salary would have been
Rs.32,678/- in the year 2005 and there is no reason why the said amount should
not be considered as the income at the time of retirement. It was contended
that the income which is to form the basis for calculation should not therefore
be the average of Rs.4004/- and Rs.8008/-, but the average of Rs.4004/- and
Rs.32,678/-.
23.
The
assumption of the appellants that the actual future pay revisions should be
taken into account for the purpose of calculating the income is not sound. As
against the contention of the appellants that if the deceased had been alive,
he would have earned the benefit of revised pay scales, it is equally possible
that if he had not died in the accident, he might have died on account of ill
health or other accident, or lost the employment or met some other calamity or
disadvantage. The imponderables in life are too many. Another significant aspect
is the non-existence of such evidence at the time of accident. In this case,
the accident and death occurred in the year 1988. The award was made by the
Tribunal in the year 1993. The High Court decided the appeal in 2007. The
pendency of the claim proceedings and appeal for nearly two decades is a
fortuitous circumstance and that will not entitle the appellants to rely upon
the two pay revisions which took place in the course of the said two decades.
If the claim petition filed in 1988 had been disposed of in the year 1988-89
itself and if the appeal had been decided by the High Court in the year
1989-90, then obviously the compensation would have been decided only with
reference to the scale of pay applicable at the time of death and not with
reference to any future revision in pay scales. If the contention urged by the
claimants is accepted, it would lead to the following situation: The claimants
only could rely upon the pay scales in force at the time of the accident, if
they are prompt in conducting the case. But if they delay the proceedings, they
can rely upon the revised higher pay scales that may come into effect during
such pendency. Surely, promptness cannot be punished in this manner. We
therefore reject the contention that the revisions in pay scale subsequent to
the death and before 27 the final hearing should be taken note of for the
purpose of determining the income for calculating the compensation.
24.
The
appellants next contended that having regard to the fact that the family of
deceased consisted of 8 members including himself and as the entire family was
dependent on him, the deduction on account of personal and living expenses of
the deceased should be neither the standard one- third, nor one-fourth as
assessed by the High Court, but one-eighth. We agree with the contention that
the deduction on account of personal living expenses cannot be at a fixed
one-third in all cases (unless the calculation is under section 163A read with
Second Schedule to the MV Act). The percentage of deduction on account personal
and living expenses can certainly vary with reference to the number of
dependant members in the family. But as noticed earlier, the personal living
expenses of the deceased need not exactly correspond to the number of
dependants. As an earning member, the deceased would have spent more on himself
than the other members of the family apart from the fact that he would have
incurred expenditure on travelling/transportation and other needs. Therefore we
are of the view that interest of justice would be met if one-fifth is deducted
as the personal and living expenses of the deceased. After such deduction, the
contribution to the family (dependants) is determined as Rs.57,658/- per 28
annum. The multiplier will be 15 having regard to the age of the deceased at
the time of death (38 years). Therefore the total loss of dependency would be
Rs.57,658 x 15 = Rs.8,64,870/-.
25.
In
addition, the claimants will be entitled to a sum of Rs.5,000/- under the head
of `loss of estate' and Rs.5000/- towards funeral expenses. The widow will be
entitled to Rs.10,000/- as loss of consortium. Thus, the total compensation
will be Rs.8,84,870/-. After deducting Rs.7,19,624/- awarded by the High Court,
the enhancement would be Rs.1,65,246/-.
26.
We
allow the appeal in part accordingly. The appellants will be entitled to the
said sum of Rs.165,246/- in addition to what is already awarded, with interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of petition till the date of
realization. The increase in compensation awarded by us shall be taken by the
widow exclusively.
Parties to bear
respective costs.
............................J.
(R V Raveendran)
New
Delhi;
............................J.
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