Nirmal Singh Kahlon Vs.
State of Punjab & Ors. [2008] INSC 1813 (22 October 2008)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6198-6199 OF 2008
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 24777 - 24778 of 2005) Nirmal Singh Kahlon ....
Appellant Versus State of Punjab and others .... Respondents WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6200-6201 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 25226 - 25227
of 2005) J.P. Singla and others .... Appellant Versus State of Punjab and
others .... Respondents
S.B. SINHA, J.
Leave granted.
1.
These
two appeals involving similar questions of law and fact were taken up for
hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2.
Nirmal
Singh Kahlon, Appellant in appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 24777-24778 of
2005 was the Rural Development and Panchayats Minister in the Government of
Punjab while the three appellants in appeals arising out of SLP (C)Nos.
25226-25227 of 2005 were working as Deputy Directors in the Department of Rural
Development and Panchayats, Government of Punjab at the relevant time.
3.
The
State of Punjab had enacted the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994.
4.
An
advertisement for recruitment of 190 Panchayat Secretaries was issued in the
year 1992 for which written test was held in the year 1994 ;
however, the posts
could not be filled. In the meantime 545 Panchayat Secretaries were appointed
on ad hoc basis by the State.
5.
One
of the applicants, who applied for the post in response to the advertisement of
190 posts, challenged the said ad hoc appointments by way of a writ petition
which was marked as C.W.P. No.9835 of 1996, titled Palvinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, which was disposed of by a Division Bench of the Court on 20th
September, 1996 by directing inter alia the completion of the selection process
as well as for available posts with the department. Selection against 190 posts
of Panchayat Secretaries, for which written test had already been held was to
be finalized on or before 20th November, 1996.
6.
Two
more advertisements were issued; first on 17/18th September, 1996 for filling
up 700 posts and second on 14th October, 1996 for filling up 800 posts of
Panchayat Secretaries respectively.
Another advertisement
was issued on 19th September, 1998 inviting applications from the female candidates
also for the post of Panchayat Secretaries.
In response to the
abovementioned advertisements over 1.5 lacs applications were received, the
processing job whereof was handed over to a Delhi based computer firm. Result
of the written test was declared on or about 14th October, 2000 in which 3286
candidates were declared successful. They were called for interview.
3 However, no
further action appears to have been taken pursuant thereto or in furtherance
thereof. Another writ petition was filed in the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana which was marked as CWP No.11912 of 2000, titled Harmesh Singh and
others v. State of Punjab and others. By an order dated 30th August, 2001,
selection for the post of Panchayat Secretaries was directed to be completed
within one month. The said order was not interfered with by this Court in a
Special Leave Petition filed by the State which was marked Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 15843 of 2001 by an order dated 24th September, 2001.
Interviews of the eligible candidates were held thereafter and 908 candidates
were selected.
7.
In
or about March, 2002 a change in the State Government took place. The Congress
Party came into power after election. The new Government made an attempt to
reinstate the Panchayat Patwaris whose services had been terminated by the
previous Government pursuant to the orders of the High Court.
8.
Selection
of the said 908 candidates was the subject matter of another writ petition
which was marked as CWP No.5283 of 2003 entitled Veero Devi v. State of Punjab
and others. In the said writ petition the Court formed a prima facie opinion
that irregularities in the selection process had been committed. By an order
dated 3rd April, 2002, the High Court issued the following directions :-
"The Bench Secretary is directed to give copy of this order to learned
Deputy Advocate General who shall forward the same to the Advocate General,
Punjab. The Advocate General, Punjab shall send the copy of the order to the
Chief Secretary, Punjab, who shall ensure that a thorough probe is conducted
into the selections made by the Directorate of Department of Rural Development
and Panchayats by an officer not below the rank of Secretary to the Government.
After conducting the
probe, the report be produced before the Court within a period of 8 weeks. The
desirability of issuing other directions would be considered by the Court after
examining the report."
The nature of
litigation, therefore, was changed from private interest litigation to public
interest litigation.
9.
In
terms of the said order an enquiry was made by one Shri P. Ram, the then
Financial Commissioner, Rural Development and Panchayat Department. He was of
the opinion that the entire selection process was required to be set aside. A
recommendation was made that an investigation into the whole affair be made by
the Vigilance Department.
10.
Pursuant
thereto a first information report was lodged by the Vigilance Department on
14th June, 2002 against several persons including appellant, Nirmal Singh
Kahlon, for alleged commission of offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 120(B)
of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 13(1) (d)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988, the material portion whereof reads as under :-
"It has come to knowledge that Sh. N.S. Kahlon Ex. Minister Rural
Department and Panchayat had during his tenure made recruitments to the various
posts of Tax Collector, Patwaris, Peons, Clerks etc. for his benefit by illegal
means by taking heavy amounts of money as bribes. In this way for his favourites
who were not fulfilling the requirement like less age, less qualification and
manipulating the marks in the answer sheet, recruitment were made to P. Sect
and deserving candidates were side lined. Similarly, to fulfil the backlog in
handicap category recruitments of Gram Sewaks were made and the candidates, who
were deserving were not recruited. It has also come to knowledge that
Kamalpreet Kaur, Advocate District Fatehgrah Sahib who was fulfilling the basic
qualifications in handicap quota for the "Mukh Sewak" was also
sidelined.
Rs. 3 lacs were
demanded from her by sending Manjet Singh Steno, office of R.D.P. to her
residence. When she was not able to give money in bribe, then she was not
recruited to the post. In 6 this way, Kahlon has accepted heavy amounts as
bribes for transfers, appointments and promotions and he has accumulated
moveable and immovable assets in excess of the known resources. This has also
come to knowledge that Kahlon has got leased 2 acres of Shamlat land at village
Phabhat, Tehsil Dera Bassi, District Patiala for 7 years in the name of his
close relative Burwinder Singh s/o. Ajnala by mis-using his position, whereas
Shamlat land cannot be leased out for such a long period. In this way
Ex.R.D.P.M. has earned crores of rupees by mis-using his position through
recruitments, transfers, appointments and promotions and has accumulated
countless assets and cash. By misusing his powers, he had made wrong
appointments for his benefit and the deserving candidates were overlooked. By
doing this Ex.RE.D.P.M. has committed crime under Section 420, 467, 468,
120(B), 13(1)(d)(e) read with 13(2)."
