Rajesh
Kumar Singh Vs. High Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh, Bench
Gwalior [2007]
Insc 675 (31 May 2007)
R.V. Raveendran & Lokeshwar Singh Panta
R.V. Raveendran, J.
The Appellant was the Sub-Divisional Officer (Police), Dabra, Gwalior
District, during 1998-1999. He has filed this appeal under Section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short "the Act"), being aggrieved
by the order dated 2.3.2001 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Contempt
Petition (Criminal) No.5 of 2000, punishing him with simple imprisonment for
seven days and fine of Rs.2,000/-.
Factual Background
2. Shri Pradeep Mittal, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dabra, sent a
Report dated 1.11.1999 to the Inspector General of Police, Gwalior Circle,
alleging that one Chander Bhan Singh Raghuvanshi, Station Officer, Picchhor
came inside his court Hall and threatened him by stating "you have not
done good by initiating contempt proceedings against me before High Court. I am
back in Picchhor Police Station and I will see you"; and "I have set
many Magistrates right and I will see you also". The learned Magistrate
complained that it was unbecoming of a police officer to threaten a Judicial
Officer in court and interrupt the court proceedings and the misbehaviour
warranted stern action. The learned Magistrate enclosed a copy of the
order-sheet dated 1.11.1999 (recording the incident) and statements of two
witnesses to the incident (Deposition Writer and Reader of the court).
3. Shri N.K. Tripathi, I.G. of Police, sent the complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, Gwalior under cover of letter dated 10.11.1999 with a
direction to take necessary action. The subject of the letter stated
"Regarding conducting an inquiry and taking disciplinary action against
Raghuvanshi". The Superintendent of Police (Sri Pradeep Runwaal) in turn
forwarded the I.G.'s letter along with the Magistrate's complaint and its
enclosures, to the appellant herein who was at that time the Sub-Divisional
Officer (Police), Dabra, under cover of letter dated 17.11.1999, with a
direction to personally look into the matter and send a detailed report
("Vistrit Teep").
4. As per the said directions, the appellant conducted an inquiry.
He recorded the statements of Raghuvanshi and several witnesses cited by the
said Raghuvanshi, namely M.P. Sharma (President, Bar Association, Dabra),
Mahendra Kumar (a litigant), Bal Kishan and Jagdish (Police Constables), Suresh
Kumar (Asst. Prosecution Officer), B. S. Thakur, Jaswant Singh Parihaar and
Mahesh Dubey (Advocates) who stated that they were present at the time of the
incident in court on 1.11.1999 as also Rajendra Prasad Sharma (constable who
had accompanied Raghuvanshi). All these witnesses stated that there was no
unbecoming conduct or misbehaviour on the part of Raghuvanshi and that he had
shown respect to the learned Magistrate. The appellant submitted a report dated
27.11.1999, in regard to his inquiry, to the Superintendent of Police,
recording a finding that the documents and statements disclosed that
Raghuvanshi had used unwarranted language in Court which was improper and
recommended punishment.
5. Long prior to the incident on 1.11.1999, the High Court had initiated
contempt proceedings (Contempt Petition No.2 of 1999) against Raghuvanshi on an
earlier reference by Sri Pradeep Mittal, Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Dabra, in regard to a false report submitted by Raghuvanshi to his court in
April, 1998. The second reference made by the learned Magistrate in regard to
the incident of 1.11.1999, was also placed before the High Court, in the
pending contempt proceedings. The High Court took note of the second reference
on 12.1.2000 and issued a show cause notice to Raghuvanshi.
