Chairman-Cum-M.D.,
T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. & Ors Vs. K. Meerabai [2006] Insc 34 (23 January 2006)
H.K.
Sema & Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan, J.
The
present appeal was preferred against the final judgment and order dated
19.04.2004 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras passed in Writ Appeal No. 2592 of
2001 dismissing the same.
Factual
Background:
The
factual background, filtering out unnecessary details, is as follows:- The
Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited (in short the "Corporation")
is constituted to fulfil its chief objective of distributing essential
commodities among the weaker sections of the population of the State of Tamil Nadu
and has opened a number of godowns throughout the State to achieve the said
objective.
The respondent-herein
- K. Meerabai was appointed as a Bill Clerk on 30.11.1974 in the service of the
Corporation and was promoted to the post of Junior Assistant on 31.12.1980. The
respondent was posted as Junior Assistant in the Godown situated at Mint Street,
Chennai on 05.01.1981 which post she held till 28.01.1983 when she was
suspended vide order dated 28.01.1983 pending initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against her and the other members of the Mint Godown staff in
respect of mis-appropriation of the Corporation's stock and money in the sum of
Rs.9,86,980.56 committed by her in collusion with the other members of the
staff through fraudulent practices such as deliberate omission to bring into
account the stocks received by them, showing bogus issues in the records,
falsification of accounts, submission of defective accounts, tampering of
records, manipulation of accounts and records etc.
In
1983, a criminal complaint was filed by the Senior Regional Manager of the
Corporation in the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai
against the respondent herein and other members of the staff of the Mint Godown
for offences under Sections 409 and 477A I.P.C. The said case was registered as
crime case No. 14 of 1983 in calendar case No. 5964 to 5967 of 1983.
Vide
charge memo dated 16.02.1984, the Disciplinary authority levelled against the
respondent herein as well as against four other members of the Staff of the
Mint Godown, the following charges:- CHARGES:
-
That as staff of
the Mint (Godown) has failed to maintain the prescribed records for the issue
of stocks from the Godown and neglected his primary duty.
-
That he/she
neglected his/her primary duty as the staff of the Mint Godown and issued the
stocks from the Godown in a highly irresponsible and objectionable manner to
the ADS, Mint without insisting for the proper acknowledgement from persons
responsible and thus indulged in the fraudulent practices and swindled the
corporation money in connivance with the ADS staff.
-
That he/she failed
to safeguard the Corporation stock and property and acted in an irresponsible
manner by having direct collusion with the ADS Mint staff and swallowed the
Corporation accounts and money for their personal benefits.
-
That he/she
proved himself to be an irresponsible, unreliable and untrustworthy employee of
the Corporation.
Meanwhile,
on 17.02.1984, the respondent had moved the High Court by filing writ petition
No. 1337 of 1984 to quash the order of suspension dated 28.01.1983. She also
moved W.M.P. No. 2084 of 1984 praying for stay of the operation of the order of
suspension. By order dated 17.02.1984, the learned single Judge of the High
Court restored the service of the respondent herein with payment of full salary
subject to deduction of the subsistence allowance already paid to her.
Meanwhile,
Departmental Enquiry was instituted against the respondent herein in respect of
the aforementioned four charges. After a full-fledged enquiry in which the
respondent fully participated, the Enquiry Officer, vide his Enquiry Report
dated 11.06.1991, recorded his conclusions based on the evidence on record
holding
-
that charge No.1
is not proved;
-
that charge No.2
is partly proved;
-
that charge No.3
is not proved and
-
that charge No.4
is partly proved. On 14.06.1991, the Disciplinary Authority issued a show-cause
notice to the respondent as well as to other 11 charged officers. They were
called upon to submit their explanations as to the findings contained in the
Enquiry Report which was also enclosed with the show-cause notice.