11.
A
charge sheet was filed against Nirmal Singh Kahlon and J.P. Singla (appellant
No. 1 in Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 25226-25227 of 2005), Ex.
Deputy Director of Rural Development and Panchayats.
Appellant Nos. 2 and
3 in Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) 25226- 25227 of 2005 were shown as
the witnesses in the said report.
12.
It
appears somewhat strange that despite the same a statement was made before the
Court on behalf of the State of Punjab on 1st November, 2002 that the
investigation was proposed to be handed over to the Central Bureau of
Investigation.
13.
On
or about 16th November, 2002 Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Department
of Rural Development issued a letter addressed to the Chief Secretary to the
Government of Punjab, opining that the case should be investigated by the Crime
Branch of the State Police.
14.
In
view of the aforementioned report the High Court, by an order dated 31st
October, 2002, directed the Additional Advocate General to obtain instructions
as to what action the Government has been contemplating on the enquiry report.
It was observed :- "The State Government will have the option of suo moto
making further investigation by removing all those named in the report from
their respective offices so as to ensure that the further enquiry is not
influenced by any of those officers. It may also order a CBI probe into the
entire scandal involving appointment of Panchyat Secretaries."
15.
On
1st November, 2002 the State Government made a statement that a decision had
been taken to handover the investigation in regard to the scandal involving
selection of Panchayat Secretaries to the Central Bureau of Investigation and
also to take action against the officers named in the enquiry report. Selection
of the candidates, however, was cancelled by State Government by its order
dated 10th December, 2002.
16.
The
Central Bureau of Investigation, however, expressed its inability to take up
investigation opining that the same may be conducted by the State Vigilance
Department. One of the grounds on which the said stand was taken was lack of
man power as also infra structure.
An affidavit to that
effect was to be filed on or before 13th November, 2002 and the matter was
adjourned to 15th November, 2002. On that date a prayer was made for some more
time to file a comprehensive affidavit. The writ petition was listed before the
High Court on 10th February, 2003 on which date it noticed the decision of the
State Government to handover the investigation to the Central Bureau of
Investigation. The State took some adjournments. Proceedings sheet of the High
Court dated 25th April, 2003 reads as under :- " From the records, it
appears that for very good reasons, the Government of Punjab decided to hand
over the investigation of scandal involving selection of Panchayat Secretaries,
who are writ petitioners, to Central Bureau of Investigation and also to take
action against the officers named in the inquiry report, that the Central
Bureau of Investigation stands impleaded as Respondent No.5 in Civil Writ
Petition No.5283 of 2002 and that today an application has been filed for
placing on record DO No.18/79-02-4/RDE 4/560 dated 04/03/2003 and DO No.
I/C/2003-CHG/NZ dated 02/04/2003 of the Director Central Bureau of
Investigation, Government of India, New Delhi, as Annexure R-1 and Annexure R-2
on behalf of Respondent No.1 and 2, stating, inter alia, that Central Bureau of
Investigation has communicated that it would not be able to take up the
investigation of the above said scandal and it may get probed through the State
Vigilance after the court had adjourned the further hearing of the case awaiting
the submission of the report of Central Bureau of Investigation. Unfortunately,
even though Central Bureau of Investigation is Respondent No.5 in Civil Writ
Petition No.5283 of 2002, a copy of aforementioend application has been served
on Shri Rajan Gupta, Advocate so that we could have a positive response of
Central Bureau of Investigation through its counsel and adjudge the correctness
or otherwise of the stand of the Central Bureau of Investigation as
communicated to the State."
17.
Despite
the same no notification was issued by the State of Punjab handing over the
investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation.
Proceedings sheet
dated 30th April, 2003 inter alia reads :- "In regard to one of the
submissions made by Shri Rajan Gupta, Learned counsel that no notification has
been made by the Punjab Government handing over the investigation to the CBI,
we hope and trust that necessary notification in that regard will be published
by the Punjab Government within couple of days."
18.
On
or about 2nd May, 2003 the State Government issued a Notification in terms of
Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short the
`Act'), the relevant portion whereof reads as under:- " And whereas during
the course of arguments, after considering the reply of the CBI and the
arguments of the Standing Counsel for the CBI on 31.4.2003, Hon'ble Punjab and
Haryana High Court directed the State Government to issue necessary
Notification well before the next date of hearing i.e. 7.5.2003 to enable the CBI
to take into hands the investigation of the recruitment of 909 Panchayat
Secretaries.
11 Now, therefore,
in pursuance of the provisions of Section 6 of the Delhi Special Policed
Establishment Act, 1946 (Central Act 25 of 1946) and all others powers enabling
him in this behalf, the Government of Punjab is pleased to accord his consent
to the extension of powers and jurisdiction of the members of the Delhi Special
Police Establishment to the whole of the State of Punjab for investigating into
the alleged scandal of selection of 909 Panchayat Secretaries made in the year
1996 to 2001 in the Department of Rural Development and Panchayats under the
relevant provisions of the law and any other offence in relation to or in
connection with the said alleged scandal of appointments committed in the
course of the same transaction or arising out of the said matter."
19.
In
view of the aforementioned Notification the High Court by its order dated 7th
May, 2003 directed :- " Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances
of the instant case, it was the court which took a view earlier that mater is
such, which requires, in the interest of justice, investigation by the Central
Bureau of Investigation and then the State of Punjab came to nearly agreeing to
the observations made by the court, though after sometime the Court noticed
some dilly dallying on the part of the State Government but ultimately it
decided to hand over the investigation to the C.B.I. We reiterate that in the
peculiar facts and circumstances investigation by Central Bureau of
Investigation appears to be not only just and proper but a necessity.