In response to it, Raghuvanshi submitted his reply stating that he had not
misbehaved with the Judge. In support of his defence, he produced the Inquiry
Report dated 27.11.1999 submitted by the appellant to the Superintendent of
Police along with the statements of the witnesses examined in the inquiry. The
High Court disposed of the contempt proceedings against Raghuvanshi by order
dated 22/29.5.2000 holding him guilty in respect of both incidents and imposed
a punishment of three months' simple imprisonment. In regard to the second
reference, the High Court held that Raghuvanshi had not only misbehaved with
the Judge on 1.11.1999, but had also raised a false defence by alleging that
the learned Magistrate had acted with malice against him. In the course of the
said order the High Court dealt with the report dated 27.11.1999 of the
appellant (which was produced by Raghuvanshi) thus:
"According to the respondent (Raghuvanshi), the Presiding Officer on
account of malice had initiated the contempt proceedings.
According to him, he had gone to the Court of Mr. Mittal in connection with
some Court work, Shri Mittal asked him as to why he did enter in the court
without being called whereupon he stated that he come there on account of some
official work. In support of this submission he has relied upon Annexure-R/6. A
perusal of Annexure-R/6 would show that he was not required to appear as a
witness in the court of Shri Mittal. According to him, at the time of the
alleged meeting number of lawyers were present in the court.
According to him, Shri MP Sharma, Virendra Thakur, S.P.
Sharma, J.S. Parihar, Mahesh Dubey and number of litigants were present in
the court. According to him, the Presiding Officer Shri Mittal had sent a copy
of the complaint to the Inspector General of Police, who in his turn directed
for departmental enquiry. In the said enquiry statements of number of witnesses
were recorded. He has produced those statements at Annexure-R/8 collectively.
He has relied upon the statements of as many as 12 persons which were recorded
on 24.11.1999, 26.11.1999 and 27.11.1999. These 12 statements do not contain
the statements of the complainant Shri Mittal. Not even a single document has
been produced in the Court to show that the Inspector General of Police ever
authorized the S.D.O.(P) to record the statements of the witnesses. Nobody
knows as to how said S.D.O.(P) came to know about the names of the witnesses.
If these statements were recorded in the departmental enquiry then copy of the
charge-sheet or such relevant documents could be filed. If these statements
were recorded in a preliminary enquiry such an order could be produced in the
Court to show that these statements were recorded in the preliminary
enquiry."
While disposing of the contempt proceedings against Raghuvanshi, the High
Court in its order dated 22/29.5.2000, directed notices to be issued to the
Inspector General of Police, Gwalior and the appellant, to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt of court, for having enquired into the
conduct of a Judge, without the permission of the High Court.
6. In compliance with the said direction, contempt proceedings were
initiated against the appellant and Shri N.K. Tripathi (I.G. Police), in
Contempt Petition No.5 of 2000 and show cause notices dated 3.7.2000 were
issued to them. Shri N.K. Tripathi, IG of Police, filed a statement submitting
that on receiving the complaint dated 1.11.1999 from the learned Magistrate
against Raghuvanshi, he merely wrote to the S.P., Gwalior to enquire into the
matter and take disciplinary action against Raghuvanshi; that there was no
intention to hold any inquiry into the conduct of the Judge; and that after the
inquiry against Raghuvanshi, and the report submitted by the appellant, a
penalty of Rs.500/- was imposed on Raghuvanshi for misbehaviour. He asserted
that he did not create any false or forged document as alleged in the show
cause notice dated 3.7.2000. He also submitted an unconditional apology. The
High Court accepted the said explanation of Sri N. K. Tripathi, IG of Police
and dropped the proceedings against him, by the following order dated 3.11.2000:
"As regards notice to N.K. Tripathi, we have perused the record.
From his reply, he has not directed any enquiry against the conduct of the
Judge. N.K. Tripathi has only directed to take action within a period of 15
days and intimate the action to the Court. He has not directed an enquiry.
Therefore, no prima facie case is made out against N.K. Tripathi and notice to
N.K. Tripathi is discharged".
7. The appellant also filed a reply similar to the reply filed by I.G.
of Police, with an unconditional apology. The High Court did not, however,
accept the appellant's explanation and apology. It framed the following charges
against the appellant on 10.11.2000, which according to the High Court amounted
to contempt of court:
(i) that he inquired into the conduct of a Judge and submitted the report
scandalizing the court in order to protect the erring official (Raghuvanshi)
who misbehaved in the court.
