State of U.P. Vs.
Manoj Kumar Pandey [2008] INSC 1909 (7 November 2008)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1068 OF 2001 State
of U.P. ...Appellant Versus Manoj Kumar Pandey ...Respondent
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT,
J.
1.
Challenge
in this appeal is to the order of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court
dismissing the appeal filed by the State. Challenge in the appeal was to the
judgment of the learned Special Additional Sessions Judge, Fatehpur in Sessions
Trial No. 566 of 1996. The respondent faced trial for alleged commission of
offences punishable under Sections 376 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short the `IPC'). The High Court dismissed the appeal in very cryptic
manner holding that there was possibility of the prosecutrix being a consenting
party as she was above 16 years of age.
2.
Learned
counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the manner of disposal of the
Government appeal needs much to be desired. Trial court did not even record any
finding that the prosecutrix was a consenting party to the sexual intercourse.
It went on some hypothetical questions regarding alleged delay in lodging FIR.
The trial court concluded that since the girl was more than 16 years of age
consent had to be presumed. The High Court concurred with the view and disposed
of the appeal which is as follows:
"Heard learned
A.G.A. and perused the judgment of the trial court. The age of the girl was
found to be above 16 years and further finding is that from the circumstances
appearing in the case the possibility of the prosecutrix being a consenting
party was not ruled out. The reasons in support of order of acquittal are
plausible and cogent. No sufficient ground is made out for interference in the
order of acquittal.
Leave to appeal is
refused."
3.
The
approach of the trial court and the High Court is clearly unsustainable. Merely
because the victim was more than 16 years of age as held by the trial court
that cannot be a ground to hold that she was consenting party. No evidence was
led to show such consent. Apart from that normal rule regarding the duty of the
prosecution to explain the delay in lodging FIR and the lack of prejudice
and/or prejudice caused because of such delayed lodging of FIR does not per se
apply to cases of rape. This has been the consistent view of this court. The
High Court was, therefore, clearly wrong in disposing of the appeal in such
cryptic manner. In the circumstances of the case, we set aside the order of the
High Court and remit the matter to it for fresh hearing so that it can consider
the matter and hear in detail and dispose of the same by a reasoned judgment.
Whatever has been expressed by us supra is only for the purpose of coming to
the conclusion that the manner of disposal of the appeal is not proper.
4.
The
appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
..........................................J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
..........................................J.
(C.K. THAKKER)
..........................................J.
(D.K. JAIN)
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Delhi:
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