12 Accordingly, we
hope and trust that the Central Bureau of Investigation will do its best to
investigate and book the real culprits. We respect that Central Bureau of
Investigation will do its investigation within a reasonable time though we
appreciate the limited resources, which it is having. We are sure that if the
Director of Central Bureau of Investigation moves the Government of India to
provide more funds and/or offices, it will consider the request, if so made,
objectively and suitable decision will be taken by the Government of
India."
20.
The
Central Bureau of Investigation, however, informed the High Court on 13th
August, 2003 that a special team had been sent for a meaningful investigation
in respect of the allegations, and the same had proceeded to a considerable
length. The Central Bureau of Investigation thereafter registered a first
information report on 26th June, 2003
21.
Appellants
filed applications which were marked as CM Nos. 6907 - 6908 of 2005 and
18993-18994 for recalling of the orders dated 30th April, 2003 and 7th May,
2003; the prayers made wherein read as under :- "(a) Recall the orders
dated 30.4.2003 (Annexure C-4) and orders dated 7.5.2003 (Annexure C-6) which
have resulted in the notification dated 2nd May, 2003 of the State Government
hading over the investigation to 13 C.B.I. and the second FIR No. 8(s) of 2003
dated 26.6.2003.
(b) set aside and
quash the notification of the Government dated 2nd May, 2003 (Annexure C-6) and
the consequential second F.I.R. No.8 (s) of 2003 dated 26.6.2003."
By reason of the
impugned judgment dated 4th October, 2005, the said applications have been
dismissed.
22.
This
Court on 12th December, 2005 while issuing notice passed the following interim
order :- " The C.B.I. may continue with the investigation, but the final
report shall not be filed till the next date of hearing"
23.
Mr.
P.P. Rao and Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf
of the appellants, would submit :- 1) As per the records and in particular the
affidavit of Chief Secretary of the State the High Court was not made aware of
the fact that the charge sheet had already been submitted on 19th September,
2002 14 before a court of competent jurisdiction and cognizance in the matter
had been taken and thus the High Court acted illegally and without any
jurisdiction in directing fresh investigation by the Central Bureau of
Investigation.
2) Although the High
Court in its impugned judgment noticed that the charge sheet had been submitted
on 19th September, 2002 but failed and/or neglected to deal with the
implication thereof which demonstrates total non application of mind on its
part.
3) The Act does not
envisage a State Government to give consent for investigation by the Central
Bureau of Investigation in respect of an offence which had already been
investigated and charge sheet submitted.
4) In any event the
learned Magistrate before whom the charge sheet had been filed did not form an
opinion that the investigation was faulty and/or did not satisfy the
requirements of law, no reinvestigation could have been directed by the High
Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
or otherwise. Even such an order of reinvestigation or further investigation is
not contemplated under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for
short `the Code').
5) Section 173(8) of
the Code does not envisage any investigation by a central agency created under
the Act after filing of a charge sheet, in which event, the Court of Magistrate
alone has the jurisdiction to issue any further direction regarding
investigation.
6) As a first
information report had already been lodged by the Vigilance Department, another
first information report for the same cause of action could not have been
lodged by the Central Bureau of Investigation in view of the decisions of this
Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, [ (2001) 6 SCC 181 ].and Kari
Choudhary v. Mst. Sita Devi and others, [ (2002) 1 SCC 714 ].
7) The Central Bureau
of Investigation itself in IAs. 3 and 4 stated that a fresh first information
report had been registered on 26th June, 2003 , which goes to show that earlier
first information report as also the material collected therein had been
totally ignored.
8) The High Court in
its impugned judgment, although accepted that a second first information report
on the same set of allegations, (not being a counter case) cannot be allowed
but did not advert to the legal implication thereof.
9) After the
submission of the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, a
further investigation by another agency is impermissible in law.
10) The High Court
committed a serious error in opining that the first information report has been
lodged only for the purpose of further investigation arising out of the first
information report lodged by the Vigilance Department.
11) The Investigating
Officer appointed by the Central Bureau of Investigation being not superior in
the rank to the police officers of the State Government who had investigated
and submitted the report on 19th September, 2002, Section 36 of the Code
whereupon reliance has been placed by the State is inapplicable inasmuch the
expression `superior police officer' would mean an officer superior in the same
hierarchy i.e. in the State Police and not an officer of the Central Bureau of
Investigation.
12) The Notification
issued by the State permitting investigation by the Central Bureau of
Investigation into the offence pursuant to the order of the High Court must be
held to be illegal as the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not have issued such a
direction. In any event the finding of the High Court that there was no
direction 17 to Central Bureau of Investigation to take over investigation is
contrary to the record of the case, as such a direction had been issued by the
High Court on 7th May, 2003, on the basis of which first information had been
lodged by the Central Bureau of Investigation as per the order of the High
Court.
13) The High Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in
a public interest litigation or otherwise cannot issue such a direction
particularly when the jurisdiction to monitor an investigation comes to an end
when a charge sheet is filed in view of the decisions of this Court in Vineet
Narain v. Union of India, [ (1998) 1 SCC 226 ]. ; State of Bihar v. P.P.
Sharma, [ 1992 Sup. (1) SCC 222 ] ; Union of India v. Sushil Kumar Modi, [
(1998) 8 SCC 661 ] ; Rajiv Ranjan Singh `Lalan' v. Union of India, [ (2006) 6
SCC 613 ] ; Rajesh v. Ramdeo, [ (2001) 10 SCC 759 ] and Sasi Thomas v. State, [
(2006) 12 SCC 421 ] ; the High Court having no constitutional power in this
behalf which is vested only in the Court of Magistrate.
