Dhampur
Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P [2006] Insc 311 (12 May 2006)
S.B.
Sinha & P.K. Balasubramanyan
(Arising
out of SLP(C)No.1811 of 2005) S.B. SINHA, J :
Leave
granted.
Whether
the adjustment of price of molasses from the amount of licence fee would amount
to sale within the meaning of Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948 ('the Act', for
short), is the question involved in this appeal which arises out of the
judgment and order dated 21.5.2004 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
in Trade Tax Revision No.1866 of 1993.
The
basic facts are not in dispute. One M/s. Swaroop Vegetables Products Industries
Ltd. ('the Company', for short) owned and possessed a sugar mill known as Sir Shadilal
Sugar and General Mills situated at Mansurpur District, Muzaffarnagar in U.P. A
Deed of Licence was executed by the said Company in favour of the appellant
herein on 3.9.1987; pursuant whereto and in furtherance whereof, the appellant
herein executed a performance guarantee to ensure performance of the said Deed
of Licence dated 3.9.1987. In terms of the said agreement dated 3.9.1987, a
performance guarantee was executed by the appellant herein, wherein it was
agreed to by and between the parties that a major part of the licence fee would
be paid in the shape of molasses. The contention of the appellant all along was
and still is that it is in lieu of the consideration for the right to use the
said sugar mill, i.e., the licence fee. The appellant was required to handover
molasses to the said Company for an amount equivalent to the licence fee and
such a transaction would not constitute a sale of molasses so as to attract the
provisions of the Act.
It is
not in dispute that for the assessment year 1987-88, the appellant was held to
be liable to pay trade tax to the extent of Rs.3,19,699.12p. by an order of
assessment dated 30.7.1991 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Trade Tax, Najibabad.
The Company, however, preferred an appeal thereagainst as it was said to be the
person aggrieved by the said order of assessment dated 30.7.1991 on the premise
that in the terms of the agreement between the parties, the Company would be
ultimately held liable for reimbursing the appellant to the extent of the
amount of tax paid. In appeal No.128/91, the Deputy Commissioner, Trade Tax, Moradabad
held by order dated 9.1.1992, that molasses having been supplied in lieu of
rent, the same would not fall within the definition of "sale" and it
was a barter or exchange. However, it was directed that in the pending appeal
preferred by the appellant, the amount assessed on molasses would be reduced.
In the
meantime, the appellant also preferred an appeal against the said order of
assessment and by an order dated 6.2.1992, the Deputy Commissioner granted the
benefit of his earlier order dated 9.1.1992 to it, but in other respects, the
said appeal was dismissed. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order
dated 9.1.1992, an appeal was preferred thereagainst by the respondent herein
before the Trade Tax Tribunal. The said appeal was found to be barred by
limitation and on the said ground alone it was dismissed by an order dated
26.8.1992. However, the respondent preferred another appeal before the Trade
Tax Tribunal against the order dated 6.2.1992. An appeal was also preferred by
the appellant herein before the said Tribunal questioning the order dated
6.2.1992 passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeal), Trade Tax in so far as it
refused relief to the petitioner on various other grounds. Both the appeals
were heard together. By an order dated 26/28.6.1993, the appeal preferred by
the Revenue was dismissed on the premise that the issues stood concluded by the
dismissal of the second appeal of the department against the order dated
9.1.1992. However, the Company was proceeded against by the Revenue for
imposition of tax for the assessment year 1988-89 purported to be in terms of
Section 3F of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948 on the licence fee of Rs.56
lakhs on the ground that the said sum was paid to it by the appellant herein by
way of consideration for the right to use the goods. A writ petition was filed
by the Company questioning the validity of the said order. The Revenue also
filed a revision petition, being Sales Tax Revision No.1866/93, before the High
Court against the order dated 26/28.6.93 in Second Appeal No.446/92 (87-88)
U.P., Second Appeal No.447/92 (87-88) Centre and Second Appeal No.283/92. The
writ petition filed by the Company was allowed by an order dated 17.2.1998
holding that 'sugar mill' was not 'goods' and hence 'licence fee' for its use
was not exigible to trade tax.
