Vidyodaya
Trust Vs. Mohan Prasad R & Ors [2008] Insc 310 (27 February 2008)
Dr.
Arijit Pasayat & P. Sathasivam
CIVIL
APPEAL NO. 1633 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3473 of 2007) Dr. ARIJIT
PASAYAT, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
This is the second round of litigation before this Court.
Challenge
in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Kerala
High Court holding that leave had been rightly granted in terms of Section 92
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'CPC').
3.
Defendants 1 to 3, 6, 8 and 10 had moved the High Court in Civil Revision
Petition questioning order of learned District Judge who had taken the view
that the suit was maintainable and justified under Section 92 of CPC.
4.
Earlier the matter was before this Court in Civil Appeal No.3679 of 2006. The
factual position as was noticed in the earlier appeal was as follows:
"Respondents
as plaintiffs filed OP NO.238 of 2000 before the District Judge, Ernakulam
under Section 34 of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 (in short the 'Trust Act') in
respect of Vidyodaya Trust and administration of the said trust and the school
run by the trust. But the said Court by order dated 31.1.2000 held that the OP
was not maintainable and dismissed the petition. Thereafter, the suit No.20 of
2000 was filed by the respondents as plaintiffs claiming several reliefs.
The
respondents filed an application (IA 349 of 2000) seeking leave of the Court to
institute the suit under Section 92 of CPC. According to the appellant without
notice to him the concerned Court granted leave to the respondents to institute
the suit. The suit was numbered as OS 20 of 2000. Plaintiffs filed written
statement inter-alia taking the stand that suit was actuated by personal
motives. The suit under Section 92 CPC is of a special nature which
pre-supposes existence of a Public Trust of religious or charitable character.
From the averments in the plaint and the reliefs sought for it is clear that
the plaintiffs were not suing to vindicate rights of the public, and it has not
been filed in the representative capacity.
The
plaintiffs four in number are trustees who instituted both the suits against
other trustees for personal reliefs and as individuals and seeking vindication
of alleged individual rights and not as representatives of the public.
Therefore, the suit as framed is not maintainable under Section 92 CPC. The
defendants filed an application before the District Judge, Ernakulam for
hearing as preliminary issue, the question of maintainability of the suit. On
the basis of contentions raised by the plaintiffs as well as defendants, the
Court framed preliminary issue as to whether the suit as framed is maintainable
under Section 92 CPC. By order dated 11.4.2003 the Court held that the suit was
maintainable.
Questioning
correctness of the order, a petition for revision in terms of Section 115 CPC
was filed. The High Court dismissed the Civil Revision petition on the ground
that the same was not maintainable. Though the High Court made reference to
some factual aspects, it ultimately came to hold that the revision petition was
not maintainable as order dated 4.11.2003 was an interlocutory one. Thereafter
the appellant filed writ petition before the High Court praying, inter-alia,
for writ, direction or order, questioning the order dated 2003. By order dated
20.8.2004 the High Court dismissed the Writ petition holding that the view
taken in the Civil Revision apparently was not correct, as by no stretch of
imagination it can be held that the High Court had no jurisdiction. It accepted
the stand of the respondents herein that since there was discussion on merits,
though the petition was not held to be maintainable subsequent proceedings
initiated under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution')
cannot be maintained."
5.
Both the orders i.e. one in the Revision Petition and the other in the Writ
Petition were challenged before this Court.
Taking
note of the facts, the appeal was disposed of with the following conclusions:
"Judged in the aforesaid background the view of the learned Single Judge
that the Civil Revision was not maintainable is clearly indefensible. Learned
counsel for the respondent has fairly conceded to this position. If it is held
that the suit in terms of Section 92 CPC is not maintainable, that would have
the result of final disposal of the suit. However, the learned counsel made an
attempt to justify the order by stating that the matter was also dealt with on
merits. That would not improve the situation. The Civil Revision was clearly
maintainable. Therefore, we allow the appeal so far as it relates to Civil
Revision Petition No.1260/2003 disposed of by judgment dated 5.2.2004 by the
High Court.
The
said order is set aside.
The
High Court shall now hear the Civil Revision on merits and dispose of the same
as expeditiously as practicable preferably within four months from the date of
receipt of our order. The time period is being fixed considering the pendency
of the matter for a considerable length of time.