14) Appellant Nos. 2
and 3 in appeals arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 25226 - 25227 of 2005, having
been cited witnesses could not have been made accused which is violative of
Article 20 of the Constitution of India.
24.
Mr.
Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State of
Punjab, supported the contentions of Mr. Rao.
25.
Mr.
P.P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Central
Bureau of Investigation, on the other hand, would submit :- 1) The Act being a
special statute, the provision thereof would prevail over the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short `the Code'). .
2) The expression
`rank' used in Section 36 of the Code cannot be held to be confined only to the
same agency but would mean the investigating agency.
3) In terms of
Section 3 of the Act the ultimate authority being the State, it was entitled to
entrust the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation.
4) The purport and
object of inserting sub-section (8) of Section 173, in the Code, as would
appear from the report of the Law Commission being laudable in nature, the same
deserves liberal interpretation.
19 5) The earlier
first information report lodged by the Vigilance Department was general in
character while the later First Information Report being in respect of the scam
relating to the appointment of Panchayat Secretaries is the real first
information report.
26.
A
criminal proceeding is initiated on the basis of lodged F.I.R.
Commencement of
investigation in the matter may be preceded by a preliminary inquiry.
The term
`investigation' has been defined in Section 2(h) of the Code to include all the
proceedings under the Code for collection of evidence conducted by a police
officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a
Magistrate in this behalf.
`Officer in charge of
a police station' is defined in Section 2(o) of the Code to mean `officer in
charge of a police station' includes, when the officer in charge of the police
station is absent from the station-house or unable from illness or other cause
to perform his duties, the police officer present at the station - house who is
next in rank to such officer and is above the rank of constable or, when, the
State Government so directs, any other police officer so present.
Both the definitions
are inclusive ones. They have expansive meaning. The interpretation clause thus
must receive a liberal interpretation.
27.
In
terms of Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861, the State has the ultimate say in
the matter of superintendence of investigation. Section 36 of the Code must be
read harmoniously with the said provision. Therefore, when Section 36 of the
Code uses the words `in rank', it should be given a purposive construction.
Although a plain reading of the aforementioned provision appears to be
containing three ingredients, namely, (i) the investigation must be carried out
by an Officer in charge; (ii) which may be supervised by an Officer superior in
rank; and (iii) in respect of a local area to which they are appointed, but in
the context of the power of the State vis- `-vis the provisions of Act, the
same, in our opinion, deserves a wider application.
21 An accused is
entitled to a fair investigation. Fair investigation and fair trial are
concomitant to preservation of fundamental right of an accused under Article 21
of the Constitution of India. But the State has a larger obligation i.e. to
maintain law and order, public order and preservation of peace and harmony in
the society. A victim of a crime, thus, is equally entitled to a fair
investigation.
28.
When
serious allegations were made against a former Minister of the State, save and
except the cases of political revenge amounting to malice, it is for the State
to entrust one or the other agency for the purpose of investigating into the
matter.
29.
The
State for achieving the said object at any point of time may consider handing
over of investigation to any other agency including a central agency which has
acquired specialization in such cases.
In that backdrop, it
is necessary to examine the rival contentions raised before us.
30.
Lodging
of a First Information Report by CBI is governed by a manual. It may hold a
preliminary inquiry; it has been given the said power in Chapter VI of the CBI
Manual. A prima facie case may be held to have been established only on
completion of a preliminary enquiry.
Whether the First
Information Report lodged by the Vigilance Department of the State and the one
lodged by the CBI related to the same cause of action is the question?
31.
We
would proceed on the basis that on the self same cause of action, two First Information
Reports would not be maintainable. A bare perusal of the First Information
Report dated 14.6.2002 lodged at the instance of the Vigilance Officer shows
that the same was general in nature. One of the several allegations contained
therein referred to was that irregularities have been committed in the matter
of recruitment of Panchayat Secretaries. No detail, however, was furnished. All
the persons involved were not named.
What types of
irregularities have been committed were not stated.
32.
The
High Court while entertaining the writ petition formed a prima facie opinion as
regards the systematic commission of fraud. While dismissing the writ petition
filed by the selected candidates, it initiated a suo motu public interest
litigation. It was entitled to do so. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by
the High Court, as is well known, in a private interest litigation and in a
public interest litigation is different. Whereas in the latter it is
inquisitorial in nature, in the former it is adversorial. In a public interest
litigation, the court need not strictly follow the ordinary procedure. It may
not only appoint committees but also issue directions upon the State from time
to time. {See Indian Bank vs. Godhara Nagrik Co- op. Credit Society Ltd. &
Anr. [2008 (7) SCALE 363] and Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhavpurkar
and others, [2008 (12) SCALE 252].
33.
The
process began by calling for a report from a responsible officer of the State.
The Financial Commissioner submitted a report. The High Court in its order
dated 31.10.2002, as noticed heretobefore, gave two options to the State. The
State itself came out with the suggestion that it would like to get the scam
investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation.
Indisputably, the
Central Bureau of Investigation had shown an initial reluctance to take over
the investigation in view of lack of infrastructure but the records of the High
Court reveal that at a later stage it had shown interest in the matter.
However, in view of the dilly dallying tactics adopted by the State in issuing
appropriate notification in terms of Section 6 of the Act, the High Court expected
the State to issue a notification at an early date, by an order dated
30.4.2003. The State concededly exercised the said power.
34.
In
an ordinary case, we might have accepted the submission of Mr. Rao that the
High Court should not direct Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate
into a particular offence. The offence, however, is not ordinary in nature. It
involved investigation into the allegations of commission of fraud in a
systematic manner. It had a wide ramification as a former Minister of the State
is said to be involved.
35.
