U.P.Pollution Control
Board Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Modi & ANR. [2008] INSC 2160 (12 December 2008)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2019 OF 2008
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1660 of 2005) U.P. Pollution Control Board
.... Appellant (s) Versus Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi & Anr. ....
Respondent(s)
P. Sathasivam, J.
1.
Leave
granted.
2.
This
appeal is directed against the order dated 29.11.2004 passed in Crl. Misc. Case
No. 1347 of 2001 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
quashing the Complaint Case No. 44 of 1988 filed by the U.P. Pollution Control
Board, Lucknow through its officers against M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. Raebareli and
12 others under Section 44 of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution)
Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") pending in the Court
of Special Judicial Magistrate (Pollution), Lucknow.
3.
Background
facts, in a nutshell, are as follows:
The State Board for
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution was constituted on 03.02.1975 by the
Government of U.P. and it has been named as - U.P. Pollution Control Board
(hereinafter referred to as "the Board") which is the appellant
herein vide notification No. 2179/9-2-100-74 dated 13.07.1982. On the
application submitted by M/s Modi Carpets Ltd., Raebareli, seeking consent to
discharge effluent, the appellant-Board granted conditional consent to
discharge their trade effluent in the river Sai. Since the conditions of
consent were not being complied with by M/s Modi Carpets Ltd., a letter dated
30.4.1983 was sent by the appellant-Board to M/s Modi Carpets Ltd., Raebareli
informing that non- compliance of the consent conditions is an offence under
Section 44 of the Act. On 07.06.1983, the inspection of unit of M/s Modi
Carpets Ltd. was done by the officers of the Board wherein it was found that
polluted trade effluent was being discharged into the river Sai through drain
without any treatment and construction of effluent treatment plant was yet to
be started. On 19.01.1984, the Board again sent a letter to M/s Modi Carpets
Ltd. that conditions of the consent order dated 22.1.1983 were not complied
with. Again it was reiterated that non-compliance of the conditions of consent
would be an offence under Section 44 of the Act. On 13.09.1984, the unit was
again inspected by the officers of the Board and it was found that effluent was
being discharged without any treatment. For this, Modi Carpets Ltd. sent a
reply dated 18.10.1984 to the appellant-Board giving clarifications for not
complying with the consent conditions and the same was considered and rejected
by the Board on 31.10.1984 on the ground that the unit was not complying with
the prescribed standards, consent conditions and also the application was
incomplete in various aspects.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Since
M/s Modi Carpets Ltd. was not complying with the provisions of the Act and
there was violation of Sections 25 & 26 of the Act, a complaint under
Section 44 was filed by the Board through its Assistant Environmental Engineer
against respondent No.1 as well as other persons namely, Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, Managing Director, Joint Managing Director, Directors, General
Manager, Commercial Manager and Company Secretary of M/s Modi Carpets Ltd.
before the C.J.M., Raebareli. It was specifically mentioned in the complaint
that the aforesaid persons are responsible for the conduct of the business of
the company and for their monetary benefits continued to discharge noxious and
polluting trade effluent of the company without complying with the conditions
of consent and mandatory provisions of law. A petition under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code was filed before the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad being Criminal Misc. Petition No. 14119 of 1985 by M/s Modi Carpets
Ltd. & Ors. for quashing the aforesaid complaint and also for other
reliefs. Vide order dated 5.11.1985, the High Court stayed further proceedings
in the complaint case. On the objection of the Board that the Principal Bench
at Allahabad had no territorial jurisdiction to decide the petition, the first
respondent herein filed a petition under Section 482 of the Crl.P.C. before
Lucknow Bench of the High Court being Crl. Misc. Case No. 1347 of 2001. In the
said petition, it was alleged that the first respondent, Dr. Bhupendra Kumar
Modi, Joint Managing Director was not concerned with day-to-day business of the
company and cannot be prosecuted for the offence committed by the Company,
hence, it was prayed that Complaint Case No. 44 of 1988 filed by the
appellant-Board be quashed.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
5)
The appellant-Board filed a counter affidavit before the High Court wherein it
was stated that the complaint could not be quashed at the initial stage and
whether a person is responsible for conduct of day-to-day business of the
Company or not, is a question which has to be decided by evidence. In any event
it was stated that the complaint discloses materials to proceed further.
6.
6)
By impugned order dated 29.11.2004, the High Court quashed the complaint so far
as it related to respondent No.1 on the main ground that there was no material
on record to show that respondent No.1 was, at the relevant time, incharge and
responsible to the company for conduct of its business.
