10pt Microwave Project,
Kota & Anr Vs. Ramesh Chand  Insc 744 (18
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of
the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, dismissing the special leave filed by
2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Respondent was engaged as a casual labourer by the Assistant Engineer of the
Microwave Project Borabas for the job of fixing of nuts and bolts in the Microwave
Tower. After completion of the work and commissioning of the Microwave Towers,
respondent was relieved from his job on 1.12.1987.
Office of the Microwave, Kota, was also abolished as there was no need of
work and in any event it was only of casual nature.
Respondent raised a dispute to the effect that there was termination of his
services which is illegal. The Labour Ministry, Govt. of India vide order dated
30.9.1991 referred the following dispute under Section 10(1) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the 'Act') to the Industrial Tribunal (Central)
"Whether the action of the AEN Microwave Project, Kota & LET,
Jaipur in terminating the services of Shri Ramesh Chand, S/o Shri Jankidas,
Casual Labour under AEN Microwave Project, Kota at Lawatbhata w.e.f. 1.12. 1987
is justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workman is entitled?"
3. On behalf of the applicant it was pleaded that he had been engaged as
casual labourer on 8.12.1986 and, therefore, he having worked for more than 240
days in 12 calendar months could not have been terminated. The appellant took
the stand that the respondent was engaged for doing a particular work on a
casual labour basis. Since the establishment itself was closed after completion
of the work there was no scope for accepting the prayer of the respondent.
The Tribunal held that since the respondent worked for 240 days in the
establishment of the present appellant, his termination will be bad as there
was violation of the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Act. Removal
from service amounted to retrenchment under Section 2 (oo) of the Act. With
these conclusions it was held that the respondent was entitled to be
re-employed to continue to be in service along with the 30% back wages. A writ
petition was filed before the High Court. A learned Single Judge by a very
cryptic order held that the Labour Court has held that there was violation of
the requirements of Section 25-F of the Act and, therefore, there was no
legality. The Division Bench came to the similar conclusions.
4. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
there is no dispute that the engagement was for a specific project. The
Tribunal has categorically noted about these aspects but granted relief to the
respondent. It was noted that the office of the present appellant was under the
Jaipur Division and the new Kota Division has been created after bifurcation of
5. In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it should
be accepted that the project has been completed, yet in view of the fact that
there was bifurcation, the Tribunal was justified in its conclusion.
6. We find that the Tribunal failed to consider the issues in proper
perspective. The effect of Section 2(oo)(bb) has been completely lost sight of.
There was no dispute that the employment was for a specific project. There was
no discussion of the various materials produced before the Tribunal. The orders
of the High Court proceeded on the basis that because there was non-compliance
with the requirements of Section 25-F, the Award was justified. The question of
the applicability of Section 25-F of the Act would be dependent upon the basic
question relating to applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. That aspect
has been lost sight of. We, therefore, think it appropriate to remit the matter
to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. Parties will be permitted to place
material in support of their respective stand. As the matter is pending since
long, we request the Tribunal to dispose of the matter within a period of four
months from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment.
7. Appeal is allowed with no orders as to costs.