State of Himachal
Pradesh Vs. Sardara Singh [2008] INSC 1445 (27 August 2008)
Judgment
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1354 OF 2008
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4503 of 2006) State of Himachal Pradesh
....Appellant Versus Sardara Singh ....Respondent
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT,
J.
1.
Leave
granted.
2.
Challenge
in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Division Bench of the Himachal
Pradesh High Court dismissing the application filed by the State in terms of
Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code').
The application was dismissed summarily by simply stating
"Dismissed".
3.
The
respondent faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under
Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in
short the `NDPS Act').
4.
The
trial court directed acquittal on the ground that the evidence of the official
witnesses cannot be accepted and accordingly the acquittal was recorded. The
application under Section 378 was filed which as noted above was dismissed
summarily.
5.
Learned
counsel for the appellant submitted that the manner of disposal of the
application is contrary to the decisions of this court in a large number of
cases.
6.
Learned
counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no merit in the case and,
therefore, the High Court was justified in rejecting the application for grant
of leave.
7.
Section
378 (3) of the Cr.P.C. deals with the power of the High Court to grant leave in
case of acquittal. Section 378 (1) and (3) of the Cr.P.C. as it stood then,
reads as follows:
"378(1) Save as
otherwise provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions of
sub-section (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the
Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or
appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court or an
order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.
(3) No appeal under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave
of the High Court".
8.
The
trial Court was required to carefully appraise the entire evidence and then
come to a conclusion. If the trial Court was at lapse in this regard the High
Court was obliged to undertake such an exercise by entertaining the appeal. The
trial Court on the facts of this case did not perform its duties, as was
enjoined on it by law. The High Court ought to have in such circumstances
granted leave and thereafter as a first court of appeal, re-appreciated the
entire evidence on the record independently and returned its findings
objectively as regards guilt or otherwise of the accused. It has failed to do
so. The questions involved were not trivial. The primary ground for acquittal
seems to be that the alleged eye- witnesses did not support the prosecution
case and, therefore, their presence is doubtful. The High Court has not given
any reasons for refusing to grant leave to file appeal against acquittal, and
seems to have been completely oblivious to the fact that by such refusal, a
close scrutiny of the order of acquittal, by the appellate forum, has been lost
once and for all. The manner in which appeal against acquittal has been dealt
with by the High Court leaves much to be desired.
Reasons introduce
clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought
to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an
application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further
avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court order
not sustainable.
Similar view was
expressed in State of U.P. v. Battan and Ors (2001 (10) SCC 607). About two
decades back in State of Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan (AIR 1982 SC
1215) the desirability of a speaking order while dealing with an application
for grant of leave was highlighted. The requirement of indicating reasons in
such cases has been judicially recognized as imperative. The view was
re-iterated in Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh and Ors. (1987 (2) SCC 222).
Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by this Court, cannot be
forsaken, under any pretext by any authority or Court, be it even the Highest
Court in a State, oblivious to Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950
(in short the `Constitution').
9.
Even
in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated
Engineering Union (1971 (1) All E.R. 1148) observed "The giving of reasons
is one of the fundamentals of good administration". In Alexander Machinery
(Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was observed: "Failure to give
reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are live links between the
mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or
conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity.
The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the
"inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it
virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or
exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the
decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system,
reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter
before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the
decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural
justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking
out.
The "inscrutable
face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or
quasi-judicial performance.
10.
These
aspects were highlighted in State of Punjab v. Bhag Singh (2004(1) SCC 547)
11.
In
view of the principles set out above it would be appropriate to direct the High
Court to grant leave as grounds raised are not without substance.
12.
Appeal
is allowed.
..........................................J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
............................................J.
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