Aggrieved by the said
judgment of the Lucknow Bench, the appellant-Board has filed the above appeal
by way of special leave.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Heard
Mr. Rakesh K. Khanna, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant-Board
and Mr. L.N. Rao, learned senior counsel, appearing for the 1st respondent.
8.
The
only point for consideration in this appeal is whether the complaint of U.P.
Pollution Control Board discloses any material against the first respondent
i.e., Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi, Joint Managing Director, particularly, his
control over the decision making process of the Company and whether the High
Court was justified in quashing the same in so far as Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi
in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
9.
The
High Court while accepting the case of Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi perused the complaint
of the Board.
According to it,
nowhere it is specifically stated in the complaint and there is also no
material on record to show that Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi was, at the relevant
time, in- charge and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the
business. The High Court also concluded that there was no specific allegation
that at the relevant time, respondent No.1 was in-charge of the Company or was
looking after the day-to- day affairs of the company or that the offence has
been committed with his consent or connivance. By arriving such conclusion the
High Court quashed the prosecution in so far as the first respondent herein is
concerned. In the same order, the High Court made it clear that the prosecution
is free to proceed against other persons mentioned in the complaint.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
In
order to answer the questions raised, we verified the complaint (Annexure - 8)
of the Board laid under Section 44 of the Act. Section 25 (1) of the Act makes
it mandatory for every new industry to obtain consent of the "Board"
for bringing into use any new or altered outlet for the discharge of its trade
effluent into the stream or well or on land as defined in Section 2 of the Act
read with its amending Act [Act No. 44 of 1978]. The Company and all the
persons in-charge of the day- to-day affairs are required to abide by the
mandatory provisions for operating their industrial establishment. The
complaint further shows that the Company had applied for the grant of consent
of the Board for the discharge of its trade effluent on 29.09.1982 which was
received by the Board on 04.10.1982 and after considering all aspects the
conditional consent order No. 83/170 dated 22.01.1983 was issued in favour of
the Company. According to the Complainant, the Company had not sent the report
for proper compliance of the condition which was imposed. Accordingly, the site
of the Company at Raebareli had been inspected by the officers of the Board on
07.06.1983 and on 13.09.1984 in the presence of representatives of the Company.
According to the Board, the accused persons intentionally failed to comply with
the conditions of consent order dated 22.01.1983 and to construct proper
effluent treatment plant and discharging without consent of the Board. This has
been asserted in para 15 of the complaint. In para 16, it is stated that the
accused persons, namely, 2-13 are Chairman, Managing Director/Joint Managing
Director, Directors, Secretaries and Managers of M/s Modi Carpets Ltd.,
Raebareli, who are responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company
and also for not complying the conditions and for not constructing proper plant
for the treatment of their highly polluting trade effluent so as to conform to
the standard laid down by the Board. In the same paragraph, it is further asserted
that the accused persons are deliberately avoiding the provisions of Section 25
of the Act for which they are punishable under Section 44 read with Section 47
of the Act.
In para 17 of the
complaint, it is specifically stated that at the time of commission of offence
all the persons were in-charge of the business of the Company and responsible
for the day-to- day working of the Company and also for conducting of the
business of the Company and continuous commissioning of offence under Section
44 of the Act and the construction of effluent treatment plant can be taken up
only when these senior authorities resolved to do so. It is further stated that
the offence mentioned in the complaint is being continuously committed against
the society at large, animals and aquatic life in particular because of their
personal monetary gains. In para 21, it is specifically stated that the
Chairman, Directors and Secretaries are the brain and nerve centre of Modi
Carpets and conducting the business of the Company which has been discharging
its trade effluents into stream for which they are to be punished under Section
44 read with Section 47 of the Act. In para 22, it is asserted that under the
provisions of Section 47 of the Act where an offence has been committed by a Company
every person, who at the time of commission of the offence was in-charge of and
responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business shall be deemed to
be guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded and punished accordingly.
11.
Apart
from the above specific averments, the Board has also placed a letter dated
22.01.1983 granting conditional consent to respondent No.1, copy of the
inspection reports, various letters/communications and their reply as Annexures
P-1 to P-7.
12.
Among
the various provisions of the Act, we are more concerned about Section 47 which
speaks about offences by companies which reads thus:
"47. Offences by
companies.- (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a
company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge
of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of, the business of the
company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing
contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any
punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed
without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the
commission of such offence.