However,
revision petition filed by the Revenue herein was allowed by the High Court by
reason of the impugned order. The appellant is, thus, before us.
Mr. Dushyant
Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted
that an exchange or barter, in view of a large number of decisions of this
Court cannot be said to be a sale within the meaning of the relevant provisions
of the Act. Reliance in this behalf was placed on M/s. Gannon Dunkerley &
Co. & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [(1993) 1 SCC 364]. The
learned counsel urged that the expression "price" would mean only
cash or deferred payment. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on Devi Das Gopal
Krishnan & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [(1967) 3 SCR 557].
It was
further submitted that in view of the decision of this Court in M/s. Gannon Dunkerley
& Co. (supra) even after the Forty-sixth Constitution Amendment Act, for
the purpose of Entry 54 List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution,
subject to the exception contained in Article 366(29-A), the meaning of the
terms "goods" or "deemed sales" would remain the same.
Reliance in this regard was placed on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2006) 3 SCC 1].
With
regard to the essentials of a sale for the purpose of the Sales Tax Act, the
word "sale" will have the same meaning as what is contained in the Sale
of Goods Act, 1930, it was argued. Hence, the impugned judgment is wholly
unsustainable. Learned counsel contended that the payment of "price"
being an essential component of a sale, the arrangements entered into by and
between the parties hereto, cannot be held to be a sale within the meaning of
the said Act or otherwise.
Mr. Dinesh
Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the
other hand, submitted that the intention of the parties, as to whether the
transaction in question would be a "sale" within the meaning of the
Act must be gathered from the terms of the licence itself and upon a perusal of
the relevant terms of the said deed, it is clear that the transaction would
constitute a sale.
The
U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 was enacted to provide for the levy of tax on the sale
or purchase of the goods. "Sale"
has been defined in Section 2(h) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948. The said
provision reads as under:
"2(h)
"sale"
with its grammatical variations and cognate expression, means any transfer of
property in goods (otherwise than by way of a mortgage, hypothecation, charge
or pledge) for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration and
includes-
-
a transfer,
otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, of property in any goods for cash,
deferred payment or other valuable consideration;
-
a transfer of
property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the
execution of a works contract;
-
the delivery of
goods on hire purchase or any system of payment by instalments;
-
a transfer of
the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified
period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;
-
the supply of
goods by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof
for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration; and
-
the supply, by
way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever of goods,
being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or
not intoxicating) where such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or
other valuable consideration."
The
terms "Manufacturer" and "dealer" are defined in Sections 2
(ee) and 2(c) of the said Act, which are as under :
"2(ee)
"manufacturer" in relation to any goods means the dealer who makes the first sale of
such goods in the State after their manufacture and includes,
i.a
a dealer who
sells bicycles in completely knocked down form,
i.b
a dealer who
makes purchases from any other dealer not liable to tax on his sale under the
Act other than sales exempted under section 4, 4-A and 4-AAA.