In view
of the order passed in the appeal relating to Section 115 CPC no order is
necessary to be passed in respect of the judgment in the writ petition. It may
be noted that the learned Single Judge observed that the Civil Revision was
maintainable and, therefore, declined to entertain the writ petition. This
order was passed on the face of the order passed by learned Single Judge
holding that it was not maintainable. The same, therefore, is not justifiable.
But it is not necessary to deal with that matter as the Civil Revision shall be
heard on merit."
6. The
High Court in the impugned judgment focused the adjudication to the issue as to
whether the plaintiffs in the case at hand can be said to be laying the suit on
behalf of the beneficiaries and members of the public to protect the interests
of the public trust or whether they were airing only private and personal
grievances. The High Court took the view that though there were certain
personal reliefs claimed as evident from the prayer portion, but that was not
sufficient to hold that the suit was not for protection of interests of public
trust but to claim and enforce private or personal rights. It was held that the
insistence of law was only that the discretionary reliefs under Section 92 CPC
shall not be granted when the plaintiffs have no genuine interest or intention
to protect the public right of the beneficiaries but are only using the forum
provided by Section 92 to air private and personal grievances. It was further
held that there was prayer to supplement the plaintiffs 1 to 3 and also 4th
defendant in the School Management Committee. The same cannot be construed to
be any prayer for enforcement of the personal rights.
7. The
learned Single Judge formulated certain procedures for grant of leave by the
Court. It was also held that there would be need for public notice under Order
1 Rule 8 CPC in a suit under Section 92. It was finally concluded that though
there were certain inadequacies they did not vitiate the proceedings. The Civil
Revision was accordingly dismissed.
8.
Learned counsel for the appellant with reference to several averments in the
plaint submitted that though the High Court correctly formulated the issue that
there is no bar on trustees instituting the suit in terms of Section 92 CPC;
yet there has to be a pointed consideration as to whether they were verblating
a private or personal grievance or verdicating public rights in respect of
trust in representative character.
But
having said so, it did not consider the true nature of the suit filed.
9.
Referring to various averments it was pointed out that even on a cursory
analysis the position comes clear that the plaintiffs were highlighting
personal grievances. It is pointed out that plaintiff No.1 was a Vice Chairman,
Plaintiff No.3 is the father-in-law of plaintiff No.1 and most of the
allegations of alleged improper action revolved round close relatives of these
two plaintiffs. Reference to the senior teacher made is nobody else then the
wife of plaintiff No.1. All the resolutions were adopted by trustees. It is
essentially an inter-trust dispute.
10.
The prayers (a), (b), (c) and (d) focus on defendants 2, 3 and 10 and prayer
(e) which was deleted initially was for removal of defendants 2, 3, 6, 9 and 10
and for supplementing the School Management Committee with plaintiffs 1, 2, 3
and 4 and defendant No.4. Basically, the allegations are against defendants 2,
3 and 4.
11. It
was submitted that it is desirable that before the leave is granted in terms of
Section 92 CPC the other side should be heard. This should obviate the
subsequent application for revocation of grant of leave. All the allegations
according to learned counsel for the appellant are personal grievances.
12.
Learned Single Judge overlooked the fact that objections were taken by the
governing council. Merely because their objections or views did not find
acceptance by majority, that cannot be a ground to lay a suit under Section 92
CPC questioning legitimate decisions taken by the majority. The Court does not
deal with administration of trusts. Only if the pre-conditions are satisfied
then only leave can be granted as provided in Section 92. There must be an
element of dis- honest intention and lack of probity. When action is taken bona
fide though there may be mistaken action, that would not amount to breach of
trust.
13. To
find out whether the suit was for vindicating public rights there is necessity
to go beyond the relief and to focus on the purpose for which the suit was
filed. It is the object and purpose and not the relief which is material. A
co-trustee is not remediless if the leave is not granted under Section 92.
14. In
reply, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that while deciding on the
question whether leave is to be granted the statements in the plaint have to be
seen and not to the allegations in the written submissions. It is permissible
to strike down the portion of averment. Though the general principle may apply
to the facts of the present case, what is expected to be seen is if the trust
has acted as a prudent man would do and the standards of care and caution
required to be taken by a prudent man, and there should not be reckless
indifference and highest standard of rectitude and accuracy is to be
maintained.
