Babubhai Udesinh Parmar Vs. State of Gujarat [2006] Insc 854 (24 November 2006)
S.B.
Sinha & Markandey Katju S.B. Sinha, J :
The
appellant herein was a labourer. He is said to have committed a series of
offences involving heinous crimes. He is involved also in a case of rape and
murder of a minor girl Savita. She was sister of Shankar Bhursinh
(complainant). He lodged a First Information Report on 1.07.1998 inter alia
stating that he with a view to earn his livelihood came with his family to Karamsad
town. He was staying in a shed opposite to Tirupati Petrol Pump.
He was
sleeping in that shed. He woke up at about 2 a.m. for answering the call of nature. At that time her sister was sleeping
along with other family members. When he woke up again, he did not find Savita.
It was raining on that night. Searches were made for her. On the next day
morning, her dead body was found lying in the surrounding field belonging to Malabhai
and Kanbhai. Her neck was tied with a frock which was worn by her. She was
found to be dead. The blood was found to have been oozing out from her private
part. The knicker worn by her was also missing. He informed the police. The
appellant was arrested by the investigating officer Mr. R.G. Patel on
12.08.2002. He purported to have made a confession about committing rape and
murdering Savita. He also allegedly showed the place of incidence to the
investigating officer. He prepared panchnama of the scene of offence and
recorded statement of the concerned witnesses. He then sent the frock worn by
the deceased to Forensic Science Laboratory.
The
appellant purported to have made a confessional statement before PW-2 Ambalal.
Principally
relying on or on the basis of said judicial confession made by the appellant,
he was found guilty of commission of offence. The learned Sessions Judge took
into consideration the fact that he has been found guilty of commission of
similar offences as also other offences and, thus, imposed death penalty on
him. The High Court affirmed the said judgment of conviction and sentence by
its judgment dated 2.03.2005.
The
High Court while recording that the confession was found not only to be true
but having been voluntarily made, opined that the same could be relied upon. At
the same time, the High Court proceeded on the basis that the accused was free
to make retraction of his confession when his statement under Section 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded. The High Court furthermore noticed
that oath should not have been administered to the accused but opined that the
same is not of much significance but proceeded on the basis that the decisions
of the Apex Court have often said that the court cannot solely rely on the
retracted confession and make it a foundation for convicting the accused. But,
while purporting to keep the confessional statement of the appellant aside, it
examined the purported circumstances used against him. We are afraid, nothing
has been brought on record to show existence of any circumstance which would
lead to the conclusion that the appellant alone is guilty of commission of the
offence.
Rape
and murder of Savita is not in dispute before us. It is also not disputed
before us as that apart from the purported judicial confession there is no
other material which can be said to be sufficient to establish the guilt of the
appellant. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadiad recorded the confession on the
basis of an application made by the said Mr. R.G. Patil.
An
application was also filed to record the confession of the appellant in another
case bearing No. I.C.R. No. 123 of 1997.
The
confession was recorded on 7.09.2000. He was in judicial custody for a period
of 16 days. His statement is as under:
"The
incident is of two years old I do not remember the exact date. On that day I
was at my house and at night say around 12.00 I went to the field which is at opp
Karamsad Petrol Pump. I don't know whose field is this. On being reached to the
field I saw that there was one shed with a______, and under that shed one girl
was sleeping. I have lifted her. I don't know the age of the girl, as soon as
she wanted to shout I have closed her mouth, and behind that field one cannel
is there and I have taken the girl in that cannel, there was a field near the
cannel, and in that field one tree namely baval was there and one floor was
constructed thereon. I have taken the girl to that field, I have removed the
cloth of the girl in the field, the mouth was shunted and have raped her, and
thereafter I have given the noose on the neck with her frock as a result of
which the girl was died. And I have taken the girl to the corner of the field
and left the field after keeping the girl in the corner of the field. I have
not told anybody about the incident, this is my confession regarding the
offence." It preceded by routine questions. It was accompanied by a
certificate in usual form.
The
learned Magistrate examined himself as PW-2. In his deposition he reproduced
the statements of the appellant. In his cross-examination, he accepted that the
confession started at about 11.15 a.m. and
was completed at about 11.30
a.m. He did not
remember that on the same day he recorded another confession of the appellant
in relation to Session Case No. 298 of 2000. He, however, accepted that he had
done so when it was brought to his notice. Recording of that confession was
completed at 11.45 a.m. Till then no legal aid was provided
to him.
He did
not examine the body of the accused. He asked only the routine question as to
whether he was ill-treated by the police. He accepted that the accused was
produced before him under police protection and was also taken back under the
police protection. He stated:
"two
things is to be noted in the confession statement regarding voluntarily and
reality. I cannot say that the accused has shown the reality or not" Two
inconsistencies appeared in the prosecution case vis-`-vis the said purported
confession. The evidence of the brother of the deceased categorically shows
that the offence was committed in between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. The purported confession shows that
the offence was committed around 12 O'Clock in the night. The prosecution case proved that not only the complainant
but also other family members were sleeping in the same shed. The purport of
the confessions goes to show that the deceased was sleeping alone in the shed.
