Karnal Improvement Trust
Vs. Sumitra Devi (Dead) By LRS. and Ors [2008] INSC 490 (24 March 2008)
Dr. Arijit Pasayat & P.
Sathasivam
CIVIL APPEAL No. 5782 of 2002 (With C.A.Nos. 5670, 5778, 5779, 5804,
6566/2002) Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT J.
1. These appeals have an identical point and are therefore disposed of by
this common judgment.
2. Challenge in each case is to the final judgment and order dated 29.1.2002
passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Writ Petitions
filed by the appellant in each case were dismissed. Challenge in the Writ
Petitions was to the award of solatium at the rate of 30% of the market value
and other amounts permissible under Sections 23(1-A) and 28 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the 'Act'). According to the appellant the
benefits were not available to the respondents because of the specific
provisions of Section 30(1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (in
short the 'Amendment Act'). The High Court relying on some earlier judgments
dismissed the writ petitions.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the decision
of this Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco
De Gama (1990 (1) SCC 277) and Kashiben Bhikabai and Ors. v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer and Anr. (2002 (2) SCC 605) no amount was payable as
provisions of under Section 23(1-A) are not applicable.
Reference is also made to Section 30(1) of the Amendment Act for the purpose
which reads as follows:
"30.Transitional provisions. - (1)
The provisions of subsection (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as
inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be
deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, -
-
every proceeding for the acquisition
of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 [the
date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the
House of the People, in which no award has been made by the Collector before
that date;
-
every proceeding for the acquisition
of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an
award has been made by the Collector .before the date of commencement of this
Act.
(2) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx."
4. It is pointed out that since there was no enhancement of compensation in
excess of the award of the Collector, the benefits under Section 28 of the Act
are also not applicable. Reliance is placed on The State of Punjab and Anr. v. Jagir Singh etc. (JT
1995 (9) SC 1) .
5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand supported the
judgment of the High Court.
6. In Filip Tiago's case (supra) it was inter-alia observed at para 21 as
follows:
"Entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A)
depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings as on April 30, 1982 or
commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date. Section 30 sub-section
(1)(a) provides that additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) shall be
applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on April
30, 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date. If the Collector
has made the award before that date then, that additional amount cannot be
awarded. Section 30, sub- section (1)(b) provides that Section 23(1-A) shall be
applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after April 30, 1982
irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made an award or not before
September 24, 1984. The final point to note is that Section 30 sub-section (1)
does not refer to court award and the court award is used only in Section 30
sub-section (2)."
7. Similarly, in Kashiben's case (supra) it was observed as follows:
"17. Counsel appearing for the claimants contended that the claimants
would be entitled to an additional compensation @ 12% as provided under Section
23(1-A) of the Act. This contention cannot be accepted in view of a Bench
decision of this Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco
De Gama which held that additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the
Act would not be available to a claimant in which the acquisition proceedings
commenced and the award was made by the Collector prior to 30-4-1982. If the
Collector made the award before 30-4-1982 then the additional amount under
Section 23(1-A) cannot be awarded. The pendency of the acquisition proceedings
on 30- 4-1982 before the Collector was essential for attracting the benefit
under Section 23(1-A) of the Act. It was held: (SCC pp. 286-87, para 21) '21.
Entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) depends upon
pendency of acquisition proceedings as on 30-4- 1982 or commencement of
acquisition proceedings after that date. Section 30 sub-section (1)(a) provides
that additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to
acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on 30-4-1982 in which
he has not made the award before that date. If the Collector has made the award
before that date then, that additional amount cannot be awarded. Section 30
subsection (1)(b) provides that Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to every
acquisition proceedings commenced after 30-4-1982 irrespective of the fact
whether the Collector has made an award or not before 24-9-1984.
The final point to note is that Section 30 sub-section (1) does not refer to
court award and the court award is used only in Section 30 sub-section (2).' No
judgment taking a contrary view to the above-referred case was cited before us.
Accordingly, it is held that the appellants would not be entitled to the
additional compensation provided under Section 23(1-A) of the Act."
8. In Jagir's case (supra) it was observed as follows:
"It would thus be seen that the legislative animation is clear that the
Civil Court on reference under Section 18, or the High Court or in some States
District Judge exercising appellate power under section 54 or civil court under
Section 26, as the case may be, awards compensation in excess of the amount
awarded by the Collector, then it gets jurisdiction and power to award additional
benefits envisaged in sub-section (I-A) of section 23, sub-section (2) of
Section 23 and Section 28 of the Act. In other words, enhancement of the
compensation in excess of the award of the collector under Section 11 is a
condition precedent to exercise the power to award statutory additional amounts
envisaged under the aforesaid respective provisions on the excess compensation.
If the High Court dismisses the appeal confirming the award of the Collector or
that of the civil court, then it has no jurisdiction and power to award
additional statutory amount under the respective provisions as amended under
the Amendment Act 68 of 1984."
9. From a reading of the orders passed by the Reference Court it is clear
that there was no enhancement of the rates as fixed by the Land Acquisition
Collector. That being so, benefits under Section 28 of the Act are not
available to the respondents. The award was passed on 7.11.1972. The Reference
Court decided the case on 18.10.1997. That will not change the position because
as noted in Filip Tiago's case (supra) the relevant date is the date of award
by the Collector under the Act. The High Court, therefore, is clearly wrong in
dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant. The inevitable conclusion
is that respondents are not entitled to solatium under Section 23(1-A) of the
Act and similarly the benefits under Section 28 of the Act.
10. The appeals are allowed but with no order as to costs.
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