15.
The parameters to be kept in view while dealing with an application for grant
of leave in terms of Section 92 CPC have been dealt with by this Court in
several decisions. In B.S. Adityan and Ors. v. B. Ramachandran Adityan and Ors.
(2004 (9) SCC 720), it was inter alia held as follows:
"9.
In this background, when a specific provision has been made in the Code of
Civil Procedure in Section 104(1)(ffa) allowing an appeal to be filed against
an order refusing to grant leave to file a suit, the appeal filed by the
respondents before the Division Bench was certainly competent to be considered
by that Bench. In this case, on an earlier occasion, when one of the suits was
filed under Section 92 CPC, when the founder had executed a deed of appointment
of trustees and certain interim orders were passed in that suit, the said
application was withdrawn without obtaining leave under Order 23 Rule 1 on 19-
9-1978 inasmuch as the newly appointed trustees had resigned their trusteeship
and withdrew their application under Section 92 CPC, the two suits CSs Nos. 352
and 353 of 1978 filed by the appellants were disposed of as having become infructuous.
Later on another Application No. 165 of 1981 had been filed under Section 92
CPC for leave to file a suit for appointing them as additional trustees and for
rendition of accounts. In that proceeding Application No. 879 of 1991 was filed
for permission of court to cross-examine the applicants therein R. Kannan Adityan
and R. Kathiresa Adityan in particular to prove the fact that it was the father
of those petitioners therein who was supplying all documents and materials and
who was conducting the proceedings. Application filed to cross-examine the
applicants was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. On further appeal, the
Division Bench held that it would be in the interest of justice to permit the
appellants to cross- examine the said parties. The matter was carried to this
Court in Special Leave Petition No. 6040 of 1982. This Court dismissed the said
special leave petition noticing that the cross-examination "will be
confined to the question of sanction and principles governing the same",
of course, after noticing entire documents. Again, another Application No. 4738
of 1982 was brought before the court to dismiss Application No. 165 of 1981 under
Order 11 Rule 21 CPC which was, however, dismissed by the learned Single Judge
and the matter was carried in appeal which was also dismissed by the Division
Bench. That matter was brought before this Court. This Court asked the parties
to file the appropriate affidavits in regard thereto and thereafter all papers
were placed before the Court. However, this Court dismissed the special leave
petition.
It is
in this background the learned counsel submitted that the Court ought to have
examined the matter in all necessary details before granting permission under
Section 92 CPC. In R.M. Narayana Chettiar case this Court considered in detail
the history of the legislation and whether court is required to give an
opportunity of being heard to the proposed defendants before granting leave to
institute a suit under Section 92 CPC and stated the law on the matter.
Although as a rule of caution, court should normally give notice to the
defendants before granting leave under the said section to institute a suit,
the court is not bound to do so. If a suit is instituted on the basis of such
leave, granted without notice to the defendants, the suit would not thereby be
rendered bad in law or non-maintainable. Grant of leave cannot be regarded as
defeating or even seriously prejudicing any right of the proposed defendants
because it is always open to them to file an application for revocation of the
leave which can be considered on merits and according to law or even in the
course of suit which may be established that the suit does not fall within the
scope of Section 92 CPC. In that view of the matter, we do not think, there is
any reason for us to interfere with the order made by the High Court."
16. In
R.M. Narayana Chettiar and Anr. v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar and Ors. (1991 (1) SCC
48), it was held as follows:
"9.
We may now discuss the main cases relied on by the learned counsel for the
respective parties. Coming first to the cases relied upon by learned counsel
for the appellants, we find that the first decision cited by him was the
decision of this Court in Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati v. Ramji Tripathi. In
that case it was held that to see whether the suit falls within the ambit of
Section 92, only the allegations in the plaint should be looked into in the
first instance. But, if, after the evidence is taken, it is found that the
breach of trust alleged has not been made out and that the prayer for direction
of the court is vague and is not based on any solid foundation of fact or
reason but is made only with a view to bring the suit under the section then
such a suit must be dismissed. Learned counsel next drew our attention to the
decision of this Court in Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh. Section 92 of the Code
before its amendment in 1976 was applicable to the case. The court cited with
approval the observations of Mukherjea, J. (as he then was), in Mahant Pragdasji
Guru Bhagwandasji v. Patel Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai which runs as follows: (SCR
p. 517) "A suit under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, is a suit of a
special nature which pre-supposes the existence of a public trust of a
religious or charitable character.
