Eastern
Coalfields Ltd. & Ors Vs. Kalyan Banerjee [2008] INSC 346 (4 March 2008)
S.B. Sinha & V.S. Sirpurkar CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1736 OF 2008 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 7375 of 2006]
S.B. SINHA, J :
1. Leave granted.
2. Respondent was an employee of Eastern Coal Fields Limited, Appellant No.
1 herein in the Mugma Area, in the district of Dhanbad, Jharkhand. The General
Manager of the area, whose office is also situated at Mugma was his appointing
and disciplinary authority. The services of the respondent were terminated at
Mugma. He filed a writ application before the Calcutta High Court. As he was
serving in the Mugma Area and the office of the General Manager was situated at
Mugma which is in the State of Jharkhand, a preliminary objection was raised in
regard to the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. In support of the said
objection, reliance was placed upon a decision of a learned Single Judge in
N.N. Singh v. Coal India Limited [C.O. No. 5869 (W) of 1994].
3. The learned Single Judge, however, disagreed with the said view and
referred the matter to the Division Bench. The Division Bench by a judgment and
order dated 26.03.2003 opined that the Calcutta High Court had no territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition stating:
"In this case the Division Bench relying on an observation of the
learned Single Judge held that since the registered office of Eastern
Coalfields Ltd. is situated at Sanctoria, Burdwan within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court which is a necessary party and also the
order of approval for dismissal was ultimately obtained from the Director,
Personnel of the Eastern Coalfields Ltd., whose office is at the said
registered office, the writ petition can be maintained before the Calcutta High
Court. Therefore, this case was essentially decided on facts, but there is no
such averments in the petition that the order of termination, passed by the
General Manager, Badjna Colliery, Mugma Area, Dhanbad had obtained any prior
approval from the head office at Calcutta. Therefore, this decision of the
Division Bench of this Court does not held the writ petitioner/ respondent in
this case.
As per the three Apex Court decisions, referred to above, cause of action is
decisive of the matter for acquiring territorial jurisdiction to decide the
matter. Simply because the head office of the company is at Calcutta is not
decisive of the matter as held in the case of Oil & Natural Gas because
that would not give a cause of action to the party. Cause of action is a bundle
of facts which decides the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, if any of the
cause of action has arisen to the party within the jurisdiction of Calcutta
High Court then the High Court at Calcutta will have jurisdiction to decide the
matter. Simply because a head office of the company is within the territorial
limits of the Calcutta High Court, that will not give jurisdiction to the
Calcutta High Court unless cause of action arises within the territorial
jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court."
4. A review application was filed thereagainst. By reason of the impugned
judgment dated 25.11.2005, the said review application has been allowed holding
that the Division Bench had not taken into consideration two other decisions of
the Division Benches of the said Court, viz., Ram Brich Muchi v. Coal India
Limited [A.P.O.T. No. 343 of 2002] and Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. v. Khagen Bouri
& Ors. [2002 (1) C.L.R. 884]. It was furthermore opined:
"As provided in the Companies Act, a company is a body corporate and
its registered office should be deemed to be its site for the purpose of all
litigations. The law is equally settled that an employee challenging an order
of dismissal cannot get an effective order unless the employer is made party to
the litigation and as such, in this case, the Eastern Coal Fields Limited
having its registered office in the district of Burdwan is a necessary party
and if the Court proposed to give relief to the writ petitioner, specific
direction of reinstatement must be given to the employer to be carried out
through its appropriate officers. As provided in Article 226(1) of the
constitution of India, even if the cause of action arises outside the
territorial limit of High Court, such High Court can entertain a writ
application if the person sought to be bound by the order of the Court is
stationed within the territorial limit. Article 226(2) is an additional
provision subsequently incorporated by way of amendment enabling a High Court
to issue writ even in cases where the respondents are functioning beyond its
territorial limit if the cause of action has arisen fully or in part within its
territorial limit.
Once it is held that Article 226(1) is clearly applicable, there is no
necessity of invoking Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. From the
order sought to be reviewed, we find that Division Bench confined its attention
to the cause of action of the present writ application but totally ignored the
fact that the employer, the Government company, has its registered office
within the district of Burdwan and consequently the question whether cause of
action had really arisen within the territorial limit of this Court was
immaterial."
