Parayya
Allayya Hittalamani Vs. Sri Parayya Gurulingayya Poojari & Ors [2007] Insc
1068 (12 October 2007)
S.B.
Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi
(Arising
out of SLP (C) No.10052 of 2005) S.B. Sinha, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
There is a temple in the village Terdal under the Jharkhandi Taluk in the State
of Karnataka, commonly known as Sri Prabhudeva Temple.
Parties
hereto are the hereditary poojaris of the said temple. They are entitled to
bless the devotees, receive alms and other offerings made by the devotees
throughout the year. The turn of worship has been amicably divided and settled,
inter alia, amongst the plaintiffs and the defendants.
3.
There were three branches with which we are concerned; one is the branch of the
plaintiff, second is the branch of the defendants and the third is the branch
represented by Parayya Allayya Hittalamani. The said Allayya and his wife Neelawwa
died without any issue. The plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 inherited their
right to worship.
4.
Disputes and differences having arisen between the parties in regard to right
of inheritance of offering poojas in the said temple, the father of the
plaintiff filed a suit which was marked as OS No.143 of 1956. Parties therein
purported to settle their disputes. The consent terms were filed which were
accepted by the Court. The said terms are :
For
the present year and the turn of Pooja which will come after 12 years, the
defendant No.1 with the plaintiff herein and with his help perform the pooja as
usual of Prabhudeva in Neelavvas pooja turn.
During
the abovesaid poojas time the offerings of Naivedya to Prabhudeva, fruits
corns Oil and Milk and Curd, Sugar, Jaggery etc. in perishable goods, defendant
No.1 should give half share of perishable goods to plaintiff and take half of
the perishable goods to himself.
In the
abovenoted pooja turn the defendant No.1 in his individual capacity as a poojari
receiving gold, silver, offering (dakshina) etc. the non-perishable goods the
defendant No.1 shall take in that he need not give any share or goods.
5.
Indisputably, the turn of worship so far as the said Allayya was concerned,
comes once in 12 years. After 1956, the said turn came in 1968.
There
exists a dispute as to how the parties hereto shared the offerings in 1968.
However, when the turn again came in 1980, the plaintiffs filed a suit praying,
inter alia, for the following reliefs :
It
may be declared that plaintiffs and their family members have a joint right of pooja
and receiving offerings of Prabhudev Temple at Terdal along with defendant No.1
or his successors regarding the turn of deceased Neelawwas branch once in
12 years in perpetually.
Consequently
perpetual injunction may kindly be issued against the defendants, their
relatives and agents from threatening, obstructing or causing obstruction to
the joint right of the plaintiffs to perform the Pooja and receive offering
during the turn of Neelawwas branch every twelve years.
6. The
said suit was decreed by the learned Trial Judge. Defendants preferred an
appeal thereagainst. The learned Court of First Appeal also affirmed the said
decree, inter alia, opining :
The
term in para 2 of Ex.P-2 makes it clear that silver, Gold, money which are
non-perishable commodities given to deft.1 in his individual capacity being a poojari
should be taken by himself and he need give any share to the plaintiff therein.
It makes it clear that any non-perishable commodities offered to deft.1 in his
individual capacity as poojari of the deity such as gold, sliver and money
should be taken by himself and he need not give share therein to the plaintiff.
So, any offerings given in individual capacity of deft.1 as poojari should be
taken by deft.1. Once example is sufficient to what kind of offerings given to poojari
in his individual capacity is given, i.e., if the poojari removes heirs of a
child during Javala ceremony and parents of the child given any offerings such
gold, silver and money to poojari he should take it as it is given to him being
poojari in his individual capacity for performing Javala ceremony. Such
offerings made to poojari in his individual capacity should be taken by the
father of deft.1 and deft.1 should take same but not offering made in the form
of gold, silver and money to deity and they should be shared by deft.1 and plaintiffs
together as per the decree at Ex.P.2 If it was the intention of the parties,
the father of deft.1 should have taken all the offerings made to deity in
non-perishable commodities for himself in 1955- 56 and 1968-69.
7.
