K.S.Poomari Vs.
A.Umarsha & ANR. [2009] INSC 925 (27 April 2009)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.2837 OF 2009 (Arising out
of SLP(C)No.13576 of 2008) K.S.POOMARI .....APPELLANT(S) VERSUS O R D E R Leave
granted.
In our view, this
appeal has no merit as all the courts below concurrently found that the Tamil
Nadu City Tenants Protection Act has no application in the facts and
circumstances of T.N.& Anr., (2005) 12 SCC 752, paragraphs 10 and 15 of
which are quoted below :- "10.It was argued that the object of the Parent
Act was to ensure that the expectation of a tenant, who has put up a
superstructure, that he would not be evicted is not belied, and that pulling
down of the superstructure which was the only option available to a lessee if
the lease did not contain a contract to the contrary, would result in
congestion causing serious detriment to public health. This object would not be
subserved by exempting leases of lands belonging to religious institutions or
religious charities. It is a matter for the legislature to balance the object
of the parent Act with the object of protecting the rights of religious
institutions and religions charities and on the basis of the material available
to the legislature, the decision to exempt the buildings of such religious
institutions and religious charities has been taken. The power to legislate is
a plenary power vested in the legislature and unless those who challenge the
legislation clearly establish that their fundamental rights under the
Constitution are affected or that the legislature lacked legislative
competence, they would not succeed in their challenge to the enactment brought
forward in the wisdom of the legislature. Conferment of a right to claim the
benefit of a statute, being not a vested right, the same could be withdrawn by the
legislature which made the enactment. It could not be said that the Amendment
Act lacked either legislative competence or that it is unconstitutional.
15.It is open to the
legislature to bring in a law that has retrospective operation. That position is
not disputed. When it affects the vested rights or accrued rights, that
question will have to be considered in that context.
But the right to take
advantage of a statute has been held to be not an accrued right. The matter has
been discussed in detail in M. Varadaraja was in pari materia with Section 9 of
the Amending Act of 1960, the legislature had intended that pending proceedings
should be affected. Even otherwise, once the applicability of the Act itself is
withdrawn, no relief can be granted to a person who could have been or who was
earlier a beneficiary under that enactment, after such withdrawal. Here, the
Section provides that even if some steps have been taken pursuant to the claim
by the tenant under Section 9 of the Parent Act,the proceeding cannot be
continued in view of the exemption enacted in favour of the institutions.
But the legislature
has taken care to save the concluded transactions by providing that nothing
contained in the Section shall be deemed to invalidate any suit or proceeding
in which a decree or order passed has been executed or satisfied in full before
the said date.
Reading Section 3 of
the Amending Act 2 of 1966, it could not be said that it is a legislative
intervention with a judicial decision. The proviso has saved concluded
transactions based on judicial adjudications. All that Section 3 does is to
make it explicit that the amendment is intended to apply to pending
proceedings. In the context of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, unless it
is shown that any right has accrued to the claimant under Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, such a provision making it clear that the Act could not be
applied any more to pending proceedings is not in any way invalid or
incompetent. Unless the proceedings have concluded and the rights of the
landlord has passed to the tenant, no right accrues to the tenant. He is only
in the process of acquiring a right, the process having been set in motion at
his instance.
When pending
proceedings are affected by an amendment, it is open to the legislature to
provide that the said process cannot continue. That alone has been done by
Section 3 of the Amending Act of 1996. As far as concluded judicial proceedings
are concerned and cases where orders for possession have been executed or decrees
satisfied in full before the date of the amendment, they have been saved by the
proviso thereby ensuring that there was no interference by the legislature with
judicial proceedings which had reached a conclusion, even though that judicial
proceeding related to a religious or charitable institution exempted by the
amendment from the purview of the Parent Act. We are, therefore, not in a
position to find any merit in challenge to Section 3 of the amending Act."
Mr.A.T.M.Rangaramanujam,
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-tenant submits that
the super structure made by the appellant on the disputed land should be
allowed to be removed. On perusal of the orders passed by the Courts below, it
appears that such order for removal of super structure has already been granted
and no further direction need to be given.
Accordingly, we find
no merit in this appeal and the same stands dismissed. There will be no 3 order
as to costs.
Keeping in view the
facts and circumstances of the present case, we grant nine months' time to the
appellant to vacate the premises in question subject to filing of usual
undertaking in this Court within four weeks from this date.
.............................J.
( TARUN CHATTERJEE )
.............................J.
( H.L.DATTU )
NEW
DELHI;
APRIL
27, 2009.
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