"2(c)
"dealer"
means any person who carries on in Uttar Pradesh (whether regularly or
otherwise) the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods
directly or indirectly, for cash or deferred payment or for commission, remuneration
or other valuable consideration and includes
-
a local
authority, body corporate, company, any co-operative society or other society,
club, firm, Hindu undivided family or other association of persons which
carries on such business;
-
a factor, broker,
arhati, commission agent, del credere agent, or any other mercantile agent, by
whatever name called, and whether of the same description as hereinbefore
mentioned or not, who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or
distributing goods belonging to any principal, whether disclosed or not;
-
an auctioneer
who carries on the business of selling or auctioning goods belonging to any
principal, whether disclosed or not, and whether the offer of the intending
purchaser is accepted by him or by the principal or nominee of the principal;
-
a government
which, whether in the course of business or otherwise, buys, sells, supplies or
distributes goods, directly or otherwise for cash or for deferred payment or
for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration;
-
every person who
acts within the State as an agent of a dealer residing outside the State, and
buys, sells, supplies or distributes goods in the State or acts on behalf of
such dealer as
-
a mercantile
agent as defined in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930; or
-
an agent for
handling of goods or documents of title relating to goods; or
-
an agent for the
collection or the payment of the sale price of goods or as a guarantor for such
collection or such payment;
-
a firm or a
company or other body corporate, the principal office or headquarter whereof is
outside the State, having a branch or office in the State, in respect of
purchases or sales, supplies or distribution of goods through such branch or
office:
PROVIDED
that a person who sells agricultural or horticultural produce grown by himself
or grown on any land in which he has an interest, whether as owner, usufructuary
mortgagee, tenant, or otherwise, or who sells poultry of dairy products from
fowls or animals kept by him shall not, in respect of such goods, be treated as
a dealer.
-
every person who
carries on the business of transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or
in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract;
-
every person who
carries on business of transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose
(whether or not for a specified period) for cash deferred payment or other
valuable consideration;" The question, which arises for our consideration,
is whether the transaction involves a transfer of property or a transfer of a
right to use any goods or not.
The
appellant herein, indisputably, carried on the business of manufacture of sugar
and molasses. It does not use the molasses itself. The stock of molasses has
not been transferred by the Appellant. The stock of molasses, indisputably,
used to be transferred to a company. The Company was the owner of the mill. The
premises of the mill had been taken on lease, although, termed as a licence for
a period of 10 years. By reason of the purported Deed of Licence, the appellant
has been allowed exclusive use of the sugar mill along with its plant,
machinery, fixtures and fittings, etc. The appellant had taken over the whole
sugar mill. The Company has not retained any control over the operation of the
said mill. In terms of the said Deed, the appellant was to pay a sum of Rs.56 lakhs
per annum by way of licence fee for the use of the entire sugar mill complex.
Such licence fee was payable at the end of every year of the licence, i.e.,
from 1st July to 30th June of the succeeding year. The licensee was to pay
during the period of the licence, all rates and taxes leviable by the
Government or local authorities on the factory. Clause 8 of the said Deed of Licence,
inter alia, is as under:
-
"That the
Licensee shall be entitled to claim and utilize all
quotas/permits/licenses/rights /permission/amenities and other facilities and
entitlements that were available to the Sugar Mills hereto before." By
reason of the provisions of the said licence, the ultimate control over the
affairs of the sugar mill vested with the appellant. Clause 11 provides that
the licensee was granted full liberty to repair/replace the plant and
machinery, if necessary, for the proper running of the sugar mill and to carry
out the civil construction work, wherever considered necessary. In terms of
Clause 18 of the purported Deed of Licence, the licensee was required to
execute a performance guarantee in favour of the owner to ensure performance on
its part and the Company was required to assure the appellant that it would not
in any manner put any hindrance to the running of the mill during the period of
the licence and the Company would also ensure that none of its creditors as on
date including its Bankers, take any steps to hinder the working of the mill.
It is
beyond any controversy that the mode and manner in which the licence fee was to
be paid, is not the subject matter of the said Deed. In other words, the Deed
of Licence does not contain any provision that the appellant was required to
transfer to the company, the molasses produced by it, by exercising its
exclusive right to use the sugar mill, in lieu of the licence fee or otherwise.
The Performance Guarantee Deed entered into by the appellant herein was a
mechanism to pay the licence fee. By reason of the said performance guarantee,
only a provision has been made in terms whereof the appellant was required to
handover the entire quantity of molasses to the Company and the appellant had
no right to sell it to any other person. Clause 1 of the said Performance
Guarantee Deed speaks of furnishing of the security of Rs.50 lakhs to the
Company as an interest free deposit. Out of the said sum, a sum of Rs.6 lakhs
was to adjusted towards payment of the licence fee of Rs.56 lakhs, as a result
whereof, the security amount would be reduced proportionately on completion of
each year of licence. Only the unadjusted amount of security, in terms of the
said Deed, was required to be refunded by the Company to the appellant at the
time of handing over possession of the mill. Clauses 4 and 5 of the said
Performance Guarantee Deed read as under:
-
"That Licence
Fee in question will be paid in shape of Molasses and the quantity thereof
shall depend upon the working of the Sugar Mill.