Such
suit can proceed only on the allegation that there is a breach of such trust or
that directions of the court are necessary.... It is only when these conditions
are fulfilled that the suit has got to be brought in conformity with the
provision of Section 92, Civil Procedure Code..."
10.
Neither of the aforesaid decisions of this Court deal with the question as to
whether, before granting leave to institute a suit under Section 92, Advocate
General, or later the court, was required to give an opportunity to the
proposed defendants to show cause why leave should not be granted. What learned
counsel for the appellants urged, however, was that these decisions show that
at the time when the Advocate General or the court is required to consider
whether to grant leave to institute a suit as contemplated under Section 92, it
is only the averments in the plaint which have to be examined and hence, the
presence of the defendant is not necessary. We may now consider the High Court
decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants. xx xx xx
16. As
far as the decisions of this Court which have been pointed out to us are
concerned, the question as to whether before granting leave to institute a suit
under Section 92 of the Code, the court is required to give an opportunity of
being heard to the proposed defendants did not arise for determination at all
in those cases. As far as the High Courts are concerned, they have taken
different views on this question. The legislative history of Section 92 of the
Code indicates that one of the objects which led to the enactment of the said
section was to enable two or more persons interested in any trust created for a
public purpose of a charitable or religious nature should be enabled to file a
suit for the reliefs set out in the said section without having to join all the
beneficiaries since it would be highly inconvenient and impracticable for all
the beneficiaries to join in the suit; hence any two or more of them were given
the right to institute a suit for the reliefs mentioned in the said Section 92
of the Code. However, it was considered desirable to prevent a public trust
from being harassed or put to legal expenses by reckless or frivolous suits
being brought against the trustees and hence, a provision was made for leave of
the court having to be obtained before the suit is instituted.
17. A
plain reading of Section 92 of the Code indicates that leave of the court is a
pre- condition or a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against a
public trust for the reliefs set out in the said section; unless all the
beneficiaries join in instituting the suit, if such a suit is instituted
without leave, it would not be maintainable at all. Having in mind the
objectives underlying Section 92 and the language thereof, it appears to us
that, as a rule of caution, the court should normally, unless it is
impracticable or inconvenient to do so, give a notice to the proposed defendants
before granting leave under Section 92 to institute a suit. The defendants
could bring to the notice of the court for instance that the allegations made
in the plaint are frivolous or reckless. Apart from this, they could, in a
given case, point out that the persons who are applying for leave under Section
92 are doing so merely with a view to harass the trust or have such antecedents
that it would be undesirable to grant leave to such persons.
The
desirability of such notice being given to the defendants, however, cannot be
regarded as a statutory requirement to be complied with before leave under
Section 92 can be granted as that would lead to unnecessary delay and, in a
given case, cause considerable loss to the public trust. Such a construction of
the provisions of Section 92 of the Code would render it difficult for the
beneficiaries of a public trust to obtain urgent interim orders from the court
even though the circumstances might warrant such relief being granted.
Keeping
in mind these considerations, in our opinion, although, as a rule of caution,
court should normally give notice to the defendants before granting leave under
the said section to institute a suit, the court is not bound to do so. If a
suit is instituted on the basis of such leave, granted without notice to the
defendants, the suit would not thereby be rendered bad in law or
non-maintainable. The grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating or even
seriously prejudicing any right of the proposed defendants because it is always
open to them to file an application for revocation of the leave which can be
considered on merits and according to law. Xx xx xx
19. In
the result, the appeals are allowed as afore-stated. The impugned judgment of
the High Court is set aside. The trial court is directed to dispose of the
application for revocation of leave on merits and in accordance with law."
17. In
Swami Paramatmanand Saraswati and Anr. v. Ramji Tripathi and Anr. (1974 (2) SCC
695), it was held as follows:
"5.
