Mantoo Sarkar Vs.
Oriental Insurance Co., Ltd.& Ors. [2008] INSC 2181 (16 December 2008)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7318 OF 2007 (Arising
out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 18201 of 2007} Mantoo Sarkar .....
Appellant Versus Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and others .....
Respondents
S.B. SINHA, J.
1.
Leave
granted.
2.
Interpretation
and/or application of Section 166 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as `the Act' for the sake of brevity) in regard to
territorial jurisdiction of a Tribunal is the question involved herein.
The said question
arises in the following factual matrix.
3.
Appellant
had been travelling as a passenger in a bus, bearing registration
No.MP-04-7915, belonging to Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation. It met
with an accident in the town of Faridpur in the District of Uttar Pradesh
having collided with truck bearing No.HR-38-E-5554.
Appellant suffered
grievous injuries. A First Information Report was lodged against the driver of
the said truck under Sections 279, 338 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code.
Indisputably the said
truck belonged to respondent No.2 and was registered at Faridabad. It was
insured with respondent No.1-company.
Appellant was working
as a skilled migrant seasonal agricultural labourer.
He had been earning
his livelihood at the relevant time by performing his job as a labourer in the
work of extracting sand gravel from a river named `Hola River' near Beri Pada,
Lalkuan, Distt. Nainital, Uttaranchal. He is said to have been living for a
long time at Pilibhit in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Indisputably, after he
remained in the district Hospital at Bareilly as an indoor patient upto 28th
July, 2003, he was shifted to Prabhakar Hospital in Pilibhit. He underwent
several operations.
4.
Appellant
filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nainital (for
short `the Tribunal') claiming a sum of Rs.23,90,000/- (Rupees twenty three
lakh ninety thousand only) alongwith interest @ 18% per annum from the date of
the accident till the date of actual payment.
5.
Respondent
No.1 has a branch office at Nainital.
The conductor of the
bus and the driver of the truck examined themselves before the Tribunal as
witnesses. No oral evidence was, however, adduced on behalf of the first
respondent. One of the questions which, only the first respondent raised and no
other, was lack of territorial jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal.
The learned Tribunal
inter alia on the premise that the jurisdiction conferred on it, having regard
to sub-section (2) of Section 166 of the Act is wide and the insurance company
having a branch office at Nainital, it had territorial jurisdiction to
determine the claim petition. It made an Award of 3
Rs.2,40,000/ (Rupees two lakh forty thousand only) in favour of the claimant.
6.
The
High Court, however, on an appeal preferred thereagaisnt by the first
respondent, opined - "It is a well settled position of law that the claim
petition can only be entertained and filed before a court having the
territorial jurisdiction to hear the matter. The claimant cannot take the
matter to different State on the pretext that his case would be disposed of
expeditiously in that State or District without having the territorial
jurisdiction.
The learned counsel
for the claimants submitted that in case the Court comes to the conclusion that
the Tribunal, Nainital had got no territorial jurisdiction to dispose of the
matter, the claimants may be given liberty to file a fresh claim petition
before the competent Tribunal."
On the basis of the
said finding it was held that Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nainital had no
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said claim petition.
7.
Mr.
Shailendra Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would
contend that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned
judgment in so far as it failed to take into consideration the evidence of the
appellant (PW-1) wherein he clearly stated that he had been working at Beri
Pada, Lal Kuan in the District of Nainital, although he had not given his
Lalkuan's address in his claim petition having been doing his work as a
labourer. The evidence of the said witness having been accepted by the learned
Tribunal, the High Court should not have interfered therewith.
8.
Mr.
Ashish Wad, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, would
contend that the accident having taken place at Bareilly, the bus belonging to
Gwalior depot of the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, the office of
the owner of the truck being at Gurgaon, office of the insurance company being
at Delhi, the Tribunal at Nainital did not have any territorial jurisdiction.
9.
Section
166(2) of the Act reads as under :- "166 - Application for compensation
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the
claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in
which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits
of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in 5
such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed:
Provided that where
no claim for compensation under section 140 is made in such application, the
application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately
before the signature of the applicant."
10.
The
said Act is a special statute. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal having regard
to the terminologies used therein must be held to be wider than the civil
court.
A claimant has a wide
option. Residence of the claimant also determines jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
11.
