Baruah Vs. Union of India &
Ors  Insc 464 (27 April 2007)
S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2205 OF 2007 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9283 of 2006]
S.B. SINHA, J :
How far and to what extent suppression of fact by way of non- disclosure
would affect a person's right of access to justice is the question involved in
this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 23.07.2003 passed by
the High Court of Delhi in LPA No. 68 of 2003.
With a view to advert to the said question, we may notice the admitted
Indian Council for Child Welfare is a Society registered under the Societies
Registration Act and is governed by its Memorandum of Association as well as
Rules and Regulations framed thereunder. Appellant herein was an employee of
the said Society which is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India. She was offered an appointment. Her services, however,
were terminated allegedly without complying with the principles of natural
justice despite the fact that she was confirmed in her service.
Appellant filed a suit in the District Court on 28.03.2001. An application
was filed for grant of injunction. On or about 9.04.2001, only a notice to the
defendant was issued but no order of ad-interim injunction was passed. She
filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court on 10.04.2001.
Admittedly, in the said writ petition, the fact in regard to pendency of the
said suit was not disclosed. However, before the writ petition came up for
preliminary hearing, she filed an application for withdrawal of the suit on
12.04.2001. The said application allegedly could not be moved because of the
strike resorted to by the lawyers. The writ petition came up for preliminary
hearing on 18.04.2001. A notice was issued therein. Her application to withdraw
the suit dated 12.04.2001 came up for consideration before the Civil Court and
upon a statement made by her, the same was permitted to be withdrawn by an
order dated 30.04.2001. The writ petition, however, was dismissed by a learned
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court by an order dated 29.11.2002, opining:
"The petitioner has filed the present writ petition for issuance of a
writ of mandamus for quashing the order dated 19th March, 2001 terminating the services of the petitioner.
Notice was issued in the writ petition.
In the counter affidavit filed by Respondent No. 3, it has been disclosed
that the petitioner had filed a civil suit in the District Court on 28th March, 2001. A photocopy of the civil suit filed by petitioner for a declaration and
permanent injunction is filed with the counter affidavit as Annexure R3/A. The
prayer made in the suit is for a declaration that the order dated 19th March, 2001 is illegal, null and void. An application was also filed for the grant of
an ex-parte ad interim injunction. It appears that no ex-parte ad interim
injunction was granted to the petitioner.
However, without disclosing all these facts, the present writ petition was
filed on 10th April, 2001. There is not even a whisper in the writ petition
about the civil suit. Learned Counsel for the petitioner does not dispute that
such a civil suit was filed. It is stated in the rejoinder affidavit that a
civil suit was subsequently withdrawn but the relevant orders have not been
filed along with the rejoinder affidavit.
In view of gross concealment of fact by the petitioner, it appears that the
petitioner is doing nothing more than forum hunting. Having failed to obtain
any injunction in the civil suit, the Petitioner has resorted to filing the
present writ petition.
In view of the conduct of the petitioner and a material concealment of fact,
I am not inclined to entertain the writ petition. The same is, accordingly,
An intra-court appeal preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by the
impugned judgment stating:
"When the writ petition was filed, in the writ petition the factum of
filing the suit and non-grant of ex-parte injunction was not mentioned,
therefore, there appears to be concealment of facts.
The ld. Single Judge rightly came to the conclusion that since the appellant
concealed the facts in the writ petition, therefore, did not deserve any relief
and dismissed the same as if was found abuse of the process of court. It is
well settled law that a party who comes to the court by concealing facts is not
entitled to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India."
Ms. Lata Krishnamurthy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, would submit that the learned Single Judge as well as the Division
Bench of the High Court failed to take into consideration that in the rejoinder
filed by the appellant to the counter affidavit of the respondents, the
circumstances in which the writ petition was moved as also the legal advice on which
the appellant had acted were disclosed.
The learned counsel would submit that as on the date of hearing of the writ
petition, the suit already stood withdrawn, the question of dismissal of the
writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy would not
arise and, thus, the writ petition could not have been dismissed on that
premise. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on S.J.S. Business
Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Others [(2004) 7 SCC 166] The
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, would submit
that as a writ court exercises a discretionary jurisdiction, it can refuse to
do so when material facts have been suppressed.
On the one hand, judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution, on
the other, it provides for a discretionary remedy. Access to justice is a human
right. [See Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by Lrs. and Another v B.D.
Agarwal and Others (2003) 6 SCC 230 and Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi &
Anr. v. The State of Gujarat & Ors., 2007 (5) SCALE 357] A person who
has a grievance against a State, a forum must be provided for redressal
reference see also Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649] The
court's jurisdiction to determine the lis between the parties, therefore, may
be viewed from the human rights concept of access to justice.