Both the Trial Judge as also the First Appellate Court furthermore took into
consideration the documents marked as Exhibit P-1 as also Exhibit P-3 executed
by the father of the defendant No.1 in favour father of the plaintiff wherein
it was categorically stated that plaintiffs branch had equal right in
worshipping the deity during the turn of Nilawwa and he had right to receive
alms equally. In this respect, the learned Court of appeal held :
This
goes to prove that father of deft.1 has admitted that father of the plaintiffs
was the nearest heir of Neelawwa and he has also right in the property of Neelawwa
such as land Sy.No.759 and right to worship of Prabhuswami. Ex.P.3 is dated
23.03.1965. Even subsequent to Ex.P.2 father of deft.1 confirmed that father of
the plaintiffs is nearest heir to Neelawwa and he has no objection for the
property to be shared by father of the plaintiffs such as land and right to
worship during turn of Neelawwa. The evidence led by the plaintiff is
overwhelming the evidence of the defendants and as such after considering the
evidence the learned Munsiff has rightly held that the plaintiffs are entitled
to receive half of non- perishable offerings such as gold, silver and money
made to deity and deft.1 should perform pula along with the plaintiffs and they
have equal right in worshipping deity and there is no distinction between the
plaintiffs and deft.1 in worshiping the deity and he has rightly decreed the
suit of the plaintiffs.
8.
Defendants filed a second appeal before the High Court which was marked as
Revision Second Appeal No.250 of 1992. The High Court, however, was of the
opinion that as both the parties would get their turns alternatively, i.e.,
once in 12 years, the courts below committed a mistake in mixing up that issues
wrongly with the real dispute, stating :
The
reference to the individual functions in the decree is very clearly to the fact
that since the right to perform the pooja was alternative, that it was a
reference to the functions performed by the party in that particular year when
the officiating party was in charge. This cannot be confused with a situation
whereby the poojari may perform individual functions at some other place de
hors these functions and for which he may receive separate offerings. This is
basically the essence of the matter and since it has been very clearly and
conclusively decided in the earlier compromise terms, there could be no
question of re-opeining that issue. To this extent, therefore, the submission
canvassed by the appellants learned counsel that the suit itself as farmed
was not maintainable, is full justified.
9. The
matter, however, was taken to this Court by the respondents being SLP (C)
No.2109 of 1999 and on leave having been granted, this Court by a judgment and
order dated 15.9.2004 noticed that even no substantial question of law was
formulated by the High Court whereupon the same was set aside and the matter
was remitted to the High Court for formulating substantial questions of law.
10.
The High Court thereafter formulated the following substantial questions of law
:
(1)
Whether both the Courts ignored the weight of preponderating circumstances
while construing the contents of compromise decree arrived at between the
predecessors-in-title of the parties to the suit and allowed their judgments to
be influenced by inconsequential matters, whether High Court would be justified
in re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to its own independent
conclusion?
(2)
Whether both the Courts below erred in misconstruing Ex.P-2, the compromise
arrived at between the predecessors-in-title in question for purposes of
ascertaining the foundation of the suit itself and if so whether that error is
to be interfered with in the exercise of High Courts power under Section
100 of CPC?
11.
Both the aforementioned questions were answered by the High Court in the
affirmative. It was of the view that as compromise decree was binding between
the parties and the dispute between them was governed by the said compromise
decree, the plaintiffs suit was not maintainable, stating :
It
is clear from the conditions of performance of pooja as per the terms of the
compromise decree that the right of performing pooja during the turn of Neelawwa
and Allayya is conferred upon the father of the first defendant and the pooja during
that turn has to be performed by the father of the first defendant with the
assistance of the father of the plaintiffs and no joint right has been
conferred and regarding the offerings made by the devotees so far as the
perishable articles are concerned, they are to be divided equally and
non-perishable offerings such as gold, silver, dakshina (cash) etc.
which
are not perishable, offered individually to the father of the first defendant
shall be taken by him exclusively and no such offerings shall be given to Parayya
Allayya Hittalamani, i.e., father of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs being
the legal representatives, being the sons of Parayya Allayya Hittalamani cannot
claim of a higher share than that is conferred upon them by the father of the defendant
and which is in fact the basis of the plaint and, therefore, it is clear that
the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below cannot be sustained and the
same are liable to be set aside as they are perverse and arbitrary being based
upon irrelevant material and being contrary to the terms of compromise decree
which is admitted by both the parties as binding upon them.
12.
Mr. Mahale, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted
that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment
insofar as it failed to take into consideration that in terms of condition
No.2(C) of the agreement, the first respondent was not entitled to gold, sliver
and money etc. which were offered to the deity and not to himself in his
personal capacity.