The main allegations in the plaint were that Brahmanand did not execute the
Will while he was in a sound disposing state of mind, that Respondent 1 had not
the requisite learning in Sanskrit and the Vedas and, therefore, he was not
qualified to be nominated as successor to the Headship of the Math, that he
came into possession of the Math properties and has committed breach of trust
by applying for grant of succession certificate and other acts, that Krishnabodhashram
was duly installed as the Shankaracharya of the Math on June 25, 1953 and that
direction of the Court was necessary for the administration of the Trust
properties. The plaintiffs prayed for the removal of Respondent 1 from the
Headship of the Math, a declaration that Krishnabodhashram was the duly
installed Head of the Math and to appoint him as the Head, and in the
alternative, to appoint any other competent person as the Head of the Math.
They further prayed for vesting of the properties of the Jyotish Math in the
new Head and for rendition of accounts by Respondent 1, etc., and to restrain
him from prosecuting the application for succession certificate and also the
mutation proceedings. xx xx xx
10. A
suit under Section 92 is a suit of a special nature which presupposes the
existence of a public Trust of a religious or charitable character. Such a suit
can proceed only on the allegation that there was a breach of such trust or
that the direction of the court is necessary for the administration of the
trust and the plaintiff must pray for one or more of the reliefs that are
mentioned in the section. It is, therefore, clear that if the allegation of
breach of trust is not substantiated or that the plaintiff had not made out a
case for any direction by the court for proper administration of the trust, the
very foundation of a suit under the section would fail; and, even if all the
other ingredients of a suit under Section 92 are made out, if it is clear that
the plaintiffs are not suing to vindicate the right of the public but are
seeking a declaration of their individual or personal rights or the individual
or personal rights of any other person or persons in whom they are interested,
then the suit would be outside the scope of Section 92 (see N. Shanmukham Chetty
v. V.M. Govinda Chetty, Tirumalai Devasthanams v. Udiavar Krishnayya Shanbhaga,
Sugra Bibi v. Hazi Kummu Mia and Mulla: Civil Procedure Code (13th edn.) Vol.
1, p. 400). A suit whose primary object or purpose is to remedy the
infringement of an individual right or to vindicate a private right does not
fall under the section. It is not every suit claiming the reliefs specified in
the section that can be brought under the section but only the suits which,
besides claiming any of the reliefs, are brought by individuals as
representatives of the public for vindication of public rights, and in deciding
whether a suit falls within Section 92 the court must go beyond the reliefs and
have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiffs are suing and to the
purpose for which the suit was brought. This is the reason why trustees of
public trust of a religious nature are precluded from suing under the section
to vindicate their individual or personal rights. It is quite immaterial
whether the trustees pray for declaration of their personal rights or deny the
personal rights of one or more defendants.
When
the right to the office of a trustee is asserted or denied and relief asked for
on that basis, the suit falls outside Section 92.
11. We
see no reason why the same principle should not apply, if what the plaintiffs
seek to vindicate here is the individual or personal right of Krishnabodhashram
to be installed as Shankaracharya of the Math. Where two or more persons
interested in a Trust bring a suit purporting to be under Section 92, the
question whether the suit is to vindicate the personal or individual right of a
third person or to assert the right of the public must be decided after taking
into account the dominant purpose of the suit in the light of the allegations
in the plaint. If, on the allegations in the plaint, it is clear that the
purpose of the suit was to vindicate the individual right of Krishnabodhashram
to be the Shankaracharya, there is no reason to hold that the suit was brought
to uphold the right of the beneficiaries of the Trust, merely because the suit
was filed by two or more members of the public after obtaining the sanction of
the Advocate-General and claiming one or more of the reliefs specified in the
section. There is no reason to think that whenever a suit is brought by two or
more persons under Section 92, the suit is to vindicate the right of the
public. As we said, it is the object or the purpose of the suit and not the reliefs
that should decide whether it is one for vindicating the right of the public of
the individual right of the plaintiffs or third persons.
xx xx xx
14. It
is, no doubt, true that it is only the allegations in the plaint that should be
looked into in the first instance to see whether the suit falls within the
ambit of Section 92 (See Association of R.D.B. Bagga Singh v. Gurnam Singh, Sohan
Singh v. Achhar Singh and Radha Krishna v. Lachhmi Narain. But, if after
evidence is taken, it is found that the breach of trust alleged has not been
made out and that the prayer for direction of the court is vague and is not
based on any solid foundation in facts or reason but is made only with a view
to bring the suit under the section, then a suit purporting to be brought under
Section 92 must be dismissed. This was one of the grounds relied on by the High
Court for holding that the suit was not maintainable under Section 92."