(ii) that with an intention to lower the dignity of the court, he sat (in
appeal) over the order-sheet dated 1.11.1999 of the Judicial Magistrate and
recorded a separate finding.
(iii) that with an intention to scandalize the court and to lower the
dignity of the court, he recorded statements against the Judicial Officer
without any authority of law with an oblique motive.
8. The appellant filed replies/explanations dated 28.7.2000, 10.11.2000 and
30.11.2000 to the show cause notice and the charges, which are summarized
below:
(a) The learned Magistrate had lodged a complaint dated 1.11.1999 against Raghuvanshi
with the IG of Police, who forwarded it to the Superintendent of Police for
inquiry and necessary disciplinary action who, in turn, sent it to him with a
direction to hold an inquiry and submit a detailed report. Accordingly, he
enquired into the conduct of Raghuvanshi and found him guilty of misbehaving in
Court and recommended his punishment.
Holding an inquiry and submitting a report as directed by his superior
officers does not amount to contempt. He did not hold any inquiry in regard to
the conduct of the Judicial Officer.
(b) As the inquiry was against Raghuvanshi, he was bound to give due
opportunity to Raghuvanshi before deciding upon departmental action. The
statements of several witnesses were recorded as per the request of
Raghuvanshi. When he recorded the statements of various persons and submitted
his report dated 27.11.1999, no other proceedings were pending against
Raghuvanshi in regard to the incident dated 1.11.1999.
Therefore, there was no question of taking any permission from court, for
holding the inquiry.
(c) He did not create any false or forged document. He acted bonafide.
Neither the act of holding an inquiry nor the act of recording the statements
of witnesses was with the intention of scandalizing or lowering the authority
of any Court or interfering with the due course of any judicial proceeding or
interfering or obstructing the administration of justice.
The High Court by the impugned order dated 2.3.2001 rejected the explanation
and held that all three charges were proved and imposed the punishment of seven
days' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/-.
The said order is under challenge in this appeal.
Whether the appellant is guilty of contempt?
9. The question whether Raghuvanshi committed contempt of court on 1.11.1999
was decided by the High Court by its order dated 22/29.5.2000 in Contempt
Petition No. 2 of 1999. We are not concerned with the acts of Raghuvanshi or
the decision against him. The question before us is whether the appellant
committed contempt by his following acts : (a) holding an inquiry in regard to
the incident dated 1.11.1999 and recording the statements of several witnesses
(who stated that they were present at the time of the incident) in the course
of such inquiry, without the permission of the High Court; and (b) recording
the statements made by the witnesses that Raghuvanshi had not misbehaved with
the learned Magistrate, thereby contradicting the record made by the learned
Magistrate as to what transpired (in the order-sheet dated 1.11.1999 of a suit
which he was hearing).
10. The High Court has held that holding an inquiry in respect of the
conduct of Raghuvanshi on 1.11.1999 amounted to holding an inquiry into the
conduct of the learned Magistrate and that was not permissible without the
permission of the High court. The High Court has also held that recording the
evidence of several witnesses by appellant, to the effect that Raghuvanshi did
not misbehave with the Judge (which contradicted the learned Magistrate who had
reported that Raghuvanshi had misbehaved with him), was with the ulterior
intention of helping Raghuvanshi to create a defence of malice on the part of
Magistrate.
The High Court concluded that these acts amounted to scandalizing the court
and interfering with the administration of justice.