What
would be a residence of a person would, however, depend upon the fact situation
obtaining in each case.
12.
Appellant
had been a resident of Pilibhit. It is in the State of Uttar Pradesh. He being
a migrant labourer accepts job wherever he gets and resides there. He,
admittedly, had been working in Nanital district and residing there during the
period of accident. The fact that he was thus a resident of Nainital in the
State of Uttaranchal is neither denied nor disputed.
13.
The
High Court unfortunately in its judgment did not assign sufficient or cogent
reason as to why the Tribunal committed any illegality in holding that he had
the jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition.
14.
No
doubt the Tribunal must exercise jurisdiction having regard to the ingredients
laid down under sub-section (2) of Section 166 of the Act. We are not unmindful
of the fact that in terms of Section 169 of the Act, the Tribunal, subject to
any rules, may follow a summary procedure and the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure under the Act has a limited application but in terms of the
rules `save and except' any specific provision made in that behalf, the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply. Even otherwise the
principles laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure may be held to be
applicable in a case of this nature.
15.
We
say so because ordinarily an appellate court shall not, having regard to the
provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, entertain an appeal on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction on the part of the court below unless he has been prejudiced
thereby. Other respondents did not raise any question of jurisdiction. Although
one witness each had been examined on behalf of the truck owner and owner of
the bus, neither a question of lack of territorial jurisdiction was raised nor
the question of any prejudice had been argued.
It is only the first
respondent who raised the question of territorial jurisdiction. However, no
prejudice was caused to the appellant by the claim petition being tried by the
MACT at Nainital.
16.
The
liability of the insurance company arises for the purpose of reimbursement of
the amount of compensation found to be payable by the owner of the vehicle
insured. It is only in exceptional cases and as provided for under Section 170
of the Act, the insurance company can defend a claim petition. Only on limited
grounds it may be permitted to question the quantum of compensation.
17.
The
Tribunal is a court subordinate to the High Court. An appeal against the
Tribunal lies before the High Court. The High Court, while exercising its
appellate power, would follow the provisions contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure or akin thereto. In view of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, it was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the appellate
court to pose unto itself the right question, viz., whether the first
respondent has been able to show sufferance of any prejudice. If it has not
suffered any prejudice or otherwise no failure of justice had occurred, the
High Court should not have entertained the appeal on that ground alone.
18.
We,
however, while taking that factor into consideration must place on record that
we are not oblivious of the fact that a decision rendered without jurisdiction
would be coram non juris. Objection in regard to jurisdiction may be taken at
any stage. ( See Chief Engineer, Hydel Project v. Ravinder Nath , [ (2008) 2
SCC 350 ] ) wherein inter alia the decision of this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman
Paswan, [AIR 1954 SC 340] was followed, stating:
"26. The Court
also relied upon the decision in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Pawan [AIR 1954 SC 340]
and quoted (in Harshad Chiman Lal case {[(2005) 7 SCC 791], SCC pp. 804-805,
para 33} therefrom: {Kiran Singh case (supra), AIR p.342, para6 `6. ...It is a
fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without
jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and
wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, 9 even at the stage of
execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction,
...strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a
defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties."
Though in the
aforementioned decision these observations were made since the defendants
before raising the objection to the territorial jurisdiction had admitted that
the court had the jurisdiction, the force of this decision cannot be ignored
and it has to be held that such a decree would continue to be a nullity."
19.
A
distinction, however, must be made between a jurisdiction with regard to
subject matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction.
Whereas in the case falling within the former category the judgment would be a
nullity, in the latter it would not be. It is not a case where the Tribunal had
no jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter of claim. As a matter of fact
the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. If the Tribunal had
the jurisdiction to entertain a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, in
our opinion, the Court should not have, in absence of any finding of sufferance
of any prejudice on the part of the first respondent, entertained the appeal.
10 In Bikash Bhushan
Ghosh v. Novartis India Ltd., [ (2007) 5 SCC 591], this Court has held :
"17. There is
another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. If the provisions
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure are given effect to, even if the Third
Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal had no jurisdiction, in view of the provisions
contained in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless the respondent
suffered any prejudice, they could not have questioned the jurisdiction of the
court. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan this Court held: (AIR p. 342, paras 6-7)
`6. ... If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on
the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no
doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was `coram non judice' and that its
judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of
Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position.