(2) Notwithstanding
anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been
committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed
with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the
part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such
director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty
of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.- For the
purposes of this section,- (a) "company" means any body corporate,
and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b)
"director" in relation to a firm means a partner in the firm."
Section 25 speaks
about restrictions on new outlets and new discharges and Section 26 relates to
provision regarding existing discharge of sewage or trade effluent. Section 44
1 speaks about penalty for contravention of Section 25 or Section 26.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
It
is not in dispute that the first respondent before letting out trade effluent
into a stream or a river has to satisfy certain conditions in terms of the
provisions of the Act and the order of the authorities concerned. It is also
not in dispute that without a consent order by the Board the Company cannot let
out untreated effluent into a land or stream or river. Though a consent order
was issued by the Board it has been specifically stated in the complaint that
those conditions have not been fulfilled by the Company. In those circumstances,
in the interest of the public health, the appellant-Board through its officers
laid a complaint against the persons, who are in charge of the day-to-day
affairs and in the decision making process. There is no need to place all the
materials at the threshold. However, on perusal of the complaint and the
relevant materials in the form of documents, the learned Special Judicial
Magistrate (Pollution) entertained the same and issued summons to the named
persons in the complaint.
1 Inasmuch as the High
Court quashed the complaint against the first respondent herein who is a Joint
Managing Director of the Company, we are concerned about the
averments/allegations against him in respect of his concern in the day-to-day
affairs and in the decision making process. We have already referred to the
relevant averments/materials adverted to in the complaint. Before going into
the reasoning and conclusion of the High Court for quashing the complaint
against the first respondent herein, let us consider various decisions of this
Court with reference to the very same provisions, namely, Sections 44 and 47 of
the Act as well as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of
Cr.PC.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
It
is settled legal position that at the stage of issuing process, the Magistrate
is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence
led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether
there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. In Smt.
Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 736, this
1 Court has held that it is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a
detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. It was further held
that whether a process should be issued, the Magistrate can take into
consideration improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the
evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations. The Magistrate
has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to
be judicially exercised by him. It was further held that once the Magistrate
has exercised his discretion, it is not for the High Court or even this Court
to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine their
case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the
complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused.
This Court has held
that in the following cases, an order of the Magistrate issuing process against
the accused can be quashed:
"(1) where the
allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded
in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case
against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential
ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;
1 4 (2) where the
allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable
so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused;
(3) where the
discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and
arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are
wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from
fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint
by legally competent authority and the like."
No doubt the grounds
mentioned above are purely illustrative and it provides only guidelines to
indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash the proceedings. Though
argument was advanced based on the decision in State of Karnataka vs. Pratap
Chand and Others, (1981) 2 SCC 335, it was decided in a case relating to
conviction under Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and not quashing of a complaint
based merely on a petition or an affidavit. Hence, the said decision is not
applicable to the case on hand.
15.
Though
reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation of
Delhi vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others, (1983) 1 SCC 1, a perusal of the said
decision makes it clear that the complaint in that case was vague as 1 regards
the Directors and the Court has concluded that no offence revealed against
them, hence the High Court was justified in quashing the proceedings against
the Directors.
16.
The
next decision pressed into service by the first respondent is State of Haryana
vs. Brij Lal Mittal and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 343. In the said decision, after
finding that except a bald statement in the complaint that the respondents
therein were Directors of the manufacturers, there is no other allegation to
indicate, even prima facie, that they were in charge of the Company and also
responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business. This Court agreed
with the High Court in quashing the prosecution against the three Directors.
17.
Reliance
was also placed on the decision in Nalin Thakor and Others vs. State of Gujarat
and Others, (2003) 12 SCC 461. This Court, after finding that there is no
allegation as regards the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 47 and the
learned Judicial Magistrate issued 1 summons without application of mind,
allowed the appeal and set aside the summons issued against the appellants
therein.
18.