The
Disciplinary Authority, vide his order dated 28.11.1991, dismissed the
respondent herein from service with immediate effect without prejudice to the
recovery proceedings to be initiated against her, while further directing that
the period of suspension with effect from 01.02.1983 till the date of the order
of dismissal would be treated as a period of suspension. On 11.12.1991, the
High Court disposed of the writ petition No. 1337 of 1984 and quashed the order
of suspension. Being aggrieved by the order of dismissal dated 28.11.1991, the
respondent preferred a Departmental Appeal to the Joint Managing Director, the
Appellate Authority. Vide common show-cause notice dated 27.01.1992, the
Disciplinary Authority intimated the official proposal to recover the loss
suffered by the Corporation on account of the malpractices of the charged
officers proportionately at 5% of the total value of the loss with interest,
while calling upon the charged officers including the respondent herein to show-cause
within 15 days from the receipt of the notice why the said amount should not be
recovered from the charged officers. Meanwhile, the respondent moved the High
Court by preferring writ petition No.15554 of 1992 praying for the issuance of
a Writ of Mandamus, directing the second appellant herein to pay to the
respondent-writ petitioner salary and other benefits due to her for the period
from 01.01.1983 (date of suspension) to 28.11.1991 (date of dismissal). Vide
order dated 13.11.1992, the High Court disposed of the writ petition by
directing the Corporation to consider the representation of the respondent
dated 22.01.1992 on merits and pass orders according to law thereon within a
period of 3 months from that date. In compliance with the directions contained
in the High Court's order disposing of the respondent's writ petition No. 1337
of 1984, the Disciplinary Authority ordered that the period of suspension of
the respondent with effect from 01.02.1983 till 28.11.1991 be treated as the
period of duty, while further ordering payment to the respondent of the arrears
of salary etc. after adjustment of the subsistence allowance already paid to
her during the period of her suspension. Vide order dated 21.09.1993, the
Disciplinary Authority passed an order directing recovery from the respondent
the proportionate amount of the principal loss in the sum of Rs.34,436.85
without any interest, while categorically holding that the respondent's
responsibility in receipt of mis-appropriation could not at all be brushed aside
and that her explanation was found not acceptable. On 05.10.1993, the
respondent again moved the High Court by preferring writ petition No. 18502 of
1993 praying for quashing the order of dismissal dated 28.11.1991. The
Appellate Aauthority, vide his order dated 16.06.1994, dismissed the
respondent's appeal after exhaustively dealing with her submissions in the
light of the documentary evidence on record. Being aggrieved by the Appellate
Order, dismissing her Departmental Appeal, the respondent moved the High Court
by preferring writ petition No.14652 of 1994 challenging the correctness of the
aforementioned order. In the meanwhile, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Egmore,
Chennai acquitted the respondent herein of the charges under Sections 409 and
477A I.P.C. on 27.09.2000. Both the writ petitions filed by the respondent
herein (writ petition No. 18502 of 1993 challenging the order of dismissal and
writ petition No. 14652 of 1994 challenging the Appellate Authority's Order
dismissing her Departmental Appeal) came up before the learned single Judge of
the High Court. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition No. 18502 of
1993 and quashed the order of dismissal dated 28.11.1991 directing her
reinstatement with all consequential benefits, while also allowing the writ
petition No. 14652 of 1994 quashing the Appellate Authority's Order dismissing
the respondent's Departmental Appeal. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment
of the learned single Judge, the appellant preferred writ appeal No. 2592 of 2001
on 07.06.2001 challenging the same insofar as it related to writ petition No.
18502 of 1993. Vide order dated 25.01.2002, the Division Bench granted interim
stay of the operation of the order of reinstatement dated 27.04.2001 of the
learned single Judge.
By
order dated 19.04.2004, the Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal No. 2592
of 2001 upholding the judgment and order dated 27.04.2001 of the learned single
Judge.
Being
aggrieved, the appellant preferred the above civil appeal arising out of special
leave petition No. 16214 of 2004. This Court granted leave on 17.01.2005 and
ordered payment of monthly salary at the rate of last pay drawn by the
respondent at the time of her suspension and that the payment shall be made
from 01.02.2005. We heard Mr. Ambrish Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants
and Mr. V.J. Francis, learned counsel for the respondent. Lenghty arguments
were advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and elaborate submissions
were made by way of reply by Mr. V.J. Francis, learned counsel for the
respondent.