11. When Raghuvanshi misbehaved in court, it was open to the learned
Magistrate to initiate action for prosecuting Raghuvanshi under section 228 of
IPC, or punish him under section 345 Cr.P.C read with section 228 IPC. If the
learned Magistrate was of the view that the contempt committed did not fall
under section 228 IPC, then he could have made a reference to the High Court
for taking action under section 10 of the Act. The learned Magistrate did not
take any action under section 228 IPC nor under section 345 Cr.P.C. read with
section 228 IPC. Even before making a reference to the High Court for
initiating action for contempt, the learned Magistrate sent a complaint to the
Inspector General of Police on 1.11.1999 itself, requiring action against
Raghuvanshi. The action that was required was, obviously departmental
disciplinary action. The Inspector General of Police, acting on the said
request, directed the Superintendent of Police to hold an inquiry and take
disciplinary action against Raghuvanshi. The Superintendent of Police, in turn,
forwarded the complaint dated 1.11.1999 of the Magistrate and the directive of
the I.G. of Police dated 10.11.1999 to the appellant, with an instruction to
look into the matter and send a detailed report. It is only in pursuance of
such directive from his superiors, the appellant held a preliminary inquiry in
respect of the conduct of Raghuvanshi. The inquiry was not in regard to the
conduct of the Judge. As the inquiry was against Raghuvanshi, the appellant had
to give an opportunity to him, to make his statement. He also had to record the
statements of persons, whom Raghuvanshi stated were present at the time of the
incident. The inquiry by the appellant was a prelude to the disciplinary action
against Raghuvanshi. In fact, after the recording of the statements of several
witnesses, the appellant submitted a report holding Raghuvanshi guilty of
having used unwarranted language in court and recommending punishment. It
cannot, therefore, be said, that recording the statements of Raghuvanshi, and
several other persons the request of Raghuvanshi, in the course of the
preliminary inquiry, amounts to holding an inquiry in regard to the conduct of
a Judge.
12. When appellant held the preliminary inquiry, no contempt proceedings had
been initiated by the High Court, in regard to the incident of 1.11.1999. There
was also no other proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate or any
other court in regard to the incident dated 1.11.1999. Therefore, the question
of seeking or obtaining the permission of High Court or other court, for
holding such inquiry, did not arise. Unless the inquiry by the appellant was a
parallel proceeding with reference to a matter pending in court and unless such
parallel proceeding interfered with or, intended to interfere with the pending
court proceeding, there is no interference with administration of justice. We
may in this context refer to the decision of this Court in Security and Finance
(P) Ltd. v. Dattatraya Raghav Agge (AIR 1970 SC 720). This Court held that an
authority holding an inquiry in good faith in exercise of the powers vested in
it by a statute is not guilty of contempt of Court, merely because a parallel
enquiry is imminent or pending before a Court. This Court pointed out that to
constitute the offence of Contempt of Court, there must be involved some act
calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt or to lower
his authority or something calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due
course of justice on the lawful process of the Court. Applying the said
principle, the act of appellant holding the preliminary inquiry, cannot be
considered to be contempt of court.
13. Let us next examine whether recording the statements of some persons,
amounted to scandalizing the court, if those statements were contrary to the
report of the incident contained in the order-sheet dated 1.11.1999.
Attributing improper motive to a Judge or scurrilous abuse of a Judge will
amount to scandalizing the court. Raghuvanshi was found to be guilty of such
conduct and he was punished. The appellant neither attributed any improper
motive to the Judge, nor abused the Judge. The High Court concluded that the
inquiry and report by the appellant was intended to help Raghuvanshi, because
the appellant recorded the statements of only persons who contradicted the
report of the learned Magistrate, but did not examine the learned Magistrate or
his Deposition Writer or Reader of the court. The appellant has given a
feasible and reasonable explanation for not recording the statements of the
learned Magistrate, or his Court Reader and Deposition Writer. He has stated
that he was only holding a preliminary inquiry as directed by his official
superiors; that the statements of the Deposition Writer and Reader of the court
as also the order-sheet wherein the learned Magistrate had recorded what
transpired on 1.11.1999, were already available on record and therefore, he did
not record their statements again, in the inquiry. In fact, the very first para
of the Inquiry Report dated 27.11.1999 states that he had perused the letter
dated 1.11.1999 of Sri Pradip Mittal, JFMC, Dabra, the order sheet and the
statements of Deposition Writer and Reader recorded by the Magistrate.
