State of Punjab Vs.
Navraj Singh [2008] INSC 1123 (14 July 2008)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2008 (Arising
out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6143 of 2006) State of Punjab ... Appellant Navraj
Singh ... Respondent
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT,
J.
1.
Leave
granted.
2.
Challenge
in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court directing that the conviction of the respondent shall
remained stayed during the pendency of Criminal Appeal No. 1498- SB of 2002.
3.
Background
facts in a nutshell are as follows:
4.
Respondent
who was working as Patwari Halqa and was convicted by learned Special Judge,
Nawanshahr, Punjab for offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short `P.C.
Act') and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three
years and to pay a fine of Rs.2000/- with default stipulation. Against the
judgment in question respondent filed the aforesaid Criminal appeal which was
admitted. After admission of the appeal, respondent filed an application in
terms of Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the
`Code') read with Section 482 of the Code for suspension of the judgment of
learned Special Judge.
5.
The
High Court by order dated 27.1.2005 stayed the conviction. According to the
appellant, the view expressed by this Court in K.C. Sareen v. CBI, 2
Chandigarh [2001(6) SCC 584] was not kept in view. The High Court dismissed
that application only on the ground that the review of the order was not
permissible.
6.
It
is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant-State that the suspension of
the conviction is clearly unsustainable. It is pointed out that the High Court
noted that the Collector, Nawanshaher had given a notice for dispensing his
services as Patwari Halqa, Musapur.
7.
Learned
counsel for the respondent submitted that the High Court took note of the fact
that this was a case where the prayer for suspension of the conviction was to
be granted. Unless the order of conviction was suspended, the respondent would
have lost his job.
8.
In
State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan and Another [2003 (12)SCC 432], it was noted as
follows: Having perused the impugned order as also the judgment of this Court
in K.C. Sareen's case [2001(6) SCC 584] we find the High Court had no room for
distinguishing the law laid down by this Court in K.C. Sareen case supra even
on facts. This Court in the said case held: (SCC p. 589, para 11) "11. The
legal position, therefore, is this: though the power to suspend an order of
conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of
the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely
because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the
court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court
has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such
conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we
have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public
servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the
appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and
sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally
suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because
refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be
heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the
offence under the PC Act, dehors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel
thereto, is a different matter."
(emphasis supplied)
In the said judgment of K.C. Sareen's case (supra) this Court has held that it
is only in very exceptional cases that the court should exercise such power of
stay in matters arising out of the Act. The High Court has in the impugned
order nowhere pointed out what is the exceptional fact which in its opinion required
it to stay the conviction. The High Court also failed to note the direction of
this Court that it has a duty to look at all aspects including ramification of
keeping such conviction in abeyance. The High Court, in our opinion, has not
taken into consideration any of the above factors while staying the conviction.
It should also be noted that the view expressed by this Court in K.C. 4 Sareen
case (supra) was subsequently approved followed by the judgment of this Court
in Union of India v. Atar Singh [2003(12) SCC 434].
9.
In
Union of India v. Avtar Singh & Anr. (2003(12) SCC 434) it was held as
follows: "This appeal is directed against the impugned order of the High
Court. The respondent- accused, who has been convicted under Section 409 IPC
and Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, preferred an appeal to the
High Court, which has been entertained. On an application being filed under
Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court has suspended the
conviction solely on the ground that the non- suspension of conviction may
entail removal of the delinquent government servant from service."
10.
In
K.C. Sareen's case (supra) it was noted as follows:
"The legal
position, therefore, is this: though the power to suspend an order of conviction,
apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code,
its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the
convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court
should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a
duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such
conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we
have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public
servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the
appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and
sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally
suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because
refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be
heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the
offence under the PC Act, dehors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel
thereto, is a different matter.
Corruption by public
servants has now reached a monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have
started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic.
Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and
orderly functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative,
executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public servants could even
paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic
polity. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to
cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and
operate public institutions. When a public servant is found guilty of
corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law,
judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is
exonerated by a superior court. The mere fact that an appellate or revisional
forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and
findings made against such public servants once again should not even
temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public servant becomes
entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is
judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of
conviction, it is public interest which suffers and sometimes, even
irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to
continue to hold public office, it would impair the morale of the other persons
manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already shrunk
confidence of the people in such public institutions besides 6 demoralising
the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or
subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants are compelled
to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of
the conviction, the fallout would be one of shaking the system itself.
Hence it is necessary
that the court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for
corruption charges to hold only (sic) public office until he is exonerated
after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level.
It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer could continue to hold
such public office even without the help of a court order suspending the
conviction.
The above policy can
be acknowledged as necessary for the efficacy and proper functioning of public
offices. If so, the legal position can be laid down that when conviction is on
a corruption charge against a public servant the appellate court or the
revisional court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency
of the appeal even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. It would be a
sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under
disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment
in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision."
11.
In
State of Haryana v. Hasmat [2004(6) SCC 175] it was noted as follows: "6.
Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending
the appeal and release of the appellant on bail.
There is a distinction
between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of
Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in
writing for ordering suspension of execution of 7 the sentence or order
appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be
released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in
writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the
relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of
bail should not be passed as a matter of routine."
12.
It
is to be noted that learned Single Judge while directing suspension of
conviction indicated no reasons.
13.
Above
being the position the order of the learned Single Judge, directing the
suspension/stay of the conviction as well as the order refusing to recall the
said order cannot stand and are set aside.
14.
Appeal
is allowed.
..................................J.
(Dr.
ARIJIT PASAYAT) ..................................J.
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