Umed
Singh Vs. Arya Samaj Sewa Sadan [2006] Insc 366 (4 July 2006)
Dr.Ar.
Lakshmanan & Altamas Kabir
WITH CIVIL
APPEALS NOs. 6496 & 6497 OF 2005 ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
The
appellant, Umed Singh, was inducted as a tenant of the suit premises by one Sewa
Ram at a monthly rent of Rs.100/- for residential purposes. One Mohan Lal was
also a tenant of a portion of the building. The said Sewa Ram executed a Will
in favour of the respondent-society, Arya Samaj Sewa Sadan, on 15th March, 1984. Soon thereafter, on 5th June, 1984, Sewa Ram died.
On
25th March, 1994, the respondent filed ejectment suit against the appellant
herein under Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent)
& Eviction Act, 1973 (hereafter referred to as 'the Act') for non-payment of
rent from 1st December, 1989 to 31st March, 1994 and also on the ground of bona
fide requirement for starting a library in the suit premises. It may be
indicated that the respondent-society also filed a suit against the other
tenant, Mohan Lal, but the same was dismissed by the Rent Controller on the
ground that running of a library could not be equated with the expression
"use or occupation by the landlord for purposes of residence".
An
appeal preferred by the society against Mohan Lal was allowed and the judgment
of the trial court was set aside.
Ultimately,
however, the High Court set aside the judgment of the Appellate Authority and
restored the decision of the Rent Controller.
In the
meantime, by its judgment and order dated 31st January, 2000, the Rent Controller decreed the
eviction petition filed by the society against Umed Singh on the ground of bona
fide requirement and an appeal preferred therefrom by Umed Singh was dismissed
by the appellate authority on 24th August, 2000.
Umed Singh filed a Revision Petition before the High Court on 7th November, 2000 against the said judgment of the
appellate authority dated 24th August, 2000.
The said Revision Petition was dismissed by the High Court on 22nd November, 2000. Subsequently, having regard to the
decision of the High Court in the case of Mohan Lal, the other tenant, whereby
the society's eviction petition had been dismissed, Umed Singh filed a Review
Petition before the High Court on 21st December, 2000 relying on the decision in Mohan Lal's
case. In view of the High Court's decision in Mohan Lal's case, the order dated
22nd November, 2000 dismissing Umed Singh's Revision Petition was recalled and
upon further consideration of the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the
Act and its different interpretations by two Division Benches of the expression
"for his own use and occupation" as used in the said section, the
learned Judge referred the matter to the Chief Justice for the following
question to be examined by a larger Bench, namely, "'Whether his own
occupation' and the 'residential purpose' in relation to a corporate
body/juristic person can be read in wider perspective or in stricto senso of
the dictionary meaning?" The aforesaid reference was placed before the
Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which considered the question
referred to it in great detail in its judgment dated 23rd August, 2002, in the
context of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Act.
While
considering the Reference, the attention of the Full Bench was drawn to the observations
made by the learned Single Judge in Mohan Lal's case in C.R.No.1217/2000,
wherein reference was made to a decision of this Court in the case of Attar
Singh vs. Inder Kumar, reported in (1967) 2 SCR 50, which was a decision
rendered under the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Restrictions Act, No.III
of 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1949 Act"). The learned
Single Judge relied on the finding in the said decision that as the respondent-
landlord required the land not for business or trade but only for constructing
a house for himself, he was not entitled to eject the appellant under Section
13 (3) (a) (ii) of the 1949 Act from the rented land. After considering the
decision of this Court in the aforesaid case, the Full Bench made a distinction
between the facts of Attar Singh's case and those of the case before it upon
holding that the expression "his own occupation" had been restricted
by virtue of the restraints provided in Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the 1949
Act. Upon considering the submissions made, the Full Bench held that all
buildings which were not "non-residential buildings" would be
"residential buildings".
Furthermore,
the expression "business or trade" are so intertwined that they are
complementary to each other and it is imperative to be seen in each case as to
whether activities which are to be carried out in the building are attended
with business and/or trade or not. If such element is missing in the activity
which is to be carried on or is to be carried out in the building, such
buildings would not be defined as "non- residential building".
