State
of Gujarat & Ors Vs. Dilipbhai Shaligram Patil
[2006] Insc 577 (11
September 2006)
Arijit
Pasayat & Lokeshwar Singh Panta
(Arising
out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7782 of 2005 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave
granted.
Challenge
in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Gujarat
High Court allowing the appeal filed by the respondent. Detailed reference to
the factual aspect is unnecessary because the High Court's order on the face of
it is unsustainable. Respondent filed the writ petition questioning the order
of discharge passed by the Superintendent of Police, Western Railway, Vadodara
by order dated 23.11.1993. Civil Special Application 1346 was filed by the
respondent on 30.11.1993. On the said date notice was issued on the application
and was made returnable on 10.12.1993. Reply was field by the appellant-State
on 16.12.1993. On 11.1.1994 an interim order was passed directing reinstatement
of the respondent pending disposal of the petition. Finally the writ petition
was dismissed by order dated 31.3.2004. It was clearly indicated in the order
that the interim reliefs stood vacated. Subsequently, the review application
was filed which was dismissed on 13.9.2004.
Respondent
filed Letters Patent Appeal 2475 of 2004 which was allowed. The High Court's
conclusions inter alia are as follows:
"Having
heard learned counsel for the parties and having carefully perused the speaking
order of admission and interim order dated 11.1.1994 passed by S.M. Soni, J.
(as he then was), this petition was required to be allowed.
In
fact, by an interim order, the learned Single Judge has been particularly
allowed the writ petition." Learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the High Court's view is clearly untenable and interim order passed looses
effect after final disposal of the writ petition.
Merely
because an interim order had been passed earlier that High Court could not have
concluded that by the interim order learned Single Judge had allowed the writ
petition. In fact, in the present case learned Single Judge while dismissing
the writ petition clearly noted that the interim reliefs stood vacated because
of the dismissal of the writ petition.
Learned
counsel for the respondent supported the order of the High Court.
It is
well settled that an order granting pending disposal of the writ petition/suit
or other proceedings, comes to an end with the disposal of the substantive
proceedings and that it is the duty of the Court in such a case to put the
parties in the same position, they would have been but for the interim orders
of the Court. Any other view would result in the act or order of the court
prejudicing the party for no fault of his and would also mean rewarding writ
petitioner in spite of his failure. Any such unjust consequence cannot be countenanced
by the courts. [(See Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. U.P. State
Electricity Board and Ors. 1997 (5) SCC 772)].
The
position was also highlighted in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South
India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras (1992 (3) SCC 1). It was
inter alia noted as follows:- "While considering the effect of an interim
order staying the operation of the order under-challenge, a distinction has to
be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order.
Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on
the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of
operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means
that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of
the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been
wiped out from existence. "(underlines for emphasis) Merely because an
interim order had been passed pursuant to which reinstatement had been done,
that cannot be a ground for allowing relief. (See Union of India v. Narender
Singh (2005 (6) SCC 106).
The
position was also noted in Union of India v. G.R. Prabhavalkar and Ors. (1973
(4) SCC 183) as follows:
"Mr.
Singhvi, learned Counsel, then referred us to the fact that after the judgment
of the High Court the State Government has passed an order on March 19, 1971, the effect of which is to equate
the Sales Tax Officers of the erstwhile Madhya Pradesh State with the Sales Tax Officers, Grade in, of Bombay. This order, in our opinion, has
been passed by the State Government only to comply with the directions given by
the High Court. It was made during a period when the appeal against the
judgment was pending in this Court. The fact that the State Government took
steps to comply with the directions of the High Court cannot lead to the
inference that the appeal by the Union of India has become infructuous."
The order of the High Court cannot be maintained and is set aside. Since the
High Court has not dealt with the matter on merits, we remit the matter to the
High Court for fresh consideration on merits.
The
appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs.
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