14. The High Court has next found fault with the appellant for recording the
statements of witnesses, which contradicted what was recorded by the learned
Magistrate in the order-sheet, and has concluded that this must have been done
to help Raghuvanshi to create a defence in the contempt proceedings. Even if
Raghuvanshi or the witnesses named by him stated something false, the appellant
who recorded their statements in the course of preliminary inquiry cannot be
held liable or responsible for such statements, unless there is material to
show that Appellant was part of a conspiracy to create false evidence.
There is nothing to show such conspiracy. It is nobody's case that he
wrongly recorded the statements of the witnesses to benefit Raghuvanshi. The
inquiry by appellant was in pursuance of the complaint by the learned
Magistrate demanding action against Raghuvanshi and the direction of the
Inspector General of Police to hold an inquiry in connection with disciplinary
action against Raghuvanshi. The Appellant submitted a report holding
Raghuvanshi had used unwarranted language in court and that he should be
punished.
It cannot, therefore, be said that appellant recorded the statements of
witnesses with an ulterior motive of helping Raghuvanshi to create a false
defence.
15. The High Court's conclusion that appellant prepared the report to
support the defence of Raghuvanshi by recording the statements of some
witnesses against the learned Magistrate is in fact based on an assumption that
the order dated 22/29.5.2000 in Contempt Petition No.
2 of 1999, while directing initiation of contempt action, had recorded such
a finding. This is evident from the following observation of the High Court in
the impugned judgment:
"In Contempt Petition No. 2 of 1999, allegations levied against Chandra
Bhan Singh Raghuvanshi were found proved and it was also recorded that the then
Sub-Divisional Officer (Police), Dabra, without any authority of law has
recorded the statements of persons in a manner to give handle to said Chandra
Bhan Singh Raghuvanshi, to make allegation of malice against the Presiding
Officer."
But we find that the order dated 22/29.5.2000 does not contain a finding
that Appellant had "without any authority of law recorded the statements
of persons in a manner to give handle to Raghuvanshi to make allegations of
malice against the Presiding Officer". All that the order dated
22/29.5.2000 stated was that no document had been produced to show that IG of
Police had authorized the SDO (P) to record the statements, and if the statements
had been recorded in pursuance of any order, such order could be produced in
court (in the proposed contempt proceedings) to show that the statements were
recorded in the preliminary enquiry. In fact no finding could have been
recorded in the order dated 22/29.5.2000 against appellant, as he was not a
party to that proceeding. The observations in the order dated 22/29.5.2000 were
made in the context of initiating suo moto contempt proceedings against the
appellant and the IG of Police. The appellant was entitled to show cause
against the initiation of contempt proceedings. The appellant in fact produced
documents to show that the statements of witnesses were recorded, in a
preliminary inquiry directed by the IG of Police, on the complaint of the
Magistrate. The explanation that he held the inquiry and recorded the
statements on the directions of the IG of Police conveyed by the Superintendent
of Police and that the statements of witnesses were recorded at the instance of
and on the request of Raghuvanshi has been completely ignored or overlooked by
the High Court.
16. The police department had issued a circular dated 14.9.1999 (read with
para 36 of MP Police Regulations) which required that whenever any complaint
was received against police, a report should be sent at the earliest after
holding necessary inquiry into such complaints.
The letter of the IG of Police and the Superintendent of Police also make it
clear that the appellant was required to hold an inquiry in connection with
initiating a disciplinary action against the Raghuvanshi.
It is no doubt true that the complaint dated 1.11.1999 of the Magistrate and
the directive of IG dated 10.11.1999 required 'action', and did not
specifically direct an 'inquiry'. But the "subject" portion of IG's
letter dated 10.11.1999 specifically states "regarding conducting inquiry
and taking disciplinary action against Sub-Inspector C.B.S. Raghuvanshi".
Therefore, the report submitted by the appellant has to be treated as one
made bona fide in pursuance of the instructions of the official superiors
directing him to hold a preliminary inquiry. It was not intended to scandalize
the court. Nor was there any attempt by the appellant to sit (in judgment) over
the order sheet dated 1.11.1999 of the learned Magistrate in his Inquiry report
dated 27.11.1999.