Mr. Ambrish
Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants, made elaborate submissions
questioning the correctness of the judgment of the High Court and took us
through the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer, order of the
Disciplinary Authority, order of the Appellate Authority and of the High Court
and submitted that the orders passed by the High Court is ex facie illegal and
that both the learned single Judge and Judges of the Division Bench were of the
erroneous impression that both the criminal proceedings and the departmental
enquiry were based upon identical set of facts and that both the Disciplinary
Authority while passing the order of dismissal and the Appellate Authority
while dismissing the respondent's departmental appeal assigned no reasons
whatsoever in support of their conclusion. He relied on Lalit Popli vs. Canara
Bank and Others 2003 (3) SCC 583, Ajit Kumar Nag vs. General Manager (PJ),
Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia and Others, 2005(7) SCC 764, B.C. Chaturvedi vs.
Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749.
According
to Mr. V.J. Francis, learned counsel for the respondent, the enquiry officer
found charge Nos. 2 & 4 have been partly proved against the respondent
without giving proper reasons and supported by evidence and, therefore, the
enquiry report cannot be relied upon. He cited Anil Kumar vs. Presiding Officer
and Others, 1985 (3) SCC 378. It was further contended that the disciplinary
authority has passed the dismissal order without giving a hearing to the
delinquent employee/respondent and without specifically disagreeing with the
enquiry report. Before the dismissal order, the disciplinary authority has not
properly considered the explanation given by the employee/respondent or without
hearing the employee-respondent. He relied on It was further submitted that the
appellate authority has also not given any hearing to the employee/respondent
and confirmed the order of dismissal without application of mind, but by
reproducing the order of the disciplinary authority. Messrs. Mahabir Prasad Santosh
Kumar vs. State of U.P. and Ors.,1970 (1) SCC 764 was
relied on for this point.
It was
further submitted that the case of the respondent/employee was that she issued
the maida from the stock in the godown after getting permission from the
Assistant Manager concerned and there was contemporaneous accounting of the
same in the sales register and in the stock register of the Amudham
departmental store and, therefore, she cannot be held responsible for the loss
whatsoever.
It was
further contended that actually 12 employees were involved in this case and
admittedly some of the employees who were also placed under suspension along
with the respondent were reinstated. No specific reasons have been given by the
appellant-Corporation why she was discriminated.
The
loss alleged to have caused, initially was Rs.9,86,980.56 but later on the
actual value of the loss assessed was Rs.6,88,737.12 and it was proposed to
recover from the respondent Rs.34,436.85 being 5% of the total loss.
The
respondent employee has been in service from 30.11.1974 to 28.01.1983 and
during this time this is the only known allegation against the respondent
employee and there was no such allegation earlier. Therefore, he requested this
Court to mould the prayer and grant appropriate relief.
It was
submitted that the case being case of procedural irregularity which cannot be
termed as negligence and 11 other employees were also involved and some of them
having been reinstated, the punishment given to the respondent is excessive.
Moreover,
criminal proceedings were also initiated against the respondent and that ended
in acquittal, on merits, and that became final. Concluding his arguments, Mr.
Francis submitted both the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench
of the High Court were, therefore, right on the totality of the circumstances,
in taking the view that the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well
as the appellate authority suffers from serious infirmity and, therefore, the impugned
judgment does not call for any interference by this Court and that, therefore,
the respondent is fit to be reinstated with consequential benefits.