This
Court in Vineet Narain (supra) held:
"8. The sum and
substance of these orders is that the CBI and other governmental agencies had
not carried out their public duty to investigate the offences disclosed; that
none stands above the law so that an alleged offence by him is not required to
be investigated; that we would monitor the investigations, in the sense that we
would do what we permissibly could to see that the investigations progressed
while yet ensuring that we did not direct or channel those investigations or in
any other manner prejudice the right of those who might be accused to a full
and fair trial. We made it clear that the task of the monitoring court would
25 end the moment a charge-sheet was filed in respect of a particular
investigation and that the ordinary processes of the law would then take over.
Having regard to the direction in which the investigations were leading, we
found it necessary to direct the CBI not to report the progress of the investigations
to the person occupying the highest office in the political executive; this was
done to eliminate any impression of bias or lack of fairness or objectivity and
to maintain the credibility of the investigations. In short, the procedure
adopted was of "continuing mandamus"
In P.P. Sharma, IAS
and another (supra) this Court held:
"31. Finally, we
are at a loss to understand as to why and on what reasoning the High Court
assumed extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India at a stage when the Special Judge was seized of the matter.
He had heard the
arguments on the question of cognisance and had reserved the orders. The High
Court did not even permit the Special Judge to pronounce the orders.
32. The Directors of
the firm who are also accused persons in this case had approached the Rajasthan
High Court for the quashing of the FIR and prosecution against them. The
Rajasthan High Court dismissed the writ petition with the following order:
"Sri Bhandari
states that in this matter chalan has already been filed in court. The writ 26
petition has, therefore, become infructuous.
The writ petition is
dismissed as having become infructuous. No order as to costs."
33. The above order
was brought to the notice of the Patna High Court but the High Court refused to
be persuaded to adopt the same course. We are of the considered view that at a
stage when the police report under Section 173 CrPC has been forwarded to the
Magistrate after completion of the investigation and the material collected by
the Investigating Officer is under the gaze of judicial scrutiny, the High
Court would do well to discipline itself not to undertake quashing proceedings
at that stage in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. We could have set aside
the High Court judgment on this ground alone but elaborate argument having been
addressed by the learned counsel for the parties we thought it proper to deal
with all the aspects of the case."
In Sushil Kumar Modi,
(supra), it was opined :- "6. This position is so obvious that no
discussion of the point is necessary. However, we may add that this position
has never been doubted in similar cases dealt with by this Court. It was made
clear by this Court in the very first case, namely Vineet Narain v. Union of India
that once a charge-sheet is filed in the competent court after completion of
the investigation, the process of monitoring by this Court for the purpose of
making the CBI and other investigative agencies concerned perform their
function of investigating into the offences concerned comes to an end; and
thereafter it is only the court in which the charge-sheet is filed which is to
deal with all matters relating to the 27 trial of the accused, including
matters falling within the scope of Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. We make this observation only to reiterate this clear position in
law so that no doubts in any quarter may survive. It is, therefore, clear that
the impugned order of the High Court dealing primarily with this aspect cannot
be sustained."
[See also Rajiv
Ranjan Singh `Lalan' and Sasi Thomas (supra) ].
36.
The
question as to whether the Court can order C.B.I. to investigate a cognizable
offence in a State without the consent of the State Government stands referred
to a larger Bench in State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic
Rights W.B. and others, [(2006) 12 SCC 534], but then concededly the law as it
stands recognizes such a power in the High Court.
37.
It
was not a case where investigation could be carried out in a slip- shod manner.
The first FIR was lodged on 14.06.2002 as against individuals. It referred to
the acts of omissions and commissions of the accused named therein. During his
tenure as a former Minister, recruitments of various posts of Tax Collectors,
Patwaris, Peons, Clerks were allegedly made by him by illegal means i.e. by
taking heavy amount of money as bribe. Even those who were not eligible were
allegedly selected.
Allegations were also
made in regard to filling up of the backlog vacancies in handicap category of
Gram Sewaks. Appellant is said to have accepted heavy amount as bribe for
transfers, appointments and promotions and, thus, accumulated movable and
immovable assets which were said to be disproportionate to his known sources of
income.
38.
The
High Court, however, was concerned only with appointment of Panchayat
Secretaries. Public interest litigation was confined to such appointments only.
In regard thereto, the only allegation which was made was that he got his
favourites appointed who did not fulfill the qualifications, such as,
under-aged person, person possessing less qualification, wherefor allegedly
marks on the answer sheets were tempered and candidature of suitable candidates
was ignored.
39.
The
Finance Commissioner, of course, had submitted a report earlier, i.e., on
4.09.2001. It refers to a large number of irregularities which were found out
by the Committee. According to the Committee, not only criminal action should
be initiated but also departmental action should be taken against a large
number of officers.
40.
The
second FIR lodged by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), however, was on
a wider canvass. It was lodged after holding a detailed preliminary inquiry.
CBI collected a large number of materials. It had also recorded the statements
of a large number of persons. Whereas the first FIR dated 14.06.2002, thus,
contained the misdeeds of individuals, the second one depicts a crime committed
in course of selection process of Panchayat Secretaries involving a large
number of officers.
The High Court was
not concerned with individual acts. It was concerned with a scam involving
appointment of Panchayat Secretaries.
41.
The
second FIR dated 26.06.2003 enumerates as many as fifteen categories of
irregularities committed by various persons involved in the said selection
process. Responsibility has not only been fixed upon the appellant but also
upon Shri Mandeep Singh, Shri C.L. Premmy, Shri J.S. Kesar, Shri Joginder Singh
as also the then Additional Deputy Commissioners of Bhatinda, Ropar and
Muktsar. The number of accused who were involved as per preliminary report of
the CBI were as many as fourteen. The first FIR pointed out offences under
Sections 420, 467, 468, 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 13(1)(d)(e)
and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act but no allegation of conspiracy
was made. In the second FIR dated 26.06.2003, the persons involved were not
only the then Minister but also the then Director, the then Division Deputy
Director, the then Deputy Directors, the then Additional Deputy Commissioners,
the then Block Development Officers, etc.