-
That at the end
of every Licence Year i.e. 30th June the value of Molasses will be ascertained
on the basis of rates notified by the Government for the relevant year. In case
there is any excess or shortage towards the amount of Licence Fee, the same
will be made good by either of the parties as the case may be." The said
provisions are required to be read conjointly. For the purpose of supply of
molasses, the rates notified by the Government was required to be taken into
consideration. The quantity of supply was not fixed and would depend upon the
working of the sugar mill. If there was to be any excess or shortage in
molasses to be delivered towards the amount of licence fee, the same was
required to be made good by either of the parties.
A
dispute resolution mechanism between the parties is contained in Clause 6 of
the said Deed of Performance Guarantee. It is, therefore, not a case where
molasses were required to be supplied, in terms of the provisions of the licence.
Both molasses and sugar, were controlled commodities in the year 1988. The
appellant, as also the Company, were required to sell molasses and sugar at the
price notified by the Appropriate Government. In terms of the Act, the
manufacturer would be a dealer. The appellant, therefore, was a dealer. It was,
therefore, not correct to contend that the licence fees were being paid by the
appellant by way of supply of molasses. In terms of the Deed of Licence, the
appellant is responsible to manufacture in the same capacity as that of the
owner. It has to pay the licence fee in the manner laid down in the deed of licence.
The performance guarantee is not a part of the Deed of Licence in the sense
that by reason thereof the terms and conditions for grant of the licence
including that of payment of the licence fee, are not controlled by it. The
definition of "sale" has undergone a change after coming into force
of the Forty Sixth Constitution Amendment Act. Clause 29-A of Article 366 of
the Constitution of India defines "sale" to mean:
"366.(29-A)
"tax on the sale or purchase of goods" includes
-
a tax on the
transfer, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract of property in any goods
for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;
-
a tax on the
transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved
in the execution of a works contract;
-
a tax on the
delivery of goods on hire- purchase or any system of payment of instalments;
-
a tax on the
transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a
specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;
-
a tax on the
supply of goods by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a
member thereof for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration;
-
a tax on the
supply, by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever,
of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink
(whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service, is for cash,
deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and such transfer, delivery
or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the
person making the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by
the person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made;" The State
of Uttar Pradesh has amended the definition of sale in consonance with Clause
29-A of Article 366 of the Constitution.
The
definition of 'sale', thus, is different from the provisions of the Sale of
Goods Act, 1930, as in terms thereof a contract of sale of goods would be
deemed to be a contract of sale or transfer of property in the goods to the
buyer for a price. However, in terms of Section 2(h) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act,
1948, a sale would mean a transfer of property in goods in any way otherwise
than by way of a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge for cash or deferred
payment or other valuable consideration. The definition being an inclusive one
must be given a broad meaning. A transfer of the right to use any goods for any
purpose either for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration,
would come within the purview of the said definition.
The
performance clause contained in Clause 18 of the Deed of Licence does not
govern the other terms and conditions of the licence. The amount of licence fee
is fixed. Only a sum of Rs.6 lakhs is to be adjusted from the amount of
security deposit. In each year, having regard to the said term, different
amount of licence fee was payable. Supply of molasses would depend upon the
production in the mill. The price payable therefor was also variable. In a
given situation, having regard to the extent of production, the appellant, at
the end of the licence year, may become entitled to some amount from the
Company as it is possible, having regard to the agreed terms, that the
appellant was required to transfer the entire quantity of molasses produced in
the said sugar mill, the amount of molasses supplied would exceed the amount of
licence fee found to be payable for a particular year. If, in respect of such
excess molasses, the Company was required to pay any amount to the appellant,
in our opinion, it cannot be said that the parties have entered into a contract
for supply of molasses produced in the sugar mill by the appellant herein in favour
of the Company by way of a barter or exchange.