Upon
holding as aforesaid, the Full Bench answered the question referred to it, as
extracted hereinabove, in the following manner:- "Any activity, whether it
is to be carried out or is being carried on in a building by a juristic person
or an individual but is not tainted with business or trade and is essentially
not connected with profit and loss, such activity would not render the usage of
the building as "non residential building". Unless the user has been
defined under a statute to be commercial dehors of element of profit and loss,
such building shall be termed as "non- residential building". Thus,
in each case it shall have to be examined whether the element of business or
trade has crept in with the necessary element of profit and loss and as a
sequel thereto, the purpose and object of occupation by the landlord shall
stand defined accordingly." In view of the above, the interpretation of
Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Act in Mohan Lal's case was overruled.
Subsequently, the Review Petition which was pending was also dismissed by
virtue of the decision rendered in the Reference.
These
three appeals which were filed by the tenant, Umed Singh against the initial
judgment of the High Court in the Civil Revision filed by the tenant and the
judgment rendered by the Full Bench and the subsequent dismissal of the Review
Petition, have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common
judgment.
On
behalf of the appellant, it was sought to be argued that the decision of the
Full Bench was erroneous, inasmuch as Section 13 (3) (a) of the Act referred to
residential buildings and clause (i) thereof could only be interpreted in
respect of such residential building. It was urged that running a library could
by no stretch of imagination be said to be for residential purposes and the
expression "own occupation" could only be in relation to use and
occupation for residential purpose. It was submitted that the Full Bench of the
High Court had failed to consider the fact that the aforesaid provisions would
have to be interpreted in the context of residential use and not for any other
purpose. It was urged that the view taken by the Full Bench was erroneous and
was liable to be set aside and both the Civil Revision Application and the
Review Petition filed by the appellant before the High Court were liable to be
allowed.
Such
submissions were vehemently opposed on behalf of the respondent-society and it
was submitted that all non- residential purposes need not be connected with
commercial activity as had been provided for in clause (ii) of Section 13 (3)
(a) which contemplates a form of commercial activity but has also been included
in the expression "own occupation" in case of a "residential building".
Reference
was made to the decision of this Court in Atul Castings Ltd. vs. Bawa Gurvachan
Singh, 2001 (5) SCC 133, wherein it was observed that when a premises had been
leased for residence only, and there was no specific clause in the agreement that
not even one room could be used as a study room for the members of the family
for doing office work at home, such activity could still be undertaken in the
leased premises, particularly in the days of computer, internet and other like
facilities which are kept at home for convenience and use.
Since
we have been called upon to consider the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (i)
and (ii) of the Act in the background of the decision rendered by the Full
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the same is reproduced hereinbelow
for the sake of reference:-
-
"Eviction
of tenants.
-
A landlord may
apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord
in possession
-
in the case of a
residential building, if,--
-
he requires it
for his own occupation, is not occupying another residential building in the
urban area concerned and has not vacated such building without sufficient cause
after the commencement of the 1949 Act in the said urban area:
-
he requires it
for use as an office or consulting room by his son who intends to start
practice as a lawyer, qualified architect or chartered accountant or as a
"registered practitioner" within the meaning of that expression used
in the Punjab Medical Registration Act, 1916, the Punjab Ayurvedic and Unani
Practitioners Act, 1963, or the Punjab Homoeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965, or
for the residence of his son who is married:
Provided
that such son is not occupying in the urban area concerned any other building
for use as office; consulting room or residence, as the case may be, and has
not vacated it without sufficient cause after the commencement of the 1949
Act." There is no ambiguity that the provisions referred to are to be
considered in the case of a residential building. In other words, we will have
to consider whether Sub-clause (i) makes it obligatory on the part of the
landlord to use the premises purely for residential purposes only or whether
the expression "own occupation" also connotes use of the premises for
non- commercial purposes, i.e. for purposes unconnected with business or trade.
The
respondent-society intends to use the premises in question for running a public
library without any profit which would bring the same within the ambit of
non-commercial use. The Full Bench of the High Court was, therefore, fully
justified in arriving at the conclusion that the suit premises would be covered
by the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the aforesaid Act. The
respondent being a society, cannot have any residential requirement in respect
of a premises and its activities will have to determine the nature of its use
of a premises. A juristic person cannot have need of residence but may use a
premises for non-commercial purposes. Since the society intends to use the
premises for itself for a non- commercial purpose, unconnected with any
business or trade, it must, in our view, come within the ambit of Section 13
(3) (a) (i) of the Act and more particularly so having regard to Clause (ii)
which contemplates use of the residential premises even for purposes such as a
consulting room for a lawyer or other professionals.
We,
therefore, see no reason to interfere with the reasoning of the Full Bench
while considering the provisions of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Act and, in
our view, the appeals before us are devoid of merit and are accordingly
dismissed.
There
will be no order as to costs.
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