42.
It
is in the aforementioned factual backdrop the order of the High Court dated
31.10.2002 assumes significance. By reason of the said order, the State
Government was given two options, viz.:
(i) to make further
investigation by removing all those names in the report from their respective
offices so as to ensure that further inquiry was not influenced by any of those
officers; or (ii) to order a CBI probe into the entire scandal involving the
appointment of Panchayat Secretaries.
43.
It
is in the aforementioned situation the State Government had taken a decision to
hand over the investigation of the scandal involving selection of Panchayat
Secretaries to the CBI.
44.
An
offence committed by an individual or two and an offence disclosed in a scandal
involving a large number of officers from the lowest category to the highest
category is distinct and different. In the first FIR although the provision of
Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code was mentioned, no allegation of
conspiracy had been made. As indicated hereinbefore, it centered round a large
number of acts of omissions and commissions on the part of the appellant Kahlon
alone, as would be evident from the following:
"...By misusing
his powers, he has made wrong appointments for his benefit and the deserving
candidates were overlooked. By doing this Ex. R.D.P.M. has committed crime
under Section 420, 467, 468, 120(B), 13(1)(d)(e) read with 13(2)..."
45.
In
the aforementioned circumstances, the decision of this Court in Ram Lal Narang
v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1979) 2 SCC 322] assumes significance. This
Court therein was concerned with two FIRs; both lodged by the Central Bureau of
Investigation. The first one contained allegations against two persons, viz.,
Malik and Mehra under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections
406 and 420 thereof wherein the CBI filed a chargesheet. Later on, however,
some subsequent events emerged resulting in lodging the FIR not only against
Malik and Mehra but also against Narang and his two brothers. This Court
opined:
"The offences
alleged in the first case were Section 120-B read with Section 420 and Section
406 IPC, while the offences alleged in the second case were Section 120-B read
with Section 411 IPC and Section 25 of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act,
1972. It is true that the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act had not yet come
into force on the date when the FIR was registered. It is also true that Omi
Narang and Manu Narang were not extradited for the offence under the
Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, and, therefore, they could not be tried for
that offence in India. But the question whether any of the accused may be tried
for a contravention of the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act or under the
corresponding provision of the earlier Act is really irrelevant in deciding
whether the two conspiracies are one and the same. The trite argument that a
Court takes cognizance of offences and not offenders was also advanced. This
argument is again of no relevance in determining the question whether the two
conspiracies which were taken cognizance of by the Ambala and the Delhi Courts
were the same in substance. The question is not whether the nature and
character of the conspiracy has changed by the mere inclusion of a few more
conspirators as accused or by the addition of one more among the 33 objects of
the conspiracy. The question is whether the two conspiracies are in substance
and truth the same. Where the conspiracy discovered later is found to cover a
much larger canvas with broader ramifications, it cannot be equated with the
earlier conspiracy which covered a smaller field of narrower dimensions. We are
clear, in the present case, that the conspiracies which are the subject- matter
of the two cases cannot be said to be identical though the conspiracy which is
the subject-matter of the first case may, perhaps, be said to have turned out
to be part of the conspiracy which is the subject-matter of the second case. As
we mentioned earlier, when investigation commenced in FIR R.C. 4 of 1976, apart
from the circumstance that the property involved was the same, the link between
the conspiracy to cheat and to misappropriate and the conspiracy to dispose of
the stolen property was not known.
12. The further
connected questions arising for consideration are, what was the duty of the
police on discovering that the conspiracy, which was the subject-matter of the
earlier case, was part of a larger conspiracy, whether the police acted without
jurisdiction in investigating or in continuing to investigate into the case and
whether the Delhi Court acted illegally in taking cognizance of the case?"
46.
It
may be true that in both the FIRs Kahlon was named. He was considered to be the
prime accused. But, it is one thing to say that he acted in his individual
capacity and it is another thing to say that he conspired with a large number
of persons to facilitate commission of crime by him as a result whereof all of
them had made unlawful gains.
47.
Even
in Ram Lal Narang (supra), we have seen that two of the accused, viz., Mehra
and Malik, were common. When two conspiracies are alleged; one is larger than
the other, there may be some common factors but the nature of offence would
differ. An offence committed would not be judged by mere mentioning of the
sections but the mode and manner in which the same was committed as also the
nature thereof.
48.
Strong
reliance has been placed by Mr. Rao on T.T. Antony (supra) and Kari Choudhary
(supra). In T.T. Antony (supra), the first FIR was lodged in 1994; another FIR
was lodged three years thereafter on the self-same cause of action. Ram Lal
Narang (supra) in the said fact-situation was distinguished on facts, opining:
"...This Court
indicated that the real question was whether the two conspiracies were in truth
and substance the same and held that the conspiracies in the two cases were not
identical. It appears to us that the Court did not repel the contention of the
appellant regarding the illegality of the second FIR 35 and the investigation
based thereon being vitiated, but on facts found that the two FIRs in truth and
substance were different -- the first was a smaller conspiracy and the second
was a larger conspiracy as it turned out eventually..."
In Kari Choudhary
(supra), the mother-in-law of the deceased Sugnia Devi lodged an FIR that some
persons from outside had entered into her bedroom and murdered her by
strangulation. During the process of investigation, it was found that the
murder took place in a manner totally different from the version furnished in
the FIR. According to the investigating officer, the murder was committed
pursuant to a conspiracy hatched by her mother-in-law and her other
daughters-in-law. A final report was sent. However, another FIR was lodged. The
first FIR was lodged on 27.06.1988 and the second FIR was lodged in 30.11.1988.
The validity of the first FIR was in question. In that case, another
chargesheet was filed on 31.03.2000. This Court held:
"11. Learned
counsel adopted an alternative contention that once the proceedings initiated
under FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the police had no authority to
register a second FIR and number it as FIR No. 208. Of course the legal
position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect
of the same 36 case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same
episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and
investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency.