13.
Mr. Chandrashekhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first
respondent, on the other hand, urged that the High Court having rightly arrived
at a decision that the plaintiffs suit was barred by res judicata and the
disputes between the parties being covered by the consent decree, the impugned
judgment is unassailable.
14. A
consent decree, as is well known, is a contract between the parties with the
seal of the Court superadded to it. {See Baldevdas Shivlal & Anr. v. Filmistan
Distributyors (India) P. Ltd. & Ors. [(1969) 2 SCC
201] and Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Amritpal Singh Nayar & Anr. [100 (2002)
DLT 278]}.
15. We
are, however, not oblivious of the fact that such consent decree may operate as
an estoppel. {See Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo. v. The State of Orissa [(AIR 1956 SC 346]}.
16. It
is equally well settled that which construing a decree, the court can and in
appropriate case ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the
proceedings leading upto the decree. In order to find out the meaning of the
words employed in a decree, the Court has to ascertain the circumstances under
which these words came to be used. {See Bhavan Vaja & Ors. v. Solanki Hanuji
Khodaji Mansang & Anr. [AIR 1972 SC 1371]}.
17. It
is now also a trite law that in the event the document is vague, the same must
be construed having regard to surroundings and/or attending circumstances.
18.
The nature of the document also plays an important part for construction
thereof. The suit filed by the parties, inter alia, involved the question of
interpretation of the said consent decree. Parties adduced evidences, inter alia,
in regard to the nature of poojas and offerings made to the priest in their
individual capacity. The dispute between the parties related to right of
worship upon inheritance thereof from their predecessor.
Their
rights in regard to offer poojas in the temple are itself not in dispute.
In a
case of this nature where a consent decree does not refer to the entire disputes
between the parties and some vaguness remained, the factual background as also
the manner in which existence of rights have been claimed by the parties would
be relevant.
The
consent decree, appears to be meant to be operative for a limited period viz. 1956
and 1961.
Section
92 of the Evidence Act in a situation of this nature, in our opinion, cannot be
said to be attracted.
19. A
consent decree must be construed keeping in view the lega principles as noticed
hereinbefore. The right of the parties to offer pooja had not been disputed.
Clause 2(A) of the consent decree was not determinative of the status of the
parties. Their rights and obligations are not clearly spelt out thereby. In the
aforementioned situation, the recital to the effect that Pooja has to be
performed as usual is significant.
20. No
difficulty arises in giving effect to clause 2(B) of the consent decree. It is
not necessary for us to consider the same. Clause 2(C), however, deserves our
attention. It speaks of offerings of non-perishable goods were to be offered to
the defendant No.1 in his individual capacity.
The
parties to the compromise knew as to why the said expression had been used. If
any of the party to the suit was entitled to keep with him even such
non-perishable goods which were to be offered to the Deity, the question of
using the terms in his individual capacity was not necessary. The
parties, therefore, were allowed to lead evidence, to show as to what
ceremonies are performed by the Priest in his individual capacity and not
necessarily offering pooja to the Deity. A devotee may arrange a special
ceremony or a special pooja and entrust the same to be done by one or the other
Priest of the said temple. The courts, therefore, were required to construe the
terms implied in the consent decree having regard to the customs in regard to
holding of religious and other functions in the temple by the devotees.
21.
Equally important was the conduct of the parties soon thereafter. We have
noticed hereinbefore that the father of the defendant No.1 executed deeds of
sale in favour of the plaintiffs father. The relationship between the
parties and their status were referred to therein. Defendant No.1s father
in the said document accepted the right of the plaintiffs father of having
equal right to the offerings and offer poojas during the turn of said Neelawwa.
It is not the case of the defendants that such statements came to be made by
reason of any fraud or inducement or threat on the part of the plaintiffs
father.
22.
That being so, the said statements were relevant. The learned Trial Judge as
also the Court of the First Appeal, in our opinion, cannot be said to have
committed any mistake in taking the same into consideration for determining the
rights of the parties. The High Court, in our opinion, was, thus, not correct
in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge as also
the Court of Appeal.
23.
We, however, make it clear that we have not gone into the question as to
whether any offerings made in Hundies for development shall go to any of the
parties or not. Such a question having not been gone into by the courts below,
we refrain ourselves from doing so.
24.
For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned judgment is set aside.
The
appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there
shall be no order as to costs.
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