In
the earlier part of our order, we have extensively adverted to the specific
averments/assertions in the complaint of the Board with reference to all the
officers i.e. named persons in the complaint including the first respondent who
is Joint Managing Director of the Company. In those circumstances, we are of
the view that the above-mentioned decisions relied on by the first respondent
are not helpful to the stand taken by him. It is useful to refer the decision
in the case of U.P. Pollution Control Board vs Messrs Modi Distillery and
Others, (1987) 3 SCC 684. The said case, by special leave, was directed against
the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad dated 16.05.1984 setting
aside, in its revisional jurisdiction, order of the CJM, Ghaziabad dated
03.11.1983 directing issue of process against the respondents therein on a
complaint filed by the appellant Pollution Control Board under Section 44 of
Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. The issue involved
therein was whether the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Managing 1 Director and
Members of the Board of Directors of M/s Modi Industries Limited, the company
owning the industrial unit called M/s Modi Distillery could be proceeded
against on a complaint against the said industrial unit. Learned Single Judge
of the High Court found that there was no sufficient ground against the
respondent inasmuch as the allegations made in the complaint do not constitute
an offence punishable under Section 44 for the admitted contravention of
Sections 25(1) and 26 read with Section 47 of the Act. The facts narrated above
clearly show that the same is identical to the case on hand. This Court taking
note of the provisions particularly, Sections 25 (1) (2) and 26 as well as
Sections 44 and 47 and the averments in the complaint after finding that prima
facie materials are available and all the issues to be dealt with by the
Judicial Magistrate at the time of trial, set aside the order of the High Court
interfering with the order of CJM directing issue of process to the respondents
and directed the learned Magistrate to proceed with the trial in accordance
with law. No doubt, it is true that the learned Single Judge of the High Court
quashed the proceedings on 1 the ground that there could be no vicarious
liability saddled on the Chairman, Vice-chairman, Managing Director and other
members of the Board of Directors of the Company under Section 47 of the Act
unless there was a prosecution of the Company i.e. M/s Modi Industries Ltd. In
the case on hand, it is not in dispute that the Company has been shown as first
accused in the complaint apart from including Chairman, Managing Director, Jt.
Managing Director, General Manager, Directors, General Manager, Commercial
Manager and Company Secretary as well as their specific role in the day-to-day
affairs and decision making process.
19.
U.P.
Pollution Control Board vs. Mohan Meakins Ltd. and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 745 is
a case filed by the very same appellant- U.P. Pollution Control Board and in
similar circumstances this Court interfered with the order of the High Court as
well as the order of the Sessions Court quashing the similar complaint. In the
said case, the Board initiated proceedings for prosecuting Mohan Meakins Ltd
and its Directors for discharging trade effluents in the river Gomti which is a
tributary of the Ganga. The learned trial Judge on 1 satisfying the averments
in the complaint of the Board issued process against the accused at the first
instance. The respondents/Company and its Directors desired the trial Court to
discharge them without even making their first appearance in the Court. When
the attempt made for that failed, they moved for exemption from appearance in
the Court. In the meanwhile, the Sessions Judge, Lucknow entertained a revision
moved by the accused against the order issuing process to them and quashed it
on the erroneous ground that the Magistrate did not pass a speaking order for
issuing such summons. The CJM before whom the complaint was filed thereafter
passed a detailed order on 25.04.1984 and again issued process to the accused.
The order was again challenged by the accused in revision before the Sessions
Court and the same Sessions Judge again quashed it by order dated 25.08.1984.
The Board moved before the High Court in a revision against the said order.
Though the revision was moved in 1984 itself it took 15 years for the High
Court to dismiss the revision petition as per the order passed by a learned
Single Judge on 27.07.1999. Questioning the same, 2 0 the Board filed special
leave petition before this Court and ultimately leave was granted by this
Court. It is useful to refer the facts and other details stated in the
complaint as noted by this Court. Thomas, J. (as he then was) speaking for the
Bench in paras 10 and 11 observed thus:-
10. ... ... ... In
the complaint filed by the appellant before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the
Company (M/s Mohan Meakins Ltd.) has been arrayed as the first accused and the
other persons who were arrayed as Accused 2 to 10 were described as the
Directors of the said Company. The 11th person arrayed in the complaint as
accused is described as the Manager of the Company. The averments in the
complaint show that the Distillery Unit of the Company at Daliganj, Lucknow,
has been discharging noxious trade effluents into River Gomti and causing
continuous pollution of the river. It was further averred in the complaint that
on 19-9-1982, samples of trade effluents were collected by the officers
empowered in this behalf, from the drain "just outside the plant inside
the factory", and from the irrigation plant out of which the effluents
were pumped into the river.
When the samples were
analysed in the Industrial Toxicology Research Centre, Lucknow, it was revealed
that the quality of effluents was beyond the standard laid down for the
purpose. Therefore, it is alleged that the Company has violated Section 24 of
the Act* and thereby the Company is guilty of the offence under Section 43 of
the Act.
11. Where an offence
under the Act has been committed by a company every person who was in charge of
and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the
company is also made guilty of the offence by the statutory creation. Any
director, manager or other officer of the company, who has consented to or
connived in the commission of the said offence, is made liable for the
punishment of the offence."