It is
inconceivable in law that a licence fee can be a subject matter of barter or
exchange. A barter or exchange indisputably is distinct and different from a
sale. A contract of sale denotes a transfer of property in goods by mutual
consent. Such a transfer of ownership must be in relation to transfer from one
person to another. The consideration would be a price in the form of money.
Only when the consideration for transfer consists of other goods, it may be an
exchange or barter. Such is not the position here.
In
State of Madras vs. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. [(1958) SCR 379], relied upon by
Mr. Dave, this Court was concerned with a question as to whether any transfer
of property in goods was involved in the execution of a works contract.
By
reason of Clause 29-A of Article 366, the ratio in Gannon Dunkerley & Co.
(supra) has been overcome, as title to the goods, although, may remain with the
transferee, a transfer of right to use the goods would also be a sale. Even a
lease of goods would be a sale. Thus, by reason of the said definition, though
an essential ingredient of a sale as defined in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930,
may be absent, the transaction may amount to a sale for the purpose of levy of
Sales Tax under the Act. What has not been altered by reason of the said
provision is the meaning of the word "goods".
In
this case, the concept of goods is not in dispute. Molasses is indisputably
goods. It can be transferred for a definite price.
An
adjustment of price in a case of this nature, in our opinion, therefore, would
come within the purview of the term "other valuable consideration",
inasmuch as both the appellant and the Company, were aware that they have to fulfil
their respective terms of obligations, i.e.,
-
payment of licence
fee on monetary terms; and
-
payment of price
of molasses supplied by the appellant to the Company, which is again on
monetary terms. Parties, therefore, by mutual consent only have agreed to
adjust the price of molasses supplied with the amount of licence fee. The rate
for supply of molasses was to be determined by the Central Government. In that
view of the matter, presumably one party or the other shall make good the
shortfall or the excess upon taking into consideration the price of molasses
fixed by the Central government. The transaction, in our opinion does not
constitute an exchange or barter. It was not a transaction by way of transfer
of stock. It was also not a transfer by way of a mortgage or lease.
In Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union
of India & Ors. [(2006) 3 SCC 1], whereupon Mr. Dave placed strong
reliance, this Court has clearly held that the content of a concept would not
remain static and an interpretation of the Constitution vis-`-vis the statute
framed in view of the amendments in the Constitution, may be given different
meanings. But, what had been held therein was that an incorporeal right
involved in the said decision was not "goods" for the purpose of
imposition of Sales Tax, as Electromagnetic waves being not capable of being
abstracted or consumed in the sense that they are not extinguished by the user
or otherwise, they are not marketable and/or a subscriber to a telephone
service may not have intended to purchase or obtain any right to use
electromagnetic waves. It was held that the transaction by which mobile phone
connection is given, is a service and not a sale of goods. It is, however,
interesting to note the following observations:
"We
cannot anticipate what may be achieved by scientific and technological advances
in future. No one has argued that at present electromagnetic waves are abstractable
or are capable of delivery. It would, therefore, appear that an electromagnetic
wave (or radio frequency as contended by one of the counsel for the
respondents), does not fulfil the parameters applied by the Supreme Court in Tata
Consultancy for determining whether they are goods, right to use of which would
be a sale for the purpose of Article 366(29-A)(d)." The subject matter
involved in the said decision of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. (supra)
primarily was held not to be within the purview of definition of
"goods" as the contract between the telecom service provider and the
subscriber was merely to receive, transmit and deliver messages of the
subscriber through a complex system of fibre optics, satellite and cables.
This
Court, it may be noticed, in a recent Constitution Bench judgment in M/s.