5. Mr. Anip Sachthey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant,
submitted that it is not a case where sanction of the corporate office or head
office was required to be taken. The entire cause of action having arisen
within the jurisdiction of the Jharkhand High Court, the Calcutta High Court
could not have exercised any jurisdiction in the matter.
6. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of or in the nature of mandamus is
conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Article 226(2), however, provides that if cause of action had arisen in more
than one court, any of the courts where part of cause of action arises will
have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
7. 'Cause of action', for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution
of India, for all intent and purport, must be assigned the same meaning as
envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It means a bundle
of facts which are required to be proved. The entire bundle of facts pleaded,
however, need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be
proved is material facts whereupon a writ petition can be allowed.
The question to some extent was considered by a Three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another [(2004) 6
SCC 254] stating:
"18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the
basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do
with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action
which would confer jurisdiction on the Court."
As regards the question as to whether situs of office of the appellant would
be relevant, this Court noticed decisions of this Court in Nasiruddin v.
State Transport Appellate Tribunal [AIR 1976 SC 331] and U.P. Rashtriya
Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow vs. State of U.P. and others [(1995) 4
SCC 738] to hold:
"26. The view taken by this Court in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad that the situs of issue of an order
or notification by the Governmen t would come within the meaning of the
expression "cases arising" in clause 14 of the (Amalgamation) Order
is not a correct view of law for the reason hereafter stated and to that extent
the said decision is overruled. In fact, a legislation, it is trite, is not
confined to a statute enacted by Parliament or the legislature of a State,
which would include delegated legislation and subordinate legislation or an
executive order made by the Union of India, State or any other statutory
authority. In a case where the field is not covered by any statutory rule,
executive instructions issued in this behalf shall also come within the purview
thereof. Situs of office of Parliament, legislature of a State or authorities
empowered to make subordinate legislation would not by itself constitute any
cause of action or cases arising. In other words, framing of a statute,
statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer
jurisdiction upon a court only because of the situs of the office of the maker
thereof.
27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive
authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause
of action arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original
authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is
constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the
places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part
of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court
within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the
order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the
order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate
authority."
8. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) has been followed by this Court in
Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd. and Others [(2006) 3 SCC 658]
stating:
"26. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India 14 a
three-Judge Bench of this Court clearly held that with a view to determine the
jurisdiction of one High Court vis--vis the other the facts pleaded in the writ
petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be made and the
facts which have nothing to do therewith cannot give rise to a cause of action
to invoke the jurisdiction of a court. In that case it was clearly held that
only because the High Court within whose jurisdiction a legislation is passed,
it would not have the sole territorial jurisdiction but all the High Courts
where cause of action arises, will have jurisdiction"
9. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and Another [(2006) 6 SCC
207], this Court held: "12. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a
judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense "cause of action"
means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate
occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary
conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction
of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself.
Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every fact, which it would
be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his
right to the judgment of the court. Every fact, which is necessary to be
proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to
prove each fact, comprises in "cause of action". (See Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Assn. v. Union of India)"
10. In Uttaranchal Forest Rangers' Assn. (Direct Recuirt) and Others v. State of U.P. and Others [(2006) 10 SCC 346], this Court held:
"44. The second impugned order dated 12-4-2004 is further vitiated for
the following reasons:
-
Forum .The seniority list under challenge in the second writ petition
was the seniority list of the Uttaranchal State Government of 2002 and such
challenge could not have been made before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad
High Court.
-
Parties .None of the direct recruits who would be directly affected by
the order were made parties to the writ petition. Therefore the High Court did
not have the benefit of competing arguments in the matter. Even though, the
Principal Secretary of the State of Uttaranchal was made a party, the said
party was never served. The only respondent which was heard was the State of U.P.
which had no stake in the matter at all since all of the writ petitioners
before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court were employees of the
State of Uttaranchal on the relevant date. It is, therefore, evident that the
relevant material was not placed before the Allahabad High Court for the
purpose of deciding the writ petition. Accordingly, the permission had to be
taken from this Court by the present appellants to prefer the SLPs."
These directions are authorities for the proposition that only that court
will have jurisdiction within which, the entire cause of action had arisen. In
this case, no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the
Calcutta High Court.
11. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma Area within the State of
Jharkhand, we are of the opinion that only because the Head Office of the
appellant company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by itself
will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly
when the Head Office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed
against the respondent.
12. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.
Back
Pages: 1 2 3