We do
not appreciate as to why oath had to be administered to the accused while
recording confession. Taking of a statement of an accused on oath is
prohibited. It may or may not be of much significance. But, it may assume
significance when we examine that a purported deposition of accused was taken
on 10.03.2003 wherein also his evidence on oath was recorded in the following
terms:
"I
hereby state on oath that:- My Name : Babubhai My father's name : Udesing Parmar
My age about : 27 years My occupation : Labour Work Village of Residence:
Native Umrav Tadia Pura, at present Karamsad Question: Have you received copy
of documents of police investigation? Answer: Yes Question: Is the charge sheet
Exh. 4 read over to you, Do you admit the offence? Or you want to proceed
further the judicial proceedings? Answer: I do not admit the offence.
Question:
Have you engaged private advocate for your self defence or you want to engage
advocate at the cost of Government? Answer: I have engaged free advocate."
Ms. Hemantika Wahi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, would
submit that the provisions of Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
contains a salutary principle and only in the event the confession is found to
have been voluntarily rendered, the same can be the foundation for recording a
judgment of conviction.
A
judicial confession undoubtedly is admissible in evidence. It is a relevant
fact. A judgment of conviction can also be based on a confession if it is found
to be truthful, deliberate and voluntary and if clearly proved. The voluntary
nature of the confession depends upon whether there was any threat, inducement
or promise and its truth is judged on the basis of the entire prosecution case.
[See Bharat v. State of U.P., (1971) 3 SCC 950 and Subramania Goundan
v. The State of Madras, (1958) SCR 429] In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu
Alias Afsan Guru [(2005) 11 SCC 600], this Court observed:
"Confessions
are considered highly reliable because no rational person would make admission
against his interest unless prompted by his conscience to tell the truth.
"Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved are
among the most effectual proofs in law". (vide Taylor's Treatise on the Law of Evidence
Vol. I).
However,
before acting upon a confession the court must be satisfied that it was freely
and voluntarily made. A confession by hope or promise of advantage, reward or
immunity or by force or by fear induced by violence or threats of violence
cannot constitute evidence against the maker of confession. The confession
should have been made with full knowledge of the nature and consequences of the
confession. If any reasonable doubt is entertained by the court that these
ingredients are not satisfied, the court should eschew the confession from
consideration. So also the authority recording the confession - be it a
Magistrate or some other statutory functionary at the pre-trial stage, must
address himself to the issue whether the accused has come forward to make the
confession in an atmosphere free from fear, duress or hope of some advantage or
reward induced by the persons in authority. Recognizing the stark reality of
the accused being enveloped in a state of fear and panic, anxiety and despair
while in police custody, the Indian Evidence Act has excluded the admissibility
of a confession made to the police officer.
Section
164 of Cr.P.C. is a salutary provision which lays down certain precautionary
rules to be followed by the Magistrate recording a confession so as to ensure
the voluntariness of the confession and the accused being placed in a situation
free from threat or influence of the police." However, it was
categorically stated that retracted confession must be looked upon with greater
concern unless the reasons given for having made it in the first instance are
on the face of them false.
Section
164 provides for safeguards for an accused. The provisions contained therein
are required to be strictly complied with. But, it does not envisage compliance
of the statutory provisions in a routine or mechanical manner.
The
court must give sufficient time to an accused to ponder over as to whether he
would make confession or not. The appellant was produced from judicial custody
but he had been in police custody for a period of 16 days. The learned
Magistrate should have taken note of the said fact. It would not be substantial
compliance of law. What would serve the purpose of the provisions contained in
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are compliance of spirit of the
provisions and not merely the letters of it. What is necessary to be complied
with, is strict compliance of the provisions of Section 164 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which would mean compliance of the statutory provisions in
letter and spirit. We do not appreciate the manner in which the confession was
recorded. He was produced at 11.15 a.m. The
first confession was recorded in 15 minutes time which included the questions
which were required to be put to the appellant by the learned Magistrate for
arriving at its satisfaction that the confession was voluntary in nature,
truthful and free from threat, coercion or undue influence. It is a matter of
some concern that he started recording the confession of the appellant in the
second case soon thereafter. Both the cases involved serious offences. They
resulted in the extreme penalty. The learned Magistrate, therefore, should have
allowed some more time to the appellant to make his statement. He should have
satisfied himself as regards the voluntariness and truthfulness of the
confession of the appellant.