The same, however, would not mean that the court will have no jurisdiction
to deny equitable relief when the complainant does not approach the court with
a pair of clean hands but to what extent such relief should be denied is the
It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be
a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a
discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the
lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material
for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for
determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person
invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to
approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed
and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the
In Moody v. Cox [1917 (2) Ch 71], it was held:
"It is contended that the fact that Moody has given those bribes
prevents him from getting any relief in a Court of Equity. The first
consequence of his having offered the bribes is that the vendors could have
rescinded the contract. But they were not bound to do so. They had the right to
say "No, we are well satisfied with the contract; it is a very good one
for us; we affirm it". The proposition put forward by counsel for the
defendants is: "It does not matter that the contract has been affirmed;
you still can claim no relief of any equitable character in regard to that
contract because you gave a bribe in respect of it. If there is a mistake in
the contract, you cannot rectify it, if you desire to rescind the contract, you
cannot rescind it, for that is equitable relief. With some doubt they said:
"We do not think you can get an injunction to have the contract performed,
though the other side have affirmed it, because an injunction may be equitable
remedy." When one asks on what principle this is supposed to be based one
receives in answer the maxim that any one coming to equity must come with clean
hands. It think the expression" clean hands" is used more often in
the text books than it is in the judgments, though it is occasionally used in
the judgments, but I was very much surprised to hear that when a contract,
obtained by the giving of a bribe, had been affirmed by the person who had a
primary right to affirm it, not being an illegal contract, the courts of Equity
could be so scrupulous that they would refuse any relief not connected at all
with the bribe. I was glad to find that it was not the case, because I think it
is quite clear that the passage in Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea 1 Cox, 318
which has been referred to shows that equity will not apply the principle about
clean hands unless the depravity, the dirt in question on the hand, has an
immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for. In this case the bribe
has no immediate relation to rectification, if rectification were asked, or to
rescission in connection with a matter not in any way connected with the bribe.
Therefore that point, which was argued with great strenuousness by counsel for
the defendant Hatt, appears to me to fail, and we have to consider the merits
of the case."
In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 16, pages 874- 876, the
law is stated in the following terms:
"1303. He who seeks equity must do equity.
In granting relief peculiar to its own jurisdiction a court of equity acts
upon the rule that he who seeks equity must do equity. By this it is not meant
that the court can impose arbitrary conditions upon a plaintiff simply because
he stands in that position on the record. The rule means that a man who comes
to seek the aid of a court of equity to enforce a claim must be prepared to
submit in such proceedings to any directions which the known principles of a
court of equity may make it proper to give; he must do justice as to the
matters in respect of which the assistance of equity is asked.
In a court of law it is otherwise: when the plaintiff is found to be
entitled to judgment, the law must take its course; no terms can be imposed.
*** *** *** 1305. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. A
court of equity refuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in regard to the
subject matter of the litigation has been improper. This was formerly expressed
by the maxim "he who has committed iniquity shall not have equity",
and relief was refused where a transaction was based on the plaintiff's fraud
or misrepresentation, or where the plaintiff sought to enforce a security
improperly obtained, or where he claimed a remedy for a breach of trust which
he had himself procured and whereby he had obtained money.
Later it was said that the plaintiff in equity must come with perfect
propriety of conduct, or with clean hands. In application of the principle a
person will not be allowed to assert his title to property which he has dealt
with so as to defeat his creditors or evade tax, for he may not maintain an
action by setting up his own fraudulent design.
The maxim does not, however, mean that equity strikes at depravity in a
general way; the cleanliness required is to be judged in relation to the relief
sought, and the conduct complained of must have an immediate and necessary
relation to the equity sued for; it must be depravity in a legal as well as in
a moral sense. Thus, fraud on the part of a minor deprives him of his right to
equitable relief notwithstanding his disability. Where the transaction is
itself unlawful it is not necessary to have recourse to this principle. In
equity, just as at law, no suit lies in general in respect of an illegal
transaction, but this is on the ground of its illegality, not by reason of the
[See also Snell's Equity, Thirtieth Edition, Pages 30-32 and Jai Narain
Parasrampuria (Dead) and Others v. Pushpa Devi Saraf and Others, (2006) 7 SCC
756] In Spry on Equitable Remedies, Fourth Edition, page 5, referring to Moody
v. Cox (supra) and Meyers v. Casey [(1913) 17 C.L.R. 90], it is stated :
"that the absence of clean hands is of no account "unless the
depravity, the dirt in question on the hand, has an immediate and necessary
relation to the equity sued for". When such exceptions or qualifications
are examined it becomes clear that the maxim that predicates a requirement of
clean hands cannot properly be regarded as setting out a rule that is either
precise or capable of satisfactory operation"
Although the aforementioned statement of law was made in connection with a
suit for specific performance of contract, the same may have a bearing in
determining a case of this nature also.