17. It is also necessary to notice that the High Court proceeded on an
erroneous impression that contempt proceedings against Raghuvanshi in regard to
the incident of 1.11.1999 were pending when appellant held the inquiry in
November, 1999 and submitted his report dated 27.11.1999, and therefore such
inquiry by the appellant must have been with the intention of helping
Raghuvanshi to prepare a defence in the Contempt Proceedings. Contempt Petition
No.2 of 1999 which was pending in November, 1999 did not relate to the incident
of 1.11.1999 at all, but related to a false report given by Raghuvanshi in
April, 1998, which had nothing to do with the incident on 1.11.1999. In the
said contempt proceedings relating to the false report given in 1998, the High
Court took cognizance of the second reference made by the Magistrate in regard
to the incident of 1.11.1999, only on 12.1.2000.
Therefore, the High Court's assumption that the entire inquiry by the
appellant was with a view to help Raghuvanshi in regard to the contempt
proceeding pending in regard to the said incident on 1.11.1999 is obviously
erroneous.
18. This Court has repeatedly cautioned that the power to punish for
contempt is not intended to be invoked or exercised routinely or mechanically,
but with circumspection and restraint. Courts should not readily infer an
intention to scandalize courts or lowering the authority of court unless such
intention is clearly established. Nor should they exercise power to punish for contempt
where mere question of propriety is involved. In Rizwan-ul-Hasan v. The State
of Uttar Pradesh (1953 SCR 581), this Court reiterated the well-settled
principle that jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is
real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due
course of justice. Of late, a perception that is slowly gaining ground among
public is that sometimes, some Judges are showing oversensitiveness with a
tendency to treat even technical violations or unintended acts as contempt. It
is possible that it is done to uphold the majesty of courts, and to command
respect. But Judges, like everyone else, will have to earn respect. They cannot
demand respect by demonstration of 'power'. Nearly two centuries ago, Justice
John Marshall, the Chief Justice of American Supreme Court warned that the
power of Judiciary lies, not in deciding cases, nor in imposing sentences, nor
in punishing for contempt, but in the trust, confidence and faith of the common
man. The purpose of the power to punish for criminal contempt is to ensure that
the faith and confidence of the public in administration of justice is not
eroded. Such power, vested in the High Courts, carries with it great
responsibility. Care should be taken to ensure that there is no room for
complaints of ostentatious exercise of power. Three acts, which are often cited
as examples of exercise of such power are : (i) punishing persons for
unintended acts or technical violations, by treating them as contempt of court;
(ii) frequent summoning of Government officers to court (to sermonize or to
take them to task for perceived violations); and (iii) making avoidable adverse
comments and observations against persons who are not parties. It should be
remembered that exercise of such power, results in eroding the confidence of
the public, rather than creating trust and faith in the judiciary. Be that as
it may.
19. There is no material to show that the appellant acted with any ulterior
motive. But for the complaint and request by the learned Magistrate that action
should be taken against Raghuvanshi and the directions issued by the I.G. and
Superintendent of Police to hold an inquiry, the appellant would not have held
the inquiry. Any such preliminary inquiry warrants recording of statements. Any
bona fide act in the course of discharge of duties and complying with the
directions of the superior officers, should not land the Inquiry officer in a
contempt proceedings. Though, common contempt proceedings were initiated against
the IG of Police and the appellant, the High Court dropped the proceedings
against the IG of Police who directed the inquiry, but chose to proceed against
the appellant who merely complied with the directions of the IG of Police. It
even ignored the declaration of bonafides and unconditional apology. The
finding of guilt is totally warranted.
20. We, therefore, hold that the appellant is not guilty of contempt of
court. Consequently, we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High
Court dated 2.3.2001 in contempt petition No.5 of 2000 and acquit and exonerate
the appellant of all charges.
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