This Court has also
noted further allegations in the complaint against Managers or Directors of the
Company which are as under:- 2 1 "12. In the above context what is to be
looked at during the stage of issuing process is whether there are allegations
in the complaint by which the Managers or Directors of the Company can also be
proceeded against, when the Company is alleged to be guilty of the offence.
Para 12 of the complaint reads thus:
"That the
accused persons from 2 to 11 are Directors/ Managers/ Partners of M/s Mohan
Meakins Distillery, Daliganj, Lucknow, as mentioned in this complaint are
responsible for constructing the proper works and plant for the treatment of
their highly polluting trade effluent so as to conform to the standard laid
down by the Board.
Aforesaid accused
persons are deliberately avoiding to abide by the provisions of Sections 24 and
26 of the aforesaid Act which are punishable respectively under Sections 43 and
44 of the aforesaid Act, for which not only the Company but its Directors,
Managers, Secretary and all other responsible officers of the accused Company,
responsible for the conduct of its business are also liable in accordance with
the provision of Section 47 of the Act."
The appellant has
further stated in para 23 of the complaint that "the Chairman, Managing
Directors and Directors of the Company are the persons responsible for the act
and therefore, they are liable to be proceeded against according to the
law".
Taking note of the
averments in the complaint against the Directors, Managers and the ingredients
of Section 47 of the Act, this Court declined to accept the reasoning of the
High Court and Sessions Court for quashing the complaint thereby set aside both
the orders and directed the trial Court to proceed with the case in accordance
with law.
20) In the case on
hand which is also similar to Mohan Meakins Ltd. had commenced its journey in
the year 1985, 2 nonetheless lapse of such long period cannot be a reason to
absolve the respondents from the trial. In a matter of this nature,
particularly, when it affects public health if it is ultimately proved, courts
cannot afford to deal lightly with cases involving pollution of air and water.
The message must go to all concerned persons whether small or big that the
courts will share the parliamentary concern and legislative intent of the Act
to check the escalating pollution level and restore the balance of our
environment. Those who discharge noxious polluting effluents into streams,
rivers or any other water bodies which inflicts on the public health at large,
should be dealt with strictly de hors to the technical objections. Since
escalating pollution level of our environment affects on the life and health of
human beings as well as animals, the courts should not deal with the
prosecution for offences under the pollution and environmental Acts in a causal
or routine manner.
21) It is our
endeavour to point out that the High Court has quashed the complaint arising in
an environmental matter in 2 a casual manner by exercising power under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court has held exercise of power under Section 482 of
the Code is the exception and under the rule there are three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised i.e. (a) to give effect
to an order of the Court;
(b) to prevent abuse
of the process of the Court; (c) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is
true that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule
which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
While exercising
inherent powers either on civil or criminal jurisdiction, the Court does not
function as a Court of Appeal or Revision. The inherent jurisdiction though
wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution. It should be
exercised to do real and substantial justice and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent
abuse. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the
question of fact. When complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to
look into the materials to assess what the complainant had alleged and whether
any offence is made out 2 4 even if the allegations are accepted in toto. When
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court could not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable
or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. To put it clear, it is the function of the trial Judge to do so. The
Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of its power is
based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle
a legitimate prosecution. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not
constitute offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is
open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Crl.
Procedure Code.
However, it is not necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the
case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or
acquittal.
22) In the light of
the above discussion and in view of the specific averments in the complaint as
referred to by us in the earlier paragraphs coupled with the statutory
provisions, 2 5namely, Sections 25, 26, 44 and 47 of the Act, we are unable to
share the view expressed by the High Court in quashing the complaint insofar as
the first respondent herein. Accordingly, we set aside the same. The Special
Judicial Magistrate (Pollution) is directed to proceed with the complaint and
dispose of the same in accordance with law. If the first respondent herein
applies for dispensing with his personal presence in the Court, after making
the first appearance, the Special Court can exempt him from continuing to
appear in the Court by imposing any condition which the Court deems fit.
Subject to the above observation, we set aside the impugned judgment of the
High Court and direct the Special Judicial Magistrate (Pollution) to proceed
with the case in accordance with law and dispose of the same as expeditiously
as possible. We make it clear that we have not expressed anything on the merits
of the contents of the complaint and it is for the Special Court to decide the
same in accordance with law. The Criminal appeal is allowed.
........................................CJI.
2 6 (K.G. Balakrishnan)
............................................J.
(P. Sathasivam)
New
Delhi;
December
12, 2008.
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