Even that apart, the report submitted to the court styling it as FIR No. 208 of
1998 need be considered as an information submitted to the court regarding the
new discovery made by the police during investigation that persons not named in
FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To quash the said proceedings merely on the
ground that final report had been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to say the least, too
technical. The ultimate object of every investigation is to find out whether
the offences alleged have been committed and, if so, who have committed
it."
Kari Choudhary
(supra) should be read with Ram Lal Narang (supra).
In State of A.P. v.
A.S. Peter [(2008) 2 SCC 383], this Court held:
"16. Even in
regard to an independent investigation undertaken by the police authorities, it
was observed: (Narang case, SCC p. 338, para 21) "21. ... In our view,
notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a
police report submitted under Section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police
to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such
right as often as necessary when fresh information came to light. Where the
police desired to make a further investigation, the police could express their
regard and respect for the court 37 by seeking its formal permission to make
further investigation."
17. It is not a case
where investigation was carried out in relation to a separate conspiracy. As
allegations had been made against the officer of a local police station in
regard to the mode and manner in which investigation was carried out, a further
investigation was directed. The court was informed thereabout. Although, no
express permission was granted, but evidently, such a permission was granted by
necessary implication as further proceeding was stayed by the learned
Magistrate. It is also not a case where two charge- sheets were filed before
two different courts. The court designated to deal with the matters wherein
investigation had been carried out by CID, is located at Chittoor. It is in the
aforementioned situation, the Sessions Judge transferred the case pending in
the Tirupati Court to the Designated Court at Chittoor. Cognizance of further
offence had also been taken by the Chittoor Court."
49.
The
instant case, in our opinion, stands on a better footing vis-`-vis Ram Lal
Narang (supra) in the sense that whereas the first FIR did not make any
allegation as regards existence of a conspiracy, the second FIR did. The
canvass of two FIRs is absolutely different. The numbers of accused in both the
FIRs are also different.
50.
We
must also bear in mind the distinction between crime committed by an individual
or a group of persons vis-`-vis a scam which means "to get money or
property from, another, under false pretences, by gaining the confidence of the
victim, also includes; swindle; defraud". [See Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd
edition, 2005, page 4237]
51.
We
may also notice that in H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi
[1955 (1) SCR 1150] the appellant Rishbud was an Assistant Development Officer
and another appellant Inder Singh was the Assistant Project Section Officer. A
number of criminal proceedings were pending against them. The cases against
them were that they along with some others entered into criminal conspiracies to
obtain for themselves or for others iron and steel materials in the name of
certain bogus firms and that they actually obtained quota certificates, on the
strength of which some of the members of the conspiracy took delivery of
quantities of iron and steel from the stock-holders of those articles. They
were prosecuted under Sections 120B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1947. The public
servants were also charged with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947.
Whereas
investigations in respect of Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
were required to be made by a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy
Superintendent of Police without the order of a Magistrate of the First Class,
investigations under other provisions were not. Therein, the FIRs were lodged
in April and June, 1949 but permission for investigation as against the public
servants by a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police was
given in March and April, 1951.
The question which
arose for consideration therein was whether the chargesheets filed in those
cases were illegal. This Court examined the scheme of the Code to hold :-
"9. The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent
the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. Now, trial follows
cognizance and cognizance is preceded by investigation. This is undoubtedly the
basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases.
But it does not necessarily
follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based
thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory
provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards
cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the
question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings
or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or illegality in investigation, however
serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to
cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an
investigation is provided in Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as
the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a
valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the
Court to take cognizance.
Section 190 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is one out of a group of sections under the heading
"Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings". The language of
this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group
under the same heading i.e. Sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections
regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases
excepting in compliance therewith.
But Section 190 does
not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1)
are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say
that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a
nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b)
of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to
consider) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in
a proceeding antecedent to the trial..."
52.
Yet
again, in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash and Others [(2004) 13 SCC 292], a
Three-Judge Bench of this Court held:
"21. From the
above it is clear that even in regard to a complaint arising out of a complaint
on further investigation if it was found that there was a larger conspiracy
than the one referred to in the previous complaint then a further investigation
41 under the court culminating in another complaint is permissible."
53.
If,
in a situation of this nature, lodging of the second FIR was not impermissible
in law, the main plank of submission of Mr. Rao that whereas in terms of
Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure further investigation is
permissible, re-investigation is not, takes a back seat.
54.
The
question can be considered from another angle. If the State has the ultimate
supervisory jurisdiction over an investigation for an offence and if it intends
to hand over a further investigation even after filing of the chargesheet, it
may do so. However, it appears from the records that those officers including
the Chief Secretary who were dealing with the public interest litigation were
not aware that the charge sheet had been filed in the earlier case. The State
Government and the High Court had proceeded on the basis that the investigation
was to be handed over to the CBI. The High Court came to know thereof only when
an application for modification was filed by the appellants therein. It may be
true that the High Court proceeded on the basis that although the CBI had
lodged the FIR, the same would be deemed to have been lodged only for the
purpose of carrying out further investigation, but, in our opinion, for the
views we have taken, its conclusions are correct.
55.
The
High Court in this case was not monitoring any investigation. It only desired
that the investigation should be carried out by an independent agency. Its
anxiety, as is evident from the order dated 3.04.2002, was to see that the
officers of the State do not get away. If that be so, the submission of Mr. Rao
that the monitoring of an investigation comes to an end after the chargesheet
is filed, as has been held by this Court in Vineet Narain (supra) and M.C.
Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) v. Union of India and Others [(2007) 1 SCC 110],
loses all significance.
56.
Moreover,
it was not a case where the High Court had assumed a jurisdiction in regard to
the same offence in respect whereof the Special Judge had taken cognizance
pursuant to the charge sheet filed. The chargesheet was not filed in the FIR
which was lodged on the intervention of the High Court.