Both
the learned counsel invited our attention to the relevant pleadings, annexures
filed along with the appeal and also of the rulings of this Court. The
following questions of law arise for consideration and adjudication by this
Court:-
-
Whether the High
Court has gravely erred in law in holding that the acquittal of the respondent
herein by the Court of C.J.M., Chennai ought to have been taken into
consideration by the disciplinary authority, while dismissing the respondent
from service vide order dated 28.11.1991;
-
Whether the High
Court has not gravely erred in law by ignoring to appreciate that the punishment
of dismissal of the respondent from service was the most appropriate punishment
in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, based on independent
appreciation of evidence on record as well as the categorical findings recorded
by the enquiry officer in perfect accordance with the requirements of the rules
applicable to the disciplinary proceedings in the appellant-Corporation;
-
Whether the High
Court has not gravely erred in law vitiating thereby the ends of justice by
erroneously interfering with the punishment as awarded by the disciplinary
authority and later confirmed by the appellate authority in the teeth of a
plethora of judicial pronouncements of this Court defining and delimiting the
scope of interference by the High Court with the punishment awarded to a guilty
employee by disciplinary authority;
-
Whether the High
Court has gravely erred in interfering with the punishment awarded to the
respondent who was found in the departmental enquiry guilty of misappropriation
and other heinous malpractices causing thereby enormous loss in stock and cash
to the Corporation, an institution primarily concerned with distribution of the
essential commodities among the weaker sections of the population of the State
of Tamil Nadu.
We
have perused the common judgment of the learned single Judge and also of the
Division Bench. What seems to have weighed predominantly with the learned
single Judge was
-
acquittal of the
respondent by the Court of C.J.M. Chennai;
-
an erroneous
impression that both the criminal proceedings and the departmental enquiry were
based upon identical set of facts;
-
an erroneous
impression that both the disciplinary authority, while passing the order of
dismissal and the appellate authority, while dismissing the respondent's departmental
appeal assigned no reasons whatsoever in support of their conclusions.
We are
unable to countenance the view and impression taken by the learned single
Judge. In our view, the single Judge has mis-directed herself in reaching the
erroneous conclusion that both the criminal case in the Court of C.J.M. and the
departmental enquiry were based on identical facts and charges.
She
has lost sight of the fact that the criminal case instituted against the
respondent in the Court of C.J.M. was in respect of the offences under Section
409 IPC (Criminal breach of trust) and falsification of accounts punishable
under Section 477A IPC whereas the respondent herein was charged in the
departmental enquiry for her failure to maintain prescribed records for issue of
a stock and for swindling the Corporation in collusion with the other members
of the staff through mis-appropriation of stock and cash of the Corporation
thereby causing huge loss to the Corporation to the tune of more than Rs. 9.00 lacs.
Similarly,
the learned single Judge was patently misconceived in reaching the conclusion
that the acquittal of the respondent by the Court of C.J.M. clinched issue
before the departmental enquiry, while losing sight of the well settled law
that the scope of criminal proceedings in the Court of criminal law and the
scope of disciplinary proceedings in a departmental enquiry are quite distinct
and exclusive and independent.
The
learned single Judge has also failed to appreciate that the standard of proof
required in the criminal proceedings and the departmental disciplinary actions
are not the same.
We
have perused the order of dismissal dated 28.11.1991 passed by the disciplinary
authority and the order of the appellate authority dated 16.06.1994 upholding
the order of dismissal with dispassionate judicial mind. In our opinion, both
the orders aforementioned are exhaustive in details, impeccable on facts and
armed with irrefutable reasons in support of the conclusions.
The
learned Judges of the Division Bench who dismissed the writ appeal filed by the
Corporation upheld the patently erroneous judgment of the learned single Judge
virtually on all those grounds and reasons which had appealed to the learned
single Judge. While passing the impugned judgment, the learned Judges have lost
sight of the following:-
-
The scope of the
Criminal Proceedings in a Criminal Code and the scope of disciplinary
proceedings in a departmental enquiry are quite distinct, exclusive and
independent of each other;
-
The Criminal
Proceedings in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and Disciplinary
Proceedings were on totally different sets of facts and charges;
-
The order of
dismissal dated 28.11.1991 (Annexure P-5) passed by the Disciplinary Authority
and the order dated 16.6.1994 of the Appellate Authority, dismissing the
respondent's Departmental Appeal are exhaustive orders, incorporating the
statement of the correct and relevant facts of the case and impeccable
conclusions based on dispassionate appreciation of the evidence on record and supported
by legally irrefutable reasons.