7. Section 11 enacts
that notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure an
objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over a suit or appeal had
exercised it by reason of overvaluation or undervaluation, should not be
entertained by an appellate court, except as provided in the section. Then
follow provisions as to when the objections could be entertained, and how they
are to be dealt with. The drafting of the section has come in--and
deservedly--for considerable criticism; but amidst much that is obscure and
confused, there is one principle which stands out clear and conspicuous. It is
that a decree passed by a court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a
suit or appeal but for overvaluation or undervaluation, is not to be treated
as, what it would be but for the section, null and void, and that an objection
to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation, should be dealt with
under that section and not otherwise.
The reference to
Section 578, now Section 99 CPC, in the opening words of the section is
significant. That section, while providing that no decree shall be reversed or
varied in appeal on account of the defects mentioned therein when they do not
affect the merits of the case, excepts from its operation defects of
jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits,
when the courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of
overvaluation or undervaluation. It is with a view to avoid this result that
Section 11 was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a
court based on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an
appellate court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the
section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection
to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised
otherwise than in accordance with it.
With reference to
objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil
Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be 12
allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless there was a consequent
failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section
11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction.
The policy underlying
Sections 21 and 99 CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same,
namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment
rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds,
unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature
has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as
technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has
been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore,
that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated
as a nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.'
"
Furthermore in
determining as to whether a part of cause of action has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court vis-`-vis an appellate court a large
number of factors may have to be taken in consideration. [See Ambica Industries
v. CCE, (2007) 6 SCC 769].
We cannot also lose
sight of the fact that the appellant herein was a labourer. The justness or
otherwise of the amount of compensation has not been disputed before us. If the
High Court judgment is to be complied with, appellant would again have to
initiate another proceeding either at Bareilly or Gurgaon or at Delhi or at
Jabalpur. The same evidence would have to be rendered once again. The question
of fact which was required to be determined in the proceeding before the
Tribunal, namely whether the driver of the truck or the driver of the bus had
been driving their respective vehicles rashly and negligently would have to be
determined afresh. The factual finding recorded in this case is that the driver
of the truck was driving the truck rashly and negligently. In our opinion, in a
case of this nature, we may even exercise our extra ordinary jurisdiction under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In New India Insurance Company v.
Darshana Devi and others, [(2008) 7 SCC 416], this Court held:
"20. Having said
so, we must take notice of the fact that the deceased Baldev Singh was labourer.
The Tribunal has
found that besides being a labourer, he also used to deal in Safeda wood. He
was the owner of the 'Safeda' wood which was being transported to the market
for its sale. The first respondent, Darshana Devi, in her deposition, stated that
the deceased used to purchase wood from the State of Himachal Pradesh on
contract basis. Only Gurdial Singh and Ravinder Singh were accompanying him as
labourer. His income was assessed only at Rs. 2,400 per month."
In this view of the
matter, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India. Even in 14 Brij Mohan this Court held: (SCC p. 64, paras 13- 14)
"13. However, Respondent 1 is a poor labourer.
He had suffered
grievous injuries. He had become disabled to a great extent. The amount of
compensation awarded in his favour appears to be on a lower side. In the
aforementioned situation, although we reject the other contentions of Ms Indu
Malhotra, we are inclined to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to direct that the award may be
satisfied by the appellant but it would be entitled to realise the same from
the owner of the tractor and the trolley wherefor it would not be necessary for
it to initiate any separate proceedings for recovery of the amount as provided
for under the Motor Vehicles Act.
14. It is well
settled that in a situation of this nature this Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India read with Article
136 thereof can issue suit directions for doing complete justice to the
parties."
20.
Reliance,
however, has been placed on a decision of this Court in State of Punjab v.
Rajesh Syal, [ (2002) 8 SCC 158 ], to contend that this Court should not
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
Whether the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution
shall be exercised or not would depend upon the fact of the each matter. Law in
this case does not come in the way of exercise of such jurisdiction.
21.
For
the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is
set aside accordingly and the order of the Tribunal is restored. The appeal is
allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.10,000/-.
................................J.
[ S.B. Sinha ]
................................J.
Back
Pages: 1 2 3