of Haryana & Ors Vs. M/S Agm Management
Services Ltd  Insc 351 (15 June 2006)
Pasayat & Altamas Kabir
out of SLP(C) No. 9913 of 2006) ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
State of Haryana, Deputy Commissioner-cum-
Collector, Faridabad and the Sub-Registrar, Faridabad call in question legality of the
judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by which Civil Writ Petition No.167
of 2006 filed by the respondnt was disposed of.
High Court disposed of the Writ Petition with the following direction :
only prayer of the petitioner at this stage is that the present matter be
disposed of by the respondents by keeping in mind the order of this Court
appended as Annexure P-7 with application. We accordingly issue a direction to
the respondents that necessary exercise be completed within a period of four
months from the date that a certified copy of this order is supplied to
them." Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the High Court without
indicating as to how the order of the High Court in an earlier case in Ramesh Chand
and Ors. v. The Registrar- cum-Deputy Commissioner, Jind & Ors. i.e C.W.P.
No.14360 of 2005 had any relevance so far as the dispute raised by the
respondent No.1 before it. According to him the judgment in CWP No. 14360 of
2005 related to refusal to register the sale deed on two grounds. The present
case, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, does not relate to a
refusal to register the sale deed. By the impugned letter dated 21.12.2005, the
respondent was required to obtain "No objection certificate" from the
office of the District and Town Planner, Faridabad. The High Court, therefore, was not justified in giving the directions
as noted above.
response, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that though the letter
dated 21.12.2005 appears to be innocuous, in a sense that relates to refusal of
is made to Section 7(A) of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban
Areas Act, 1975 (in short the 'Act') to substantiate the stand.
find that the High Court has not even indicated as to the applicability of the
decision in Ramesh Chand's case (supra) to the facts of the present case.
Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the
factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed.
of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of
their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they
appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as
statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may
become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the
discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes,
they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words
are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v.
Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of
Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the
rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the
great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most
distinguished judge." In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER
294) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech.....is not to be treated as if
it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new
circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must
not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were
an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972
(2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said:
is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they
are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial
utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world
of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly
placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have
become locus classicus:
case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and
another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the
entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to
decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against
the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case
falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." ***
*** *** "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of
justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you
will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path
to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." As noted above,
the High Court has not even discussed as to how the decision in Ramesh Chand's
case (supra) had any similarity to the facts of the present case.
aforesaid background we set aside the order of the High Court and remit the
matter for a fresh hearing in accordance with law. We make it clear we have not
expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.
counsel for the respondent submitted that similar cases are pending in the High
Court awaiting decision in this case. Therefore, it would be proper that the
writ petition is disposed of finally.
in view the aforesaid submission, we request the High Court to dispose of the
writ petition as early as possible.
appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.