In our
opinion, both the learned single Judge and the learned appellate Judges of the
High Court failed to consider and appreciate dispassionately and judicially the
Corporation's most emphatically pronounced plea that it would be virtually
impossible for them to reinstate the respondent who was found in the
departmental enquiry guilty of mis-appropriation and other malpractices causing
thereby enormous loss in stock and cash to the Corporation, an institution
primarily concerned with the distribution of essential commodities among the
weaker sections of the population of the State of Tamil Nadu whose dismissal
from service has been upheld by the appellate authority vide its very detailed,
well-considered and well-reasoned verdict and in whose integrity, honesty and
trustworthiness the Corporation have lost their faith completely and
absolutely.
We
shall now advert to the rulings cited by Mr. Ambrish Kumar, learned counsel for
the appellants, in support of his submission:-
-
Lalit Popli vs. Canara
Bank and Others, (2003) 3 SCC 583 While considering the nature of proof
required in a departmental enquiry on the scope of judicial review of the High
Court under Article 226, this Court held as follows:- "It is fairly well
settled that the approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the
disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different. In the
disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is
guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him, whereas in criminal
proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are
established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. The
standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and
trial are conceptually different. (State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 417). In case of disciplinary
enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of
"proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance of
probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at the
conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct.
While
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court
does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by
limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading
to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial
review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an Appellate
Authority.
In B.
C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. (1995 (6) SCC 749) the scope of judicial review
was indicated by stating that review by the Court is of decision making process
and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some
evidence, the Court or the Tribunal cannot re-appreciate the evidence and
substitute its own finding.
As
observed in R. S. Saini v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1999 (8) SCC 90) in paragraphs 16 and 17 the scope of interference
is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed
limits." 2) In B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, it
was observed at page 762 para 18 as under:
"
A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary
authority, and on appeal the Appellate Authority, being fact-finding
authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to
maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose
appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the
misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial
review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose
some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or
the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it
would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to
shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 3) In Ajit
Kumar Nag vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia and Others,
(2005) 7 SCC 764 (Three Judges Bench). Thakker, J. speaking for the Bench held
as under:
"11.
As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our
opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action
if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well
settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from
exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force.
The
two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They
operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object
of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the
purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally
and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules.
In a
criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain
circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence.
Such
strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental
proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is
different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of
delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two
proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the
prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the
accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be convicted by a Court
of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on
the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of
"preponderance of probability". Acquittal of the appellant by a
Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the
liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are,
therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was
acquitted by a criminal Court, the impugned order dismissing him from service
deserves to be quashed and set aside." We shall now advert to the rulings
cited by Mr. V.J. Francis, learned counsel for the respondent, in support of
his submission:-
-
Messrs. Mahabir
Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of U.P.
and Ors., 1970 (1) SCC 764 was cited that the executive authority while
exercising quasi judicial functions should give reasons for their conclusion.
-
Anil Kumar vs.
Presiding Officer and Others, (1985) 3 SCC 378 and first judgment was cited by
Mr. Francis for the proposition that in a quasi judicial enquiry, a reasoned
report of the enquiry is essential. The second judgment was cited for the
proposition that disciplinary enquiry against respondents declared to be
vitiated on account of non-observance of the principles of natural justice.
This
contention has no merits. A perusal of the enquiry officer's report in which
the respondent has fully participated and the order of the disciplinary
authority and of the appellate authority would go to show that the order passed
by them are very detailed, well-considered and well-reasoned verdict. The
conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority
are exhaustive in nature incorporating the correct and relevant facts of the
case and conclusion based on the appreciation of the evidence on record and
supported by legally irrefutable reasons.
-
State of
Karnataka vs. Amajappa and Others (2003) 9 SCC 468 The other contentions made
by Mr. Francis are in respect of procedural irregularity which, according to
him, cannot be termed to be negligence on the part of the respondent. We have
already held both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority has
given ample reasons for arriving at their conclusions. This Court has held in a
catena of decisions that interference is not permissible unless the orders
passed by the quasi judicial authorities is clearly unreasonable or perverse or
manifestly illegal or grossly unjust.
Mr.