In Devendra
Prasad Tiwari v. State of U.P. [AIR 1978
SC 1544], this Court opined:
"It
is also true that before a confessional statement made under Section 164 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure can be acted upon, it must be shown to be voluntary
and free from police influence and that the confessional statement made by the appelant
in the instant case cannot be taken into "account, as it suffers from
serious infirmities in that
(1) there
is no contemporaneous record to show that the appellant was actually kept in
jail as ordered on Sept.
6, 1974 by Shri R.P.
Singh, Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur,
(2) Shri
R.P. Singh who recorded the so called confessional statement of the appellant
did not question him as to why he was making the confession and
(3)
there is also nothing in the statement of the said Magistrate to show that he
told the appellant that he would not be remanded to the police lock up even if
he did not confess his guilt" [See also Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh AIR 1952 SC 159] In Parmananda Pegu v. State of Assam [AIR 2004 SC
4197], this Court opined:
"The
foremost amongst the factors that are sought to be relied upon by the
prosecution is the retracted confession of the appellant recorded under Section
164 Cr.P.C. The confession has been extracted supra in verbatim. Before acting
on a confession made before a Judicial Magistrate in terms of Section 164, the
Court must be satisfied first that the procedural requirements laid down in
Sub- sections (2) to (4) are complied with. These are salutary safeguards to
ensure that the confession is made voluntarily by the accused after being
apprised of the implications of making such confession. Looking at the
confessional statement (Ext.8) coupled with the evidence of PW 22, the then
Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhemaji, we have no doubt in our mind that the
procedural requirements have been fulfilled. Inter alia, PW 22 deposed that
after cautioning the accused that the confessional statement, if made, will be
used in evidence against them, he gave three hours time for reflection during
which the accused were kept in a room attached to the Court in the immediate
presence of an office peon. PW22 further stated that it appeared to him that
the accused made the statement voluntarily. A memorandum as required by
Sub-section (4) was also recorded. Thus the first requirement for acting on a
confession is satisfied but that is not the end of the matter. The Court,
called upon to consider the evidence against the accused, should still see
whether there are any circumstances appearing from the record which may cast a
doubt on the voluntary nature of the confession. The endeavor of the Court
should be to apply its mind to the question whether the accused was free from
threat, duress or inducement at the time of making the confession. In doing so,
the Court should bear in mind, the principle enunciated in Pyare Lal v. State
of Rajasthan [(1963) Suppl.1 SCR 689] that under Section 24 of the Evidence
Act, a stringent rule of proof as to the existence of threat, duress or
inducement should not be applied and a prima facie opinion based on evidence
and circumstances may be adopted as the standard laid down. To put it in other
words, "on the evidence and the circumstances in a particular case it may
appear to the Court that there was a threat, inducement or promise, though the
said fact is not strictly proved."
17.
Having thus reached a finding as to voluntary nature of a confession, the truth
of the confession should then be tested by the Court. The fact that the
confession has been made voluntarily, free from threat and inducement, can be
regarded as presumptive evidence of its truth. Still, there may be
circumstances to indicate that the confession cannot be true wholly or partly
in which case it loses much of its evidentiary value.
18. In
order to be assured of the truth of confession, this Court, in a series of
decisions, has evolved a rule of prudence that the Court should look to
corroboration from other evidence.
However,
there need not be corroboration in respect of each and every material
particular.
Broadly,
there should be corroborated so that the confession taken as a whole fits into
the facts proved by other evidence. In substance, the Court should have
assurance from all angles that the retracted confession was, in fact, voluntary
and it must have been true" We must also notice that there was no
direction to provide free legal aid to the appellant. He had no opportunity to
have independent advice. We may, however, hasten to add that it does not mean
that such legal assistance must be provided in each and every case but in a
case of this nature where the appellant is said to have confessed in a large
number of cases at the same time, the State could not have denied legal aid to
him for a period of three years.
There
is another aspect of the matter which must be taken into consideration. The
same being the manner in which the case has been dealt with by the courts
below.
The
judgment of the learned Trial Judge gives an impression that he had proceeded
on the basis that the appellant is guilty of commission of crime in large
number of crimes. The High Court although taken note of the propositions of
law, while pointing out the corroborative pieces of evidence, repeated only the
evidences brought on records which proved the commission of offence. The
purported corroborative evidence brought on record by the prosecution and as
noticed by the High Court did not indicate that the appellant was guilty of
commission of the offence. The circumstances were not such which formed links
in the chain and point out only to the guilt to the accused and accused alone.
We,
therefore, with respect, are constrained to record disagreement with the
ultimate findings of the learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court. We,
however, may observe that we have only considered the merit of the present
appeal. Each case against the appellant must be judged on the basis of the
legal evidence brought on records. Our observations, we are sure, would not
influence the learned Judges dealing with other cases involving the appellant
and pending before them.
The
judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
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