Sunrise Associates vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
(pronounced
on 28th April, 2006), has opined that the sale of
lottery ticket or a railway ticket may not be a sale of goods.
In Tata
Consultancy Services vs. State of A.P.
[(2005) 1 SCC 308], a CD containing software was held to be goods within the
meaning of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957.
Devi Das
Gopal Krishnan & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Anr. [(1967) 3 SCR 557] and
CIT, A.P. vs. Motor & General Stores (P) Ltd. [(1967) 3 SCR 876 : AIR 1968
SC 200] were relied upon by Mr. Dave for the proposition that the expression
"valuable consideration" takes colour from the preceding expression
"cash or deferred payment". The said decision is not an authority for
the proposition that cash or deferred payment cannot be by way of adjustment.
If the parties intended to adjust their own dues, having regard to different
transactions in terms whereof both the parties to the said transaction were
required to pay in cash or by way of deferred payment, the same would not
militate against the interpretation of the expression "valuable
consideration", although, the term "valuable consideration" in
the changed context (in view of the Constitution amendment) may be viewed
differently. But, having regard to the fact situation obtaining in this case,
we may not have to go into the said question.
Molasses
manufactured in the sugar mills, was the property of the appellant and it
answers the description of "goods". In view of the terms and
conditions of the Deed of Licence, the appellant was the owner thereof.
The
Company was to use the molasses for the purpose of manufacture of sugar in its
factory. Transfer of such molasses by the appellant to the Company, would not
be a transfer by way of transfer of stock. It is transfer of the ownership in
goods wherefor the Company was to pay the price to the appellant. The
transaction, therefore, beyond any doubt, answers the description of
"sale" within the meaning of the provisions of the U.P. Trade Tax
Act, 1948. For each supply of molasses the appellant would be entitled to the
price thereof. The amount towards the price of the goods could be paid either
by way of cash or deferred payment. Instead of cash, the price of molasses was
to be adjusted from the amount payable by the appellant to the owner by way of
consideration for use of the mill. Such a mutual arrangement is merely one for
the purpose of adjusting the accounts. The transactions between the parties are
in effect and substance involve passing of monetary consideration. It would,
thus, come within the purview of the expression "any other valuable
consideration", which expression would take colour from deferred payment
being a monetary payment, but does not loose its character of some other
monetary payment by way of mutual arrangement. The parties are not bartering or
exchanging any goods so that the element of monetary consideration is absent.
Money is a legal tender.
Cash
is, however, narrower than money. The words "deferred payment" and
"other valuable consideration" enlarge the ambit of consideration
beyond cash only. Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution of India provides for "sale of goods". Once a sale of
goods takes place, the State becomes entitled to impose tax on sale or purchase
of goods. For construction of the words "sale of goods", now the
Court is not necessarily required to fall upon the definition of sale of goods,
as contained in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. It has to be governed by its
enlarged definition under Clause (29-A) to Article 366 of the Constitution of
India. Once an essential component of sale takes place, Sales tax would,
indisputably, be payable.
By
reason of such an arrangement by the parties, the State is not creating a new
taxable event nor imposing a new tax which was unknown in law.
In
fact, the transaction entered into by the parties even does not provide for any
camouflage to evade tax. They are clear and unambiguous.
We,
therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court cannot be said to have
committed any error in passing the impugned judgment.
In
regard to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties that as no
appeal was preferred from the order dated 30.7.1991, wherein the Company was
the appellant, the respondent must be held to have accepted the order, is not
acceptable to us, as, admittedly, the appellant itself is liable to pay the
tax. The contentions of the appellant that having regard to the transaction
entered into by and between the parties and no sale having taken place, they
are not liable to pay any tax, will not be correct. Non-filing of the appeal
against the said order dated 30.7.1991, would not take away the effect of order
of assessment passed as against the appellant by the Assessing Authority.
Therefore, for the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in the
contentions of the appellant. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.
No
costs.
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