Francis also submitted that a sum of Rs.34,436.85 being 5% of the total loss of
Rs.6,88,735/- is sought to be recovered from the respondent and that the
present departmental proceedings is the only known allegation against the
respondent and there was no such allegation earlier and, therefore, a lenient
view should be taken by this Court and relief prayed for by both the parties
can be suitably moulded by this Court. We are unable to agree with the above
submission which, in our opinion, has no force. The scope of judicial review is
very limited. Sympathy or generosity as a factor is impermissible. In our view,
loss of confidence as the primary factor and not the amount of money mis-appropriated.
In the instant case, respondent employee is found guilty of mis-appropriating
the Corporation funds. There is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing
confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal.
In such cases, there is no place for generosity or mis-placed sympathy on the
part of the judicial forums and interfering therefor with the quantum of
punishment awarded by the disciplinary and appellate authority.
The
other contention taken by Mr. Francis that criminal proceedings which were
initiated against the respondent ended in acquittal, on merits, and that became
final. A lenient view must be taken since the charges in both the cases are
identically the same. We have already elaborately discussed about this point
factually and also with reference to the judgments referred to supra and for
the reasons recorded earlier, we reject this contention.
The
order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority was based on
dispassionate and independent examination and appreciation of the entirety of
facts and evidence on record relating to the malpractices and mis-appropriation
indulged in by the respondent in collusion with the other members of the staff
causing thereby huge loss to the Corporation.
The
scope of disciplinary proceedings and the scope of criminal proceedings in a
Court of Criminal law are quite distinct, exclusive and independent of each
other.
The
prosecution proceedings launched against the respondent herein were in respect
of offences punishable under Sections 409 and 477-A I.P.C., whereas the
Departmental Proceedings as initiated against her were in respect of the
charges of misappropriation and other fraudulent practices such as deliberate
omission to bring into accounts the stock received showing bogus issues in the
records, falsification of accounts, submission of defective accounts, tampering
of records, manipulation of accounts and records etc. Thus, the respondent
herein was proceeded against for quite different charges and on different sets
of facts before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, on the one hand, and
before the Departmental Enquiry on the other.
The
orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority
are not only impeccable on facts, tenable on law but also unambiguously
supported by unassailable reasons in support of their conclusions. Thus the unchargeable
acquisition by the learned single Judge and of the learned Judges of the
appellate bench that the order of the disciplinary authority and of the
appellate authority suffer from total non-application of mind is patently
devoid of any substance of truth and law.
It was
submitted that though departmental actions initiated against 11 employees and
some of them were reinstated who were also involved in the same offence and,
therefore, a direction should be issued to the appellant-Corporation to take
the same view insofar as the respondent is concerned. We directed the learned
counsel for the appellant to ascertain the correct position insofar as all the
other 11 employees are concerned. Mr. Ambrish Kumar, learned counsel appearing
for the appellants, on instructions from the Corporation, submitted a
memorandum stating that out of 11 employees, 9 were dismissed from service
including the respondent herein and 2 employees were not charge-sheeted.
In the
instant case, the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and
integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning and, therefore, in our
opinion, the matter should be dealt with firmly with firm hands and not
leniently. In the instant case, the respondent deals with public money and
engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity and,
therefore, highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is must and
unexceptionable. Judged in that background, the conclusion of the learned
single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear
to be proper. We have no hesitation to set aside the same and restore the order
passed by the disciplinary authorities upholding the order of dismissal.
The
Civil Appeal stands allowed. The orders passed by the disciplinary authority
and the appellate authority ordering dismissal is confirmed and the judgment
passed by the learned single Judge in writ petition No. 14652 of 1994 as confirmed
by the appellate Judges in writ appeal No. 19646 of 2001 dated 25.01.2002 are
set aside.
However,
there will be no order as to costs.
During
the pendency of this appeal, this court passed an order on 17.01.2005 directing
the appellant-Corporation to pay to the respondent the monthly salary at the
rate of last pay drawn by the respondent at the time of her suspension and that
the payment shall be made from 01.02.2005. Since the payment has been ordered
by this Court during the pendency of the appeal, we are not inclined to disturb
the said order and, therefore, the monthly salary paid pursuant to the above
order need not be recovered from the respondent.
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