Sree
Ayyanar Spinning & Weaving M.Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [2008] INSC 779
(1 May 2008)
S.H. KAPADIA & B. SUDERSHAN REDDY
1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL
NO.3246 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 10576 of 2007) SREE AYYANAR SPINNING
& WEAVING M.LTD. ...APPELLANT (S) VERSUS ORDER Leave granted.
In this Civil Appeal filed by the assessee - appellant, we are required to
decide the scope of Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short the
said Act).
The assessee is a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956.
It carries on the business of manufacture of cotton and man made fiber yarn.
For the Assessment Year 1989-90, assessment under Section 143(3) was framed
by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Madurai, wherein the said authority
determined the taxable total income for 21 months ending 31st March, 1989 at
Rs.45,92,240/-. This order was passed on 27th February, 1992. The determination
of the taxable total income was based on Section 115J of the Act. In the said
assessment order the total income of the assessee was computed at Rs.
42,98,019/- and on scrutiny of the said computation and the balance-sheet along
with the return the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax reworked the computation
as indicated at page 63 of Volume II in this case.
Suffice it to state that the total profit was reworked at Rs.1,53,07,444/-.
Thirty per cent thereof was reworked at Rs.45,92,239/-. In the process of
reworking the computation under 2 Section 115J, the Deputy Commissioner added
to the profit the excess depreciation which was debited in the profit and loss
account in view of the difference which arose due to the change in the method
of accounting adopted by the assessee for the claim of depreciation on
machinery retrospectively from the year ending 30th June, 1983. The assessee
had changed its method of claiming depreciation from Straight Line Method (SLM)
to Written Down Value Method and in that connection it was argued by the
assessee that the profit stood computed correctly in accordance with the
provisions of the Companies
Act, 1956 and, therefore, 273) the assessee submitted that the Assessing
Officer had no authority to go beyond the book profits, correctly computed by
the assessee in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.
Suffice it to state at this stage that in this Civil Appeal we are not
concerned with the merits, i.e., reworking of the computation by the Deputy
Commissioner of Income Tax.
However, in that connection the Department contends that the judgment of
this Court in Apollo Tyres was not applicable to the facts of the present case
because in that case the issue involved was regarding admissibility of
deduction relating to extra shift depreciation for past years which were not
claimed by Apollo Tyres in the relevant years, whereas in the present case the
claim of the assessee arose due to the change in the rate of depreciation
brought about by Schedule XIV to the Companies Act
which was inserted with effect from 2nd April, 1987. It is urged on behalf of
the Department that the judgment of this Court in the case of Apollo Tyres
(supra) was not applicable as in the present case the assessee had debited
excess depreciation of Rs.1,10,09,445/- to the profit and loss account for the
period 1.7.1987 to 30.6.1988 which consisted of Rs.19,24,684/-. According to
the Department the excess depreciation of Rs.19,24,683/- was due to the change
in the method of claiming depreciation from Straight Line Method to Written
Down Value Method and, therefore, the judgment of this Court in Apollo Tyres
case was not applicable. We have referred to the 3 submissions of both sides on
merits with which we are strictly not concerned. In this case we are only
concerned with the interpretation of Section 254(2) regarding powers of the
Tribunal in the matter of rectification of mistakes apparent from the record.
This controversy has arisen because on 9th December, 1996, ITAT in ITA No.
719(MDS)/94 had passed an order upholding the order of CIT (Appeals) on
computation of income under Section 115J of the said Act. By the said order
ITAT had dismissed the appeal of the assessee on the ground that the profit and
loss account of the assessee did not reflect correct picture for the Assessment
Year 1989-90. On 2nd August, 2000 assessee had moved Miscellaneous Application
bearing No. 40/2000 praying for recall of the order dated 9th December, 1996 by
mainly relying upon the judgment of this Court in Apollo Tyres' case. At this
stage, it may be noted that the miscellaneous application dated 2nd August,
2000 was filed within four years from the date of the Tribunal's Order dated
9th December, 1996. To complete the chronology of events, it may be stated that
on 31st January, 2003 following the judgment of this Court in Apollo Tyres
Limited the Tribunal allowed the rectification application filed by the
assessee against which the Department carried the matter in appeal to the High
Court under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act.
By the impugned judgment the High Court came to the conclusion that under
Section 254(2) the Tribunal could not have allowed rectification beyond four
years. That, the Tribunal had no power to rectify the mistake after four years
which time is set out in Section 254(2) itself for passing an order of
rectification either suo motu or an application filed either by the assessee or
by the Assessing Officer. The High Court did not go into the merits of the
case. The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Tribunal
only on the ground of limitation. Hence, this Civil Appeal by Special Leave.
In the light of the above controversy we set out hereinbelow provisions of
Section 254(2) of the 1963 Act which read as follows:- "The Appellate
Tribunal, may at any time within four years from the date 4 of the order, with
a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order
passed by it under sub-section (1), and shall make such amendment if the
mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing
Officer."
Analysing the above provisions, we are of the view that Section 254(2) is in
two parts. Under the first part, the Appellate Tribunal may, at any time,
within four years from the date of the order, rectify any mistake apparent from
the record and amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1). Under the
second part of Section 254(2) reference is to the amendment of the order passed
by the Tribunal under sub-section (1) when the mistake is brought to its notice
by the assessee or the Assessing Officer. Therefore, in short, the first part
of Section 254(2) refers to suo motu exercise of the power of rectification by
the Tribunal whereas the second part refers to rectification and amendment on
an application being made by the Assessing Officer or the assessee pointing out
the mistake apparent from the record. In this case we are concerned with the
second part of Section 254(2). As stated above, application for rectification
was made within four years. Application was well within four years. It is the
Tribunal which took its own time to dispose of the application.
Therefore, in the circumstances, the High Court had erred in holding that
the application could not have been entertained by the Tribunal beyond four
years.
In this connection, our attention is also invited to the judgment of the
Rajasthan Another (2002 (256) ITR 767) wherein an identical controversy arose
for determination and the view taken by that Court was as follows:- "Once
the assessee has moved the application within four years from the date of
appeal, the Tribunal cannot reject that application on the ground that four
years have lapsed, which includes the period of pendency of the application
before the Tribunal. If the assessee has moved the application within four
years from the date of the order, the Tribunal is bound to decide the
application on the merits and not on the ground of limitation. Section 254(2)
of the Income Tax Act, 1961, lays down that the Appellate Tribunal may at any
time within four years from the date of the order rectify the mistake apparent
from the record but that does not mean that if the application is moved within
the period allowed, i.e., four years, and remains pending before the Tribunal,
after the expiry of four years the Tribunal can reject the application on the
ground of limitation."
5 We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Rajasthan High Court in
the case of Harshvardhan Chemicals and Minerals Ltd. (supra).
For the aforesated reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High
Court and restore T.C.(A) No. 2/2004 on the file of the Madras High Court for
fresh decision on the merits of the matter as indicated hereinabove. All
contentions on merits are expressly kept open. We express no opinion on the
merits of the case whether rectification application was at all maintainable or
not and whether the judgment in the case of Apollo Tyres was or was not
applicable to the facts of this case. That question will have to be gone into
by the High court in the above T.C.(A) No. 2/2004.
Accordingly, the Civil Appeal filed by the assessee stands allowed with no
order as to costs.
....................J.
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