18.
Prior to legislative change made by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 104 of 1976 the expression used was "consent in writing of the
Advocate-General". This expression has been substituted by the words
"leave of the Court". Sub-Section (3) has also been inserted by the
Amendment Act. The object of Section 92 CPC is to protect the public trust of a
charitable and religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits
filed against them. Public trusts for charitable and religious purpose are run
for the benefit of the public. No individual should take benefit from them. If
the persons in management of the trusts are subjected to multiplicity of legal
proceedings, funds which are to be used for charitable or religious purposes
would be wasted on litigation. The harassment might dissuade respectable and
honest people from becoming trustees of pubic trusts. Thus, there is need for
scrutiny. In the suit against public trusts, if on analysis of the averments
contained in the plaint it transpires that the primary object behind the suit
was the vindication of individual or personal rights of some persons an action
under the provision does not lie. As noted in Swami Parmatmanand's case (supra)
a suit under Section 92 CPC is a suit of special nature, which pre- supposes
the existence of a public trust of religious or charitable character. When the
plaintiffs do not sue to vindicate the right of the public but seek a
declaration of their individual or personal rights or the individual or
personal rights of any other persons or persons in whom they are interested,
Section 92 has no application.
19. In
Swamy Parmatmanand's case (supra) it was held that it is only the allegations
in the plaint that should be looked into in the first instance to see whether
the suit falls within the ambit of Section 92. But if after evidence is taken
it is found that the breach of trust alleged has not been made out and that the
prayer for direction of the Court is vague and is not based on any solid
foundation in fact or reason but is made only with a view to bringing the suit
under the Section then suit purporting to be brought under Section 92 must be
dismissed.
20. In
Chettiar's case (supra) it was held that normally notice should be given before
deciding the question as to whether leave is to be granted.
21. If
in a given case notice has not been given and leave has been granted, it is
open to the Court to deal with an application for revocation and pass necessary
orders.
22. One
of the factual aspects which needs to be highlighted is that the allegations
which have been made against respondents 2, 3 and 10 are referable to a
decision taken by the Board, though may be by majority. The fundamental
question that arises is whether allegations against three of them would be
sufficient to taint the Board's decision. As was observed by this Court in Swamy
Parmatmanand's case, (supra) to gauge whether the suit was for vindicating
public rights, the Court has to go beyond the relief and to focus on the
purpose for which the suit is filed. To put it differently, it is the object or
the purpose for filing the suit and not essentially the relief which is of
paramount importance. There cannot be any hard and fast rule to find out
whether the real purpose of the suit was vindicating public right or the object
was vindication of some personal rights. For this purpose the focus has to be
on personal grievances.
23. On
a close reading of the plaint averments, it is clear that though the color of legitimacy
was sought to be given by projecting as if the suit was for vindicating public
rights the emphasis was on certain purely private and personal disputes.
24. In
Sugra Bibi v. Hazi Kummu Mia (AIR 1969 SC 884) it was held that the mere fact
that the suit relates to public trust of religious or charitable nature and the
reliefs claimed fall within some of the clauses of sub-Section (1) of Section
92 would not by itself attract the operation of the Section, unless the suit is
of a representative character instituted in the interest of the public and not
merely for vindication or the individual or personal rights of the plaintiffs.
25. To
put it differently, it is not every suit claiming reliefs specified in Section
92 that can be brought under the Section; but only the suits which besides
claiming any of the reliefs are brought by individuals as representatives of
the public for vindication of public rights. As a decisive factor the Court has
to go beyond the relief and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiff
has sued and the purpose for which the suit was brought. The Courts have to be
careful to eliminate the possibility of a suit being laid against public trusts
under Section 92 by persons whose activities were not for protection of the interests
of the public trusts. In that view of the matter the High Court was certainly
wrong in holding that the grant of leave was legal and proper. The impugned
order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed but without any
order as to costs.
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