In the said treatise, it was also stated at pages 170-171:
"In these cases, however, it is necessary that the failure to disclose
the matters in question, and the consequent error or misapprehension of the
defendant, should be such that performance of his obligations would bring about
substantial hardship or unfairness that outweighs matters tending in favour of
specific performance. Thus the failure of the plaintiff to explain a matter of
fact, or even, in some circumstances, to correct a misunderstanding of law, may
incline the court to take a somewhat altered view of considerations of
hardship, and this will be the case especially where it appears that at the
relevant times the plaintiff knew of the ignorance or misapprehension of the
defendant but nonetheless did not take steps to provide information or to
correct the material error, or a fortiori, where he put the defendant off his
guard or hurried him into making a decision without proper enquiry"
In S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. (supra), it was stated:
"14. Assuming that the explanation given by the appellant that the suit
had been filed by one of the Directors of the Company without the knowledge of
the Director who almost simultaneously approached the High Court under Article
226 is unbelievable ( sic ), the question still remains whether the filing of
the suit can be said to be a fact material to the disposal of the writ petition
on merits. We think not. The existence of an adequate or suitable alternative
remedy available to a litigant is merely a factor which a court entertaining an
application under Article 226 will consider for exercising the discretion to
issue a writ under Article 226 5 . But the existence of such remedy does not
impinge upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the matter itself
if it is in a position to do so on the basis of the affidavits filed. If,
however, a party has already availed of the alternative remedy while invoking
the jurisdiction under Article 226, it would not be appropriate for the court
to entertain the writ petition. The rule is based on public policy but the
motivating factor is the existence of a parallel jurisdiction in another court.
But this Court has also held in Chandra Bhan Gosain v. State of Orissa 6 that
even when an alternative remedy has been availed of by a party but not pursued
that the party could prosecute proceedings under Article 226 for the same
relief. This Court has also held that when a party has already moved the High
Court under Article 226 and failed to obtain relief and then moved an
application under Article 32 before this Court for the same relief, normally
the Court will not entertain the application under Article 32. But where in the
parallel jurisdiction, the order is not a speaking one or the matter has been
disposed of on some other ground, this Court has, in a suitable case,
entertained the application under Article 32 7 . Instead of dismissing the writ
petition on the ground that the alternative remedy had been availed of, the
Court may call upon the party to elect whether it will proceed with the
alternative remedy or with the application under Article 226 8 . Therefore, the
fact that a suit had already been filed by the appellant was not such a fact
the suppression of which could have affected the final disposal of the writ
petition on merits."
There is another doctrine which cannot also be lost sight of. The court would
not ordinarily permit a party to pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the
same subject matter. [See Jai Singh v. Union of India and Others, (1977) 1 SCC
1] But, where one proceeding has been terminated without determination of the
lis, can it be said that the disputant shall be without a remedy? It will be in
the fitness of context to notice M/s. Tilokchand and Motichand & Others v.
H.B. Munshi and Another [(1969) 1 SCC 110] wherein it is stated:
"6. Then again this Court refrains from acting under Article 32 if the
party has already moved the High Court under Article 226. This constitutes a
comity between the Supreme Court and the High Court. Similarly, when a party
had already moved the High Court with a similar complaint and for the same relief
and failed, this Court insists on an appeal to be brought before it and does
not allow fresh proceedings to be started. In this connection the principle of
res judicata has been applied, although the expr ession is some what inapt and
unfortunate. The reason of the rule no doubt is public policy which Coke
summarised as " interest reipublicae res judicatas non rescindi" but
the motivating factor is the existence of another parallel jurisdiction in
another Court and that Court having been moved, this Court insists on bringing
its decision before this Court for review.
Again this Court distinguishes between cases in which a speaking order on
merits has been passed.
Where the order is not speaking or the matter has been disposed of on some
other ground at the threshold, this Court in a suitable case entertains the
application before itself. Another restraint which this Court puts on itself is
that it does not allow a new ground to be taken in appeal. In the same way,
this Court 'has refrained from taking action when a better remedy is to move
the High Court under Article 226 which can go into the controversy more
comprehensively than this Court can under Article 32."
[Emphasis supplied] Existence of an alternative remedy by itself, as was
propounded in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. (supra) may not be a
relevant factor as it is one thing to say that there exists an alternative
remedy and, therefore, the court would not exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction but it is another thing to say that the court refuses to do so on
the ground of suppression of facts.
Ubi jus ibi remedium is a well known concept. The court while refusing to
grant a relief to a person who comes with a genuine grievance in an arguable
case should be given a hearing. [See Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi (supra)] In
this case, however, the appellant had suppressed a material fact. It is evident
that the writ petition was filed only when no order of interim injunction was
passed. It was obligatory on the part of the appellant to disclose the said
In this case, however, suppression of filing of the suit is no longer a
material fact. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High
Court may be correct that, in a case of this nature, the court's jurisdiction
may not be invoked but that would not mean that another writ petition would not
lie. When another writ petition is filed disclosing all the facts, the
appellant would be approaching the writ court with a pair of clean hands, the
court at that point of time will be entitled to determine the case on merits
having regard to the human right of the appellant to access to justice and
keeping in view the fact that judicial review is a basic feature of the
Constitution of India.
The judgment of the High Court, in a case of this nature, shall not operate
as a res judicata.
For the reasons aforementioned, while we uphold the judgment of the High
Court, are of the opinion that in the event the appellant files a fresh writ
application, the same may be considered on its own merits. The appeal is
dismissed with the aforementioned observations. No costs.
Pages: 1 2