43 As the offences
were distinct and different, the High Court never assumed the jurisdiction of
the Special Judge to direct reinvestigation as was urged or otherwise.
57.
The
Act is a special statute. By reason of the said enactment, the CBI was
constituted. In relation to the matter which were to come within the purview
thereof, the CBI could exercise its jurisdiction. The law and order, however,
being a State subject, the CBI derives jurisdiction only when a consent
therefor is given by the statute. It is, however, now beyond any controversy
that the High Court and this Court also direct investigation by the CBI. Our
attention has been drawn to the provisions of the CBI Manual, from a perusal
whereof it appears that the Director, CBI exercises his power of
superintendence in respect of the matters enumerated in Chapter VI of the CBI
Manual which includes reference by the State and/ or reference by the High
Courts and this Court as also the registration thereof. The reference thereof
may be received from the following:
"(a) Prime
Minister of India (b) Cabinet Ministers of Government of India/ Chief Ministers
of State Governments or their equivalent (c) The State Governments (d) Supreme
Court/ High Courts"
44 The CBI Manual
having been framed by the Union of India, evidently, it has accepted that
reference for investigation to the CBI may be made either by this Court or by
the High Court.
58.
Thus,
even assuming that reference had been made by the State Government at the
instance of the High Court, the same by itself would not render the
investigation carried out by it to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction
as assuming that the reference had been made by the High Court in exercise of
its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a public interest
litigation, the same would also be valid.
59.
The
second FIR, in our opinion, would be maintainable not only because there were
different versions but when new discovery is made on factual foundations.
Discoveries may be made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage.
Discovery about a larger conspiracy can also surface in another proceeding, as
for example, in a case of this nature. If the police authorities did not make a
fair investigation and left out conspiracy aspect of the matter from the
purview of its investigation, in our opinion, as and when the same surfaced, it
was open to the State and/ or the High Court to direct investigation in respect
of an offence which is distinct and separate from the one for which the FIR had
already been lodged.
60.
An
order of further investigation in terms of Section 173 (8) of the Code by the
State in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 36 thereof stands on a different
footing. The power of the investigating officer to make further investigation
in exercise of its statutory jurisdiction under Section 173(8) of the Code and
at the instance of the State having regard to Section 36 thereof read with
Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861 should be considered in different contexts.
Section 173(8) of the Code is an enabling provision.
Only when cognizance
of an offence is taken, the learned Magistrate may have some say. But, the
restriction imposed by judicial legislation is merely for the purpose of
upholding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. It is one thing
to say that the court will have supervisory jurisdiction to ensure a fair
investigation, as has been observed by a Bench of this Court in Sakiri Vasu v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [(2008) 2 SCC 409], correctness whereof is
open to question, but it is another thing to say that the investigating officer
will have no jurisdiction whatsoever to make any further investigation without
the express permission of the Magistrate.
The ratio laid down
in A.S. Peter (supra) (wherein one of us was a member), to which reliance has
been placed by Mr. Rao should be considered from that angle.
61.
Contention
raised that the investigating officer appointed by the CBI would not be a
superior officer in rank to the police officer of the State Government in terms
of Section 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may not detain us in view of
our findings aforementioned.
We may, however,
observe that the State as in terms of the provisions of the Code and the Act
exercises two different and distinct jurisdictions.
The power of
supervision over investigation vested in the State in terms of Section 3 of the
Police Act, 1861 is absolute. It may in a given case having regard to the
nature and complexity of the offence may also direct that further investigation
in the matter may be carried out by a central agency.
The State in terms of
the special statute, viz., the Act can always request the CBI to make an
investigation / further investigation. The said power of the State is wholly
unrestricted by Section 36 of the Act or otherwise. As a logical corollary if
while making preliminary inquiry pursuant to the notification issued by the
State in terms of Section 6 of the Act, the CBI comes to know of commission of
other and further offence involving a larger conspiracy which required
prosecution against a large number of persons who had not been proceeded
against at all by the local police officers, we are of the opinion that even lodging
of second FIR would not be a bar.
62.
If
lodging of the second FIR is legally permissible, only because the same has
been done at the instance of the High Court could not lead this Court to arrive
at a conclusion that its direction in that behalf was wholly without
jurisdiction. It will bear repetition to state that law as it stands permits
the High Court and this Court to direct investigation made by the CBI. As
indicated hereinbefore, it is also recognised by the Central Government, as
would appear from the provisions of the CBI Manual referred to hereinbefore.
63.
We
must, however, not lose sight of the fact that before the High Court it was the
State Government who stated that it would like to get the scam investigated by
the CBI. The direction was issued only in view of the said offer and not
de'hors the same.
64.
For
the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in these appeals.
We would, however, in
exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,
like to issue some directions.
In view of the fact
that a chargesheet has been filed on the basis of the first FIR and it is
stated that two witnesses had also been examined, we would direct the learned
Trial Judge to segregate that portion of the trial which has any bearing with
the scam relating to the appointment of the Panchayat Secretaries. Appellants,
in the other appeals, who had been cited as witnesses therein, should not be
allowed to be examined except with their consent. All the materials collected
by the investigating officer pertaining to the said scam shall be transferred
to the Court of Sub-Judge dealing with the CBI matters forthwith so as to
enable it to hear that part of the case either independently or together with
the charge sheet which may be submitted by the CBI before it. These directions
are issued for doing complete justice to the parties and in terms of the
decision of this Court in Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and Others
[(2008) 3 SCC 542], whereupon Mr. Rao himself placed strong reliance.
65.
As
the investigation is complete, the CBI may file chargesheet before a court
having appropriate jurisdiction.
66.
The
appeals are dismissed with aforementioned directions.
...............................J.
[S.B. Sinha]
................................J.
[Aftab Alam]
New
Delhi;
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