Kasilingam
Vs. Abharanji Chettiar [2008] Insc 238 (21 February 2008)
A.K.Mathur
& Altamas Kabir
O R D
E R
CIVIL
APPEAL NOS. 85-86 OF 2002
1.
These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment and order
dated 13.11.2000 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras
in respondent's C.R.P Nos. 1280/1998 and 1281/1998 whereby the learned Single
Judge has reversed the order passed by the First Appellate Court and maintained
the judgment and decree granted by the Trial Court.
2. Brief
facts which are necessary for the disposal of these appeals are that a suit was
filed by the landlord-respondent herein for eviction of the tenant-appellant
herein from the premises bearing Door No. 188 (Old No. 112) at Jawaharlal Nehru
Street, Pondicherry on the ground that the premises is very old and in a
dilapidated condition requiring demolition and that he has taken steps to get
permission and approval from the competent authority for demolition and
reconstruction. He filed another suit on the ground that the tenant-appellant
had ceased to occupy the demised premises under Section 10(2)(vi) of the Pondicherry
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969 (hereinafter for short the 'Act').
The Trial Court decreed both the suits filed by the landlord-respondent and
granted decree of eviction against the tenant-appellant herein.
Aggrieved
against both the said judgments and decrees of the Trial Court, the appellant
herein preferred two separate appeals before the Appellate Authority. The
Appellate Authority reversed both the judgments and decrees passed by the Trial
Court. Aggrieved against the orders passed by the First Appellate Court, the
landlord-respondent herein preferred two revision petitions before the High
Court of Madras wherein a learned Single Judge has reversed the orders passed
by the Appellate Authority and maintained the judgment and decree of the Trial
Court. Hence, the present appeals by special leave have been filed by the
tenant-appellant.
3.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that under Section 25 of the Act a
revision petition is maintainable before the High Court and in revision the
High Court could not have reversed the finding of fact recorded by the First
Appellate Court. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on a
decision of this Court in the case of
4. We
have heard counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgments and
orders. It is true that Section 25 of the Act is almost pari materia with the
Tamil Nadu (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter for short the
"Tamil Nadu Act").
5.
Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Act came up for consideration before this Court in
the case of P.M. Punnoose (supra) where this Court held that the revisional
jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is not as narrow as one under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure; nevertheless a finding of fact
arrived at by the Appellate Authority cannot be lightly interfered with by the
High Court acting like a court of appeal and reappreciating the evidence. Their
Lordships in para 17 observed as under:- "It is true that the revisional
jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is not as narrow as one under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure; nevertheless a finding of fact
arrived at by the Appellate Authority cannot be lightly interfered with by the
High Court acting like a court of appeal and reappreciating the evidence."
6. The
provision of Section 25 of the Act is almost pari materia with the Tamil Nadu
Act and we are of the opinion that the approach of the High Court is correct.
The scope of Section 25 is not as narrow as Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The expression used in Section 25 of the Act is that the High Court
can "examine the record of the appellate authority, to satisfy itself as
to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety
of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case, it appears to the
High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled,
reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly."
Therefore,
the scope of Section 25 of the Act is very wide as the High Court can under
this provision examine the record of the appellate authority as to the
regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any
decision or order passed therein and can modify, annul, reverse or remit for
reconsideration. This expression in the Act has a wide import and the very fact
that the High Court can examine the correctness, legality or propriety of the
order necessarily goes to show that the High Court has power to examine the
matter with reference to facts also. The High Court in exercise of power under
Section 25 of the act has found that the building is about 60 years old and it
has developed cracks in it. Therefore, the High Court has rightly interfered
with the finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Authority and affirmed the
judgment and decree of eviction granted by the Trial Court in the suit.
7. In
these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the High Court has under
Section 25 of the Act rightly interfered with the finding of fact recorded by
the Appellate Authority. Consequently, these appeals fail and are dismissed as
such.
8.
Since, we have upheld the judgment and order of the High Court on the ground of
Section 25 of the Act, we think no useful purpose will be served by going into
another issue where the decree of eviction was granted on the ground that the
appellant ceased to occupy the premises in terms of Section 10(2)(vi).
9.
Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we grant to the
tenant- appellant time till 31st October, 2008 to vacate the suit premises subject to his filing usual undertaking
before this Court within a period of four weeks from today. The appellant shall
continue to pay the rent month by month to the respondent till 31st October, 2008 and clear all arrears of rent upto
date.
Appeals
dismissed. No order as to costs.
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